



^r^ ^<5^ c ° ^ *- « -^b 



V 1 B ^ '>> 




<\ ^ , X -^ A 

0^ *^;py^% -^-^ _^^^"^ -■'If^i 






•^ '^ -P 

■P r\ ''■ v; 






^"^^ 







.V 






.4 -7*. - = \0O^ >■ 









•^ '■ ». ^" .,* rP Q-, *• 



'oa'< 





*^ 



y 



















-. 'J' ' ' "**!*. A'- 













-S ' 






^^-^ 



.0^ X 

^ 






"'o^' ,6^ 




Digitized by tine Internet Arciiive 
in 2010 witii funding from 
Tine Library of Congress 



Iittp://www.arcliive.org/details/panamericanismit01lock 



PAN - AMERICANISM 
ITS BEGINNINGS 






:^M^ 



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

NBW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS 
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN & CO., Limited 

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd. 

TORONTO 



PAN AMERICANISM 
ITS BEGINNINGS 



BY 

JOSEPH BYRNE LOCKEY 



SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY, IN THE 
FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 



il3etD gork 

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1920 

All rights reserved 






COPYEIGHT, 1920, 

bt the macmillan company 



Set up and printed. Published, April, 1920 



m \ 



^ 



h^ 



" !N^ature in making ns inhabitants of the 
same continent has in some sort united us in 
the bonds of a common patriotism." 

MaiA to JeFFEESO'N. 



PEEFACE 

The history of Pan-Americanism falls roughly into three 
periods. The first, embracing the years of revolution and of 
the formation of new states, extends to about 1830; the second 
covers the succeeding three or four decades to the close of the 
Civil War; and the third extends from the Civil War to the 
present time. Of these periods the first is characterized by a 
strong tendency toward continental solidarity, the second by the 
opposite tendency toward particularism and distrust, and the 
third by the revival of the earlier tendency toward fraternal 
cooperation. The present study is devoted to the early period, 
the period of beginnings. It was undertaken and carried to 
completion as an academic task at Columbia University, under 
the direction and counsel of Professor John Bassett Moore, to 
whom the writer acknowledges a deep debt of gratitude. He 
is also under great obligations to Dr. Angel Cesar Rivas, who, 
during the course of the preparation of the book and while it 
was in proof, made helpful suggestions and invaluable criti- 
cisms; to Miss S. Elizabeth Davis, who read the proof; and to 
Senor D. Manuel Segundo Sanchez for various favord re- 
ceived. Finally, he takes this method of expressing his thanks 
to the Hispanic Society of America for the use of its valuable 
collection of old newspapers, and to the ]^ew York Public 
Library, whose great assemblage of books and pamphlets re- 
lating to Spanish and Portuguese America, constituted the 
main body of his source material. 

J. B. L. 
George Peabody College, 
I^Tashville, Tennessee. 
April, 1920. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

I Meaning of Pan- Americanism 1 

II Formation op New States 36 

in Failure of Monarchical Plots 82 

IV United States and Hispanic American Independence . 134 

V International Complications . 172 

VI Hispanic America and the Monroe Doctrine .... 223 

Vn Early Projects op Continental Union 263 

Vni The Panama Congress 312 

IX British Influence 355 

X Attitude op the United States 393 

XI Argentina, Brazil, and Chile 434 

Bibliography 468 

Index 487 



PAN- AMERICANISM: 
ITS BEGINNINGS 

CHAPTER I 

MEANING OF PAN-AMEtRICANISM 

It is obviously desirable to know what Pan-Americanism 
means, before an attempt is made to discover its beginnings. 
The term itself is new. It is one of an increasing number of 
similar compounds which have come to be widely used since 
the middle of the last century. Modem tongues are indebted 
to the ancient Greek for the prefix and for models of its use 
with national names. Pan-Hellenes, for example, signified the 
united Greeks; Pan-Ionian was used to describe whatever per- 
tained to all the lonians ; and the Panathenaea was the national 
festival of Athens, held to celebrate the union of Attica under 
Theseus. Of the modem combinations Pan-Slavism and Pan- 
Slavist were the first to gain currency. The movement for the 
union of all the Slavonic peoples in one political organization 
originated in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, and 
somewhat later began to be described as Panslavism. Jowett 
used Panslavismus in 1846 ; ^ and in 1850 Longfellow, in mak- 
ing an entry in his journal, defined the term as " the union 
of all the Slavonic tribes under one head, and that head Eus- 
sia." ^ About 1860 the movement for the political union of 
all the Greeks began to be called Pan-Hellenism. Then fol- 
lowed Pan-Germanism, Pan-Islamism, Pan-Celticism, and so 
on, with an ever increasing number of movements designated 
by similar compounds. 

1 Life and Letters, 1, 156. 

2 S. W. Longfellow, Life of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, II, 176. 

1 



2 PAJ^-AlIEEICAi^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

The term Pan-Americanism was first used in newspaper dis- 
cussions relating to the International American Conference 
held at Washington in 1889-90. The New York Evening Post 
appears to have been the first to employ it.^ To the Post is 
also to be credited the first use of the adjective, Pan-American. 
This term was introduced into the columns of the Post in 
1882,* during the agitation of Mr. Blaine's first proposal for 
a conference of American states at Washington. But it was 
little used until the conference convened in 1889, when, having 
been adopted by other leading dailies, it soon won universal 
acceptance.^ The substantive, Pan-Americanism, did not so 
quickly become current. Indeed, not until the last decade or 
two has it been widely employed. To-day it is encountered 
with ever increasing frequency. It is constantly recurring in 
newspapers and periodicals; and gradually it is also finding a 
place in works on international law and diplomacy. 

The adjective, Pan-American, and the substantive, Pan-Amer- 
icanism, were soon taken up and defined by the dictionaries; 
but the definitions are not satisfactory. The adjective is 
usually defined as including or pertaining to the whole of Amer- 
ica, both North and South; which is inaccurate, as it pertains, 
by common usage, to the independent part of the continent only. 
The definitions of the substantive, though not subject to this 
criticism, are none the less inaccurate. Not only so, but they 
are widely divergent among themselves. 

To become convinced of this requires but a glance at the 
definitions of some of the standard dictionaries. The New In- 

3 March 5, 1888. 

4 June 27. Murray erroneously attributes its first appearance to the 
issue of the Evening Post of September 27, 1889. 

5 The New York Sun used the term September 12, 1889; the London 
Times, September 30, 1889; the London Spectator January 29, 1890; Paul 
Leroy-Beaulieu in an article published in the Journal des Dehats on Octo- 
ber 15, 1889, discussed the conference at length, but did not describe it as 
Pan-American. On December 28, 1889, however, L'Economiste Frangais, 
a weekly of which Leroy-Beaulieu was editor, admitted the word into its 
columns. The term Pan-American appears to have been introduced into 
the other American republics from the United States. 



MEAN^IN^G OF PAll^-AMEKICANISM 3 

ternational defines it as : " The principle or advocacy of a 
political alliance or union of all the states of America " ; The 
New Standard, as " The advocacy of a political union of the 
various states of the Western Hemisphere; also the life of the 
American people as represented in republican forms of govern- 
ment and tending toward such a union " ; Murray as " The 
idea or sentiment of a political alliance or union of all the 
states of North and South America " ; La Orande Encyclopedie 
as a " Political doctrine tending to group all the American 
states in a sort of federation under the hegemony of the United 
States " ; Nouveau Larousse as a " Doctrine according to which 
the people of European origin who have founded states in the 
New World aim to exclude other states from the exercise of 
sovereignty over them " ; and finally, the second supplement of 
the Diccionario Enciclopedico Hispano- Americano as the " As- 
piration or tendency of the peoples of the New World to estab- 
lish among themselves ties of union; to promote good under- 
standing and fraternal harmony between all the states of the 
continent; and to act always in accord vdth a view to prevent- 
ing the dominance or the influence of European powers in 
American territory." 

The bringing of these set definitions into juxtaposition sug- 
gests some important questions. Is Pan- Americanism an ad- 
vocacy, an idea, a sentiment, an aspiration, a tendency, a prin- 
ciple, or a doctrine ? Is it one, or all, or any number of these 
combined? Is it the life of the American people as repre- 
sented in the republican form of government ? Does it aim 
to federate the American republics under the hegemony of the 
United States? If so, exactly vrhat is meant by hegemony? 
Is its only aim the exclusion of European powers from the fur- 
ther acquisition, of territory or from the exercise of sovereignty 
in the New World ? To raise these questions is to disclose the 
necessity of further inquiry. 

That the formulation of a precise definition of Pan-Amer- 
icanism would be attended with great difficulty is evident ; and 



4 PAN^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

little would be gained by attempting it. Our aim, therefore, 
will be rather to describe than to define. With this end in view, 
we shall endeavor to discover in the expressions of American 
statesmen and publicists the material for such a brief and exact 
description as will afford the reader an adequate conception of 
the meaning of the term. The views of James G. Blaine, the 
dominant figure in the Washington Conference which furnished 
the occasion for the adoption of the new name, may be con- 
sidered first. 

In an article on the foreign policy of the Garfield adminis- 
tration, which he published in the Chicago Weehly Magazine 
for September 16, 1882, Blaine set forth the ideas which he 
held at that time on the subject of the international relations 
of the American states. The foreign policy of the Garfield 
administration, he said, had two principal objects in view: 
" First to bring about peace and prevent future wars in North 
and South America; second, to cultivate such friendly com- 
mercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a 
large increase in the export trade of the United States by sup- 
plying those fabrics in which we are abundantly able to com- 
pete with the manufacturing nations of Europe." In order 
to attain the second object it was necessary, Blaine declared, to 
accomplish the first. " Instead of friendly intervention here 
and there — patching up a treaty between two countries to- 
day, securing a truce between two others to-morrow — it was 
apparent . . . that a more comprehensive plan should be 
adopted, if wars were to cease in the Western Hemisphere." 
In short, Pan-Americanism, as Blaine conceived it in 1882, 
was expressed in two words, peace and commerce, attained by 
means of the friendly counsel and cooperation of all the Amer- 
ican states and redounding equally to the benefit of all. 

Seven years later, in his address of welcome to the delegates 
to the International American Conference, he set forth his 
views with greater fullness. He said : 

" The delegates I am addressing can do much to establish 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 5 

permanent relations of confidence, respect, and friendship be- 
tween the nations which they represent. They can show to 
the world an honorable, peaceful conference of eighteen inde- 
pendent American powers, in which all shall meet together on 
tenns of absolute equality; a conference in Which there can be 
no attempt to coerce a single delegate against his own concep- 
tion of the interests of his nation ; a conference which will per- 
mit no secret understanding on any subject, but will frankly 
publish to the world all its conclusions; a conference which 
will tolerate no spirit of conquest but will aim to cultivate an 
American sympathy as broad as both continents, a conference 
which will form no selfish alliance against the older nations 
from which we are proud to claim inheritance — a conference, 
in fine, which will seek nothing, propose nothing, endure noth- 
ing that is not, in the general sense of the delegates, timely and 
wise and peaceful. 

" And yet we cannot be expected to forget that our common 
fate has made us inhabitants of the two continents which, at 
the close of four centuries, are still regarded beyond the seas 
as the New World. Like situations beget like sympathies and 
impose like duties. We meet in firm belief that the nations 
of America ought to be and can be more helpful, each to the 
other, than they now are, and that each will find advantage 
and profit from an enlarged intercourse with the others. 

" We believe that we should be drawn together more closely 
by the highways of the sea, and that at no distant day the rail- 
way systems of the North and South will meet upon the Isthmus 
and connect by land routes the political and commercial cap- 
itals of all America. 

" We believe that hearty cooperation, based on hearty confi- 
dence, will save all American states from the burdens and evils 
which have long and cruelly afilicted the older nations of the 
world. 

" We believe that a spirit of justice, of common and equal 
interest between the American states, will leave no room for an 



6 PAi^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGIl^NINGS 

artificial balance of power like unto that wliicli lias led to wars 
abroad and drenched Europe in blood. 

" We believe that friendship, avowed with candor and main- 
tained with good faith, will remove from American states the 
necessity of guarding boundary lines between themselves with 
fortifications and military force. 

" We believe that standing armies, beyond those which are 
needful for public order and the safety of internal administra- 
tion, should be unknown on both American continents. 

" We believe that friendship and not force, the spirit of just 
law and not violence of the mob, should be the recognized rule 
of administration between American nations and in American 
nations." ^ , 

Permanent relations of confidence, respect, and friendship; 
equality; no coercion; no secret understandings; no conquest; 
no selfish alliance against the older nations from which we are 
sprung; no balance of power; no threatening armies; mutual 
helpfulness; commerce; the spirit of just law as the rule of 
administration between American nations and in American na- 
tions — this was Blaine's later conception of the guiding prin- 
ciples of Pan-Americanism. And with this conception the 
statesmen and publicists of all the American republics have 
been subsequently in substantial agreement. 

President Eoosevelt, in his instructions to the United States 
delegates to the second International American Conference, 
which met at Mexico City in October, 1901, declared among 
other things, that " The chief interest of the United States in 
relation to the other republics upon the American continent is 
the safety and permanence of the political system which under- 
lies their and our existence as nations — the system of self- 
government by the people. It is, therefore, to be desired that 
all the American republics should enjoy in full measure the 
blessings of perfect freedom under just laws, each sovereign 

International American Conference (1889-90), I, 40-42, 



MEANING OF PAN-AMEKICANISM 7 

community pursuing its own course of orderly development 
without external restraint or interference. 

" Nothing/' he added, " is of greater importance from a po- 
litical point of view than that the United States should be 
understood to be the friend of all the Latin-American republics 
and the enemy of none. To this end it will be prudent to pro- 
pose nothing radical, to favor a free expression of views among 
the delegates of the other powers, and to favor and support 
only such measures as have the weight of general acceptance 
and clearly tend to promote the common good." '^ 

When the third International Conference met at Rio de 
Janeiro m 1906, Roosevelt still being President, the United 
States delegates were provided with a copy of the instructions 
of 1901, by which they were to be guided, as a review of those 
instructions indicated no occasion for changing them except 
in some minor details. The delegates, however, were reminded 
by Mr. Root, who was then Secretary of State, that " The true 
function of such a conference is to deal with matters of com- 
mon interest which are not really subjects of controversy, but 
upon which comparison of views and friendly discussions may 
smooth away differences of detail, develop substantial agree- 
ment, and lead to cooperation along common lines for the at- 
tainment of objects which all really desire." And he added 
that the least of the benefits anticipated from the conference 
would be " the establishment of agreeable personal relations, 
the removal of misconceptions and prejudices, and the habit 
of temperate and kindly discussion among the representatives 
of so many republics." ^ 

It was during the summer of 1906 that Mr. Root made his 
celebrated visit to South America. Though not a delegate to 
the conference at Rio, he was present for a few days during 
its progress. On July 31 he made a speech at an extraordinary 

Tint. Am. Oonf. (1902), report of the U. S. delegates, 31, 32. 
sint. Am. Conf. (1906), report of the U. S. delegates, 39, 40. 



8 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGHsTNINGS 

session of the conference, in which he made the following dec- 
laration which has often been quoted : 

" We wish for no victories but those of peace ; for no terri- 
tory except our own ; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty 
over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights 
of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations 
entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and 
deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the 
weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim 
nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not 
freely concede to every American republic. We wish to in- 
crease our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, 
in wisdom, and in spirit, but our conception of the true way 
to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their 
ruin, but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a com- 
mon growth, that we may all become greater and stronger to- 
gether." ^ 

In his message of December Y, 1915, President Wilson, de- 
claring that we had been put to the test in the case of Mexico, 
and that we had stood the test, characterized Pan-Americanis 
as follows: 

" The moral is, that the states of America are not hostile 
rivals but cooperating friends, and that their growing sense of 
community of interest, alike in matters political and in matters 
economic, is likely to give them a new significance as factors 
in international affairs and in the political history of the world. 
It presents them as in a very deep and true sense a unit in !| 
world affairs, spiritual partners, standing together because 
thinking together, quick with common sympathies and common 
ideals. Separated, they are subject to all the cross-currents of 
the confused politics of a world of hostile rivalries ; united in 
spirit and purpose, they cannot be disappointed of their peace- 
ful destiny. This is Pan-Americanism. It has none of the 
spirit of empire in it. It is the embodiment, the effectual em- 

9 Root, Latin America and the United States, Addresses, 10. 



;0;^ 
nf 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 9 

bodiment, of the spirit of law and independence and liberty 
and mutual service." ^" 

Before the second Pan-American Scientific Congress, which 
met at Washington in the latter part of 1915, Mr. Lansing, 
Secretary of State, made an address in which he expressed at 
some length his views on the subject of Pan- Americanism. Ac- 
cording to him, " there has grown up a feeling that the repub- 
lics of this hemisphere constitute a group separate and apart 
from the other nations of the world." . . . This feeling, he said, 
we term " the Pan-American spirit," and from it springs the 
" international policy of Pan- Americanism." Continuing, he 
declared : " If I have correctly interpreted Pan- Americanism 
from the standpoint of the relations of our governments withj 
those beyond the seas, it is in entire harmony with the Monroe j 
Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine is a national policy of the; 
United States; Pan-Americanism is an international policy of, 
the Americas. The motives are to an extent different ; the ends 
sought are the same. Both can exist and, I trust, will ever 
exist in all their vigor. . . . Pan- Americanism is an expression 
of the idea of internationalism. America has become the 
guardian of that idea, which will in the end rule the world. 
Pan-Americanism is the most advanced as well as the most 
practical form of that idea. It has been made possible because 
of our geographical isolation, of our similar political institu- 
tions, and of our common conception of human rights." ^^ 

In a speech delivered before the Pan-American Financial 
Conference, which also met at Washington in 1915, Mr. John 
Bassett Moore declared that the idea of America's being not 
simply a geographical term, but a term representing a com- 
munity of interests, has existed so long that there is a fair 
presumption that it is not a term that misleads us, but a term 
that is thoroughly and persistently leading us in the right di- 
rection. Continuing, he said : " The word ' America,' be- 

10 Scott, President Wilson's Foreign Policy, 129. 

11 World Peace Foundation, Pamphlet Series, VI, 99-101. 



10 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGHsTNmGS 

ginning with the early part of the last century, during the 
struggles of our neighbors for independence, represented the 
idea of a community of political interests, in which, as Henry 
Clay said, we should be regarded as standing together for the 
establishment of a human freedom league; and this idea has 
gradually advanced until to-day we are undertaking to estab- 
lish a community of interests with regard to all our activities. 
. . . Identity of political interests we have had for many years. 
We now proceed to make the circuit complete by establishing 
the identity of our material interests on the broad basis of jus- 
tice, contentment, and good-fellowship." ^^ 

In the introduction to his " Principles of American Di- 
plomacy," Mr. Moore makes the following important statement : 

" The idea of Pan- Americanism is obviously derived from the 
conception that there is such a thing as an American system; 
that this system is based upon distinctive interests which the 
American countries have in common ; and that it is independent 
of and different from the European system. To the extent to 
which Europe should become implicated in American politics, 
or to which American countries should become implicated in 
European politics, this distinction would necessarily be broken 
down, and the foundations of the American system would be 
impaired; and to the extent to which the foundations of the 
American system were impaired, Pan-Americanism would lose 
its vitality and the Monroe Doctrine its accustomed and tangible 
meaning." ^^ 

The views of representative men of the other republics of 
the continent must now be considered ; for Pan- Americanism is 
not what only one of the American family of nations may con- 
ceive it to be. It is what the common opinion and the common 
action of all the states concerned make it. 

The government of Peru, in replying to the invitation of the 
United States to take part in the first International American 

12 Proceedings of the First Pan-American Financial Congress, 481. 

13 Moore, John Bassett, Principles of American Diplomacy, X. 



MEAN^ING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 11 

Conference at Washington, declared that the idea of increasing 
and strengthening the bonds which connect the American na- 
tions with each other, and in this way improving for the com- 
mon good the opportunities afforded by their geographical po- 
sition, and affording the union which nature itself created 
when it filled this continent with a galaxy of free, independent, 
vigorous, and youthful nations, was necessarily hailed by the 
government of Peru with feelings of sympathy and good will.^* 
In the addresses made by the Hispanic- American delegates in 
the conference there also occur many expressions of a similar 
nature. It was not until some time later, however, that any- 
thing approximating a definition of Pan- Americanism was set 
forth by leading men of the Latin republics. 

In a report which the Argentine delegation made to the sec- 
ond International American Conference, it was declared: 

" In order that Pan- Americanism be not ... a mere thesis 
under discussion, and that the recommendations and the pro- 
fessions of principles may not remain idle words, it is necessary 
to descend from abstract heights, to conform ourself to the 
spirit of modern times, and to map out the great lines of a 
positive policy, inspired in justice, in equality, in territorial 
integrity, and in commercial relations, founded upon a compe- 
tition open to all." ^^ 

A few months before the meeting of the third International 
American Conference at Eio de Janeiro, in 1906, a special ses- 
sion of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 
was held at Philadelphia in honor of Senor don Joaquin D. 
Casasus, Mexican ambassador at Washington. The subject for 
discussion was the Pan-American conferences and their signifi- 
cance. Speaking of the tendency of nations, as time elapses, to 
meet more frequently in conferences and congresses for the pur- 
pose of avoiding conflicts, dissipating prejudices, reestablishing 

14 /n*. Am. Conf. (1889-90), I, 22. 

1)5 Informe que la Delegacidn Argentina Presenta a la Segunda Con- 
ferencia Pan-Americana, 3. 



12 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

peace, and for other similar purposes, Senor Casasus declared 
that the labors of the Pan- American Conferences were for con- 
cord and peace; that they did not seek, like the Congress of 
Laibach or that of Vienna, to restore a form of government 
and authorize a nation to reconquer her colonies; that they 
were not inspired, as was the Congress of Panama, with the 
necessity of uniting the persecuted to resist the attacks of a 
common aggressor; but that they sought rather the union of 
all in common effort, and the establishment of a basis of peace 
by means of the amicable solution of international conflicts.^® 

In an address which he made upon his election as per- 
manent president of the third International American Confer- 
ence, Senhor Nabuco, for many years Brazilian ambassador to 
the United States, declared that the aim of the conferences was 
intended to be the creation of an American opinion and of an 
American public spirit. He believed that they should never 
aim at forcing the opinion of a single one of the nations taking 
part in them ; that in no case should they intervene collectively 
in the affairs or interests that the various nations might wish 
to reserve for their own exclusive deliberation. " To us," he 
said, " it seems that the great object of these conferences should 
be to express collectively what is already understood to be 
unanimous, to unite, in the interval, between one and another 
what may already have completely ripened in the opinion of 
the continent, and to impart to it the power resulting from 
an accord amongst all American nations." ^'^ 

Two years later Senhor Nabuco declared on the occasion 
of the laying of the corner stone of the building of the Pan- 
American Union at Washington, that there had never been a 
parallel for the sight which that ceremony presented — " that 
of twenty-one nations, of different languages, building together 
a house for their common deliberations." Continuing, he said : 

i« " Proceedings of Special Session of the Am. Acad, of Pol. and Soc. 
Science, February 24, 1906, 7. 

17 /»^ Am. Conf. (1906), report of the delegates of the U. S., 57. 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 13 

" The more impressive is the scene as these countries, with all 
possible differences between them in size and population, have 
established their union on the basis of the most absolute equal- 
ity. Here the vote of the smallest balances the vote of the 
greatest. So many sovereign states would not have been drawn 
so spontaneously and so strongly together, as if by irresistible 
force, if there did not exist throughout them, at the bottom 
or at the top of each national conscience, the feeling of a destiny 
common to all America." ^^ 

At the opening session of the third International American 
Conference, the Brazilian statesman. Baron de Rio Branco, in 
adverting to the fact that the meeting of the conference might, 
perhaps, give rise to the suspicion that an international league 
against interests not represented was being formed, declared: 
"It is necessary therefore to affirm that, formally or im- 
plicitly, all interests will be respected by us ; that in the discus- 
sions of political and commercial subjects submitted for con- 
sideration to the conference it is not our intention to work 
against anybody, and that our sole aim is to bring about a 
closer union among American nations, to provide for their 
well-being and rapid progress ; and the accomplishment of these 
objects can only be of advantage to Europe and the rest of the 
world." ^^ 

At the special session of the third International American 
Conference held in honor of Mr. Root, to which reference has 
been made above, Senor Comejo, a delegate for Peru, made in 
the course of a short address the following remarks: 

" These congresses, gentlemen, are the symbol of that soli- 
darity which, notwithstanding the ephemeral passions of men, 
constitutes, by the invincible force of circumstances, the essence 
of our continental system. They were conceived by the organ- 
izing genius of the statesmen of Washington in order that the 
American sentiment of patriotism might be therein exalted, 

18 Pan-American Union Bulletin, May, 1908. 

19 /w*. Am. Con. (1906), report of the delegates of the U, S., 56, 



14 PAI^-AMEEICA]^ISM: ITS BEGIlSrtTINGS 

freeing it from that national egotism which may be justified 
in the difficult moments of the formation of states, but which 
would be to-day an impediment to the development of the Amer- 
ican idea, destined to demonstrate that just as the democratic 
principle has been to combine liberty and order in the consti- 
tution of states, it will likewise combine the self-government of 
the nations and fraternity in the relations of the peoples." ^^ 

On the occasion of Mr. Root's visit to Uruguay, the president, 
Senor Battle y Ordonez, said in the course of an address that 
America will be the continent of a just peace, founded on the 
respect for the rights of all nations, a respect as great for the 
weakest nations as for the most vast and most powerful em- 
pires. A Pan-American public opinion would be created and 
made effective, he thought, by systematizing international con- 
duct with a view to suppressing injustice, and to establishing 
amongst the nations ever more and more profoundly cordial 
relations. Continuing, he declared that the Pan-American 
conferences were destined to become a modem Amphictyon to 
whose decisions all the great American questions would be 
submitted. 

Dr. Luis M. Drago, the well-known Argentine publicist, au- 
thor of the Drago doctrine, speaking on the occasion of Mr. 
Root's visit to Buenos Aires, said: 

" Enlightened patriotism has understood at last that in this 
I continent, with its immense riches and vast, unexplored exten- 
Isions, power and wealth are not to be looked for in conquest 
and displacement, but in collaboration and solidarity, which 
'will people the wilderness and give the soil to the plow. It 
has understood, however, that America, by reason of the na- 
tionalities of which it is composed, of the nature of the repre- 
sentative institutions Which they have adopted, by the very 
character of their peoples, separated as they have been from 
the conflicts and complications of European governments, and 
even by the gravitation of peculiar circumstances and wants, 
20 Root, Latin America and the U. 8., Addresses, 12. 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 15 

has been constituted a separate political factor, a new and vast 
theater for the development of the human race, which will 
serve as a counterpoise to the great civilizations of the other 
hemisphere, and so maintain the equilibrium of the world." ^^ 

In 1910, at the opening session of the fourth International 
American Conference, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, Dr. V. de la Plaza, said : 

" It had come to be the inveterate custom of the powers to 
deliberate among themselves on the destinies of incipient and 
weai: nations, as if dealing with states or sovereignties pos- 
sessing neither voice nor weight in the control and develop- 
ment of the rules, principles, and declarations inherent in hu- 
man societies, recognized as independent and sovereign in their 
international relations. This condition of precarious autonomy 
and liberty of action, and the constant danger of being sub- 
jugated or of suffering the mutilation of their territory, would 
have continued among these weak states but for the wise and 
famous declaration of President Monroe, to which we ought to 
render due homage; and but for the constant action of other 
continental powers of somew'hat greater strength in the defense 
of their territory and sovereignties as well as their declared in- 
tention to cooperate for the protection of those states which 
were endowed with less strength and fewer means of self- 
defense." ^^ 

The foregoing statements made by responsible men in public 
life in the Hispanic American republics may be fairly con- 
sidered as representative of the best thought in that section of 
the continent. It is not to be inferred, however, that unanim- 
ity of opinion exists. On the contrary there is much diversity 
and not a few writers of more or less note, and occasionally 
men in public life advocate a closer union of the Hispanic 
states for the purpose of resisting the threatening (as they 
believe) encroachments of the United States. These views 

21 Root, Latin America and the TJ. 8., Addresses, 95. 

22 7»t Am. Conf. (1910), report of the delegates of the U. S., 46. 



10 PA]!^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGI]SrNi:N^GS 

need not be discussed at length. A bare reference to two or 
three of the best-known writers of this group will suffice. A 
Illusdo Americana by a Brazilian, Eduardo Prado, is typical. 
Appearing some three decades ago, soon after the establishment 
of the Brazilian republic, this book expressed great skepticism 
respecting the fraternity of the American nations in general, 
and manifested particularly a hostile spirit toward the tendency 
of the Hispanic republics to establish more intimate relations 
with the United States. More recently an Argentine writer, jc 
Manuel TJgarte, has gained an extensive notoriety by his propa- 
ganda against Pan- Americanism. His ideas are set forth in a if 
book which he published in 1911 under the title of El Porvenir 
de la America Latina. Finally, an article by Jacinto Lopez on 
what he calls Monroismo y Pan-Americanismo, appearing in 
Cuba C ontempordnea for April, 1916, may be taken as repre- 
sentative of the more serious adverse criticisms which have in 
recent years been made in Hispanic American periodicals. 
Monroeism, according to this writer, means empire, and Pan- 
Americanism is the mask of imperialism. The significance of 
Monroeism, he thinks, is clear; but Pan- Americanism is am- 
biguous, incomprehensible, susceptible of all sorts of interpre- 
tations. The remedy for the situation, in Lopez's opinion, is 
to be found in the union of Hispanic American states as a coun- 
terpoise to the preponderant influence of the United States. 

On the other hand such opinions are offset by those of other 
Hispanic American writers and publicists who in a private ca- 
pacity maintain and justify the existence of Pan- Americanism. 
Alejandro Alvarez, a Chilean publicist, viewing the subject 
from the historical standpoint, is of the opinion that the notion 
of international solidarity is essentially American and that it 
manifested itself in most brilliant fashion in the struggle of the 
Spanish colonies for independence. This sense of unity which 
existed between the belligerent Spanish colonies was, he be- 
lieves, different in its origin and in its manifestations from the 
sentiment of international fraternity about which certain of the 



MEANING OF PAK-AMERICANISM 17 

eighteenth-century philosophers had written. The sentiment, 
however, according to Alvarez, did not develop between the new 
Spanish American nations and Brazil, because there was no 
common action in the struggle for independence. When Brazil 
became an empire in 1822, it was still regarded as semi-Euro- 
pean. 

Between the new Spanish American powers and the United 
States, on the other hand, there existed a solidarity, different, 
it is true, from the other, but no less effective. That soli- 
darity, thoug'h it did not yet embrace Brazil, was, according 
to Alvarez, Pan-American. It had its basis in the fact that 
the struggling colonies were in the same continent with the 
United States; that the United States had a few years before 
conducted a similar struggle to achieve its freedom ; that it 
furnished a model for the political institutions of the new 
states; and that it could establish economic relations with the 
new nations with greater facility than with the countries of 
Europe. ^^ 

What Alvarez calls Latin American solidarity — that is the 
unity of the Spanish-speaking states with Brazil — did not 
develop, according to his view, until about the middle of the 
nineteenth century. It was then brought about by the identity 
of political and international problems with which the Latin 
states were all alike confronted. Thus, according to this writer, 
there are three phases of American solidarity — Spanish Amer- 
ican, Pan-American, and Latin American, which developed in 
the order named. ^* Some further views of Seiior Alvarez will 
be noted below. 

In Cuba C ontempordnea for October, 1916, there was pub- 
lished a lengthy article on Pan- Americanism by the well-known 
Penivian writer, Erancisco Garcia Calderon. The following 
extracts will give a fair idea of his conception of Pan-Ameri- 
canism : 

*3 La Diplomacia de Chile, 65. 

24 Alvarez, Droit International Americam, 245. 



18 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGIIO^INGS 

" The likeness of peoples whom a doctrine and a policy strive 
to unite is not always complete. They may differ in religion 
as is the case with the diverse dominions of the Slavs, or the 
different provinces of German speech. The systems of govern- 
ment of the Spaniards of the Old and of the ISTew World are 
diverse as also is the case with Saxons of the Monarchical 
Island and the Republican Continent. Among the immense 
number of Slavs the creed, the language, the customs, and po- 
litical order vary ; and yet they are moved by a common spirit. 
In America, unity is geographical and moral. Republicanism, 
liberalism, democracy, tolerance, constitute from north to south 
aspects of a common social gospel. Germanized Saxons and 
Latinized Spaniards succeed in defining similar aspirations and 
aversions. Though the North American is Protestant and the 
Ibero- American is Catholic; though they speak different lan- 
guages and respond to a different logic, yet they derive from 
like lands, from a uniform system of government, from a growth 
free from secular traditions, from the absence of rigid castes, 
from a community of generous principles, such as arbitration 
and the love of peace, and from general enterprises of utility, 
an active Pan-Americanism, theory and militant reality, prac- 
tical crusade and romantic apostleship. 

" It is not, as in the book of Mr. Stead, ^^ a plan for the 
Americanization of the southern continent, a mask for pacific 
penetration. Whoever defines this international system fixes 
its characteristics in free competition, and in organization based 
upon harmonious wills, and closer relations of peoples who 
neither obey the command of a despotic overlord, nor renounce, 
upon associating, a strong spirit of nationalism. Although in 
the history of the last century violence frequently prevailed 
over union and the expansion of the strongest was transformed 
into conquest, yet upon the development of a Pan-American 
ambition the United States announces that the era of unjust 
policy is at an end and that in the new moral federation con- 

2(5 W. T. Stead, The Americanization of the World. 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICAmSM 19 

sent is an essential virtue. ... In ideal Pan-Americanism, 
free from ancient appetites, fraternal republics construct an 
economic and moral association, formulate aspirations for lib- 
erty and for peace which will affect continents grown old in 
wars of spoliation and slavery." 

The views of a sufficient number of representative men of 
both North and South America have now been set forth to 
show whether or not there is a consensus of opinion as to the 
general characteristics of Pan-Amiericanism. Before any at- 
tempt is made, however, to deduce from these particulars and 
from the pertinent facts of international American relations a 
concise description of Pan-Americanism, it is indispensable to 
inquire into a point about which there is some difference of 
opinion; namely, the doctrine of equality as applied to certain 
of the republics of this hemisphere. In this question is in- 
volved the position of the United States in the American fam- 
ily of nations. 

The equality of nations as a principle of international law 
is not universally accepted. Lorimer, for example, says: 
" Men are not and never will be, equal : their equalization is 
not within the reach of human will ; and as the inequalities of 
classes and the inequalities of states are the direct and neces- 
sary results of the inequalities of individuals, they are equally 
certain and equally permanent. However fondly the dream 
of equality may be cherished by the envious or the vain, whether 
it be manifested as an individual or a natural aspiration, it is 
a chimera as unrealizable as the union of the head of a woman 
and the tail of a fish." But he goes on to say that " To the 
same category of absolute impossibilities belong all schemes 
which, in this changing world, assume as existing, or seek to 
establish, permanent relations of superiority or inferiority, 
whether between individuals, or classes, or states, in place of 
accepting as their basis the facts presented by the contemporary 
history of mankind." ^^ 

26 Itistitutes of the Law of Nations, II, 193, 



20 pa:n^-ameeicanism: its beginnings 

The weight of opinion, however, from Grotius to the present 
time supports the doctrine of equality. Phillipson, in a recent 
edition of Wheaton, says that sovereign states possessing legal 
personality as members of the society of nations enjoy equal- 
ity before international law; but that from the political point 
of view it cannot be said that all the states of the world are jl 
equal. " In Europe the concert of the six great powers, and p 
on the American continent the United States," he says, " exer- i 
cise a leadership which, in each case, is real and possesses the r 
greatest weight, though it is not determined by definite rules." ^"^ ^ 

Westlake, one of the profoundest of recent writers on inter- [ 
national law, says on the subject of the political inequality of [ 
states in Europe that " when a matter arises, and the states !* 
which are agreed as to the mode of dealing with it carry their 
plan into effect as far as it is possible to do so by their own 
action, without directly compelling a state which does not agree f 
with them to join in their action and without directly affecting 
that state, they do not violate its independence. But their ac- f 
tion may indirectly compel that state to join in it, or to endure j 
without opposition a conduct which it deems to affect it in- I 
juriously though indirectly, or of which it disapproves in the j 
general interest of the European system. In that case a po- ! 
litical victory has been gained over the state in question. And l 
a state may be so weak that it is not much or at all consulted 
by the other powers, and that little attention is paid to its 
opinion, if given. In that case it is in a position of political 
inferiority, and many states of the European system are per- 
manently in such a situation toward what are called the great 
powers, yet their equality is not necessarily infringed 
thereby." ^s 

Declaring that at no time in no quarter of the globe can 
small states ever have been admitted by large ones to political 
equality with themselves, Westlake reviews the control of Euro- 

27 Wheaton^ s Elements of International Law, 261, 
?8 Collected Papers, 92. 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICAOTSM 21 

' pean affairs during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by 
I the great powers, and reaches the conclusion that a certain sort 
' of political inequality is compatible in the European system 
^vith legal equality. This fact he thinks is not one to be con- 
demned ; for it may prove to be a step toward the establishment 
of a European government, and in no society, he holds, can 
peace and order be permanently enjoyed without a government. 
If, then, such political inequality as has long subsisted in 
Europe is not incompatible with legal equality — equality be- 
fore international law — it follows that in the American fam- 
ily of nations political inequality, if it exists, is not incom- 
patible with legal equality. It will be remarked that Westlake 
makes no specific reference to the American situation. Law- 
rence points out the disparity in strength and influence be- 
tween the United States and any other power in the Western 
Hemisphere, and he accords to this republic because of its pre- 
ponderant strength and influence a position in America sim- 
ilar to that occupied in Europe by the great powers. But he 
is careful to point out differences, the most important of which 
is that the United States is not called upon in the exercise of 
its primacy to dictate territorial arrangements with a view to 
maintaining a shifting balance of power. ^^ This difference is 
so fundamental and the preponderant influence of the United 
States is exercised in a manner so different from the way in 
which the European concert is made effective, that the com- 
parison between the two systems is hardly valid. The marks 
of contrast are rather more striking. 

In 1895 there occurred an incident which led not a few 
observers to believe that the United States contemplated the 
assertion of its preponderant influence to such an extent as 
to reduce the less powerful American states to a species of 
vassalage. Reference is made to the intervention of the Cleve- 
land administration in the boundary dispute between Great 
Britain and Venezuela. It was on this occasion that Secret 

29 Principles of International Law, 242. 



22 PAK-AMEEICAKISM: ITS BEOmNINGS 

tary of State Olney declared in his instructions of July 20, 
1895, to Mr. Bayard, the American ambassador at London, 
that " To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this 
continent, and its fiat is law upon subjects to which it confines 
its interposition " f^ and that President Cleveland in his mes- 
sage to Congress on December 17, 1895, affirmed that, " If the 
balance of power is justly a cause for jealous anxiety among 
the governments of the Old World and a subject for our abso- 
lute noninterference, none the less is an observance of the Mon- 
roe Doctrine of vital concern to our people and their govern- 
ment." 31 

The statement of Secretary Olney, standing alone, is per- 
haps susceptible of such an interpretation as was, for example, 
given to it by The Nation to the effect that it was " the first 
assertion of sovereignty over the whole Western Hemisphere 
since the Pope's Bull, and, of course, makes us responsible for 
all wrong-doing from Canada to Cape Horn." ^^ And the 
words of President Cleveland, quoted above, give color to the 
assumption that it was desired to have the United States oc- 
cupy a position in the Western Hemisphere similar to that 
occupied by the great powers in Europe. Such criticisms were 
not confined to the United States. In discussing a resolution 
defining the Monroe Doctrine which had been introduced into 
the United States Congress as a result of the Anglo- Venezuelan 
boundary agitation, the London Times, in its issue of January 
22, 1896, says that it was understood that some of the South 
American republics had expressed themselves decidedly against 
the proposed definition, w'hich they considered would impair 
their independence and reduce them to a condition of vassalage 
to the United States. The Paris Temps strongly expressed a 
similar opinion in the interests of the minor American com- 
munities, while entering at the same time an emphatic protest 

so Foreign Rel. of the U. S., 1895, 558. 
31 Id., 543. 
32LXI, 459. 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 23 

in the name of Europe against what it called " the moral an- 
nexation, pure and simple, of the two continents of the West- 
ern Hemisphere." ^^ 

If these critics had paid heed to Secretary Olney's instruc- 
tions as a whole, their criticisms, no doubt, would have been 
less severe. After making the declaration that to-day the 
United States is practically sovereign on this continent, Mr. 
Olney goes on to explain what he means. " It is not," he 
said, " because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. 
It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilized 
state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the in- 
variable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. 
It is because in addition to all other grounds, its infinite re- 
sources combined with its isolated position render it master of 
the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all 
other powers. All the advantages of this superiority are at 
once imperiled if the principle be admitted that European pow- 
ers may convert American states into colonies or provinces of 
their own." ^* 

Moreover, Mr. Olney expressly disclaimed any intention on 
the part of the United States to interfere in the internal affairs 
of the other American republics. The Monroe Doctrine, he 
said, " Does not establish any general protectorate by the United 
States over the other American states. . . . The rule in ques- 
tion has but a single purpose and object. It is that no Euro- 
pean power or combination of powers shall forcibly deprive an 
American state of the right and power of self-government and 
of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and destinies." *° 

Subsequently the relations of the United States with Cuba 
and certain other republics in the region of the Caribbean have 
led to renewed discussion. According to Phillipson,^^ Cuba, 
since the treaty of June 12, 1901, by which the island was 

33 Cf. also Des Jardins in Revue General de Droit Int. Public, III, 159. 
Si For. Ret. of the U. S., 1895, 558. 

35 For. Rel. of the U. S., 1895, 554. 

36 Wheaton's Elements of Int. Law, 63. 



24: PAN-AMERICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

made over to the Cuban people, has occupied, with respect to 
the United States, a position which " seems " to bring it within 
the category of international protectorates. Though it man- 
ages its own internal and external affairs, it is precluded from 
entering into any treaty with a foreign power which might 
endanger its independence; and it undertakes to contract no 
debt for which th^ current revenue will not suffice, and to con- 
cede to the United States the right of intervention to preserve 
Cuban independence, to maintain a government adequate for 
the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and the 
right to use its harbors as naval stations. 

Phillipson, however, calls attention to the fact that as con- 
ditions are at present, there does not appear to be unanimity 
of opinion as to the precise international status of the republic. 
Benton, for example, in his Interrmtional Law amd Diplomacy 
of the Spanish- American War, holds that it is a fully sover- 
eign state, and Whitcomb, in La Situacion International de 
Cuba, maintains that it is a semi-sovereign state. But even 
admitting that the weak constitutional tie by which Cuba is 
bound to the United States has the effect of reducing it to the 
status of semi-sovereignty, yet since other states accept it as 
being sovereign and independent, its equality remains unim- 
paired ; that is, the identity of rights and obligations for all is 
admitted; which is merely to say that the international law 
which they recognize is a body of general rules and not of par- 
ticular solutions. ^'^ 

In his fifth annual message, communicated to Congress De- 
cember 5, 1905, President Roosevelt discussed the relations of 
the United States with the Dominican Republic, which may 
be taken as a case typical of these weaker republics. For a 
number of years conditions in that republic had been growing 
from bad to worse, until finally, according to Roosevelt, society 
was on the verge of dissolution. Fortunately, however, a ruler 
sprang up who, with his colleagues, saw the dangers threatening 

37 Westlake, Collected Papers, 89. 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 25 

their country and appealed to the friendship of the United 
States. There was imminent danger of foreign intervention. 
The previous iiilers of Santo Domingo had recklessly incurred 
debts; and, owing to internal disorders, the republic had been 
unable to provide means to meet its obligations, Roosevelt had 
accordingly negotiated a treaty under which the United States 
undertook to help the Dominican people '^rehabilitate their 
finance by taking charge of and administering their custom- 
houses. The treaty at the time this message was sent to Con- 
gress was pending before the Senate. An intervention such 
as the President had been foreshadowing in his previous mes- 
sages had at last taken place. And in his message of December 
5, giving an account of it to the Congress, he said : 

" We must recognize the fact that in South American coun- 
tries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret 
the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, 
and we must try to convince all the other nations of this con- 
tinent once and for all that no just and orderly government has 
anything to fear from us. There are certain republics to the 
south of us which have already reached such a point of sta- 
bility, order, and prosperity that they themselves, though as 
yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this doc- 
trine. These republics we now meet not only on a basis of 
entire equality, but in a spirit of frank and respectful friend- 
ship, which we hope is mutual. . . . Under the proposed treaty 
the independence of the island is scrupulously respected, the 
danger of the violation of the Monroe Doctrine by the interven- 
tion of foreign powers vanishes, and the interference of our 
government is minimized, so that we shall only act in conjunc- 
tion with the Santo Domingo authorities to secure the proper 
administration of the 'customs, and therefore to secure the pay- 
ment of just debts and to secure the Dominican Government 
from demands for unjust debts." ^^ This treaty failed of rati- 
fication; but a new one was concluded and ratified in 1907. 

38 The Works of Theodore Roosevelt, TV, 607, 



2e PAE'-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGIISTNINGS 

In the addresses which he delivered on his South American 
trip in 1913, Mr. Eoosevelt made statements which clearly in- 
dicate a classification of the American states in two categories : 
those enjoying political equality with the United States and 
those politically inferior. He nowhere says or implies, of 
course, that all American states do not enjoy legal equality. 
This difference must be kept in mind in interpreting his re- 
marks. In an address delivered at Kio de Janeiro, he said, in 
speaking of the Monroe Doctrine, that " all of the American 
nations which are sufficiently advanced, such as Brazil and the 
United States, should participate on an absolute equality in the 
responsibility and development of this doctrine, as far as the 
interests of the Western Hemisphere as a whole are con- 
cerned." ^^ 

At Buenos Aires he declared that certain of the Hispanic 
American nations had grown with astonishing speed to a posi- 
tion of assured and orderly political development, material 
prosperity, readiness to do justice to others, and potential 
strength to enforce justice from others. " Every such na- 
tion," he continued, " when once it has achieved such a posi- 
tion, should become itself a sponsor and guarantor of the doc- 
trine ; and its relations with the other sponsors and guarantors 
should be those of equality." *® In Chile, Eoosevelt declared 
that relations between certain Hispanic American countries, 
among which he included Chile, were based on exact equality 
of right and mutuality of respect. ^^ 

Representative of the best Hispanic American opinion on 
this subject are the views of Dr. Emilio Frers, who, on the 
occasion of Mr. Roosevelt's visit to Buenos Aires in 1913, ad- 
mitted the political inequality of certain American states with- 
out conceding the right of the United States to intervene in the 

39 The Outlook, CV, 474. 

40 Frers, American Ideals, 23. 

41 Souvenir of the Visit of Colonel Roosevelt to Chile, 47. 



MEAI^ING OF PAN-AMEEICANISM 27 

affairs of those states either for their own good or in the inter- 
ests of the American republics in general. He said : 

" The nations of Latin America will not feel at their ease 
so long as they do not rest in the security that no master may 
arise for them either from within or from without, and that 
no one, no matter where he may come from, may place in dan- 
ger their integrity or their independence and sovereignty. The 
sentiment of nationality and of independence is so deeply rooted 
and is so exalted among these nations, that it perhaps consti- 
tutes the dominant feature of their patriotism. . . . Fortu- 
nately there are now many states in South America which have 
well implanted institutions and which have fully entered upon 
an orderly and constitutional life. The Argentine republic, 
among them, may rest in the confidence of its own advances. 
. . . But her origin and her history inevitably bind her to the 
other Spanish American nations, and if, perchance, her people 
feel inclined to recognize the necessity of imposing peace and 
civilization on those who are fulfilling a less happy destiny 
than hers, I do not think it would sympathize with the idea of 
acknowledging the right of rich and powerful nations to rise up 
in self -constituted authority and judgment over the weaker and 
more disorderly nations, or to impose penalties upon them, even 
though it be for their offenses against civilization." 

Dr. Frers foreshadowed a possible solution of the difficulty 
in the following words : " Perhaps it may not be difficult to 
find the solution which is inevitably produced whenever turbu- 
lent or disorderly states commit offenses against civilization 
and expose the prestige of the entire continent. Perhaps in a 
more or less distant future some high authority may be con- 
stituted which shall have jurisdiction in these questions of 
offenses against civilization, which may settle such questions 
with absolute impartiality, and which may acquire confidence 
and establish peace. The undeniable fact is that some means 
must be sought for to resolve these conflicts between the right 



28 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

to independence and autonomy and the supreme right of Amer- 
ican civilization which must be defended as the common heritage 
of the New World." ^^ 

With a brief reference to the views of Dr. Alejandro Al- 
varez, the eminent Chilean authority, this discussion must be 
brought to a close. According to Dr. Alvarez *^ the first part 
of the Monroe message of 1823 contained an implicit recogni- 
tion of the political equality of all the states of the New World 
and consequently the negation of the right of one state to in- 
tervene in the affairs of the others. But this idea, Alvarez 
affirms, has not been adhered to by the United States, espe- 
cially since the development of its hegemony, which he defines 
as the exercise by the United States of preponderance when 
its interests are involved. 

Calling attention to the fact that the policy of hegemony 
applies almost exclusively to the countries in the neighborhood 
of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, Alvarez declares 
that the policy is the inevitable fruit of the prodigious and 
rapid development of the United States and of its great terri- 
torial, economic and maritime superiority, compared with the 
other American republics. What has contributed to its success 
is the fact that it is always presented as the logical consequence 
of the Monroe Doctrine, and the powerful states, far from op- 
posing it, have always respected it. It is interesting to note, 
says Alvarez, that in certain cases where the Monroe Doctrine 
might have been applied it was not invoked, and that frequently 
it is invoked as an act of hegemony, in order to make it appear 
as being founded in a traditional policy, generally accepted. 
It is for this reason that publicists seldom distinguish between 
the one policy and the other; that is, between the Monroe Doc- 
trine and hegemony. 

Alvarez maintains that the hegemony of the United States 
takes two distinct forms, corresponding to different situations. 

42 American Ideals, 15. 

43 Droit Int. Am., 136. 



MEANING OF PAN-AMERICANISM 29 

The first he calls a policy of the maintenance, application, and 
development of the Monroe Doctrine. In this form of the 
policy the United States voices the needs and aspirations of the 
whole of America. Under the second form the policy becomes 
.personal; that is, it becomes a policy (1) aimed at assuring the 
preponderance of the United States in the New World, and (2) 
a policy of intervention in the affairs of certain Latin American 
states. Recognizing the benefits which the American republics 
have derived from the hegemony of the United States as well 
as from the Monroe Doctrine, Alvarez raises the question 
whether it might not be better for both policies to be maintained 
by the active cooperation of all the American states. He thinks 
he is able to note in recent events a tendency in this direction. 

It may be said in passing that the supremacy which the 
United States enjoys in the Western Hemisphere by virtue of 
its preponderant strength and infiuence and which it main- 
tains under the Monroe Doctrine, cannot be in any historical 
sense of the word properly denominated hegemony. The hege- 
mony of Athens was imperialistic. Athens stood in the rela- 
tion of sovereign to certain members of the Delian League. 
The leagTie was not one of equal states. And if in the Pelo- 
ponnesian confederation the states were equal, the hegemony 
of Sparta was military in its nature. Its leadership was exer- 
cised for the purpose of waging war more effectively upon 
other states. And finally the supremacy of Prussia in the Ger- 
man Confederation, to which the tenn has often been applied, 
was wholly different from the position of the United States in 
the American family of nations. Though admitting that the 
United States is preponderant, it is undoubtedly misleading to 
call its preponderance hegemony. It is better, therefore, to 
avoid the term unless a definite meaning such as that given to 
it by Alvarez in his Droit International Americain be agreed 
upon. And even then its two aspects, as defined by him, are 
likely to lead to confusion. 

The attempt must now be made to deduce from this lengthy 



30 PAN'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGIEl^ING'S 

discussion a description of Pan- Americanism as exact and as 
concise as the nature of the conception will permit. It has al- 
ready been found that the lexicographers do not agree among 
themselves as to the precise meaning of the term. Indeed it 
may well be doubted whether an adequate definition per genus 
et differentia is possible. As genus none of the terms employed 
— principle, advocacy, idea, sentiment, aspiration, tendency, 
doctrine — satisfies the logical and inquiring mind as to what 
the real nature of Pan-Americanism is. And even though the 
genus were agreed upon the differentiae of these set definitions 
would still fail to describe the concept in a manner sufficiently 
explicit. A choice from among the various descriptions given 
by statesmen and publicists would be but little more satisfactory. 
Mr. Lansing calls Pan- Americanism an international policy 
of the Americas. ]!^ow a policy may be defined as a course of 
action adopted and pursued, or intended to be pursued, by a 
government, party, ruler, statesmen, or by some nonpolitical 
body or by an individual. If Pan-Americanism is a policy, 
what is the body which adopts and pursues the course of action 
which makes it effective ? Evidently it cannot be a policy with- 
out such a formulating and directing force. Does the Interna- 
tional Union of American Republics, formed in 1890, consti- 
tute such a body ? It is with the greatest difficulty that it may 
be so conceived. The course of action which this union adopts 
in its periodical conferences, and which it pursues through the 
agency of its bureau at Washington and through the activity 
of the separate governments, is extremely limited in scope. 
But supposing that it were not so limited, the question would 
arise whether or not, according to this conception, Pan-Ameri- 
canism existed prior to 1890. Evidently it could not be an 
international policy of the Americas until some international 
American body had adopted it as an appropriate course of ac- 
tion. The separate action of the American states could not 
make it an international policy. The ineffective international 
conferences which now and then took place from 1826 to 1889 



1 MEANING OF PAN-AMERIOANISM 31 

I between some of the American states could not make it such 
■ a policy. Was it something other than a policy, if it existed at 
i all, prior to the meeting of the first International American 
. Conference ? That Pan- Americanism was brought into exist- 
I ence through the action of the representatives of the American 
states who met at Washington in 1889 is not a tenable proposi- 
tion. It was in existence, at least in its beginnings, long be- 
fore the Washington conference took place. As Ambassador 
Nabuco put it, the conferences merely express collectively what 
is already felt to be unanimous. 

There is another way of viewing the matter which may help 
to dissipate the confusion. Cornejo, in the address cited above, 
speaks of " our continental system " ; Drago conceives of Amer- 
ica as constituting a " separate political factor " ; and Moore 
states that " Pan-Americanism is obviously derived from the 
conception that there is such a thing as an American system." 
This conception of America as a separate political entity is not 
new. Monroe declared in his famous message that " it is im- 
possible that the allied powers should extend their political 
system to any portion of either continent without endangering 
our peace and happiness, nor can any one believe that our 
southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their 
own accord." And two years and a half before Monroe made 
his declaration Henry Clay said on the floor of Congress : " It 
is in our power to create a system of which we shall be the 
center, and in which all South America will act with us. . . . 
We should become the center of a system which would consti- 
tute the rallying point of human wisdom against all the des- 
potism of the Old World." ** 

It will be recalled that Lawrence compared the primacy of 
the United States in the ISTew World to the primacy of the 
great powers in the Old.^^ As has already been pointed out 

44 Moore, Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism, in Columhia Univ. Qiiar., 
Sept., 1915, 351. 

45 Principles of Int. Law, 242. 



32 PAl^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

the differences between the two are so great as to destroy, prac- 
tically, the validity of the comparison. But a view of the 
European system may help to determine the nature of Pan- 
Americanism. Von Gentz, writing in 1806, conceived of the 
balance of power as " a constitution subsisting between neigh- 
boring states, more or less connected with one another, by vir- 
tue of which no one among them can injure the independence 
or essential rights of another." ^^ Fenelon even considered the 
whole of Christendom as " a kind of universal republic " all I: 
the members of which owed it to one another, for the common ly] 
good, to prevent the progress of any other members who should J 
seek to overthrow the balance existing between them.*"^ West- j 
lake has the same idea in mind with regard to the balance of jii 
power when J^e speaks of it as possibly being a step toward the y 
establishment of a European government. And Lorimer con- Ij 
siders the balance of power as an indirect solution of what he 
called the ultimate problem in international law; that is, how 
to find the international equivalents known to national law 
as legislation, jurisdiction, and execution.^^ In short, these 
authorities consider the balance of power as a political system 
constituting the beginnings of an international government. 
Now if the American nations constitute a separate political 
factor in relation to the rest of the world, their political sys- 
tem may be regarded as a step — and nothing more than a 

step toward an interniational American government. But a 

step toward government implies a step toward constitution, for 
constitution, however vague and ill-defined, is necessary for the 
guidance of government. By constitution is meant a collection 
of principles according to which the powers of government, and 
the rights of the governed and the relations between the govern- 
ment and the governed, are adjusted. It may have no outward 

46 Taylor, Treatise on Int. P'uMic Law, 98. 

^7 Ibid., 99. 

48 Institutes of Int. Law, II, 193. 



MEAISTING OF PAK-AMERICANISM 33 

form of expression further than is given by precedents and 
habits of political action.^^ 

It cannot be said that the progress thus far achieved has pro- 
duced any clearly defined organ of government. The Inter- 
national Conferences of American Republics may be considered 
as such an organ only in the vaguest and most tenuous sense 
of the term. But back of this organization lies a moral union 
of American states founded upon a body of principles growing 
out of the common struggle for independence. It is to this 
body of principles that we must turn for the meaning of Pan- 
Americanism. They are: 

1. Independence. Not merely nominal independence with 
Old World attachments remaining; but independence in the 
sense of complete political separation, American states neither 
interfering in the aifairs of the European powers nor allowing 
those powers to interfere in their own affairs. These princi- 
ples, first formally proclaimed by Washington in his farewell 
address and by Monroe in his message of 1823, subsequently 
received, by tacit assent and by express governmental action, 
the sanction of the Hispanic American states. The establish- 
ment of the League of ISTations tends rather to confirm than to 
invalidate this principle. 

2. Community of Political Ideals. The fact that the Amer- 
ican states are all republics is not so much the bond of union 
between them, as the fact that they all cherish common political 
ideals. It is the spirit of their governments rather than their 
form which serves to bring them together. It is not likely that 
if Brazil had continued as a constitutional monarchy the prog- 
ress of Pan-Americanism would have been seriously retarded. 

3. Territorial Integrity. The states of this hemisphere re- 
gard the principle of conquest as inadmissible in American 
public law. The uti possidetis of 1810 was generally adopted 
as a rule for the settlement of the boundary questions between 

*9 Woolsey, Political Science, I, 284. 



34 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

the new states, and while the application of the rule has given 
rise to numerous international conflicts, and important cessions 
of territory have been made as a result of wars growing out of j 
other causes, the spirit of conquest has not generally prevailed ' 
among the American states. The repeated declarations of the J 
United States to the effect that it neither covets the territory 
of its neighbors nor seeks to aggrandize itself by conquest, givej 
additional sanction to the rule. Roosevelt, December 3, 1901 ;[ 
Eoot, July 31, 1906; Knox, February 28 and March 6, 1912 ;f 
Wilson, October 27, 1913 ; Lansing, December 27, 1915. f 

4. Law Instead of Force. The American states rely upon; 
law and amicable adjustments to settle their international diffi-L 
culties rather than upon force. In their international confer-f 
ences action is taken by unanimous consent. As far as con- 
cerns itself, every state is left free to interpose a negative to, 
whatever measure it may consider prejudicial to its interests.! 
This device of requiring unanimous consent has tended to pre- 
vent the development of the idea of the balance of power in this 
continent. The system of voting by the absolute majority tends j 
to the formation of two groups more or less evenly divided I 
along sectional or economic lines, and this in turn tends to thej 
formation of a balance of power. Moreover, if the will of the 
majority is to prevail, it must be supported by force. Unan- 
imous consent precludes the use of force. Although this rule 
has had definite application only since the organization of the 
Pan-American Conferences, it has prevailed none the less in 
spirit from the beginning. 

5. Nonintervention. Believing that " every nation has the 
right to independence in the sense that it has the right to the 
pursuit of happiness and is free to develop itself without inter- 
ference or control from other states," ^^ the American powers 
have never, as a body, undertaken to intervene in the affairs 
of any particular state or states. There has been in recent years 

i50 American Journal of Int. Law, X, 213. 



MEAmNG OF PAlSr-AMEKICAI^ISM 35 

a tendency toward the joint use of good offices, but no tendency 
toward dictatorial interference. 

6. Equality. The American powers not only recognize the 
principle of the eqnality of states under international law, but 
in the conduct of their international union they observe it to 
the fullest extent, presenting in this respect a striking contrast 
to the Concert of Europe. Only the great powers are admitted 
to the European conferences on a basis of equality. On the 
other hand all the American states are admitted to the Amer- 
ican conferences, and the vote of the weakest republic has as 
much weight as that of the most powerful. The political in- 
equality of certain American states gives rise to the exercise by 
the United States of international police power ; but this is an 
individual policy of the United States and not Pan-American. 

7. Cooperation. The American states, forming a separate 
political system, a distinct family of nations, entertaining the 
same political ideals, cooperate in a spirit of fraternal friend- 
ship, in the promotion of their common interests, whether these 
be political, economic, or cultural. 

These principles may indeed be considered as bases of the 
constitution of what, by the free choice of all concerned, may 
develop into an international American government. Taken 
together with the whole mass of precedents and habits of polit- 
ical acting which have emerged from the international relations 
of the states of the Western Hemisphere, they constitute the 
particulars from which, by a process of generalization, the 
abstract concept Fan- Americanism is derived. 



CHAPTER II 

FOBMATIOJSr OF NEW STATES 

The intervention of Napoleon in the affairs of Spai in 
1808 marks the beginning of a series of events of the highest |j 
importance to the Western Hemisphere. The resistance of the 
Spanish people to the rule of Joseph Bonaparte, whom the 
emperor had placed on the throne of Spain in place of Ferdi- 
nand VII, was reflected in a movement on this side of the'j 
Atlantic, which, evolving through different phases, finally cul- 
minated in the independence of the vast expanse of Spanish 
territory extending from Mexico to Buenos Aires. And the 
flight of the Portuguese prince regent, John, afterward King 
John VI, with his court to Brazil, to escape the fate which had ^ 
overtaken the Spanish king, proved to be the first step toward |; 
the conversion of that wide domain into an independent em-|| 
pire. p 

By the end of the year 1824 the process of emancipation was 
about complete, though there was still much to be done in the i 
way of the political organization of the nascent states. The j, 
transform'ation in Brazil was rapid, and the establishment of | 
an independent government was for obvious reasons relatively l: 
easy. The residence of the Portuguese court at Rio de Janeiro \ 
for a considerable length of time, and the elevation of the col- [ 
ony in 1815 to the rank of a kingdom coordinate with that of i 
Portugal, had already given Brazil a consciousness of its virtual 
independence. The return of John VI, therefore, to Portugal f 
in 1821, leaving his son, Dom Pedro, as regent in Brazil, was i 
quickly followed by the complete severing of the slight bonds j 
which still held the two kingdoms together. The year follow- 1 
ing the king's departure, independence was formally declared 

36 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 37 

and Pedro was proclaimed " Constitutional Emperor and Per- 
petual Defender of Brazil," ^ The opposition which the Por- 
tuguese forces in the country interposed to the assertion of inde- 
pendence was so insignificant that the revolution was accom- 
plished almost without bloodshed. The young empire was thus 
permitted to enter at once upon the undisturbed enjoyment of 
its freedom. 

The Spanish colonies, on the other hand, achieved their in- 
dependence only after long and bitter warfare. It was not un- 
til the victory of Ayacucho was won in the mountains of Peru 
on December 9, 1824, that the outcome of the struggle was defi- 
nitely assured. Being driven, as an immediate consequence of 
that battle, from the Andean plateau where they were making 
a last stand, the Eoyalist forces were reduced to the possession 
of a mere foothold in southern Chile, of the fortresses of Callao, 
in Peru, and of San Juan de Ultia in Mexico. These they 
were soon to be forced also to relinquish; San Juan de Ulua 
in September, 1825, and the other places in January of the 
following year. While these great changes were occurring on 
the mainland, the island colonies of Cuba and Porto Eico had 
likewise been stirred by the spirit of revolution, but their at- 
tempts at independence failed and they were destined to remain 
under Spanish rule till the intervention of the United States 
in behalf of Cuba three quarters of a century later. 

On the other hand, the French colony of St. Domingue, later 
the republic of Haiti, met with a wholly different result. If 
not the first of the revolting colonies to establish beyond per- 
adventure its independence, it was at least the first to declare 
it formally, its declaration being made in 1804,^ whereas the 

1 This title was later sanctioned by the constitution which was put into 
effect in 1824. Cf. Carvahlo Moreira, Constitucao do Imperio do Brasil, 
45. A translation into Spanish of the constitution of 1824 is found in 
Arosemena, Estudios constitucionales sobre los gobiernos de la America 
Latina, I, 1-27 (2nd ed.) A French translation is found in British and 
Foreign State Papers, XIII, 936-958. 

2 The declaration was signed and proclaimed by Dessalines, the leader 



38, PAIST-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

first of the formal declarations upon the part of the Spanish 
colonies was made seven years later. Considering the ignorance 
of the mass of the population and its lack of experience in self- 
government, it is not to be wondered at that the political organ- 
ization of this new state was accomplished with great difficulty. 
Years of disorder and of frightful excesses followed the separa- 
tion from France. Jean Pierre Boyer, who assumed the presi- 
dency in 1818, was the first of the numerous rulers to unify 
the country and to maintain order throughout all its parts. 
For some years prior to his accession, two rival states strug- 
gled for supremacy, one of these being a republic in the south 
and the other a monarchy in the north. In 1820, Boyer, who 
had succeeded to the chief magistracy of the republic, managed 
to unite the two states under one government; and two years 
later, when the former Spanish colony of Santo Domingo de- 
clared its independence ^ and was seeking annexation to the 
republic of Colombia, he marched an army into that part of the 
island and forced the leaders of the movement to accept union 
with Haiti. Thus, with the whole of the island under his con- j 
trol, Boyer remained in office, under a provision of the consti- i 
tution giving the president a life tenure,* until 1843, when he I 
was forced to resign. The following year the eastern portion | 
of the island withdrew and set up the independent republic of j 
Santo Domingo. I 

On the continent, the struggles of the Spanish colonies for in- : 
dependence, and the subsequent essays of their people in the [ 
field of political organization, present a varied and interesting 
record. The vicissitudes of the republic of Colombia are fully 

of the revolution, on January 1st of the year indicated. Cf. Madion, His- 
toire d' Haiti, III, 115-118. 

3 For the " Constitutive Act of the provisional government of the inde- 
.pendent state of the Spanish part of Haiti," see British and Foreign State 
Papers, VIII, 557-670. 

* Boyer took office under the republican constitution of 1816. From 
1801 to 1816 there had been adopted five different constitutions. The in- 
strument under which Boyer ruled remained in force as long as he con- 
tinued to exercise the chief magistracy. Cf. Janvier, Les Constitutions 
d'Hwiti, 1-154. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 39 

considered hereafter, in a chapter dealing with the ideals of 
Simon Bolivar; but it is proper here to remark that this new 
state, erected within the bounds of the old viceroyalty of New 
Granada and comprising what is to-day Venezuela, Colombia, 
and Ecuador, attained during the first years of its existence a 
position of the greatest promise. A republican constitution had 
been adopted in 1821,^ and the executive, legislative, and judi- 
cial branches of the government had entered at once upon the 
exercise of their several functions. The Colombians them- 
selves believed that the foundation of a happy and prosperous 
nation had been laid; and foreign observers were equally con- 
vinced that the new republic, by virtue of the extent of its 
territory, the abundance of its natural resources, and the energy 
of its inhabitants, would soon take high rank among the na- 
tions of the world. ^ Moreover Colombia had acquired great 
prestige among the other new states by virtue of the contribu- 

6 For an English translation of this constitution, see British and Foreign 
State Papers, XIX, 698-722. A French translation was published at Paris 
in 1822 under the title of Constitution de la Repuhlique de Colombia. 

6 In 1823 J. Q. Adams, then Secretary of State, in his instructions to 
Anderson, the first minister to Colombia, said : " The republic of Co- 
lombia, if permanently organized to embrace the whole territory which 
it now claims, and blessed with a government effectually protective of the 
rights of its people, is undoubtedly destined to become hereafter one of 
the mightiest nations of the earth. Its central position upon the surface 
of the globe, directly communicating at once with the Pacific and Atlantic 
oceans, north and south with the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, 
brings it into relations of proximity with every other part of the world: 
while the number and variety of its ports on every sea by which it is sur- 
rounded, the magnitude and extent of its navigable rivers, three of which, 
the Amazon, the Orinoco, and the Magdalena, are among the largest in 
the world, intersecting with numberless tributary streams, and in every di- 
rection, the continent of South America, and furnishing the means of water 
communication from every point of its circumference to every spot upon 
its surface; the fertility of its soil, the general healthiness and beauty of 
its climate, the profusion with which it breeds and bears the useful metals, 
present a combination of elements unparalleled in the location of the human 
race and relieve, at least from all charge of enthusiasm, the sentiment 
expressed by the late Mr. Torres (Colombian minister to the United States) 
that this republic appeared to have been destined by the Author of Nature 
' as the center and the empire of the human family.' " American State 
Papers, Foreign Relations, V, 894. 



40 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

tion which it had made, in leadership and in men and material, 
to the final dissolution of Spanish dominion in the southern 
continent. 

The provinces of Kio de la Plata and the former captaincy- 
general of Chile, though as successful on the whole as Colombia 
in throwing off the Spanish yoke, were less fortunate in their 
early efforts at political organization. Buenos Aires, loosely 
confederated with a number of the provinces which had consti- 
tuted the vice-royalty of La Plata, maintained its independence 
in fact, after the first revolt in 1810, though the formal declara- 
tion was postponed until 1816 ; but conflicts between two oppos- 
ing systems of government, the unitary and the federal, long 
delayed the organization of a constitutional regime, and no 
doubt caused the loss of a large part of the territory which the 
leaders of Buenos Aires aspired to consolidate into a single na- 
tion. 

The province to the east of the river Uruguay, known as the 
Banda Oriental, having rebelled against the government of 
Buenos Aires, was occupied in 1817 by Brazil and held by that 
empire '^ for a decade until, as a result of a war between the 
two claimants, the disputed territory was recognized, by way of 
compromise, as the independent republic of Uruguay. Para- 
giiay likewise declined to submit to Buenos Aires, and after 
successfully resisting a military expedition sent against it by 
the central authorities, its leaders set up an independent govern- 
ment which quickly fell into the hands of the dictator, Francia, 
under whose rule it was to remain almost completely isolated 
from the world until his death in 1840. Efforts were also made 
to bring the territory known as Upper Peru, which formerly 
constituted a part of the vice-royalty of La Plata, under the 
authority of the government at Buenos Aires, but the forces 

1 The revolt of the Banda Oriental against Buenos Aires was led 
by the famous Jos6 Artigas, who also opposed the occupation of the 
province by Brazil. Defeated by the Brazilians in 1820 Artigas was 
compelled to seek asylum in Paraguay, where he remained until his 
death in 1850. 



FOKMATION" OF NEW STATES 41 

sent to wrest it from the royalists were defeated. Its libera- 
tion was not effected until 1825, when the victorious patriot 
army under General Sucre marched into the country and organ- 
ized a provisional government which was shortly afterward 
superseded by the definitely constituted republic of Bolivia. 

Throughout the period of the wars of independence and for 
a generation afterward, the provinces which later united to form 
the Argentine Republic remained in a state of disorganization. 
A constitution framed by a constituent assembly composed of 
representatives of the several provinces was rejected in 1819, 
because, among other reasons, it failed to provide for local au- 
tonomy. During the next five years there was practically no 
national government, though the government of the province 
of Buenos Aires, which was then conducted in a wise and or- 
derly manner, served, by virtue of treaty arrangements with the 
other provincial governments, as the representative of all in the 
conduct of foreign affairs. In December, 1824, a new con- 
stituent congress met at Buenos Aires, but the constitution for 
the " Argentine Nation," which, two years later, it adopted, 
was also rejected by the provinces. The state of anarchy which 
followed was taken advantage of by the dictator, Rosas, to im- 
pose his will upon the country, and it was not until his over- 
throw, in 1852, that any real progress was made toward the 
organization of a national government.^ 

Chile, unlike the Argentine provinces, met with serious re- 
verses in the achievement of its independence. In 1814 the 
authority of Spain was reestablished throughout the colony and 
Chilean independence might have been long delayed but for 
the aid furnished by Argentine forces under San Martin. 
Born in 1778 at Yapeyu, a village in the viceroyalty of La 
Plata, near the frontier of Paraguay, San Martin received his 
education in Spain and served in the Spanish army against the 
French until 1811, attaining the rank of colonel; but he aban- 

sVedia, Constitucidn Argentina, 13-15; Arosemena, Estudios consti^ 
tucionales sobre los gobiernos de la AmeriQa Latina (2d ed.), I, 176. 



42 PA^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGIKNTINGS 

doned his promising military career in Spain to devote himseK 
to the cause of the revolution in America. On his arrival in 
Buenos Aires he was entrusted with the organization of the 
national army. He later commanded the Patriot forces against 
the Koyalists in Upper Peru, where, becoming convinced that 
independence could not be assured so long as the Spaniards re- 
mained in possession of Lima, he conceived the plan of driving 
them from that stronghold by first liberating Chile and then 
advancing on Peru by way of the Pacific.^ 

With this great project in mind, he obtained his appointment 
as governor of the province of Cuyo, situated on the eastern 
slope of the Andes at the gateway to Chile; and although the 
province was exceedingly poor, yet, with the help of Buenos 
Aires and the accession of Chileans who had fled across the 
Andes to escape Eoyalist persecution, he eventually succeeded 
in organizing and equipping an army which he considered ade- 
quate to his task. Accordingly, in January, 181Y, San Martin 
led his band of Patriots across the Andes, and on February 12, 
with the cooperation of Chilean forces, won at Chacabuco 
a decisive victory over the Royalist forces. The viceroy of 
Peru, on learning of the Ebyalist defeat, sent a new expedi- 
tion against the Chileans ; but on April 5, 1818, the Patriots, 
after having suffered several severe reverses, were again vic- 
torious in the decisive battle of Maipo. The independence of 
Chile being now firmly established, San Martin turned his atten- 
tion to the final step — the destruction of Spanish power in 
Peru; but the execution of this design was complicated by po- 
litical events in Chile. 

After the battle of Chacabuco the Royalists abandoned San- 
tiago, the capital of the new Chilean republic, and a popular 
assembly, convened on the day the Chilean army entered the 
city, voted to place the supreme authority of the state in the 

9 For a full account of the formation of San Martin's army and of his 
passage of the Andes, see Mitre, Historia de San Martin,^ I, 499-632. 
A good, brief account in English is found in the Memoirs of General 
Miller. I. 90-108. 



FOEMATION OF NEW STATES 43 

hands of San Martin. But the Patriot leader, believing that 
the acceptance of such a post would be prejudicial to the ac- 
complishment of his chief object, declined the honor, and on 
the following day the assembly named in his stead General 
Bernardo O'Higgins, who assumed office under the title of Su- 
preme Director. ^'^ 

O'Higgins, like San Martin and other leaders of the revolu- 
tion, had been educated in Europe, His mother was a native 
Chilean. His father, Ambrose O'Higgins, was an Irishman, 
who, having been sent as a child to Spain to be educated, pro- 
ceeded to seek his fortune, about the middle of the eighteenth 
century, in the Spanish colonies. After trading as an itinerant 
merchant from Costa Firme to Buenos Aires, he eventually 
settled in Chile and entered the royal service. Promoted in 
time to the captaincy-general of the province, he was afterward 
appointed by the king viceroy of Peru, a post which he contin- 
ued to hold until his death in 1801. The son Bernardo, born 
in 1778, was sent at the age of sixteen to Spain, but he soon 
passed over to England, where he remained in school till 1799. 
He then returned to Spain, and, in 1802, after some misadven- 
tures, embarked for Chile. In Europe he met Miranda, San 
Martin, and other Spanish American pioneers in the cause of 
colonial independence, and imbibed their views. He therefore 
returned to Chile with ideas inimical to the Spanish regime; 
and, from the beginning of the revolt until he became Supreme 
Director of Chile, he contributed increasingly important serv- 
ices to the cause of independence. -^-^ 

During the vigorous and effective administration of O'Hig- 
gins, the country enjoyed peace and prosperity. But his rule 
was autocratic. Believing that the deliberations of a national 
congress under the conditions then existing would result only 

10 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, X, 628-632 ; Mitre, His- 
toria de San Martin, II, 24. 

11 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XI, 663-680. Cf. also La- 
valle, Galeria de retratos de los gobernadores y virreyes del Peril, and 
Mehegan, O'Higgins of Chile. 



44 PAlSr-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINKINGS 

in arousing civil dissension, he employed his influence and the 
power of his office to frustrate all attempts to assemble such a 
body. Likewise, in order to avoid the calling together of rep- 
resentatives of the people to sanction the declaration of inde- 
pendence, he hit upon the device of opening registers through- 
out the country in which the citizens could record their wishes 
on the subject. By the same unique method he secured the 
acceptance of a provisional constitution framed by a commis- 
sion which he appointed for the purpose. -^^ This constitution, 
though intended to appease the demand for popular government, 
served to give the color of legality to the autocratic system 
already adopted. Attempts to disturb the established order, 
whether due to the personal ambition of military chiefs or to a 
more or less sincere desire to give the people a greater share in 
the management of their affairs, he firmly repressed, by means 
of the military forces at his command. ^^ 

By the middle of the year 1820 widespread discontent had 
come to prevail and the demand for political reform had become 
more and more insistent. Eealizing the necessity of making 
some concession to public clamor, the Supreme Director caused 
a convention to be assembled at Santiago in 1822 for the pur- 
pose of framing a new constitution. But the convention was so 
clearly a creature of the administration and the constitution 
which it hurriedly adopted so evidently failed to make effective 
the desired reforms, that the prevailing discontent was in no 
wise allayed. Toward the close of the year 1822, open rebel- 
lion broke out in the provinces of Coquimbo and Concepcion. 
In the latter province the movement was led by General Ramon 
Freire, whose distinction as a military leader was second only 
to that of O'Higgins. The troops sent to suppress the revolt 
abandoned the government and joined the rebels. In Santiago 

12 See Proyecto de Constitucidn Provisoria para el Estado de Chile, pub- 
lished in 1818, to which was appended an exposition of the proposed method 
of ratification. 

13 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XI, 346, 520, 526. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 45 

the feeling of dissatisfaction, though manifested in a less vio- 
lent manner, was no less acute, and in January, 1823, a pop- 
ular assembly met in that city to consider means for remedying 
the evils of which the country complained. Unwilling to strug- 
gle longer against such formidable opposition, O'Higgins relin- 
quished to a junta, named by the assembly, the authority with 
which he had been invested six years before. ^^ 

This junta was composed of three influential citizens of the 
capital ; and it was hoped that, with public confidence restored, 
the new provisional authority would proceed to the definitive 
political and administrative organization of the republic. But 
the steps taken to that end did not meet with universal appro- 
bation. In the province of Concepcion the local assembly, 
backed by General Freire, declared that the provisional govern- 
ment should be composed of a representative of each of the three 
provinces into which the republic was then divided; namely, 
Concepcion, Santiago, and Coquimbo, Authorized to put this 
plan into execution, Freire transferred his army by sea to Val- 
paraiso, whence he marched upon Santiago. Encamping a few 
miles from the capital, he entered into negotiations with the 
junta, and soon reached an agreement by which the solution of 
the anomalous situations was entrusted, in accordance with his 
demands, to a so-called congress of plenipotentiaries, composed 
of a representative of each of the three provinces. ^^ 

This "congress of plenipotentiaries" immediately set up a 
provisional government similar in every way to the autocratic 
system which had been the cause of O'Higgins's downfall, only 
three short months before. Freire was made Supreme Direc- 
tor. But the leaders in reality desired to organize the govern- 
ment on a democratic basis, and Freire convoked a constituent 
assembly which met in August, 1823, and toward the close of 
the year adopted a constitution. Early in its proceedings, how- 

i^Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XIII, 695, 732, 817. After 
his abdication O'Higgins lived in retirement in Peru until his death in 
1842. 

isBarros Arana, op. cit., XIII, 830; XIV, 18, 39. 



46 PAI^-AMEEICAT^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

ever, the assembly gave constitutional sanction to the oflSce of 
Supreme Director, and unanimously designated Freire to fill 
it for a period of three years. The constitution was promul- 
gated amid great rejoicing in January, 1824; but it was ill- 
adapted to the needs of the situation. Its framers, besides de- 
vising a complicated form of government, failed to take into 
account the established institutions and customs of the coun- 
try. In any circumstances the new system would have been 
difficult to administer; and, with a state of disorder pervading 
the country, the Supreme Director, after a few months of trial, 
became convinced of his inability to fulfill the duties of his 
office under the constitution and offered his resignation. It is 
hardly surprising that, instead of being permitted to resign, he 
was clothed anew with the dictatorial powers which had been 
found necessary to the maintenance of public order. Thus the 
constitution of 1823 became a dead letter. ^^ 

Though the first attempts to establish popular government in 
Chile were failures, many of the leaders continued to cherish 
the hope that success would eventually crown their efforts. 
Among these was Freire himself. Returning to Santiago from 
the south, where he had brought to a happy termination, early 
in 1826, the final campaign against the few Spanish troops who 
still remained on Chilean soil, he convoked a constituent con- 
gress, to which he presented his resignation. Adopting a reso- 
lution to the effect that in future the official title of the chief 
executive should be that of president, the congress accepted 
Freire's resignation and elected Manuel Blanco Encalada in his 
stead. Thereafter the executive played a less important part 
in the affairs of the country. The congress also passed an 
act providing for the adoption of the federal system. In Jan- 
uary, 1827, it proceeded to consider the draft of a complete 
constitution. This project, it appears, was based on the Mexi- 
can constitution of 1824. Its discussion was attended with 
heated debates as to whether the system should be unitary or 

16 Barros Arana, op. cit., XIV, 43, 125, 320, 391, 395. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 4Y 

federal, and on this question the congress closed its sessions 
without reaching an agreement. In February, 1828, a new 
assembly took up the task which its predecessor had abandoned, 
and, thanks to its labors, the country was soon provided with a 
fundamental law which, when promulgated, was received 
throughout the republic, as had been the case in 1824, with 
manifestations of great satisfaction.^"^ 

Although the constitution of 1828 was by far the best evi- 
dence which the Chileans had yet given of their capacity for 
political organization, yet it did not merit unqualified praise, 
nor did it in practice satisfy the general aspiration for a strong, 
vigorous government. Agitation continued, and in 1833, the 
system which had been adopted — a compromise between the 
federal and the unitary system — was replaced by one from 
which every vestige of federalism was removed. With this 
accomplished the republic at last settled down to a condition 
of political stability. ^^ 

Returning now to the expedition for the liberation of Peru,^^ 
it may be observed that O'Higgins, who was in complete accord 
with San Martin, lent to the latter his most cordial and ef- 
fective cooperation in the recruiting and equipping of the expe- 
ditionary force. The enterprise, however, was beset with enor- 
mous difficulties. To form, in a country of limited resources, 
and impoverished by years of conflict, an army sufficient to dis- 

" Barros Arana, op. cit., XV, 5, 32, 128, 144, 158, 269. 

18 Barroa Arana, op. cit., XVI, 62 ; for the constitution of 1833 and a 
brief account of the early attempts to organize politically the republic of 
Chile, see Arosemena, Estudios constitucionales sohre los gobiernos de la 
America Latina, 1. 

19 For a full history of the expedition see Historia de la Espedicidn Li- 
bertadora del Perii (2 vols.), by the Chilean historian, Bulnes. Barros Ar- 
ana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, treats the subject fully. The best Argentine 
account is given by Mitre in his Historia de San Martin. For an account 
from the Peruvian standpoint, see Paz Solddn, Historia del Peru Independi- 
ente. The account given by one of the principal actors. Lord Cochrane, may 
be found in his Narrative of Services irv the Liberation of Chile, Peru, and 
Brazil (2 vols.). Another foreigner (Greneral William Miller), who took 
an active part in the expedition, has left an account in his Memoirs 
(2 vols.). 



48 PA]Sr-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

lodge and disperse the Eoyalist forces entrenched in the Pe- 
ruvian capital and in occupation of advantageous positions in 
the interior of the country was an undertaking no less serious 
than that of obtaining transports for the troops and the im- 
provising of a naval force to convoy the expedition to its desti-. 
nation and give it effective support. Nevertheless, in spite of 
these difficulties and of the inability of the government of 
Buenos Aires to provide the pecuniary assistance which it had 
promised, preparations went forward with commendable ra- 
pidity, so that toward the middle of 1820 the expedition was 
ready to strike the blow which, it was confidently believed, 
would put an end to Spanish power in America. 

The land forces, comprising about 4500 men, consisted of two 
divisions. One of these, composed chiefly of the remnants of 
the army which had accomplished the remarkable feat of cross- 
ing the Andes in 1817, was recruited with Chilean soldiers. 
The other, which was less numerous, contained Chileans only, 
though it was officered in part by men who had owed allegiance 
to Buenos Aires. Whether the majority of the men constitut- 
ing the two divisions were Argentine or Chilean is a point upon 
which historians of the two countries do not agree. ^" But, as 
a large proportion of the troops and the greater part of the 
officers were Argentine, the expedition affords an excellent ex- 
ample of the spirit of solidarity which prevailed among the 
people then struggling for freedom from Spanish rule. In 
December, 1818, the naval forces were put in charge of Lord 
Cochrane, who, although he had been dismissed from the British 
navy, enjoyed unimpaired the fame which he had previously 
acquired as a naval officer. Under his direction the incipient 
Chilean navy had already obtained the ascendancy over the 
Spanish squadron in the Pacific, and, when the expedition was 
ready to sail, adequate naval protection was afforded. In all 
seven warships, mounting 231 guns, were provided, their crews 

20 Bulnes, Historia de la Espedicion Lihertadora del Peru, I, 207 ; Mitre 
Historia de San Martin, II, 532. 



FORMATION OF KEW STATES 49 

swelling the total number of men in the expedition to more 
than 6000. 

The expedition, which was placed under the general com- 
mand of San Martin, was, as originally planned, to be carried 
out under the joint authority of Chile and the United Provinces 
of Rio de la Plata, and a treaty to that end was concluded be- 
tween those governments.^^ By this treaty the contracting par- 
ties engaged to assist the inhabitants of Peru, in conformity 
with their expressed desires, in achieving independence, but 
were to leave them absolutely free to establish their own govern- 
ment, and, when the object of the expedition had been attained, 
were to withdraw the army from Peru, unless the three govern- 
ments should agree to retain it there for a longer period. The 
cost of the undertaking was to be jointly borne by the contract- 
ing parties, it being understood that as soon as an independent 
government had been established at Lima, that government 
should reimburse Chile and the United Provinces for the ex- 
penses incurred on account of the expedition. The government 
at Buenos Aires having failed to ratify the treaty, Chile as- 
sumed sole responsibility for the expedition; but, while no 
formal instructions were given to San Martin relative to the 
conduct which he should observe in Peru, it appears to have 
been generally understood that the spirit of the unratified 
treaty should nevertheless control the relations between the ex- 
peditionary forces and the state which it was proposed to bring 
into existence. ^^ . 

21 Bulnes, Eistoria de la Espedicion Libertadora del Peru, I, 115. The 
treaty was signed at Buenos Aires on February 5, 1819, and ratified by 
Chile on March 15 following. Cf. Recopilacion de tratados y convenciones 
celebrados entre la republica de Chile y las potenoias extranjeras, I, 5. 
Also, Coleccion de tratados celebrados por la Republica Argentina con las 
naciones extranjeras, 1, 39. 

22 Mitre, Eistoria de San Martin, II, 536, Dundonald (Lord Cochrane), 
Na/rrative of Services, 1, 78. Instructions were prepared by the Chilean 
Senate but were never delivered by O'Higgins to San Martin. According 
to these instructions the objects of the expedition were: The emancipation 
of the inhabitants of Peru from the slavery and domination of the King of 
Spain; the establishment of a uniform system of civil and national liberty 



50 PAK-AMERlCAi^riSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

While the rest of Spanish America had been swept into the 
movement for independence, the viceroyalty of Peru remained 
nominally loyal to the home government. The great mass of 
the population was composed of Indians of an exceedingly docile 
character. Accustomed under Inca rule to submission to a pa- 
ternal government, they had been easily conquered by a handful 
of Spanish adventurers, who superimposed upon the social and 
political organization of the Inca regime a system which left 
the population in the state of serfdom to which it had for cen- 
turies been subjected. Thus three hundred years of Spanish 
rule had done little to change the condition or the character of 
these people. An inert mass, without the spirit of independ- 
ence or the power of initiative, they were not easily moved to 
revolution; and although there existed in Peru a Creole class, 
such as furnished the directing force of the movement for inde- 
pendence, it found greater difficulty in pursuing its designs 
there than it did elsewhere in Spanish America; for, in addi- 
tion to the listlessness of the lower classes, it was obliged to 
reckon with the fact that the upper classes were generally op- 
posed to revolutionary movements. Not only did the large 
number of Spaniards employed in the government service, or 
engaged in commercial or other pursuits, constitute a conserv- 
ative element, but the nobility, at the top of the social scale, 
formed, by virtue of the number and distinction of its members, 
an important factor, the majority of whom used their influence 
to maintain the established order, in the fear that the titles 
which they so highly prized might otherwise be placed in 
jeopardy. In a society thus organized, the viceroy had been 
able, with the abundance of resources at his command, not only 
to suppress every outbreak occurring within the territory of 

throughout South America; the destruction of the servile partisans of Fer- 
dinand VII, who, quartered in that section, were carrying on an obstinate 
and destructive warfare; and the constitution of new, independent states, 
which, united with those already liberated, would present an impenetrable 
front to the power of Spain. The instructions are printed in Odriozola, 
Documentos Histdricos del Peru, IV, 5-9. See, also, Bulnes, Historia de la 
Espedicidn Libertadora del Per4, I, 214. 



rORMATIO:N" OF NEW STATES 51 

Peru, but even to send troops to reduce to submission other 
sections in revolt. The Spanish power in Peru therefore con- 
stituted a menace, the destruction of which was one of the chief 
aims of the preparations which had been going on in Chile. ^^ 

The expedition landed on the coast of Peru in September, 
1820. It was well received by the Peruvians, many of whom 
joined the invading army ; and after some months San Martin, 
without risking a battle, succeeded, with the aid of the fleet, in 
compelling the forces of the viceroy to abandon the capital and 
retire into the mountains. Possession was then taken of the 
city, and on July 28, 1821, independence was formally de- 
clared, pursuant to an act signed by an assemblage of citizens 
previously convened by the Municipal Council of Lima for the 
purpose of giving expression to the popular will.^* A few 
days later San Martin issued a decree establishing a provi- 
sional government, the supreme civil and military authority 
of which he himself exercised under the title of Protector. 
The only machinery of government for which the decree pro- 
vided was a cabinet of three members, whom it designated as 
follows : Juan Garcia del Rio, a Colombian, Minister of For- 
eign Relations; Bernardo Monteagudo, an Argentine, Minister 
of War and Marine ; and Hipolito Unanue, a Peruvian, Minis- 
ter of Finance. By the terms of the decree this arrangement 
was to continue in force until the representatives of the Pe- 
ruvian nation should organize the government and take its ad- 
ministration into their own hands. ^^ 

Prior to the evacuation of Lima, negotiations were begun be- 
tween San Martin and the Viceroy, Pezuela, looking to some 
form of accommodation. Pezuela proposed an arrangement by 
which the government of Chile and the expeditionary army 
should agree to submit to the authority of Ferdinand VII, un- 

23 Bulnes, Eistoria de la Espedicidn Lihertadora del Peru, I, 347, et seq.; 
Paz Soldan, Eistoria del Peril, Independiente, I, 27. 

24 Odriozola, Documentos Eistdricos del Peru, IV, 262, 271. 

25 Ibid., 318-320. See, also, Hall, Extracts from a jQurnal Written o^ 
the Cga^t of Chile, Peru, and Mexico, I, 266-270, 



52 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

der the Spanish constitution of 1812. This constitution had 
been cast aside by Ferdinand upon his return to the throne in 
1814, but in March, 1820, it was restored in the Peninsula, 
and it had just been promulgated by the Royalist government 
at Lima. The exchanges came to nothing because of the Pa- 
triot leader's insistence upon the recognition of the independ- 
ence of Peru as a prerequisite to conciliation. Subsequently, 
however, through the interposition of an agent of the Spanish 
Government, Manuel Abreu, who had just arrived in Peru, 
negotiations were renewed. Conferences were begun in May 
and were not finally broken off until the evacuation of Lima by 
the Royalists, two months later. These negotiations, like the 
first, were fruitless ; but they gave rise to a proposal which 
is of more than passing interest. In common with many of his 
contemporaries, San Martin believed that the form of govern- 
ment best adapted to the needs of the new states was the mon- 
archical. With a view therefore to its establishment in Peru, 
he proposed, in substance, that the independence of the coun- 
try be declared by the joint action of the two armies; that a 
provisional government be organized under a regency, the pres- 
ident of which should be La Sema, who had succeeded Pezuela 
as viceroy; and that commissioners be dispatched to Spain to 
ask the king to consent to the placing of a prince of his family 
upon the new throne. Though La Serna was at first inclined 
to regard with favor the solution thus proposed by San Martin, 
he afterward declined to accept it, thus putting an end to the 
project of founding an independent kingdom in Peru with the 
cooperation of the Royalist authorities.^^ 

But San Martin did not abandon the plan. Conditions in 
Peru appeared to him and to his political advisers to offer but 
little promise for the success of the republican form. On the 
other hand, for the monarchical form, the indispensable ele- 

26 Paz Soldan, Historia del Perd Independiente, I, 69, 164-172; Bulnes, 
Historia de la Espedicidn Libertadora del Peril, II, 93-129. The documents 
relating to these conferences are published in Odriozola, Documentos His- 
toricos del Peru, IV, 139-238. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 53 

ment of aristocracy was already at hand, while the traditions 
of reverence and respect for everything pertaining to royalty 
had continued to be cherished among both the Creole and the 
native element of the population. The social organization and 
the example of the viceregal court had indeed made monarchical 
customs and practices much more familiar in Peru than else- 
where in Spanish America, with the possible exception of Mex- 
ico. Thus the establishment of a republic meant in Peru an 
especially violent break with the past, which, with the resulting 
disorders, San Martin desired to avoid. Accordingly, when he 
assumed the title of Protector, he took steps to revive the mon- 
archical project. Though personally a man of great modesty, 
he preserved in the new government all the pomp and cere- 
mony of the viceregal court; he validated the titles of the 
nobles of the old regime, created a new aristocratic order called 
the Order of the Sun, and appointed a council of state ; he also 
established a patriotic society whose real object, it soon became 
clear, was to carry on a propaganda in favor of the monarchical 
form of government. ^^ 

Having thus adopted measures to counteract the further de- 
velopment of republican sentiment in Peru, San Martin ap- 
pointed two agents, Juan Garcia del Rio and Diego Paroissen, 
to proceed to Europe with a view to secure a monarch for the 
Peruvian throne. These envoys, who were to solicit enroute 
the cooperation of the governments of Chile and Buenos Aires, 
were instructed to go first to England, where they were to en- 
deavor to arrange with the government for the acceptance of 
the crown by the Prince of Saxe-Coburg,^^ or, if that were not 
practicable, by a prince of the reigning family, preferably the 
Duke of Sussex. In the event of failure in England, they 
were to negotiate in turn with Russia, Austria, France, Portu- 
gal, and lastly with Spain. Moreover, ministers plenipoten- 

2TBulnes, op. cit., 373 ff.; Paz Soldan, op. cit., I, 268. Villanueva, La 
Monarquia en America: Bolivar y el General San Martin, 190-194, 
28 Leopold, afterward King of the Belgians. 



54 PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

tiary were accredited by San Martin to the governments of the 
new Spanish American states, with instructions to use every 
possible means to induce them to follow the lead of Peru in the 
matter of political organization.^^ 

It is not desired to create the impression that San Martin's 
zeal for the monarchical form of government so far influenced 
his conduct as to lead him to disregard the moral obligation 
which he owed to the people of Peru, to allow them the fullest 
freedom in adopting for themselves whatever political system 
they might prefer. He believed not only that he was acting 
in harmony with the general sentiment, but also that the estab- 
lishment of a republic would result in anarchy and perhaps in 
the loss of independence. Being himself without ambition, he 
desired unselfishly to contribute to the permanent welfare of 
Peru and of the other new states formerly colonies of Spain, 
by giving them the only kind of government which, in his opin- 
ion, could maintain order and insure for them a free and pros- 
perous development. He did not intend to erect a throne at 
Lima in defiance of the will of the Peruvian people. ^^ On the 
contrary, although he had little faith in popular assemblies, 
yet he convoked a congress to which he committed the respon- 
sibility of deciding upon the form of government and of fram- 

29 Paz Solddn, Historia del Peni, Independiente, I, 270-27S. 

30 Captain Basil Hall of the British navy who was in Peru at this time 
had several interviews with San Martfn and was impressed with his dis- 
interestedness. In his Extracts from a Journal Written on the Coasts of 
Chile, Peru, and Mexico, the following interesting passage occurs (I, 229) : 
" When all was quiet in the capital, I went to Callao, and hearing that San 
Martfn was in the roads, waited on him on board his yacht. I found him 
possessed of correct information as to all that was passing, but he seemed 
in no hurry to enter the city, and appeared, above all things, anxious to 
avoid any appearance of acting the part of a conqueror. ' For the last ten 
years,' said he, ' I have been unremittingly employed against the Spaniards, 
or rather, in favor of this country, for I am not against any one who is not 
hostile to the cause of independence. All I wish is, that this country should 
be managed by itself, and by itself alone. As to the manner in which it 
is to be governed, that belongs not at all to me. I propose simply to give 
the people the means of declaring themselves independent, and of establish- 
ing a suitable form of government; after which I shall consider I have done 
enough and leave them.' " 



FOEMATION OF NEW STATES 56 

ing a constitution in harmony with the system which might 
be adopted. 

But San Martin's plans were doomed to failure. Contrary 
to his expectation, there was an increasing trend of opinion 
toward republican institutions. Many of his administrative 
measures aroused bitter opposition. He was unpopular in the 
army. Conspiracies were hatched against him. Some of the 
ablest officers became disgusted and quit the service. Lord 
Cochrane openly defied his authority and sailed away with the 
warships under his command. The government of Buenos 
Aires was unfriendly. Misunderstandings arose with Chile 
over the pay of the expeditionary forces and with Colombia 
over the possession of Guayaquil. The severe defeat of a di- 
vision of the patriot army added to the difficulties of the situa- 
tion. As a consequence, the Eoyalists, who had never been 
dislodged from the greater part of Peru, took courage and be- 
gan to threaten the very existence of the new government. 

Desiring to placate public opinion and hoping to obtain ma- 
terial assistance in completing the emancipation of Peru, San 
Martin delegated early in 1822 to a Peruvian, the Marquis of 
Torre Tagie, the supreme authority which he as Protector had 
been exercising, and prepared to make a journey to Guayaquil 
to confer with Bolivar, who appeared to be in a situation which 
would permit him to furnish the desired help. San Martin 
expected Colombian aid not only on the ground of common 
interest but also on the ground of reciprocity, for troops from 
Peru were then fighting side by side with those of Colombia 
in freeing the province of Quito. Moreover, apart from the 
question of military support, he wished to come to an under- 
standing with Bolivar in regard to the form of government to 
be adopted by the new states, as well as to determine the ques- 
tion of the status of Guayaquil, which, as has been seen, was 
an object of contention between Colombia and Peru. 

The conference did not take place until July, 1822.^^ Mean- 
si San Martin gives a brief account of this celebrated conference in a 



56 PAK-AMERtCAI^riSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

while, Bolivar had completed the liberation of Quito, and by his 
aggressive action had assured the annexation of Guayaquil to 
Colombia. San Martin, by accepting the result, permitted this 
question to be eliminated. Upon the other questions, he found, 
after exchanging views with Bolivar, that it was impossible to 
reach a satisfactory agreement. The Liberator would neither 
furnish adequate assistance to San Martin, nor would he accept j 
the latter's invitation to take command of the combined forces 
of the two countries, in which the Argentine leader offered to, 
serve in a secondary capacity. Bolivar's objections were thatj 
the Colombian laws did not permit the extension of his opera- 1 
tions beyond the limits of the republic, and that he was disin-| 
clined, for reasons of delicacy, to have under his command so 
great a general as San Martin. As to the remaining question, 
the views of the two leaders were hopelessly divergent. San 
Martin, as we have seen above, had taken steps looking to the 
establishment of a monarchy in Peru with a prince of some 
European house as sovereign ; and to assure success he wished to 
have thrones erected in the other new states. Bolivar on the| 
other hand was a partisan of republicanism and San Martin] 
was unable to shake his attachment to that system. This diver- j 
gence, was, doubtless, a still more effective reason for the Libera- 1 
tor's present unwillingness to place the Colombian army at the 
disposal of Peru. I 

Thus, San Martin failed to attain any of the objects for which ! 
he had made the journey to Guayaquil. Disheartened, he re-j 
turned to Lima in August, 1822, only to find the city in a I 
state of growing discontent. During his absence Monteagudo, 

letter to General William Miller, dated Brussels, April 19, 1827. Of. San 
Martin, Su Correspondencia (3d ed.), 70-74. For other accounts see Lar- 
razabal, Vida del Lihertador; Paz SoldSn, Historia del Per4 Independiente, 
I, 308-312; Mitre, Historia de San Martin, III, 602-635; Villanueva, Bo- 
livar y el General San Martin, 235-251. See also Destruje, La entrevista 
de Bolivar y San Martin en Guayaquil; La Cruz, La entrevista de Guaya- 
quil; Goenaga, La entrevista de Guayaquil. This latter work, containing 
the report of the interview by Bolivar's secretary general, which until 
1910 remained unpublished, throws new light on the subject. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 57 

his cliief political adviser, who had exercised a controlling in- 
fluence in the administration of the government, had, by reason 
of certain harsh and oppressive measures, become so obnoxious 
that the people finally took matters into' their own hands, com- 
pelling him to resign and go into banishment This incident 
still further discouraged San Martin and strengthened his re- 
solve to quit the country ; and when, a month after his return 
to Lima, the congress assembled, he resigned all authority into 
the hands of the representatives of the people and immediately 
embarked for Chile. Passing thence to his estate in the prov- 
ince of Cuyo, he tarried there until the beginning of 1824, 
when, in order to avoid being drawn into the civil strife with 
which the provinces of the Eio de la Plata were continually 
afflicted, he took passage for Europe, where he spent the re- 
mainder of his days in obscurity.'^ 

The people of Peru being at last left free to establish their 
own form of government, the congress, in the reaction against 
the centralization of power which existed under the protector- 
ship of San Martin, appointed three of its own members as a 
commission to exercise the executive authority under the title 
of junta gubernativa, until a constitution should be adopted 
and a government organized in accordance with its provisions.^^ 
No autocrat, no foreign prince, would be tolerated. The pow- 
ers and instructions given to San Martin's agents in Europe, 
in so far as they related to the establishment of a monarchy in 
Peru, were declared to be without effect. In December, 1822, 
a provisional constitution, providing for a popular, representa- 
tive government with the customary division of powers, was 
adopted. Eleven months later a definitive constitution, based 
on these principles, was formally promulgated, but, for reasons 
which will now appear, it never became effective. 

The junta guhemativa having proved to be an unsatisfactory 

32 Bulnes, Espedicidn Libertadora del Peril, II, 484. San Martin died at 
Boulogne, France, in 1850. 

33 Paz Soldan, m^toria del Per4 Independiente, IIj, 6, 



58 PA:N'-AMEE.ICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

executive body, the severe defeat of an expedition which it had 
sent against the Royalists was made use of to precipitate a 
change. In compliance with a petition of the officers of the 
army and in response to a general public demand, the congress 
abolished the junta and created the office of president, to which 
it appointed Jose de la Riva Agiiero, a Peruvian patriot who 
had long been active in the cause of independence. As the na- 
tion's executive and as commander in chief of its armed forces, 
Riva Agiiero displayed great activity, and within a few brief 
months greatly improved the situation. He augmented the 
army and sent a formidable expedition against the Royalists 
in the south ; he organized reserves and strengthened the navy ; 
he obtained an auxiliary force from Colombia, and in general 
put the country in a better posture for offensive and defensive 
operations. But in spite of these measures more serious re- 
verses were in store. In June, 1823, upon learning that Lima 
had been weakened by the withdrawal of troops for the expedi- 
tion to the south, the able Royalist leader, Canterac, marched 
upon the capital and took it without a struggle, the Patriot 
forces having in the meantime retired to the fortress of Callao. 
In consequence the congress was dispersed, some of the mem- 
bers remaining in Lima, others fleeing the country or escaping 
to neighboring provinces, and still others following the army 
to Callao. This latter group, though constituting a minority, 
continued to meet as the congress of Peru. 

Riva Agiiero was blamed for the loss of the capital and had 
to suffer accordingly. Not only did the congress deprive him 
of the chief military command, but, as a further mark of dis- 
approval, resolved to transfer, contrary to his expressed wish, 
the seat of government to the town of Trujillo, some three hun- 
dred miles to the north of Lima. The command of the army 
was intrusted to General Sucre,^* commander of the Colombian 

34 Antonio Jose de Sucre was born in Cumand, Venezuela, in 1795. En- 
rolling in the patriot army in 1812, he rapidly rose to high rank and 
before the close of the wars of independence had become Bolivar's most 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 59 

auxiliary force and Bolivar's diplomatic representative, who, 
by a later decree of the congress, was also authorized to exer- 
cise full power, civil as well as military, in the area in which 
the war was actively prosecuted. But, when Sucre took the 
held, he delegated the civil authority to Torre Tagie. Thus 
two governments were set up — one at Trujillo under Eiva 
Agiiero, and the other at Callao, and later at Lima, under Torre 
Tagle.3^ 

The confusion into which the country had fallen caused the 
Peruvian patriots to forget local pride and petty jealousies and 
to look abroad for a leader skillful enough to unite the conflict- 
ing factions and strong enough to save the nation from the 
certain consequence of anarchy — resubjugation to the Spanish 
crown. This was the opportunity for which Bolivar had been 
waiting. Although the Peruvians had already entered into 
correspondence with him, they had been unwilling to grant him 
the authority which he required. But, with San Martin out 
of the way, there was no longer a leader whose achievements 
were comparable with his own. The Peruvians had made an 
essay at self-government and had failed. The moment was 
auspicious. Accordingly, when a commission arrived from 
Peru to renew the invitation, Bolivar accepted without further 
cavil, and, duly authorized by the congress of Colombia, set 
out to win new glory in the emancipation of Peru. 

He reached Lima on September 1, the Eoyalists having 
again evacuated the city. The next day he was granted au- 

trusted lieutenant. He was personally in command of the united Patriot 
forces at Ayacucho — Bolivar being absent at the time the battle was 
fought — and on account of that great victory he was made Grand Marshal 
of Ayacucho. After driving the Royalists from upper Peru he aided in 
the establishment of the republic of Bolivia and became its first president. 
He returned to Colombia in 1828 and met death two years later at the 
hands of an assassin. Second to none of his contemporaries as a military 
leader, he was no less eminent as a diplomatist and as a political adminis- 
trator. See for his letters, O'Leary, Memorias, I. See also, Irisarri, His- 
toria Critica del Asesinato cometido en la persona del Gran Mariscal de 
Ayacucho. 

35 Paz Soldan, Historia del Peru Independiente, II, 83, 99. 



60 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

thority to settle the anomalous situation which had arisen out 
of the establishment of the two governments under Torre Tagle 
and Riva Agiiero. On September 10 he was invested by the 
congress with full military and political authority under the 
title of Liberator, Torre Tagle being permitted to retain only 
minor functions; and when, in November, Riva Agiiero was 
arrested on a charge of treasonable correspondence with the 
enemy and banished from the country, the Liberator remained 
in undisputed control of the whole of the emancipated terri- } 
tory. It was during this period that the constitution of 1823 f 
was adopted and promulgated. But in order that the Liberator i* 
might not be embarrassed by restrictions, the congress passed [ 
a resolution on February 10, 1824, amplifying his dictatorial j* 
powers and authorizing him in particular to suspend those 
articles of the constitution which " might be incompatible with 
the salvation of the republic." The congress then adjourned 
subject to the dictator's call.^*' 

The outcome of the war has already been indicated. After 
its conclusion, Bolivar gave his attention exclusively to the 
realization of certain political plans which had long been re- 
volving in his mind. As this subject receives full considera- 
tion in a subsequent chapter, a brief reference to it at this 
point will suffice. Shortly after the victory of Ayacucho, which 
assured the independence of Peru and relieved the other new 
states of the fear of resubjugation, Bolivar assembled the Pe- 
ruvian congress ^"^ and resigned into its hands the dictatorial 
authority with which it had invested him. His resignation 
was not accepted. On the contrary, his dictatorial powers were 
extended until the congress should meet in 1826, and, as pro- 
vided in the constitution of 1823, take steps to organize the 
government on a legal basis. But, when, in September, 1826, 

36 The decrees referred to are found in Anales Parlamentarios del Peru, 
1, 497, 499. 

37 The coneress here referred to was the first congress convoked by San 
Martin in 1821. After being in session for a short time it was dissolved 
(March 10, 1825). 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 61 

events in Colombia compelled him to return to that country, 
he had not been divested of his authority, a new congress hav- 
ing assembled and adjourned without taking action. Before 
embarking for Colombia, therefore, Bolivar delegated his pow- 
ers to General Santa Cruz, in the hope that, by retaining a hold 
on Peru, the plan which was then uppermost in his mind — 
the federation of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia — might be 
more readily advanced. Once freed, however, from the domi- 
nating influence of Bolivar's personality, the national spirit 
of Peru asserted itself. Early in 1827 the authority which 
the Liberator still attempted to exercise through Santa Cruz 
was thrown aside and a provisional government under the 
constitution of 1823 was organized. A convention was then 
called to revise the constitution. The result was a new instru- j 
ment which was promulgated in 1828, from which date con- 
stitutional government in Peru definitely takes its beginning. ^^ 
Mexico and Central America formed a group apart. Dur- 
ing the three centuries of Spanish domination, intercourse be- 
tween the colonies to the south of the Isthmus and those to the 
north of it was infrequent. Mexico and Guatemala were for- 
bidden to trade by way of the Pacific with Peru and New 
Granada; and, although all commercial restrictions were re- 
laxed during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, suffi- 
cient time had not elapsed to permit the development of inti- 
mate relations between the two sections. On the other hand, 
the fieet system, which involved the distribution of all goods 
for the southern colonies through Porto Bello and Cartagena, 
led to a constant movement back and forth from the shores of 
the Caribbean overland to Quito and from Porto Bello across 
the Isthmus to Panama, thence by water to Lima, and then 
on by land to the closed port of Buenos Aires. ^'^ The habits 
of generations, therefore, had prepared the colonies of the 

38 Vargas, Historia del Peril Independiente, III, 243 ; Arosemena, Consti- 
tuciones Politicas (2d ed.), II, 424. 

39 Bourne, Spain in America, 291; Alaman, Historia de Mexico, I, 112. 



62 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS ] 

southern continent for cooperation ; whereas between the south- 
ern and the northern groups the situation was just the reverse. 
Besides, as communication by land between Mexico and South 
America was not feasible, contact between the two sections, 
during the wars of independence, was rendered extremely diffi- 
cult; for Spain controlled the seas. 

Beginning in 1810, the revolution in Mexico continued for 
a decade without positive results. During its first stage, under 
the leadership of the priest, Miguel Hidalgo, there appears to 
have been no well-defined plan of political organization, though 
the object of the movement was declared by Hidalgo himself 
to be that of wresting the control of the government from the 
" Europeans " ; that is, the Spaniards, who had fallen under 
the domination of the French. ^° During the second stage of 
the revolution, from 1811 to 1815, under the leadership of an- 
other priest, Jose Maria Morelos, the situation became, from 
the political standpoint, somewhat more clearly defined, yet it 
must be remarked that harmony of purpose and of action was 
by no means attained. When in 1811 Hidalgo was taken pris- 
oner and executed, one of his ministers and his ablest sup- 
porter, Ignacio Lopez Eayon, took the initiative in organizing 
a revolutionary government. Following the example which 
had been set in Spain and in different parts of America, Rayon 
formed a junta to govern in the name of Ferdinand VII. In 
the limited territory controlled by the Patriots, however, obedi- 
ence was never generally accorded to this junta. Morelos him- 
self, though maintaining friendly relations with it, never recog- 
nized its authority. To him a government in the name of the 
Spanish king was utterly repugnant. 

Desiring to establish a government whose authority would 
be respected by all who were attached to the Patriot cause, 
Morelos convoked a congress, which assembled at Chilpancingo 
in September, 1813. This congress, after electing Morelos as 

40Alaman, Historia de Mexico, 1, 361, 376; Zavala, Ensayo Eistdrico de 
Ids Revoluciones de Mexico, I, 65, 



FORMATIOIi]' OF NEW STATES 63 

commander in chief, proclaimed on November 6 the independ- 
ence of Mexico. During the next year, though compelled to 
migrate frequently from place to place in order to escape cap- 
ture, it framed a provisional constitution which was promul- 
gated on October 24, 1814.^^ This instrument was an adapta- 
tion of the Spanish constitution of 1812 to the republican form 
of government. But its operation, even within the narrow 
limits of the territory controlled by the revolutionists, was only 
nominal, and its duration was brief, for the congress was soon 
dispersed and Morelos, the main support of the new regime, 
was, like his predecessor, Hidalgo, captured and executed.^ ^ 
For the next four or five years the revolution was prosecuted 
in a desultory fashion, without organization and without ef- 
fectiveness, until it entered upon its final stage under circum- 
stances which will now be briefly related. 

By the year 1820 the fires of the revolution appear to have 
been almost extinguished. With the exception of a band under 
General Vicente Guerrero, now driven to seek refuge in the 
mountains of the south, no considerable force remained on 
foot to oppose the disciplined troops at the command of the 
Viceroy. In reality, as the result of a lack of leadership, of 
organization, and of unity of purpose, the revolutionary wars 
had been characterized by such ineffectiveness and by such 
excesses that the Mexican nobility, the higher clergy, the great 
landed proprietors, and in general the more enlightened classes 
had been rather confirmed in their attachment to the Royalist 
cause than attracted to that of independence. And yet the 
upper classes of Mexican society were not hostile to the idea 
of independence itself. On the contrary, they generally fa- 
vored separation from the mother country, provided it could 
be effected without jeopardizing their special interests. That 
is to say, if the character of the revolution were changed from 

41 For the declaration of independence and the constitution of 1814, see 
Gamboa, Leyes Constitucionales de Mexico du/rante el Siglo. XIX, 235, 
237 ff. 

42Alaman, Eistoria de Mexico, III, 545; IV, 166, 313, 334, 



64 PAI^T-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

a popular to an aristocratic movement, their opposition to it 
would largely disappear. An event wliicli occurred in Spain 
early in 1820 furnished the occasion for just such a change and 
led to the rapid consummation of independence under condi- 
tions more or less satisfactory to all elements of the popula- 
tion. 

The event referred to was the reestablishment of the Spanish 
constitution. The restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1814 and 
his putting aside of the constitution of 1812 had caused great 
rejoicings among the Loyalists in Mexico, and now that a lib- 
eral system was again to prevail, they, and especially the clergy, 
became greatly concerned as to the security of their special in- 
terests. The first impulse was to prevent the promulgation of 
the constitution and to offer Ferdinand an asylum in Mexico, 
where absolute government might be maintained unimpaired. 
But wiser counsels prevailed. The constitution was proclaimed 
and the new order of things was nominally accepted. Mean- 
while, plans were laid to unite all parties on a program whose 
end was independence.^^ 

Colonel Augustin Iturbide, a Mexican who had won distinc- 
tion in the royalist army against the insurgents and who up to 
this moment had remained loyal to the king, was chosen to 
carry the plans into effect. It was essential to win the support 
of those who had for a decade been fighting for independence, 
or if any should oppose, to break their power of resistance. 
Guerrero with his followers in the south appeared to present 
the most serious obstacle, and Iturbide determined to deal with 
him as the first step in the accomplishment of his enterprise. 
Obtaining from the viceroy, who was not a party to the con- 
spiracy, a commission to put down the remnant of the insurgent 
forces, Iturbide marched against Guerrero late in the year 
1820. After a few skirmishes in which the rebels were suc- 
cessful, Iturbide became convinced that the insurrection could 

43 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, V, 14, 60; Zavala, Ensayo Histdrico de 
las Revolucione$ de Meopico, I, 108; Poinsett, Notes on Mexico, 264. 



FOEMATION OF NEW STATES 65 

not be terminated by force as readily as he bad hoped. He 
therefore resolved to try a different procedure. ^^ 

Entering into communication with the rebel leader, Iturbide 
obtained without great difficulty the promise of his adhesion to 
the revolution in its new form. In the meantime agents had 
been sent to win over the leaders in different parts of the coun- 
try. Progress was rapid, and Iturbide was soon ready to make 
an open avowal of his intentions. Accordingly, on February 
24, 1821, he issued a proclamation which, while explaining the 
causes that impelled the separation of Mexico from the mother 
country, set forth the principles on which it was proposed to 
found the new order. This declaration of principles, being 
associated in name with the place at which it was published, 
is known to history as the Plan of Iguala.^^ Its essential pro- 
visions were: First, the conservation of the Catholic religion 
without tolerance of any other; secondly, absolute independ- 
ence under a constitutional monarchy to be known as the Mex- 
ican Empire ; and thirdly, the intimate union of Americans and 
Europeans; that is, citizenship and equality of rights for all, 
regardless of place of birth. Thus, under the device, religion, 
iTidependence, union, the Mexican revolution entered upon its 
final stage. 

The Plan of Iguala provided that the crown be offered to 
Ferdinand VII, and in the event of his failure to accept it, to 
the other members of his family in succession. It further 
provided that the country should be ruled in the interregnum 
by a body of regents, the presidency of which was offered to 
the Viceroy, Apodaca, in the expectation that he would not 
be unwilling to give his support to the scheme as it was set 
forth in Iturbide's proclamation. But Apodaca, far from giv- 
ing the movement his support, prepared to resist it by every 
means in his power. He did not proceed, however, with the 

44 Alamfin, Historia de Mexico, V, 57, 84. 

45 The Plan of Iguala is printed in full in the Appendix to Vol. V of 
AlamSn's Historia de Mexico, and in Gamboa's Leyes y Constituciones de 
Mexico, 283. 



66 PAE'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

vigor whiclij in the opinion of the officers of the Koyalist army, 
the occasion demanded, and they deposed him, appointing one 
of their own number, Francisco Novella, in his stead. This 
step did not result, as it was hoped it would, in arresting the 
progress of the revolution. On the contrary, the revolutionary 
ranks continued to fill with recruits from all sides and the 
country gradually passed into the control of the Patriots. 
Early in August, 1821, Iturbide entered the city of Puebla, 
which for some time had been invested, and from this advan- 
tageous position he disposed his troops to begin the siege of the 
capital itself. ^^ 

Shortly before the fall of Puebla a new viceroy, Juan 
O'Donoju by name, arrived at Vera Cruz. Being a liberal in 
politics, O'Donoju was little inclined to employ force to reduce 
the Mexicans to submission ; and, when he perceived that all 
the important interests in the country had at last been drawn 
into the movement for independence, he readily concluded that 
the continuance of the struggle was futile. He therefore en- 
tered into negotiations with Iturbide, and on August 24 con- 
cluded with him, though without authority, an agreement con- 
firmatory of the Plan of Iguala. This agreement, known as 
the Treaty of Cordova ^'^ because of its having been signed at 
a little town by that name some hundred miles inland from 
Vera Cruz, departed in one important particular from the 
Plan of Iguala; that is, it authorized the Mexican Cortes to 
elect an emperor in the event that none of the Spanish Bour- 
bons should accept the crown. By this change the way to the 
throne was opened to the ambition of Iturbide. 

Because of O'Donoju's lack of authority to conclude such 
an agreement. Novella and the leaders of the Eoyalist army 
declined to abide by it. Nevertheless Iturbide was able to take 
possession of the city of Mexico and to set up a government 

46 Alaman, op. cit., V, 257 ff. 

47 A translation of the treaty is found in American State Papers, Foreign 
Relations, IV; see also, Alamdn, Historia de Mexico, V, Appendix; and 
Gamboa, op. cit., 286. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 6Y 

without serious interference from the Eoyalists. The Regency, 
under the Plan of Iguala, was organized with Iturbide as its 
president, to which office was attached the chief command of 
the armed forces on hmd and sea. O'Donoju, who had en- 
tered the capital with the Patriot troops, was made one of the 
regents ; but he died suddenly a few days later. In February, 
1822, a national congress, convoked by the regency, met in the 
City of Mexico. In this assembly opposition to the regency 
was at once manifested by the former followers of Hidalgo and 
Morelos — the " old patriots " — because of the evident inten- 
tion of Iturbide to usurp the throne. Of the five members of 
the regency, three, who were strong partisans of Iturbide, were 
deposed and were replaced with persons hostile to him. More- 
over an active propaganda was begun in the press in favor of 
the establishment of a republic, and conspiracies were formed 
with that end in view. 

In due time news arrived of the rejection of the treaty of 
Cordova by the Spanish Government. Iturbide then deter- 
mined to gain possession of the throne without further delay. 
The situation was serious and uncertain, and the method of 
his procedure was altogether irregular. On the night of May 
18, 1822, disorganized bands of soldiers and crowds of the 
lowest class of people, known in Mexico as leperos, acclaimed 
him as emperor; and on the following day a mob composed of 
like elements of the population invaded the halls of the Na- 
tional Assembly and by threats of violence compelled that body 
to give its approval to the choice of the populace. If the cir- 
cumstance of intimidation had not deprived the action of the 
congress of its legal force, the further circumstance that less 
than a majority of the deputies were present and that a re- 
spectable number of these voted in the negative, would have 

sufficed to oast grave doubt upon the validity of the emperor's 
title.*8 

48 Mexican historians are in substantial agreement as to the facts relat- 
ing to the establishment of the empire, Cf, Alaman, Historia de Mewico, 



68 PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Although the conditions under which Iturbide assumed the 
crown were not such as to inspire confidence, yet, if he had 
possessed political sagacity, had had the good judgment to 
conciliate the partisans of representative government, and had 
not committed all manner of political blunders, he might have 
been able to induce the leaders of the various groups to give 
the new regime their united support. But, lacking penetra- 
tion and balance, he pursued a contrary course. In the first 
place, he made his government ridiculous in the eyes of many 
of his subjects by forming an imperial court whose members 
were premitted to enact the farce of imitating manners and 
customs to which the precedents of genera4;ions alone gave sanc- 
tion in the monarchies of the Old World. In the second place, 
he aroused bitter opposition on the part of those who were 
hostile to arbitrary government by gradually usurping the pow- 
ers of the congress and fijially by dissolving it altogether. ^^ 

The inevitable result was the downfall of the empire. In De- 
cember, 1822, Colonel Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, destined 
to occupy the center of the stage in Mexican affairs for long 
years to come, raised the standard of revolt at Vera " Cruz. 
Declaring in favor of the republican form of government, he 
was soon joined by Victoria, Guerrero, and other veterans of 
the early struggles for independence. The uprising spread rap- 
idly and soon became so formidable that the emperor attempted 
to check it by reassembling the congress which he had boldly 
dissolved a few months before. But his efforts were of no 
avail. Eealizing at length that his situation was hopeless, he 
sent to the congress on March 19, exactly ten months after his 
elevation to the throne, a formal renunciation of the imperial 
crown. This renunciation the congress, in order to avoid even 

V, 591 ff.; Zavala, Ensayo Histdrico, I, 164 if.; Bustamente, Cuadro His- 
torico, VI, 91 ff. Both Zavala and Bustamente were members of the con- 
gress. A good, brief account is given by J. R. Poinsett in his Notes on 
Mexico, 265-274. 

49Alaman, Historia de Mexico, Y, 637, 662 j Zavala, Ensayo Eistorico^ 
I, 175. . • - 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 69 

an implied recognition of his right to the thing renounced, re- 
fused to accept ; but it voted to permit him to quit the country 
and to pay him an annual stipend of 25,000 pesos, on condition 
that he establish his residence in Italy. ^'^ To this condition 
Iturbide agreed. 

His subsequent* career was as brief as it was tragic. Placed 
aboard a British vessel chartered for the purpose, he was con- 
ducted to Italy; but he remained there only a short time. 
Making his way to England, where he arrived in January, 
1824, he informed the Mexican Government of his movements, 
attributing his breach of agreement to the desire to aid in re- 
pelling an attack, which, he declared, Spain was preparing, in 
conjunction with the Holy Alliance, upon the independence of 
Mexico. The Mexican congress, however, fearing that it was 
his purpose to regain the imperial throne, decreed that he should 
be dealt with as a traitor and an outlaw, if, upon any pretext 
whatever, he should set foot upon Mexican soil. Ignorant of 
this measure, Iturbide, some four months after his arrival in 
England, embarked for Mexico. About the middle of July his 
ship cast anchor on the coast near Soto la Marina, where, ac- 
companied by Colonel Beneski, a Polish officer who had for- 
merly been in the imperial service in Mexico, he went ashore. 
But in spite of his disgTiise he was recognized and placed under 
arrest. The commandant of the district, Felipe la Garza, be- 
ing in doubt as to whether he should at once give effect to the 
proscription, resolved to consult the provincial congress of 
Tamaulipas, which was in session at the neighboring town of 
Padilla. No sooner was the matter presented to that body 
than Garza was ordered immediately to proceed with the execu- 
tion of the law, and in the afternoon of the same day, July 19, 
Iturbide was shot in the public square. ^^ 

50 Bustamente, Historia del Emperador D. Agustin de Iturbide, 135. 

51 The best account of the capture and execution of Iturbide is that 
given by Garza in his official report, which is found in full in Bustamente's 
Historia del Emperador, 249-258. Iturbide's Memoirs were published in 
England by M. J. Quin, on the eve of the former Emperor's return to Mexico. 



70 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINOTNGS 

Meanwliile, progress had been made toward the establish- 
ment of popular government in Mexico. Upon the abdication 
of Iturbide the congress vested the executive authority of the 
nation in a junta of three members, each of whom was author- 
ized to serve for alternate periods of one month in the office of 
president. In response to a general demand a new congress 
was convoked to meet the following October for the purpose 
of framing a constitution. Political parties at once began to 
form on the issue of a unitary system with little local autonomy, 
as opposed to a federal system with a weak central authority. 
Monarchism practically disappeared. The Bourbonists — that 
is, those who had favored the establishment of a Bourbon em- 
pire in Mexico, and who had never become reconciled to the 
elevation of Iturbide to the throne — gave their support to the 
group which stood for a strong centralized government; while 
the Iturbidists, moved in part, no doubt, by resentment against 
the Bourbonists, whom they blamed for the emperor's down- 
fall, joined forces with the partisans of a federal system. The 
centralists drew into their ranks a majority of the Spaniards 
resident in the country, the higher clergy, and the men of 
wealth and standing in the community; while the federalists, 
composed in the main of the humble sort of folk, gained 
strength and prestige by the adhesion of the " old patriots " — 
now regarded as the real national heroes — to their cause. 
Thus the two parties came to be distinguished not only as cen- 
tralistic and federalistic, but as aristocratic and democratic, re- 
spectively.^^ 

The same year the volume was translated and published in French under 
the following title: Memoires Autographes de don Agustin Iturbide, ex- 
empereur du Mexique, oontenant le detail des prinoipaux evenements de sa 
vie politique, avec une preface et des pieces justificatives. A pamphlet by 
Beneski, entitled: A Narrative of the Last Moments of the Life of Don 
Agustin de Iturbide, ex-emperor of Mexico, was published in New York in 
1825. The following recent studies of Iturbide have appeared: La Guerra 
de Independencia, Hidalgo — Iturbide (1910), by Francisco Bulnes, and 
Don Agustin de Iturbide by Augustin de Iturbide in the Records of the 
American Catholic Historical Society for December, 1915, and March, 1916. 
52 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, V, 763 ; Zavala, Ensayo Histdrico, I, 254. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES .71 

When the new congress assembled it was seen that the feder- 
alists were in the majority; in fact, they all appeared to have 
been federalists, differing only in the degree of local autonomy 
which they severally favored. A Constituent Act setting 
forth the fundamental principles upon which it was proposed 
to found the government was the first matter to receive consid- 
eration. The adoption of Articles 5 and 6 of the Act, provid- 
ing that the form of government should be that of a federal 
republic composed of states " free and sovereign " in all mat- 
ters pertaining to their internal administration, was the point 
upon which discussion principally turned. One of the repre- 
sentatives. Father Mier, a man of learning, whose long resi- 
dence and varied experiences in Europe and in the United 
States added authority to his words, made a notable address in 
which he pointed out the dangers attendant upon too great 
decentralization in the government. The prosperity of the 
United States under a loosely federated system had served, he 
thought, to blind the Spanish American countries to important 
differences between the two sections. He called attention to 
the fact that the Thirteen Colonies were originally separate and 
independent states and that they had formed a federation for 
the purpose of opposing their united strength to the oppression 
of England. For Mexico, already united, to break up into a 
loose federation would be but to weaken itself by division and 
to give free rein to the very evils which it was desired to hold 
in check. The want of enlightenment among the masses, the 
political inexperience of those who would be called upon to 
administer the local governments, the necessity for vigorous 
action to maintain order and preserve independence, and finally 
the very geographical configuration of the country, demanded 
that power should be retained for the most part in the hands 
of the central authorities. The speaker did not, however, con- 
demn the principle of federation itself. He merely opposed 
the application of it in such a way as to weaken the effective- 
ness of the national government. His ideal was a system mid- 



T2 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGIKNINGS 

way between that of the United States, where an excess of local 
autonomy prevailed, and that of Colombia and Peru, where [ 
centralization of authority was carried to an extreme. ^^ 

But argument was in vain. The Act was passed and, being 
promulgated in January, 1824, served as a fundamental law 
until the following October, when the constitution was com- 
pleted and put into effect.^* In respect to the general provi- 
sions which this instrument made for the organization of the 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the government, , 
as well as in respect to the large measure of local control which | 
it permitted to the provinces — henceforth to be called states ! 

— it followed the Constitution of the United States more or j 
less closely. It is not to be inferred, however, that the Mexi- j 
can constitution was a servile imitation of that of the United 
States; for ^throughout, in form as well as in spirit, it shows 
unmistakable evidences of having been strongly influenced by 
the Spanish constitution of 1812.^^ In accordance with the 
provisions of the new fundamental law, a president was elected 

— the choice falling to General Victoria who had already been 
elected provisionally — and the United Mexican states appeared | 
at last to have attained definite political organization. Fourj 
years later, however, Victoria's term of office came to a close! 
amid circumstances of the greatest disorder. The constitution 
from which so much had been expected was violated. The 
presidential succession was determined by force and a period i 
of anarchy from which Mexico was long to suifer was begun. ^^ 

Amid the upheavals which for years had been stirring the 
other Spanish American countries, the captaincy-general of 

53 Tlie speech is published in : Gonzalez, Biografia del Benemerito Mexi- 
cano D. Servwndo Teresa de Mier Noriega y Guerra, 350-363 ; and in Busta- 
mente, Historia del Emperador Agustin de Iturbide, 200-216. 

54 For the constitution see Gamboa, Leyes y Constitiiciones de M4adco, 
313-357. 

55 Cf. an article by James Q. D'ealey on The Spanish Source of the Mex- 
ican Constitution of 1824, in the Quarterly of the Texas State Historical 
Association for January, 1900. 

56 Alamdn, Historia de Mexico, Y, 812-843. 



FOKMATION OF NEW STATES IS 

Guatemala, embracing the provinces of Guatemala, Chiapas, 
Honduras, San Salvador, Leon (Nicaragua), and Costa Rica, 
had remained in a state of relative tranquillity. There had 
been revolts, it is true, but being sporadic they had been easily 
suppressed. Not until 1820, when the Spanish constitution 
was restored and freedom of speech was extended to the colonies, 
did a general movement in favor of independence make itself 
felt throughout Central America. The proclamation of the Plan 
of Iguala, to which Chiapas adhered, had the effect of hasten- 
ing decisive action on the part of the other provinces. Guate- 
mala, the capital, declared its independence on September 15, 
1821 ; buit, as the captain-general, Gainza, and the other co- 
lonial authorities joined in the declaration, they were con- 
tinued in office under a consultative junta, which was author- 
ized to exercise a general supervision over their acts. A con- 
gress was called, to which the other provinces were invited to 
send delegates, to decide whether or not independence should be 
made general and absolute, and if so, to determine the form of 
government and to frame a constitution. The way was thus 
purposely left open for a possible agreement, which Gainza and 
many others favored, for incorporation in the Mexican Empire 
under the Plan of Iguala. This idea, however, was not gener- 
ally approved, and, when Gainza took the oath of allegiance 
under the new order, he was required to employ a formula de- 
claring specifically that Guatemala was independent of Mexico 
and of all other nations. ^'^ 

Guatemala's declaration had the effect of precipitating action 
on the part of the other provinces. All declared their inde- 
pendence of Spain, but not all entertained the same opinion 
as to their future status. San Salvador was inclined to main- 
tain an independent position without connection with either 
Guatemala or Mexico. Nicaragua was divided, a part of the 
province being in favor of incorporation in the empire of 

5" Marure, Bosquejo Histdrico de las Revoluciones de Centra America, I, 
25. Alaman, Historia de Mexico, V, 344. 



74 PAN'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Mexico and a part preferring union with Guatemala. Hon- 
duras was similarly divided, while Costa Rica declared its in- 
dependence of all powers and resolved to await the outcome of 
events to decide upon its future connections.^^ 

When the news reached Mexico that the province of Chiapas 
had expressed a desire to become incorporated in the Mexican 
empire under the Plan of Iguala, the regency, but recently 
created, proclaimed its incorporation and ordered that in the 
convocation of the Cortes an invitation to send deputies to that 
body should be extended not only to Chiapas but to any other 
province or part of a province manifesting a desire to unite 
with Mexico.^^ Soon afterward, when Guatemala's action be- 
came known at the Mexican capital, Iturbide, as president of 
the regency, addressed a communication to Gainza, in which 
he declared that Guatemala, instead of attempting to remain 
independent, ought to unite with Mexico to form a great em- 
pire; that Guatemala was, in fact, incompetent to govern her- 
self; and that, as it might fall a victim to foreign ambition, a 
strong Mexican army was already marching southward to give 
it protection. 

While Iturbide' s designs were made manifest by this letter, 
his agents and partisans, who were growing in number, set on 
foot an agitation to bring about their realization. Late in No- 
vember, 1821, the Guatemalan junta, which now included in 
its membership representatives of the other provinces, resolved 
to lay the proposal of union before all the municipal govern- 
ments and request them to take the sense of their several com- 
munities upon it. Thirty days were allowed for their replies ; 
and, when the returns received by the end of that period were 
canvassed, it was found that a majority were in favor of im- 
mediate annexation. Thereupon, without waiting for the re- 
sponses of a number of municipalities, the junta, in spite of 
its previous announcement that it would commit the question 

58 G6mez Carrillo, Compendio de Eistoria de la America Central, 163-171. 

59 Alaman, Eistoria de Mexico, V, 346. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 16 

to a congress for final decision, declared, on January 5, 1822, 
that the provinces of Central America were henceforth " in- 
corporated " in the empire of Mexico. This hasty action was 
deemed necessary in order to avoid a civil war, which would, 
it was feared, destroy the political harmony which the provinces 
had so long enjoyed under a common government. Moreover, 
the incorporation was agreed to on condition that, if the prov- 
inces should in future find it practicable to constitute an inde- 
pendent state, they were to be permitted to do so.^*^ 

Although action of the junta was generally acquiesced in, 
San Salvador disputed its legality and prepared to maintain 
her independence by force. Gainza, acting in the name of the 
empire, attempted to reduce the province to submission and 
an armed conflict ensued. Shortly afterward General Filisola, 
who had been appointed by the Mexican government as captain- 
general with full military and political power over the newly 
acquired territory, arrived on the scene, and, desiring to end 
the conflict without further bloodshed, arranged an armistice 
and entered into negotiations with the authorities of the recalci- 
trant province ; but, after some months of fruitless negotiations, 
he resolved to settle the difliculty by arms. Victorious in a 
number of encounters, he took the capital and flnally compelled 
the remnant of the republican army to capitulate. ^-^ But the 
victory proved to be fruitless; for, a month after the war was 
brought to a close, the fall of the empire made inevitable the 
reestablishment of Central American independence. 

Of San Salvador's resistance to forcible annexation to Mex- 
ico, there was an incident which merits a passing notice. Dur- 
ing the negotiations between Filisola and the Salvadorean gov- 
ernment, the latter proposed to unite with Mexico on condi- 
tions which would be disclosed to the Mexican congress alone. 
Filisola refused to transmit the proposal without full knowl- 

60 Marure, Bosque jo Historico, I, 31-38. For the act of incorporation, 
see Ihid., Appendix, doc. 2. 

61 Marure, Bosquejo Historico, I, 50-51. 



YO PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

edge of its terms, and, in conformity with his instructions, de- 
manded that the Salvadoreans lay down their arms as a condi- 
tion preliminary to any form of accommodation.^^ The con- 
gress of San Salvador replied by an Act providing for annexa- 
tion to the United States, and declaring that in the name of 
the latter the attack of the Mexican forces would be repelled. ^^ 
This move produced upon Filisola no deterrent effect. On the 
contrary, adverting to the fact that Mexico was at peace with 
the United States, and declaring the opinion that territory be- 
longing to the empire would not be admitted into the Anglo- 
American federation without a previous agreement between the 
two governments, he proceeded with his military operations. 
Nevertheless, the measure encouraged the Salvadoreans to con- 
tinue their resistance, in the belief that succor would soon come 
to them from the United States. At one time, indeed, a base- 
less rumor prevailed that American warships were actually on 
the way to protect the province and redress its wrongs.®* 

Nor is it to be inferred that San Salvador, in invoking the 
protection of the United States, was moved solely by opposition 
to incorporation into the Mexican Empire. The fact that the 
congress dispatched three commissioners to the United States 
with full powers to conclude an arrangement would appear to 
indicate that the proposal of union was not a mere makeshift. 
The commissioners landed at Boston in May, 1823, and pro- 
ceeded later to Washington.®^ Meanwhile the situation in Mex- 
ico had changed. Iturbide had abdicated, and, a republic hav- 
ing succeeded the empire, a more generous conception of liberty 
had come to prevail. The Mexican congress, acknowledging 
the right of the Central American provinces to determine for 

62 Ihid., I, 48. Garcia, Documentos para la Historia de Mexico, XXXVI, 
150-154. 

63 Moore, Digest of International Law, I, 583, citing Clay, Secretary of 
State to Williams, charge d'affaires to the Federation of the Center of 
America, February 10, 1826. Mss. Inst, to Ministers, XI, 5. 

64Marure, Bosquejo Histdrico, I, 49. 

65 Torrens to Alamfin, May 31, 1823; La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 10. 



FOKMATION OF NEW STATES 77 

themselves their future political status, accorded them a free 
choice as to withdrawal from the union ; and San Salvador cast 
in its fortunes with those of the other Central American states.^® 
During the interval of several months between the fall of the 
Mexican Empire and the definite establishment of the Central 
American Eepublic, the Salvadorean commissioners remained in 
the United States, apparently awaiting further instructions. 
Torrens, the Mexican charge d'affaires at Washington, kept his 
government advised regarding their movements. In a dispatch 
dated August 21, 1823,^'^ he reported that he had talked with 
two of the commissioners, Arce and Ebdriguez,^^ who informed 
him that since Mexico had become a republic they preferred 
union with it, and that their colleague, Castillo, had set out 
for the Mexican capital to inform himself respecting the situa- 
tion there and to discover the attitude of the new regime toward 
San Salvador. In the same dispatch, Torrens stated that the 
commissioners were generally regarded as representing not a 
part but the whole of the ancient kingdom of Guatemala, and 
had been treated by the public with great cordiality; and that, 
even if San Salvador should, as they desired, decide in favor 
of union with Mexico, they had intended to approach the gov- 
ernment at Washington at least for the purpose of explaining 
why the plan of annexation to the United States had been 
abandoned. He further stated, however, that one of them, 
Arce, had just departed in great haste for New York under 
circumstances calculated to arouse suspicion; that he had been 

66 Moore, op. cit., I, 582. 

67 La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 20. 

68 In his dispatch of May 31, cited above, Torrens declared that four com- 
missioners had arrived; namely, Rafael Castillo, Manuel Jose Arce, Juan 
Manuel Rodriguez, and Cayetano Vedoya. A fifth, Manuel Zelago, Torrens 
learned, had died at sea on the way to the United States. Apparently, 
however, not all of these were commissioned to treat with the United States 
on the subject of annexation. Marure mentions only one commissioner, 
Rodriguez. Valladares, in his biographical sketch of Arce (Prdceres de la 
Independencia) refers to Aree's activities in the United States, but does not 
mention the question of annexation. Clay, in his instructions to Williams 
says that there were three commissioners, but does not mention their names. 



78 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

commissioning military and naval officers and had at his dis- 
posal, either at Boston or New York, an armed vessel and a 
quantity of military supplies. Torrens was thus induced to 
believe that the Americans had persuaded Arce to lead an ex- 
pedition to Central America with a view to annex to the United 
States not only San Salvador but all the other Central Amer- 
ican provinces. The expedition never set out, if indeed it was 
ever seriously contemplated by any one. A month later Tor- 
rens informed his government that the commissioners had re- 
turned to San Salvador.®^ Although they had received en- 
couragement from private individuals, yet persons in authority I 
appear to have manifested but little interest in their mission, if 
They, in fact, left the country without having seen either the jl 
President or the Secretary of State. '^° 

In June, 1823, a congress met at the city of Guatemala, and, 
although composed of representatives of but two provinces, 
Guatemala and San Salvador, declared, on July 1, the former I? 
captaincy-general of Guatemala, as a whole, to be independent \ 
of Mexico and of all other powers ; adopting as the title of the 
new nation the " United Provinces of the Center of America," } 
in the hope that the other provinces would join the federa- [ 
tion.''^^ San Salvador from the first bore a leading part in the \ 
formation of the new state. The president of the congress and 
two members of the triumvirate, to which the executive author- ! 
ity was provisionally entrusted, were Salvadoreans. Possibly i 
these developments may have had an influence in causing San 
Salvador to abandon any thought of annexation to the United I 

States. Owing, however, to the infrequency of communiea- ! 

I 

69 According to Valladares {Proceres de la Independencia, 99) , Arce sailed ! 
from New York on October 18, bound for Tampico in the interest of a I 
scheme which he had been promoting in the United States for the libera- ! 
tion of Cuba. 1 

70 Torrens to AlamSn, September 18, 1823; La Diplomacia Mexicana, j 
II, 32. 

71 Marure, Bosquejo Historico, I, 62 ff. For the declaration of July 1, i 
see ibid. Appendix, doc. 4. 



FOKMATION" OF ITEW STATES 79 

tion, the events took place long before they were known to the 
Salvadorean conmiissioners. 

Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Kica, as was expected, soon 
united their fortunes with those of Guatemala and San Sal- 
vador; and in December, 1823, a congress, composed of rep- 
resentatives of all the provinces, adopted the bases of a federal 
constitution, in accordance with whose provisions the provinces 
were erected into states and a national government was organ- 
ized. In November, 1824, a definitive constitution was adopted 
and promulgated."^^ Modeled in its essential principles upon 
the constitution of the United States,"^^ it contained some im- 
portant departures from that instrument, due in part, as in 
Mexico, to the influence of the Spanish constitution, and in 
part to the influence of local conditions. It especially provided 
that the republic should be known as the " Federation of Cen- 
tral America." This provision, however, was not strictly ob- 
served in state papers, the old title being occasionally used, and, 
with yet greater frequency, the variant, " Federated Republic 
of Central America." '^'^ 

A presidential election was held in 1824, in advance of the 
formal adoption of the constitution. There were two candi- 
dates for the ofiice. One of these was Jose del Valle, a man 
of learning, and an able advocate of American unity. The 
other was Manuel Jose de Arce, the Salvadorean whose activi- 
ties in the United States during the summer of 1823 have been 
mentioned. The election resulted in a contest which was not 
resolved until February, 1825, when the first congress under 
the constitution decided in Arce's favor. On the face of the 
returns, Valle appears to have received a majority of the 

72 For the constitution, see Gaceta del Gohierno Supremo de Guatemala, 
No. 1. A translation is found in British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 
725-747. 

73Marure, Bosquejo Historico, 1, 112 S. 

7* See, for example, the treaty concluded, March 15, 1825, and December 
5, 1825, with Colombia and the United States respectively. Marure, Bos- 
quejo Histdrico, I, Appendix, doc. 10, 



80 pa:n^-americanism: its beginnings 

electoral vote, and the action of the congress not unnaturally 
embittered him; but, unfortunately, his hostility to the new 
administration was but one of the many factors that produced 
in the new republic a serious state of discord.'^^ Conflicts be- 
tween state and national authorities, local quarrels of long 
standing, personal animosities, the alliance of the president with 
the enemies of the constitution,'''® and the general tendency to, 
disregard the provisions of that instrument rapidly brought ' 
about a condition of affairs bordering upon anarchy. Oppo- 
sition to Arce finally became so strong that he was obliged to 
resign. His retirement, however, did not save the situation. • 
Order was not restored ; and although the federation nominally ' 
continued to exist until 1839,'^'^ it had long before that time 
fallen into practical dissolution. 

Briefly summarizing our account of the formation of the new 
American states, we have seen that, upon the ruins of the Euro- 
pean colonial systems then remaining in the New World, there 
were erected, during the second and third decades of the nine- 
teenth century, eleven independent powers. One of these, 
Haiti, successor to the colony which the Erench had long main- 
tained in the western part of Santo Domingo, was later tem- 
porarily extended by conquest over the eastern part of the 
island, where, except for a short period, Spanish control had 
been supreme. Another, the empire of Brazil, embraced the 
whole of the vast Portuguese territory in the continent of 
South America. The rest — Mexico, Central America, Colom- 
bia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, the United Provinces of Rio de la 
Plata, Uruguay, and Paraguay, all of Spanish origin — formed 
an unbroken chain of independent states extending from the 
northern limits of California to the southernmost bounds of 
Chile and the Argentine. As between the nations of this group, 
composed of former colonies of Spain, abundant evidence has 

75 Marure, Bosquejo Histdrico, I, 93, 139. 

76 Valladares (Proceres de la Independencia, 112 ff. ) presents Arce in a 
more favorable light. 

77 G6mez Carrillo, Compendia de Historia de la America Central, 202. 



FORMATION OF NEW STATES 81 

been adduced of the existence of a unity of purpose during the 
struggle for independence. As colonies they had been subject 
for three hundred years to a common rule ; they had a common 
ethnic origin; they spoke a common language; they were in- 
fluenced by common social traditions and practices ; and finally, 
they achieved their independence in a common struggle against 
a common enemy. Their cohesion was therefore the natural 
result of causes which operated only indirectly, in the forma- 
tion of the more inclusive sentiment of Pan- Americanism. It 
remains to be seen what were the forces that drew together the 
nations of the Western Hemisphere irrespective of political 
origin, of racial composition, of religion, of customs, or or lan- 
guage. To make this clear will be the purpose of the succeed- 
ing chapters. 



CHAPTER III 

EAILUEE OF MONA.BCHICAI, PLOTS 

Some reference has been made in the preceding chapter tq 
the efforts of San Martin to set up an independent monarchVi] 
in Peru, and the history of Mexico's experiment as an empire|l 
under Iturbide has also been briefly related. Whether the new] 
states should adopt the republican or the monarchical form oi\ 
government was a question of vital importance ; for, if the lati] 
ter form had prevailed, and if dynastic connections had beenji 
maintained by the new governments with the reigning housesO; 
of Europe, the development of a separate political system on 
this continent would have been impossible. The subject, there- 
fore, deserves further consideration. 

Although the series of revolutions which took place through- 
out Hispanic America during the second and third decades of 
the last century did undoubtedly involve, from the first, an idea 
of separation from the mother country, yet the movements 
were not aimed primarily at the attainment of independence, jj 
Hence there was little thought, in the beginning, of the form i; 
of government most convenient to adopt. The conception of j 
absolute freedom from European control and of an independent |, 
existence under a republican regime was slowly evolved out of i 
the struggle. Moreover, loyalty to the Spanish sovereign was [ 
SL remarkable characteristic of the revolution in its early stages, j 
JSTapoleon's usurpation of the throne of Spain met with scant I 
sympathy or support in the Spanish dominions in America. I 
On the contrary, the colonial authorities, on hearing of the 
emperor's designs, proclaimed Ferdinand VII as their lawful 
king and established relations with the revolutionary junta, 
which had been formed in Seville to govern in the name of the 

82 



FAILURE OF MONAECHICAL PLOTS 83 

captive monarch. In some quarters, however, doubt w^as ex- 
pressed as to the right of that body to exercise supreme author- 
ity and, in 1810 when the junta was forcibly dissolved, there 
followed, generally, a movement in the colonies to establish 
governmental committees owning no superior authority in the 
mother country. Still these provisional governments professed 
to act in the name of Ferdinand VII.^ 

In spite of the general indifference toward independence, 
there were numerous leaders throughout Spanish America who 
looked forward to and labored to establish, a new order of 
things. Among these was the Chilean, Juan Martinez de Rozas, 
whose work may be mentioned to illustrate the conflict, which 
must have been going on in the minds of many, between loyalty 
to the Spanish king and the desire for a free national existence. 
In 1810 there were circulated in Chile ^ manuscript copies — 
there was no printing press in the province at that time — of 
a pamphlet entitled " Politico-Christian catechism arranged for 
the instruction of the free peoples of South America," of which 
Rozas was believed to be the author. After considering the 
evils of a monarchy in all its forms he concluded that " a 
democratic-republican government in which the people rule by 
means of representatives or deputies whom they elect is the 
only government which preserves the dignity and majesty of a 
people; brings men nearest the equality in which God has 
created them; is least exposed to the horrors of despotism and 
arbitrariness; is the most moderate, the freest, and therefore 
the best calculated to make rational beings happy." And yet 
he recommended that a government be constituted in the name 
of Ferdinand VII, because that unfortunate prince merited 
the sympathy and the tender consideration of every American 
heart. If Ferdinand should not return to his throne, however, 
Rozas believed that a government should be formed free from 
the control of " usurping kings, or of the English, or of Prin- 

iVillanueva, Resumen de la Historia de America, 212-218. 
2 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, VII, 184, 185. 



84: PAN^-AMEKICANISM: ITS BEGIN^NINGS 

cess Charlotte, or of the Portuguese, or of foreign dominatioii 
of any kind whatever." ^ jj 

By the time the restoration of Ferdinand had been effectec 
in 1814, the inevitable drift of the revolution toward independ 
ence had attained irrepressible momentum. Moreover, the re-^ 
actionary attitude of Ferdinand seriously impaired what re 
mained of the traditional loyalty to Spain and inclined th^ 
colonies more decidedly toward independence. On the other|j 
hand, the success of the Royalist arms and the growing anarchy! 
within the Patriot ranks led many of the leaders of the revolu-|)| 
tion to believe that independence was not to be achieved, nor| 
internal order and tranquillity restored except through the pro-i) 
tection of some powerful nation, or through the rule of a princejj 
of some one or another of the reigning families of Europe. j 

This was the condition of affairs especially in the United 
Provinces of Rio de la Plata. There the masses of the people 
warmly championed the idea of a federal republic, but many 
of the leaders were of the opinion that a constitutional monarchy 
was the only form of government capable of meeting the ex- 
traordinary conditions which had arisen. Accordingly two ( 
agents, Manuel Belgrano and Bernardino Rivadavia, were com- { 
missioned to proceed to Europe with secret instructions to se- 
cure independence by negotiating the establishment of a con- 
stitutional monarchy with a Spanish or an English prince as 
sovereign; or in their default one of any other powerful house 
of Europe.^ They were further instructed to go by way of 

3 Reference is here made to the different proposals which had been made 
for the disposition of the Spanish colonies. 

4 Neither Rivadavia nor Belgrano, according to Mitre, was at heart a 
monarchist, as the sum total of their public life goes to show. In speak- 
ing of this chimerical mission, Mitre says : " These two great citizens, the 
two loftiest representatives of Argentine democracy, always admired and 
supported one another and continued, until separated by death, in their 
mutual esteem. Misled for the moment in their political principles, this 
passing error, motived by their love of the public welfare involves a moral 
lesson, which teaches to what extent contemporary happenings may becloud 
the minds of the most intelligent and lead astray the moral sense of even 
the most noble characters." Mitre, Historic de San Martin, II, 285, 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 85 

Rio de Janeiro and there to open negotiations with Lord Strang- 
ford, British minister at the court of Brazil. 

Shortly after the departure of these agents the Director of 
the United Provinces resigned and was succeeded by Carlos 
Alvear. The new Director appointed Manuel Jose Garcia con- 
fidential agent to the court of Brazil with instructions to co- 
operate in the task intrusted to Belgrano and Rivadavia. In 
the face of serious internal disorders, which the acts of Alvear 
himself had served to aggravate, it was deemed expedient to 
take steps to place the United Provinces under the protection of 
Great Britain. Garcia was made the bearer of two notes, one 
of which was addressed to the British Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs. In this note Alvear declared that the provinces desired 
to belong to Great Britain; that they wished to receive her 
laws; to obey her government and to live under her powerful 
influence; that they placed implicit trust in the generosity and 
good faith of the English people.^ The note closed with an 
urgent request that troops be sent to restore order and that some 
person of authority and standing be designated to take charge 
of the colony and begin to mold the country to the will of the 
British king and nation. The second note was addressed to 
Lord Strangford, and in matter and form was of similar pur- 
port to the one directed to the Foreign OflBce at London.^ 

Garcia arrived at Rio early in 1815. Though he shared with 
Alvear the opinion that it would be better in the last extremity 
to surrender the colony to England than to submit again to the 
domination of Spain, he was not convinced, as was Alvear, that 
the situation had become hopeless. Counseled by Rivadavia, 
to whom he confided his instructions, and comprehending the 
gravity of the proposed step, which partook somewhat of the 

Barros Arana says that both were republicans in character, habits, and 
I.-rinciples. He expresses the opinion that the majority of the leaders were 
likewise, by instinct and conviction, believers in the republican system. 
Historia Jeneral de Chile, XII, 24-25. 

5 Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, II, 261 (ed. 1902) . 

6 Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, II, 256-261. 



86 PAiN'-Al.IEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS i 

nature of a criminal act, to use his own characterization, Gar- 
cia resolved to disobey his instructions. In accordance with 
this resolution he withheld the note directed to the British 
minister at Rio and presented the matter to him orally, in a 
less humiliating form. But Garcia found that Lord Strang- 
ford not only lacked authority to negotiate, but had been in- 
structed by his government to act in harmony with Spain in 
matters relating to the war in America. 

Thus, disappointed in their first efforts '^ the commissioners 
set out for England, where they arrived in May, 1815. A more 
unfavorable time for treating with Great Britain could scarcely 
be imagined. The whole of Europe was in arms against Napo- 
leon, who, having shortly before escaped from the island of 
Elba, had again assumed the crown of France. Since the prin- 
ciple of legitimacy was being strongly invoked in the new strug- 
gle against the emperor, it was clear that England was not in 
a position to give encouragement to a plan which would have 
been in direct violation of that principle. Moreover, by the 
terms of the treaty of July 5, 1814, between Great Britain and 
Spain, of whose existence the Argentine agents appear to have 
been ignorant until their arrival in England, the two countries 
entered into an alliance in consequence of which they agreed 
to forward by all possible means their respective interests.^ 
On August 28 of the same year additional articles were signed, 
the third article of which was as follows : " His Britannic 
Majesty being anxious that the troubles and disturbances which 

7 It appears that the commissioners during their stay at Rio de Janeiro 
entered into negotiations with the Brazilian chancellery and that on Jan- 
uary 15, 1815, an agreement was reached which was to serve later as the 
basis of new negotiations. 

According to this agreement, Brazil was to be permitted to occupy, with- 
out resistance on the part of Buenos Aires, the Banda Oriental, and the 
government of Buenos Aires engaged to see that the congress should seek 
annexation to Brazil, thus forming an independent empire under the scepter 
of the Prince Regent of Brazil, who should take the title of the Emperor of 
South America. Villanueva, Bolivar i/ El General San Martin, 31-32; 
52-57. 

8 British and Foreign State Papers, 1814, I, 273. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 87 

unfortunately prevail in the dominions of his Catholic Majesty 
in America should entirely cease, and the subjects of those 
provinces should return to their obedience to their lawful sov- 
ereign, engages to take the most effectual measures for pre- 
venting his subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, or 
any other warlike article to the revolted in America." ^ It 
was evident, therefore, that no help was to be obtained from 
England. 

Under the circumstances the Argentine commissioners, ac- 
cepting the advice of Manuel Sarratea,^'' resident agent of the 
Buenos Aires Government in London, resolved to forego all 
efforts to treat with the government of Great Britain or that of 
Spain, and instead to open negotiations with the deposed Span- 
ish king, Charles IV, who was at the time domiciled in Rome. 
Charles IV, it will be recalled, had been forced to abdicate, 
as a result of the rebellion of Aranjuez, shortly before the Na- 
poleonic invasion of Spain, and the Prince of Asturias had 
been proclaimed as Ferdinand VII. During the occupation 
of Spain by the armies of JSTapoleon, Charles and Ferdinand, 
as well as other members of the royal family, were held as pris- 
oners in France. By the treaty of Valengay,^^ the crown of 
Spain was restored to Ferdinand, who being released returned 
to his kingdom in the spring of 1814. The regency and the 
Cortes, representing the liberal element of the population, had 

9 Ibid., 292. 

10 Sarratea, who, according to Mitre, was a man of versatility, a gifted 
conversationalist, a consummate political speculator, not lacking in ability 
or breadth of view, suffered the least illusion of any of those concerned in 
the project, with respect to its desirability or the possibility of realizing 
it, though he was its real author. He entered upon the affair merely as 
an interesting adventure. Historia de Belgrano, II, 277. 

11 After the invasion of Spain in 1808 Ferdinand was held as a prisoner 
at Valengay. Charles was detained at Marseilles. Toward the end of 
1813 the continued success of the allies drove Napoleon to enter into negotia- 
tions with Ferdinand, in the hope that by restoring him to the throne of 
Spain he might embroil that power with its British ally. A treaty was 
concluded on December 11, 1813, which stipulated, among other things, that 
Ferdinand should be recognized by the emperor as King of Spain and the 
Indies. Alison, Histoi-y of Europe, XII, 423, 426. 



88 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

refused to ratify the treaty, and they were opposed to recog- 
nizing Ferdinand except on condition that he swear to the con- 
stitution of 1812. But the Liberals were a small minority. 
The great mass of the people acclaimed Ferdinand, and soon 
he was recognized on all sides as the lawful king.^^ 

After the fall of Napoleon there was no disposition on the 
part of the powers to insist upon the return of Charles IV to 
the throne, although his abdication was originally brought 
about and was afterward maintained by force, in violation of 
the principle of legitimacy. Charles, therefore, left without 
support from any quarter, signed, January 14, 1815, a species 
of family pact in the form of a declaration renouncing forever 
in favor of Ferdinand VII all claims to the throne of Spain. ^^ 
But it was thought that this agreement, ratified as it was at 
the moment of Napoleon's triumphant return, lacked binding 
force ; that the very fact of the coalition of the powers against 
Napoleon placed Charles in a position of vantage, for, in order 
to be consistent with their declarations and maintain in all 
its vigor the principle of legitimacy, the members of the coali- 
tion could not fail to recognize him as the lawful King of 
Spain. Moreover, a failure of the allies to support him might 
result in his being thrown into the arms of Napoleon. 

The commissioners proposed, therefore, first, to obtain from 
Charles IV a declaration as sovereign recognizing the separa- 
tion of the colonies from Spain and constituting two or more 
independent monarchies upon whose thrones should be placed 
Spanish princes; secondly, to induce Charles to communicate 
the plan to the sovereigns of Europe and to request them to 
support it against the opposition of Ferdinand VII. It was 
believed that in this way the hostility of the absolutist govern- 
ments of Europe could be overcome, and at a single stroke in- 
dependence attained and the war ended. From the standpoint 

12 Cambridge Modern History, X, 212. 

13 British and Foreign State Papers, 1814, II, 873. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 89 

of European politics, the plan was not lacking in plausibility, 
for it offered a solution based on legitimacy. JSTevertheless, it 
was destined to failure. Before the negotiations were well un- 
der way I^apoleon's power had been destroyed, and in view of 
this turn of affairs Charles IV refused outright to give the 
scheme his approval, thus bringing the negotiations to an abru pt 
end.-^* 

This venture having failed, Belgrano returned to America, 
leaving Rivadavia to continue negotiations in Europe. In 
March, 1816, shortly after Belgrano's arrival at Buenos Aires, 
the congress of Tucuman convened to consider a number of 
questions of vital importance to the provinces, among them 
being the declaration of independence and the form of govern- 
ment to be adopted. It must be remembered that the inde- 
pendence of the Buenos Aires Government, though actually an 
accomplished fact, had not yet been expressly declared. This 
step had been awaiting the selection of the form of government, 
for upon that would depend the question of recognition and 
the possibility of forming much desired alliances. Belgrano, 
strongly impressed by the course of events in Europe, declared 
m a secret session of the congress that the whole tendency of 
European politics was toward monarchy and away from re- 
publicanism. He had become convinced, however, of the de- 
sirability of separation from Spain, and he accordingly recom- 
mended the immediate declaration of independence. As to the 
form of government he inclined toward monarchy and he sug- 
gested the resuscitation of the ancient Inca empire, by erecting 
a throne at Cuzco and placing upon it a descendant of the Inca 
kings. The congress accepted this recommendation with ref- 
erence to the declaration of independence, a resolution to that 
effect being passed on July 9, but though the body was over- 
whelmingly in favor of the principle of monarchy, it rejected 
the proposal for the restoration of the Inca dynasty, as there 

14 Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, II, 271-28^, 



90 PAISI'-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

were other schemes under consideration which appeared to be 
more feasible. -^^ 

One of the first acts of the congress of Tucuman was the 
election of Juan Martin de Pueyrredon as supreme director of 
the United Provinces. Pueyrredon on assuming the directorate 
became interested in the promotion of plans for the conversion 
of the government of the provinces into a monarchy. As early 
as 1808, when Napoleon usurped the crown of Spain, Princess 
Charlotte, wiie of the prince regent of Brazil and sister of 
Ferdinand VII, had begun to intrigue to get possession of the 
Spanish dominions in America,^^ considering them lost to Spain. 
Out of these intrigues grew a number of proposals, among which 
was one to create in Buenos Aires a monarchy with Princess 
Charlotte as regent. But this and other similar schemes being 
opposed by Great Britain, as the ally of Spain and virtual pro- 
tector of Portugal, came to nothing, though they did not lack 
supporters among the American subjects of Ferdinand, par- 
ticularly in Buenos Aires. -^"^ 

The idea of establishing some sort of political connection be- 
tween the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires 
was kept alive. Shortly before the congress of Tucuman de- 
clared the independence of the united provinces, a communica- 
tion was received from Garcia proposing that the King of Por- 
tugal be recognized as sovereign. The congress after consider- 
ation appointed a special agent to negotiate with the Brazilian 
court on the basis of the following alternative projects: First, 

15 Mitre, Eistoria de Belgrano, II, 329-333. 

16 According to a report made by Joel R. Poinsett to the State Depart- 
ment, November 4, 1818, on his mission to South America, manifestoes were 
published by the Infante dom Pedro, nephew of Charles IV of Spain, and by 
the Infanta Carlota setting forth their right to the Spanish dominions in 
America. These manifestoes were accompanied by letters addressed to the 
viceroy and governors of provinces and were circulated from Buenos Aires 
to Mexico. Am. State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 342—3. See also Barros Arana, 
Eistoria de Chile, VIII, 92-100. 

17 Villanueva, La Monarquia en America: Bolivar y el General San Mar- 
tin, 10-17. Mitre, Eistoria de Belgrano, II, 201-205; III, 188-192. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 91 

the reestablishment of the Inca dynasty and the union of that 
dynasty with the house of Braganza; secondly, the crowning 
in the United Provinces of a Brazilian prince or some European 
prince not Spanish who would marry a Brazilian princess ; and 
finally, as a last resort, the recognition of the King of Portugal 
on condition that he remain on American soil. The agent des- 
ignated, however, did not accept the post and the Director, 
under authority of the congress, continued the negotiations, 
employing for the purpose as before the agent, Garcia. ^^ 

Pueyrredon, though born in Buenos Aires, was the son of 
a Frenchman and having been educated in France naturally 
felt a predilection for that nation. Though he continued ne- 
gotiations with Brazil,^^ he turned his attention preferably to 
the prosecution of plans aimed at placing a French prince upon 
the prospective throne of the united provinces. It appears 
that about this time he received proposals in connection with a 
plot which had as its object the establishment of a great His- 
pano- American confederation, at the head of which was to be 
placed Joseph Bonaparte, who had not, it seems, abdicated his 
title of King of the Indies.^" The promoters of this scheme 
were exiled followers of the Great Napoleon. ^^ They proposed 
to raise a body of Indian troops in the western part of the 
United States, invade Mexico, and once in possession of that 
country, extend their operations to the colonies further south. 
The French minister at Washington, Hyde de Neuville, having 
learned of the plot, entered a protest to the Secretary of State 
against its further prosecution on the ground of the violation 
of neutrality. He was joined in this protest by the ministers 
of Great Britain and Spain. The American Government took 

18 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin, 51-57. 

19 Mitre, Hisforia de Belgrano, III, 310-326. 

20 Villanueva, Resumen de la Historia de America, 253. 

21 The scholar and statesman, Lakanal, Marshal Clauzel, and General Des- 
monettes are mentioned by Villanueva. {Bolivar y el General San Martin, 
59.) A colony of French exiles received from congress a grant of land 



92 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

steps to comply with its obligations, and whether for this reason 
or some other the scheme was soon abandoned. ^^ 

Hyde de Neuville, having the opportunity to note the de- 
velopment of the revolution in the Spanish colonies and be- 
lieving its success to be inevitable, unless Spain changed her 
colonial policy, recommended to the Due de Richelieu that two 
constitutional monarchies be set up in America; one in the 
region of the Rio de la Plata and the other in Mexico. ^^ These 
two monarchies, backed by that of Brazil, would be able, he 
thought, to smother the insurrection in the rest of the colonies, 
destroy the spirit of republicanism wherever it existed, and put 
an end to the predominance of Washington and London in the 
affairs of Spanish America. He supported his recommendation 
as to Mexico by an observation of the French consul at Balti- 
more to the effect that unless Mexico were given a Bourbon 
king it would fall under the direct influence of the United States 
and thus be lost to Europe ; and as to the United Provinces, by 
a statement of Secretary Adams to the effect that within a few 
months the United States would be obliged to recognize their 
independence. Richelieu favored the plan of Hyde de Neu- 
ville and discussed it with the representatives of the powers. 
In August, 1818, he proposed to Spain that either the Prince 
of Lucca or the infante, Erancisco de Paula, be crowned at 
Buenos Aires; and he offered to take the matter before the 
congress which was soon to meet at Aix-la-Chapelle,^^ if Spain 
so desired. But the negotiations failed, for Eerdinand VII 
maintained an uncompromising attitude, proudly refusing to 
acknowledge that he was powerless to prevent the further dis- 
integration of his crumbling empire.^^ 

on the Tombigbee River in Alabama and settled there in the winter and 
spring of 1816-1817. Pickett, History of Alabama, 623-633. 

22 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 9, 19, 20. 

23 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin, 62, citing Hyde de Neu- 
ville to Richelieu, May 14, 1817. 

24 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin, 83-88. 

25 Other efforts were made to extend the influence of this congress to the 
Spanish colonies, but they were defeated by the stubborn attitude of Fer- 



FAILUEE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 93 

While these negotiations were going on in Europe, Pueyrre- 
don and his colleagues were taking steps at Buenos Aires which 
were intended to lead to a definite agreement with France. 
After an unsuccessful attempt to communicate directly with 
the Due de Richelieu, Pueyrredon received an agent, Le Moyne, 
by name, of the French Government who had been sent to 
Buenos Aires by the Marquis of Osmond, French ambassador 
at London, for the purpose of counteracting the influence of 
the Bonapartists who were in the councils of Pueyrredon, and 
of announcing that Europe would view with extreme repugnance 
the establishment of a republic in South America. In Sep- 
tember, 1818, Le Moyne reported to Osmond ^® that the Buenos 
Aires Government was strongly in favor of a close political 
connection with France, that San Martin and Belgrano, who 
were formerly partisans of England, were now convinced that 
France offered greater advantages; that the monarchical sys- 
tem was generally preferred to the republican ; that Chile and 
Peru would immediately unite with a monarchy set up at 
Buenos Aires; that the constitution which was at that time in 
preparation was being given as strong a monarchical charac- 
ter as circumstances would permit; and finally, that if a mon- 
archy were negotiated the Duie of Orleans would be acceptable 
as sovereign.^'^ 

Early in 1819, at the instance of Pueyrredon, Le Moyne 
returned to Europe to report in person upon the favorable dis- 
position of the Buenos Aires Government. He was followed 
shortly afterward by Jose Valentin Gomez, ^^ who was author- 

dinand VII and the opposition of Great Britain. Cambridge Modern His- 
tory, X, 19. 

26 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin, 91-96; 109-121. 

27 Afterward King Louis Philippe of France. 

28 In his credentials it was declared " that the state of affairs in Europe 
and America had led to the decision to appoint SeSor Gomez near the courts 
of Europe with authority to establish his residence at Paris, Senor Riva- 
davia returning to London; and that he was empowered to negotiate and 
make proposals to the ministry of France to the end of causing the cessa- 
tion of the hostilities which were inundating with blood the provinces of 
Eio de la Plata, which deserved a better fate. For this result the native 



94 PA]S3"-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGIE^NINGS 

ized by Pueyrredon to negotiate with the French Government 
the establishment of an Orleanist monarchy with its seat at 
Buenos Aires. France, however, was not in a position which 
would enable her to follow an independent course in a matter 
of such great importance, for she was not yet free from re- 
strictions placed by the powers on her freedom of action.^® 
Dessolle, successor of the Due de Eichelieu, therefore renewed 
negotiations at Madrid with a view to obtaining the agreement 
of Spain to the erection of a monarchy in the region of the Eio 
de la Plata with a Spanish prince as sovereign, though this 
procedure was not approved by Gomez. Failing to win the 
consent of Ferdinand, Dessolle proposed to Gomez as candi- 
date for the Argentine throne Charles Louis of Bourbon, Prince 
of Lucca, and grandson of Charles IV of Spain. It is not 
clear whether Dessolle made this proposal, so close upon the 
heels of his failure at Madrid, merely as a device to prevent 
Gomez from treating with some other court, or whether he made 
it sincerely in the expectation, as he averred, of securing the 
cooperation of Russia and Austria in inducing Ferdinand to 
accept.^*' 

Gomez objected to the candidacy of the Prince of Lucca on 
the ground that while it might facilitate the negotiation with 
Madrid, it would have an opposite effect in Buenos Aires, where 
a Spanish prince, he thought, would not be acceptable. ]!^ever- 
theless he communicated the scheme to his government, and the 
matter was laid, by the Director, before the congress. On 
November 12, 1819, this body voted to accept the project un- 
der conditions which may be briefly summarized as follows: 
That the King of France would agree to obtain the consent 
of the great powers of Europe and especially of England and 
Spain; that he would use his influence to effect the union of 

inhabitants were crying out, longing for the moment of this happy meta- 
morphosis, though resolved to maintain to the last their independence." 
Mitre, op. cit., Ill, 331. 

29 Cambridge Modem History, X, 18. 

30 Villanueva, BoUvar y el Qeneral San Martin, 127-146, 



rAILURE OF MOl^ARCHICAL PLOTS 95 

the Prince of Lucca with a Brazilian princess and to secure 
the abandonment of the Brazilian claims in the Banda Oriental ; 
that the new kingdom should embrace at least the territory 
which constituted formerly the viceroyalty of La Plata; that 
the constitution already adopted,'^ with such minor changes 
only as were necessary to adapt it to a monarchical regime, 
be accepted; that France, in case of resistance on the part of 
Spain, should engage to furnish the Prince of Lucca with 
troops to carry out the enterprise; and that if England offered 
armed opposition the project should be abandoned.^^ The 
events which followed made the realization of the scheme im- 
possible. 

In the United Provinces the period of relative order under 
the directorate of Pueyrredon was followed by an increase of 
unrest resulting in civil war. Rondeau, who succeeded Puey- 
rredon upon the adoption of the constitution of 1819, was like 
his predecessor, of French descent and partial to France and 
a monarchy. Taking the field against the rebels he was de- 
feated by them in February, 1820, and compelled to resign. 
Sarratea, whose activities in London have been noticed above, 
now assumed the office of governor of the province of Buenos 
Aires. Championing the cause of republicanism he published 
a pamphlet ^^ exposing the intrigues of the monarchists. This 

31 The constitution was promulgated on May 25, 1819. In the manifesto 
recommending it to the people, the state was thus described : " It is not 
the democracy of Athens, nor the regime of Sparta, nor the patrician aris- 
tocracy or the plebeian effervescence of Rome, nor the absolute government 
of Russia, nor the despotism of Turkey, nor the complicated confederation of 
some other states. It is a state midway between democratic convulsion and 
the abuse of limited power." But as a compromise between these extremes 
it was not a success, giving satisfaction to neither party. Mitre, Historia 
de Belgrano, III, 333-335. For the constitution of 1819 and the manifesto 
see Lemoult, Constitution des Provinces Unies de I'Amerique du 8ud ( Paris, 
1819). 

32 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin, 146-151. Mitre, His- 
toria de Belgrano, III, 335 (ed. 1902). 

33 Proceso original justificativo contra los reos acusados de alta traicidn 
en el Congreso y Directorio, Buenos Aires, 1820. Cf. Blanco-Azpurtia 
Documentos, VII, 110-127. 



96 PAIT-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNIlirGS | 

publication was inspired, it was believed, by the partisans oi 
England in Buenos Aires, Sarratea himself being among this 
number. The supporters of the candidacy of the Prince oi 
Lucca being thus driven from office were unable to carry the 
negotiations forward. And if this had not been the case, fail- 
ure would have been inevitable in Europe ; for, apart from the 
fact that France failed to receive the expected support fromj 
the Holy Alliance, England, informed of the project, madq 
known her hostility and would have been able, no doubt, to^ 
interpose successful resistance to its execution, had it been per-|j 
sisted in. Though the idea of a monarchy was not yet comi 
pletely banished from Argentine soil, there were henceforth to 
be no more official efforts to establish that system of govern-i 
ment there. ^^ 

The projects which have just been considered, although the; 
were put forward with reference mainly to the provinces o 
the Rio de la Plata, yet extended in scope to Chile and Peru. 
The latter, held in strict subjection to the peninsular authori- 
ties, took no part in the negotiations. Chile, however, while 
much less inclined to the monarchical system than the Unitedj. 
Provinces and usually refraining from active participation in|, 
the plans looking to the establishment of that system, did send 
an agent, ^^ Antonio Jose Irisarri, at the solicitation of the 
government of Buenos Aires, to take part in the negotiations 
which issued in the candidacy of the Prince of Lucca. Irisarri 
was instructed to proceed to London and to let it be known jl 
in the conferences which he might have with the ministers of l! 
England and the ambassadors of the European powers, that it | 

34 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin, 151-160. ![ 

35 Barros Arana declares that if there was in Chile at this time a I 
deeply rooted sentiment it was that of nationality ; that no consideration ' 
whatever could have overcome the desire of Chile to form a separate nation ; \\ 
that O'Higgins, in obedience to national sentiment, would never have lent j 
his sanction to any plan violating that sentiment; and that if this intrigue E 
for establishing a monarchy in Chile had become known there would have I 
been aroused against it a storm of public opinion. Historia de Chile, XII, 
41, 42. 'i 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 97 

was the ultimate aim of the govermnent of Chile to adopt the 

I" continental system of Europe " ; that Chile would not be in- 

j disposed to set up a constitutional monarchy, such form of 

government being better adapted than any other to the legis- 

ijlation, customs, conventions, and religious organization of Chile ; 

I but that having no prince to whom the government could be 

I intrusted, the country was willing to accept, subject to the con- 

jstitution which was being framed, a prince of any of the 

i neutral powers, who, under the protection of the dynasty to 

I which he belonged and in the enjoyment of influence derived 

from relations with European courts, would fix his empire 

I in Chile, thus assuring its independence of Ferdinand VII and 

of his successors and of every other foreign power. ^^ 

Irisarri, proceeding overland to Buenos Aires on his way to 
Europe found, after reaching San Luis in the province of Cuyo, 
that the instructions which had been given him did not bear the 
signature of the Supreme Director nor of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Returning the papers therefore to Santiago, 
to be signed and dispatched to England by sea, he continued 
his journey. Upon the return of the documents, O'Higgins, 
who had probably not read the instructions before with care, 
now refused to sign them, and as no new instructions were 
drawn up the Chilean envoy was left without a definite guide 
for his diplomatic functions in Europe. It appears, however, 
that he put himself in touch with the Argentine agents and 
sent dispatches to his government concerning the project for 
crowning the Prince of Lucca at Buenos Aires. It is not clear 
whether or not he favored the project; for shortly afterward 
O'Higgins had all the papers referring to the matter burned.^''' 

36 Barros Arana, Historia de Chile, XII, 48. Mitre, Historia de 8cm 
Martin, IV, 4S6 (ed. 1890). 

37 Barros Arana, Historia de Chile, XII, 51, 52. Irisarri left Santiago 
December 12, 1818, and reached his destination in May, 1819. While in 
London he was the principal editor of El Censor Americano, which was 
published in that city from July to October, 1820. Sanchez, BihUografia 
T enezolanista, 176. 

Villanueva states that Irisarri urged O'Higgins to accept the plan. 



98 PAK-AMEEICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

It was two years after the failure of this scheme for estaj 
lishing a monarchy in southern South America with the Prin< 
of Lucca as sovereign, that San Martin, as has been not| 
above, entered into negotiations with the viceroy of Peru wi 
the aim of securing the recognition of the independence of tl- 
viceroyalty through its erection into a kingdom with a Spanig 
prince on the throne. With the breaking off of these negoti[ 
tions and the retirement of San Martin from Peru before h 
plans for further negotiations with other reigning houses t 
Europe had matured, the monarchical form of govemmei| 
came to be regarded by the leaders of opinion in the newl 
formed states in this section of South America as less suitab 
to their peculiar needs than the republican form. 

Some attention must now be given to the northern part ( 

the continent ; that is, to Venezuela, New Granada, and Quit^ 

Here republican tendencies were, perhaps, not essential! 

stronger than in the south, but they found more positive exprei 

sion in the early years of the struggle. On December 11, 181] 

a constituent congress which had been assembled at Caraca 

adopted for Venezuela a federal constitution similar to that o 

the United States, though containing certain substantial varigf 

tions. It is significant that the congress rejected at the samij 

time an aristocratic plan, neither republican nor monarchical 

proposed by Francisco de Miranda.^^ A constitution adoptei 

by the " State of Cundinamarca " April 5, 1811, contained, 

elements taken from the constitution of the United States anJ 

from that of France under the Directory. This instrument! 

however, provided that Ferdinand VII should be recognizee, 

as head of the state. Shortly afterward, this constitution wa^ 

overthrown, and on November 27, 1811, an act was adopted 

constituting the " United Provinces of New Granada," an4 

t 
He does not, however, give his authority. Bolivar y el General San Martin: 
147. 

38 Eobertson, Francisco de Miranda. An. Eep. Am. Hist. Assn. 1907, I! 
417-421, 456. Cf. also Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitucional de Venezuela] 
I, 156-172. 1 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 99 

jdeclaring that no official appointed by Spain without the con- 
jsent of the people of ISTew Granada would be recognized. At 
{about the same time Cartagena set up an independent govern- 
Iment under a republican constitution. Quito continued under 
jthe authority of Spain until 1822.39 

The years immediately following these first essays in self- 
government were full of trials and disappointments for the 
Patriots. They were crushed by the Royalists on every hand. 
Miranda, who for a brief space was the hope of the revolution, 
was taken prisoner and transported to Spain, where he died 
in 1816. Bolivar, though continuing the struggle and winning 
important victories, was finally compelled to abandon the coun- 
try. With the exception of a few localities where guerrilla 
warfare was continued both Venezuela and New Granada fell 
into the hands of the Royalists. Meanwhile, Bolivar, who had 
fled to the island of Jamaica and afterward to Haiti, devoted 
his energies to the organization and development of plans for 
renewing the war. Of his career as military leader, no more 
need be said here than to recall the fact that he returned in 
1816, after an exile of about a year, at the head of an expedi- 
tion, fitted out through the magnanimity of President Petion 
of Haiti; that he overcame tremendous difficulties, gradually 
making himself master of Venezuela and New Granada, then 
of Quito and finally of Peru and Bolivia; that in 1821 he was 
made president of the republic of Colombia, a state nearly 
equal in area to the part of the United States east of the Missis- 
sippi ; and that vdthin a little more than a year thereafter he 
had become the arbiter of the destiny of the Spanish-speaking 
peoples from the Orinoco to the borders of Chile and the Argen- 
tine. It will be of interest therefore to study for a moment 
this great leader's political ideals. 

During his exile in 1815, Bolivar wrote what has been called 
his " prophetic letter," setting forth the political principles 
which he held at the time and which no doubt served in great 

39 Villanueva, Resumen de la Historia de America, 200-237. 



100 PAiN'-AMEEICAIsriSM: ITS BEGINNmGS i 

i 

measure to guide his conduct during tlie succeeding eventfuj: 
years of his lifetime. The letter was written in reply to on(i^ 
received from a person in Jamaica, whose name does not ap|i 
pear, requesting information as to what the political situatioi|| 
in each colony was ; whether preference was being shown for th| 
republican or for the monarchical system, and whether it wa[ 
desired to establish a single great republic or a monarchy oi- 
like extent.**^ The following extract from Bolivar's reply ex|| 
presses his view : I 

" Above all men I desire," he said, " to see formed in Ameri 
ica the greatest nation on earth ; greatest not so much by virtu| 
of its extent and its wealth, as by virtue of its liberty and its, 
glory. Though I long for a high degree of excellence in th« 
government of my native land, I cannot persuade myself t(|, 
believe that the ISTew World will, for the present, be organizec; 
as a great republic. Since it is impossible to set up such £, 
state I do not dare to wish for it ; and much less do I desire a 
monarchy embracing the whole of America ; ^^ for that is likely 
wise impossible. Under so great a state it would be impo»« 
sible to correct the abuses which we at present endure, ancij 
hence our emancipation would be fruitless. The Americai]jj 
states need paternal governments to cure the sores and wound.j; 
of despotism and war. If such a general government wercl; 
organized the metropolis would be Mexico, the only countr}^ 
whose intrinsic strength could give it such a position. But lelf 
us suppose it were Panama, which is more central. Would, 
not all the parts continue to be as weak and as badly governec^; 
as at present? For a single government to be able to infuse. 

40 The letter was first published in a newspaper of Kingston. From tha,i\ 
source General O'Leary obtained it and republished it in his Memorias]^ 
XXVII, 291-309. 

41 The context appears to show that Bolivar here meant Spanish America,* 
' Contemporary writers in Spanish frequently used the terms " America '{ 

and " Nuevo Mundo " to refer to the former colonies of Spain. In the sam^ 
way America del Septentridn was sometimes used to designate Mexico. Cfi 
Alaman, Historia de Mixico, V, 587, 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 101 

^ life into the New World, touch all the springs of public pros- 
1 perity, carry out reforms and, in general, bring about a state 
1 of relative perfection, it would need to be possessed of the au- 
1 thority of a god and of all the intelligence and virtue of men." ^^ 
1 A monarchy of such vast proportions, he concludes, would be 
1 a deformed colossus which would break to pieces from its own 
weight upon suffering the least strain. 

With regard to the kind and number of governments that 
should be established, Bolivar referred to the fact that the 
Abbe de Pradt had suggested the division of America into fif- 
teen or more independent monarchies governed by as many 
monarchs. As to the number of separate nations he was in 
agTeement with the abbe ; but not so with respect to the nature 
of the governments that should be given them. Small repub- 
lics, he thought, were to be preferred because the legitimate 
sphere of their activity is the pursuit of national welfare and 
the conservation of independence. Their distinctive mark is 
permanence, while that of great states is change, with a tend- 
ency to imperialism. Nearly all small republics, he affirms, 
have had a long life. The fact that Rome survived some cen- 
turies as a republic was due to its being governed as a republic 
at the capital only, other laws and institutions prevailing in the 
rest of the territory under its sway.^^ 

• Discussing the kinds of government which the different di- 
visions would be likely to set up he predicted that some would 
choose the federal republic and others the unitary or central- 
ized republic; but that the more important sections would in- 
evitably incline to monarchy. He thought a union of New 
Granada and Venezuela likely to occur, and he suggested that 
their government might imitate that of England, with the 
difference that the executive should be elected, preferably for 
life. A hereditary senate would check the waves of popular 

42-O'Leary, Memorias, XXVII, 303. 

43 Ibid., 304. 



102 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

passion. The lower house should be elected without other rel 
strictions than such as applied to the British House of Com 
mons.** 

Such a scheme Bolivar was destined to attempt to carry out 
at least in its main features. Upon renewing the war in 1816 
he was accorded dictatorial powers. Having made considerably 
progress toward the recovery of the country from the enemy 
he called a congress which met at Angostura, afterward Ciudaq 
Bolivar, February 8, 1819, for the purpose of restoring con' 
stitutional government. Into the hands of the congress, Bo| 
livar resigned the extraordinary authority which he had beeii 
exercising, and recommended the adoption of the constitutioij 
of which he presented a draft. In an address to the congress] 
he set forth more fully than he had previously done his political 
principles. He was of the opinion that only a democracy i& 
susceptible of absolute liberty. " But," he asks, " what demO| 
cratic government has united at one time power, prosperity, 
and permanence? Is it not true, on the contrary, that aria 
tocracy and monarchy have been the foundation of the grea1 
and powerful empires which have lasted for centuries? Whalj 
government has endured longer than that of China? What 
republic has been more durable than that of Sparta, or thatj 
of Venice? Did not the empire of Rome conquer the earth? 
Has not France been a monarchy for fourteen centuries ? 
What power is greater than England? These nations have 
been, nevertheless, either aristocratic or monarchical." 

In spite of these painful reflections, he felt great satisfac 
tion in the steps taken by the republic of Venezuela. She hadi 
achieved her independence, had proscribed monarchy and priv-j 
ilege, had set up a democratic government, had declared thel 
rights of man. But admirable as was the constitution of Ven- 
ezuela, it was not suited to existing conditions. In his opin-j 
ion it was a marvel that its model in North America had hap-: 
pily endured, without being overthrown at the first appearance | 

44 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVII, 306. ! 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 103 

of difficulty or danger. The people of the United States in 
many respects were unique; they were models of political vir- 
tue ; they breathed the atmosphere of liberty ; yet it was, after 
all, he repeated, astonishing that a weak, complicated federal 
system such as theirs should have survived the trials through 
which it had passed. Be that as it may, he had not the remot- 
est intention of trying to adopt the system of a people so differ- 
ent from Spanish Americans as were the Anglo-Americans. 
Venezuela should have a constitution adapted to the political 
conditions of the country ; to the religion, customs, inclinations, 
of its inhabitants; to the degree of liberty which they were 
prepared to receive. This was the code they should consult, 
and not that of Washington. ^^ 

The model, he insisted, should be the British constitution. 
The principle of federation should be abolished, the adminis- 
tration centralized, and the triumvirate which constituted the 
executive authority, under the constitution of 1811, be re- 
placed by a president with greatly enlarged powers. The office, 
though filled by election, should be analogous to that of the 
British sovereign. The ministers alone should be responsible. 
The president of a republic should be invested with even greater 
authority than that exercised by the chief magistrate of a mon- 
archy; for the throne is protected by the veneration of the 
people, by the loyalty of the nobility, and by the fraternal in- 
terest of other monarchs, whereas the president of a republic 
stands alone, resisting the combined attacks of opinion, inter- 
ests, and passions of the whole social body of the state.^^ Bo- 
livar did not on this occasion propose that the president be 
elected for life, but he warmly championed the hereditary 
senate. 

The congress, in spite of Bolivar's great prestige, was not 

*5 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVII, 499. 
46 lUd., 506-519. 

For Bolivar's address to the congress of Angostura, Feburary 15, 1819, 
see Blanco-AzpurGa, Documentos, VI, 585-598. 



104 PAN-AMERICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

inclined to accept his aristocratic scheme without due consid- 
eration. Their deliberations continued for six months, at the 
end of which time the project was adopted with no important 
changes other than the rejection of the hereditary senate, and 
the elimination of the provision for a fourth power to be known 
as the " censors." ^'^ 

In the meantime, having provisionally accepted the presi- 
dency, Bolivar continued operations against the enemy, and 
having met with important successes in New Granada, in the 
liberation of which he had been invited to cooperate, he returned 
to Angostura in December, 1819. In an address to the con- 
gress he gave an account of his campaign and, declaring that 
the people of New Granada were generally convinced of the de- j 
sirability of a union of the two provinces, he urged the adop- 
tion of the steps necessary to effect such a union. The con- 
gress acceded to his wishes and, consulting the expressed desire 
of the people of New Granada for a political union with 
Venezuela, enacted a " fundamental law " on December 17, 
1819, creating the republic of Colombia. As but one province 
of New Granada was represented in the passage of the act it 
was provided that a general congress should meet at Eosario de 
Cucuta, on January 1, 1821, for the purpose of framing a con- 
stitution for the United Provinces. It was determined, how- 
ever, that the constitution adopted shortly before at Angostura 
should meanwhile remain in force and serve as a basis for the 
new instrument. ^^ No sooner had the free provinces of New 
Granada heard of the step taken by the congress of Angostura 
than meetings were held, and formal sanction was given to 
the union. ^^ 

In due time the congress met at Cucuta and adopted a con- 
stitution, thus definitively effecting the union of Venezuela 

47 The sections of Bolivar's project referring to the " Censors " or " Moral 
Power " may be consulted in Gil Fortoul's Historia Constitucional de Ve- 
nesuela, I, 545-551. 

48 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 18-21. 

49 Ibid., 26. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 105 

and New Granada. The republic was divided into depart- 
ments, at the head of which were placed intendants directly 
responsible to the president. The legislative branch, contrary 
to Bolivar's desire, was vested with the exercise of the chief 
authority, except in times of invasion or of internal commo- 
tion, when the president was authorized to assume absolute 
control. Moreover the judiciary was made wholly independ- 
ent of the executive. Bolivar, believing as he did in the neces- 
sity for the centralization of authority in the chief magistrate, 
naturally was not pleased at the weakening of this office by the 
relative increase of the power and of the independence of the 
other branches of the government. ^^ 

Elected president, and accepting the post reluctantly, the 
Liberator left the administration of the state to the vice presi- 
dent, and under the authority of the congress continued to lead 
his armies against the enemy in the south.^^ It was as a re- 
sult of his conquests in that quarter that he was finally to have 
the opportunity to give concrete expression to his political ideals 
in the constitution of Bolivia,^^ which was adopted by that 
republic in October, 1826. A brief reference to some provi- 
sions of that instrument will throw further light upon the 
Liberator's political views. 

The outstanding feature of the Bolivian constitution was 
the provision for a president to be chosen for life. Great au- 
thority was concentrated in his hands, and he was declared not 
to be responsible for his administrative acts.^^ The vice presi- 

50 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 101, 102. 

51 lUd., 107. 

52 This constitution, together wtih Bolivar's address to the congress on 
presenting his project, is found in the Blanco-Azpurfla collection of D'ocu- 
mentos, X, 341-358. 

53 Article 79 of the constitution is as follows: "El Presidente de la 
ReptiMica es el jefe de la administracion del Estado, sin responsabilidad por 
los actos de dicha administracion." Blanco-Azpurua, Documentos, X, 353. 

Freeman in his essay on presidential government declares that the main 
difference between a king and a president is that the president is distinctly 
responsible to the law; that he may be judged and deposed by a legal 
process. Historical Essays, first series, p. 379. 



106 PAI^-AMERICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

dent was appointed by the president and confirmed by tbe 
legislature. This body, however, was obliged to accept one 
of three candidates whom the president might name.^* The 
parts of the constitution relating to the executive were adopted 
only after long debate, and then not unanimously, as was the 
case with practically the whole of the rest of the project. The 
body of " censors," for which provision had been made in the 
Angostura project, was included in the Bolivian scheme, the 
censors forming a third house of the legislative body, and the 
provision was now adopted. With the exception of an article 
declaring Eoman Catholicism to be the religion of the state, 
which congress inserted of its own initiative, Bolivar's draft 
was adopted practically as presented. In the original project 
nothing had been said about religion. 

The preparation of a constitution for Bolivia was but one 
phase of a great scheme which had been revolving in the mind 
of the Liberator for some time ; namely, the union of the states 
of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. His plan is set forth in a 
letter to General La Fuente written at Lima shortly before sub- 
mitting his draft of a constitution to the Bolivian congress. 
He said: 

" At last I have finished the constitution of Bolivia, and am 
commissioning my aid-de-camp, Wilson, to take it to General 
Sucre, who will present it to the congress of Upper Peru. I 
may say to you now, therefore, that this constitution is going 
to be the ark in which we shall be saved from the shipwreck 
which on all sides threatens us, and especially from a direction 
which you would least suspect. A few days ago Senor Pando 
arrived from Panama, and the picture which he paints of af- 
fairs in general and of the situation in Colombia in particular 
has excited my attention and for some days past has forced me 
to the most distressing meditations. You have learned, no 
doubt, that party spirit has divided Colombia ; that her treasury 
is empty; that her laws have become oppressive; that the nura- 

54 Blanco- Azpurfla, D'ocumentos, X, 352, 354. 



FAILUEE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 107 

ber of state employees increases with the decline of the treas- 
ury; and finally, you must know that in Venezuela they are 
clamoring for an empire. This is a very brief statement of 
the condition of things in Colombia ; but it is sufficient to give 
you an idea of what I feel under the circumstances. This is 
not all, my dear general. The worst is that if the trend con- 
tinues as at present we shall in time experience the same re- 
sults in Peru; and here as well as there we shall lose what we 
have achieved by our sacrifices. After careful consideration 
we have agreed — men of the best judgment and myself — 
that the only remedy that we can apply in this serious situa- 
tion is a general federation of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia, 
closer than that of the United States, ruled by a president and 
vice president under the Bolivian constitution, which, the neces- 
sary changes being made, might serve for each state and the 
federation as well. The intention is to attain the most perfect 
union possible under the federal system. The government of 
each of the federal states will remain in the hands of a vice 
president and two legislative chambers. These governments 
will deal with questions of religion, justice, civil administra- 
tion, economic matters, and, in short, everything not relating 
to foreign affairs and war. Each department will send a 
deputy to the Federal Congress which will be divided into 
three chambers, each chamber having a third of the deputies 
of each republic. These three chambers with the vice presi- 
dents and the secretaries of state, who will be elected from the 
republic at large, will govern the federation. The Liberator, 
as supreme chief, will visit yearly the departments of each 
state. The capital will be a central point. Colombia should 
be divided into three states: Cundinamarca, Venezuela, and 
Quito. The federation will take whatever name may be chosen 
for it.^° There will be one flag, one army, and a single nation. 
It is indispensable that Peru and Bolivia should begin in some 

56 It is this proposed federation that Villanueva calls El Imperio de los 
Andes in his book of that title. 



108 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

way to put this plan into effect, since their situation makes 
them more dependent upon one another. Later it will be easy 
for me to induce Colombia to adopt the only means left for 
her salvation. Upper and Lower Peru united, Arequipa will 
be the capital of one of the three great departments into which 
these united states will then be divided, after the manner of 
the great divisions of Colombia." ^® 

The Senor Pando, to whom Bolivar refers above, was Jose 
M. Pando, one of the representatives sent by Peru in 1825 to 
take part in the Congress of Panama. In June, 1825, shortly 
before that body fiually convened, Pando was recalled by 
Bolivar and made Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru. The 
fact that Pando upon his return began a vigorous propaganda 
in favor of the federation of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia 
makes it not unreasonable to suppose that the Liberator, hav- 
ing great confidence in that statesman's ability and judgment, 
recalled him for the purpose of furthering the scheme. Pando 
brought from Panama alarming reports to the effect that the 
Spanish had concentrated great forces in Cuba with the inten- 
tion of attacking some point on the coast of Colombia, and 
that another expedition equally strong was being prepared in 
Spain for the same purpose ; that the Spanish squadron in the 
harbor of Havana was greatly superior to the small Colombian 
fleet; that Mexico intended to make a separate peace; that 
France was offering to pay the expenses of the military opera- 
tions of Spain; that the Holy Alliance was resolved to reduce 
the republics of America to obedience to the mother country, 
and that Great Britain, desirous of seeing the democratic foun- 
dations of the new states swept away, would not be opposed to 
the plans of the continental powers. ^'^ 

- The external dangers were exaggerated, no doubt, in order 
to bring the people of Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia to a realiza- 

56 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 507-508. 

57 Ihid., 503-505. 

Ibid. (Bolivar to Santander, April 23, 1826), 655-658. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 109 

tion of the necessity of organizing strong, effective governments 
to prevent internal disorder, as well as to repel invasion. 
Pando, in accordance with what appears to have been a pre- 
concerted plan, urged the establishment of an empire embracing 
the territory from Potosi to the Orinoco. His views were 
shared by many others. Among this number was General Ga- 
marra, afterward president of the republic of Peru, who of- 
fered to support Bolivar in the establishment of the only sys- 
tem, the monarchical, which in his opinion could destroy 
anarchy and make independence a blessing. ^^ 

O'Leary affirms that Bolivar never countenanced these mon- 
archical schemes ; that though he believed the adoption of such 
a system might assure for the new states the protection of 
Europe it would inevitably result in war between the partisans 
of republicanism and those of monarchy.^^ Bolivar's public 
utterances appear to bear out O'Leary's contention. In his 
letter to General La Fuente, the Liberator mentions the fact 
that in Venezuela they were clamoring for an empire. He 
had in fact received a letter from General Paez, commandant 
of the military forces in Venezuela, who wrote as the leader of 
a movement of revolt there, proposing, as Bolivar expressed 
it, ^Napoleonic ideas.^'' In a letter to Vice President Santander 
under date of February 21, 1826,®^ Bolivar said that in reply- 
ing to General Paez he would direct his attention to the draft 
of the constitution for Bolivia, and that he wished opinion 
turned in favor of this instrument, for he believed it would 
satisfy the most extreme views. He thought that the over- 

58 La Fuente also favored the federation. Haigh gives an account 
(SJcetches, 183) of a banquet given by La Fuente to promote good feeling 
between Colombia and Peru and between these and Great Britain. 

59 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 57-60. 

60 lUd., 57, 60. 

General PSez declares in his autobiography that the letter referred to is 
not in accordance with the original and he gives what he claims is the cor- 
rect version. Autobiografia, I, 487-490. 

61 Villanueva, El Imperio de los Andes, citing Consul Watts to Mr. Can- 
ning, Cartagena, May 20, 1826. 



110 PAN-AMERICAOTSM: ITS BEGINlSrilSrGS 

confidence whicli led to Iturbide's downfall ought to be guarded 
against ; or rather that the thing to be guarded against was the 
just suspicion on the part of the people that a new aristocracy 
would destroy equality. The plan for establishing an empire 
offended him more than all the insults of his enemies, because 
it was based on the assumption that he was a man of vulgar 
ambition, capable of putting himself on a level with Iturbide 
and other such miserable usurpers. According to those who 
proposed such a plan nobody could be great except after the 
manner of Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon. " I wish to sur- 
pass them all," he said, " in unselfishness, since I cannot equal 
them in deeds." ®^ 

A few days later (March 6) he wrote to Paez reminding 
him that Colombia was not France nor he himself Napoleon, 
suggesting a possible solution of all difficulties through the 
adoption of the Bolivian constitution, and in general discourag- 
ing any effort to promote plans for the establishment of a 
monarchy. ^^ 

Realizing that the open discussion of the question of mon- 
archy would lead to the formation of warring factions, Bolivar 
availed himself of the opportunity, on different occasions, to 
make declarations disclaiming any intention on his part to 
establish such a form of government. As early as September, 
1823, at a banquet given him in Lima, he expressed the hope 
that the American people might never consent to the elevation 
of thrones in their territory; that as ISTapoleon was sent into 
exile and the new Emperor Iturbide driven from the throne 
of Mexico, so might the usurpers of the rights of the American 
people be dealt with. He wished to see not a single would-be 
sovereign triumphant in the whole extent of the New World. ^* 

In June, 1824, Bolivar made certain remarks to an officer, 
sent by Commodore Hull of the United States Navy to treat 

62 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 651-653. 

63 Ihid., 653-655. 

64 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General San Martin, 279. 
Odriozola, Docjimentos Hist6ricos del Peru, V, 328. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 111 

with him, respecting matters affecting American vessels in the 
Pacific, which confirm the view that he was opposed to the 
establishment of monarchical governments. " They say," the 
Liberator declared, " that I wish to found an empire in Pern 
or join Peru to Colombia and establish an absolute government 
with myself at the head of it ; but this is all false and does me 
great injustice. If my heart does not deceive me I shall follow 
in the footsteps of Washington. I would rather have an end 
like his than be monarch of the whole earth, and of this all 
those who know me are convinced. My only ambition is the 
glory of Colombia and the desire to see my native land assume 
its place in the circle of enlightened nations." ^° This was 
said in the presence of ofiicers of the Patriot army. 

But these declarations antedated two years or more the Bo- 
livian constitution and the eiforts to found the " Empire of 
the Andes." Had Bolivar changed from republican to mon- 
archist ? The so-called " prophetic letter " cited above and hig 
address to the congress of Angostura show that he was early 
convinced that his people were not ready for democratic insti- 
tutions ; and that he wished to see established strongly central- 
ized governments with certain aristocratic tendencies. The fol- 
lowing extract from the report of a conference between the 
Liberator and Captain Mailing of the British 'Na.vj, which took 
place in March, 1825, serves to recall his former expressions 
and to raise anew the question of his republicanism. Begin- 
ning the conversation with a reference to the reports that had 
reached him from Bogota, relative to the fear of an attack by 
France upon Colombia, Bolivar said : 

" But what can France or Spain expect to gain ? They can 
never obtain a permanent footing in our country. France has 
declared that she will not tolerate popular governments, that 
revolutions have distracted Europe during the last thirty years, 
and that America can never see peace so long as she gives way 
to the popular cry of equality ; and, in truth, I am of the opin- 
es Blanco- AzpurQa, Dooumentos, IX, 322. 



112 PAiq'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS | 

ion of France, for, although no man is a greater advocate fori 
the rights and liberties of mankind than I, and I have proved l 
this by devoting my fortune and the best years of my life toi, 
their attainment, still I must confess this country is not ready j 
for government by the people, which one must allow, after all, |ij 
is generally better in theory than in practice. No country is 
more free than England under a well-regulated monarchy. She 
is the envy of all the countries of the world, and the pattern I 
all would wish to follow in forming a new constitution or gov-')] 
emment. Of all countries South America is, perhaps, the least [ 
fitted for republican government. What does its population |, 
consist of but Indians and negroes ? — who are more ignorant jr 
than the vile race of Spaniards we are just emancipated from. I 
A country represented and governed by such people must go to 
ruin. We must look to England for relief, and you have not 
only my leave but my request that you will communicate our 
conversation and bring the matter under the consideration of 
H.B.M. government in any manner which may seem best to 
you, either officially or otherwise. You may say that I never 
have been an enemy of monarchies, upon general principles. 
On the contrary, I think it essential to the respectability and 
well being of new nations, and if any proposal ever comes 
from the British Cabinet for the establishment of an orderly [ 
government — that is, of a monarchy or monarchies in the New [ 
World — they will find in me a steady and firm promoter of s 
their views, perfectly ready to uphold the sovereign whom Eng- l 
land may propose to place and support upon the throne. |l 

" I know it has been said of me I wish to be a king, but it i 
is doubtful [sic^ not so. I would not accept the crown for my- [ 
self, for when I see this country made happy under a good and 
firm government, I shall again retire into private life. I re- | 
peat to you if I can be of service in forwarding the wishes and 
views of the British Government in bringing about this de- 
sirable object, they may depend upon my services. I 

" I owe it to England. I would infinitely sooner be indebted 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 113 

; to England for its always generous and liberal assistance than to 
I any other country. France or Spain would treat with me, no 
I doubt, were I to make similar proposals to them, but never will 
I submit to any interference with America on the part of those 
odious and treacherous nations. 
I " The title of king would perhaps not be popular at first in 
South America and therefore it might be as well to meet the 
prejudice by assuming that of Inca ®® that the Indians are so 
much attached to. This enslaved and miserable country has 
hitherto only heard the name of king confiled [sic] with its 
miseries, and Spanish cruelties and a change of vice kings has 
invariably proved a change of one rapacious oppressor for an- 
other. Democracy has its charms for the people, and in theory 
it appears plausible to have a free government which shall 
exclude all hereditary distinctions, but England is again our 
example. 

" How infinitely more respectable your nation is, governed 
by its king, lords, and commons, than that which prides itself 
upon an equality which holds but little templation \^sic\ to 
exertion for the benefit of the state; indeed I question much 
whether the present state of things will continue very long in 
the United States. In short I wish you to be well assured I 
am not an enemy of kings or of aristocratical governments, 
provided that they be under necessary restraints, which your 
constitution imposes upon the three degrees. If we are to have 
a new government, let it be modeled on yours, and I am ready 
to give my support to any sovereign England may give us." ^^ 

66 This title was proposed in Miranda's draft of a constitution prepared 
in London in 1808. Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitucional de Venezuela, I, 
517. 

67 Eojas, Tiempo Perdido, 8-11; Villanueva, Fernando VII y los Nuevos 
Estados, 257-261, citing archives of the British Government. Foreign office, 
Peru, 1825, No. 6. Captain Mailing to Lord Melville, Chorrillos, March 20, 
1825. 

Rojas gives what purports to be an exact copy of the letter in the 
original English. His version is followed here. Apparently, however, 
errors have been made in transcribing and in printing the letter. Such 



114 PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS Ij 

i 
The letter of Captain Mailing reached the Admiralty Juln 

25, 1825, and on August 1 a copy of it was sent to Canning. |i 

No action was taken by the Foreign Office. This unusu£i 

method of carrying on diplomatic intercourse is explained bll 

the fact that the consul-general, Thomas Rowcroft, whom tUl 

government of Great Britain had sent out to Lima in Octobejl 

1823, and through whom the correspondence ordinarily wouli 

have been conducted, had been accidentally killed a few monthl 

before the conversation with Captain Mailing took place. Thaj]l| 

Bolivar did not employ Peruvian or Colombian agents for thijl 

particular purpose was due, in the opinion of certain Ven^ 

zuelan writers, to his lack of faith in their loyalty ; ^^ and the|i 

cite in evidence of this the fact that of his aids-de-camp in whon; 

he most fully confided, three, O'Leary, Wilson, and Fergusod 

were British, and another, Peru de la Croix, was French 

That Bolivar trusted these foreigners on his staff is true; bu 

it does not follow that he distrusted his own countrymen. Nojt 

do his conversations on the subject of a monarchy necessarilj 

disclose his real convictions. His aim may have been nothin^i 

more than to make soundings. Such, at least, seems to hav^'j 

been the object of his conference with the French admiralil 

Rosamel. At about the time of the conference with Captaiji 

Mailing, Bolivar received Rosamel, and expressed to him view^t 

substantially the same as those which he had made known td' 

Captain Mailing. He even went so far as to manifest a dei 

sire to have France take the initiative in the matter of setting 

up monarchies in South America. On other occasions the Libl 

erator expressed himself with similar freedom.^^ One exampl^' 

may be given. While Bolivar was an exile in Haiti in 1816,| 

errors as were plainly typographical have been corrected in the above| 
extract. 

68 Villanueva, Fernando VII y los Nuevos Estados, 261. Bolivar, at thisj 
time, says Rojas (Tiempo Perdido 11), did not confide in any Colombian or' 
Peruvian with the exception of General Sucre, who alone merited his full 
confidence. 

69 Villanueva, El Imperio de los Andes, 72-74. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 116 

ie received aid in fitting out an expedition from an influential 
British merchant by the name of Sutherland. Bolivar held 
Sutheiland in high esteem, and it appears spoke freely to him 
;i)n the subject of government in the nev^^ states.'^® The British 
jjnerchant related his impressions afterward to his son, Robert 
Sutherland, who, as British consul at Maracaibo, wrote Canning 
ibn July 5, 1824, as follows: 

:! " I must observe to you that it was all along Bolivar's inten- 
tion to change the form of government, as he had expressed such 
'^n intention to the late Mr. Sutherland, his most cordial friend, 
-i . . In another conversation with Mr. Sutherland Bolivar re- 
marked that he was aware that a republican form of govern- 
ment was not suited to the genius of the Colombians, but that 
he felt it necessary to cry it up to aid the revolution and to 
attribute to Ferdinand all the despotic acts of the former sys- 
item, but when I get rid of the Spaniards and you visit me I 
ishall have you kneeling and kissing my hands. This was said 
in a jocular way. These are anecdotes which I believe are 
alone known to me." "^^ 

Do Bolivar's confidences to foreigners and his political 
i philosophy as expressed, particularly in his Angostura address 
land in his Bolivian constitution, justify the conclusion that he 
I was at heart a monarchist ? Were the opinions which he ex- 
pressed to foreigners, especially to representatives of Great 
Britain and France, his real political convictions ? Were the 
frequent declarations which he made to his fellow countrymen 
of loyalty to the principles of popular representative govern- 
ment mere political strategy? And finally, was the real pur- 
pose of his Bolivian constitution to serve as an easy means of 
transition from the already established republican institutions 
and democratic tendencies to an aristocratic monarchical sys- 
tem, frankly avowed? A brief review of the Liberator's po- 

70 Villanueva, Fernando VII y los Nuevos Estados, 250. El Imperio de 
los Andes, 97-108; 285. 

71 Villanueva, Bolivar y el General 8am. Martin, 278; citing British ay- 
chives, Foreign office. O'Leary, Memorias, XXVII, 340. , 



116 pa:n'-amer,icanism: its beginni:ngs 

litical activity during tlie four succeeding years, up to his deatlP 
in 1830, will help to answer these questions. ] 

At about the time Bolivar presented his draft of a constitui 
tion to the congress of Bolivia, the situation in Colombia haq 
really become acute. An insurrection in Venezuela had re 
suited in the virtual separation of that province from the' 
republic. General Paez had been proclaimed civil and mili| 
tary chief and empowered to continue in office as long as cirl 
cumstances might demand, or until the return of Bolivar, whosq- 
authority as president there was no intention of disputing. '^^ 
The spirit of rebellion soon spread to the south. On July 19/; 
1826, the municipality of Quito in secret session passed reso| 
lutions urging the Liberator to perpetuate himself in the officii 
of chief executive with the title of life president, or with what^ 
ever other title he might find most suitable. '^^ After several 
months of agitation the citizens and members of the local gov-i,^ 
emment of Guayaquil met, on August 28, and " reassumed "' 
their sovereignty to resign it forthwith to Bolivar, " the father) 
of the country." This assembly declared that the Liberatoill) 
should have absolute control of the destinies of the nation until! 
he had rescued it from the impending ruin ; and that until the J 
system of government should be definitely determined the Bo- 
livian constitution should prevail."^^ On September 6, the au- 
thorities and citizens of Quito in public assembly adhered to the 
action taken at Guayaquil.'^^ 

Moved by these reports from the north, encouraged by thei"^ 
leaders of the rebellious factions to believe that his presence f{ 
there was indispensable, and convinced that the moment had'i 
arrived for giving concrete form to his project of federating i'l 
Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia, the Liberator resolved to quit | 
Peru and return to Colombia. The announcement of his in-;j 



72 For a full account of this insurrection see O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 
603-640. 

73 O'Leary, Memoriae, II, 644-645. 

74 Odriozola, Documentos Histdricos del Peru, VII, 151-154. 

75 Ibid., VII, 155, 



FAILURE OF MOKAKCHICAL PLOTS llY 

tention was the cause of anxiety in Peru; for no satisfactory 
governmental machinery had been organized. Bolivar's rule 
had been that of a beneficent despot. It was feared, therefore, 
that on his departure the country would fall into a state of 
anarchy similar to that with which it had been afflicted prior 
to his coming. Every effort accordingly was made to induce 
him to remain in Peru. Memorials of citizens and of civic 
and ecclesiastical corporations poured in from every part of the 
republic, beseeching him not to abandon the country. And 
finally, as a last resort, the electoral colleges were convoked and 
the Bolivian constitution was submitted to them for approval. 
They voted almost unanimously in favor of its adoption and 
designated at the same time the Liberator as life president. 
These measures, however, did not have the desired effect, for 
on September 4, having delegated the authority which he had 
been exercising as Dictator to the grand marshal, Santa Cru^:, 
Bolivar embarked for Guayaquil.^^ 

The Bolivian constitution, it may be said in passing, was 
proclaimed in Peru on December 9, 1826. Its life was short. 
On January 26, 1827, the Colombian troops still in Peru re- 
volted, declaring against the constitution. It was charged that 
Vice President Santander of Colombia had fomented the re- 
bellion in order to check Bolivar's imperial designs and to safe- 
guard the Colombian constitution which was then threatened. 
On January 27 the government of Peru resolved to put into 
force the Peruvian constitution of 1823 ; and a congress was 
convoked to meet on May 1 for the purpose of electing a presi- 
dent and vice president. Bolivar had foreseen the breakdown 
of his system in Peru; for, writing to Santa Cruz in October, 
while on his way to Bogota, he predicted the nationalistic reac- 
tion and counseled his friends not to oppose it, not to support 
his " American plans " as against purely Peruvian aims.'^'^ 

When Bolivar reached Guayaquil toward the middle of Sep- 

76 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 526-527. 

77 Vargas, Historia del Peru Independiente, III, 185, 233, 240-245. 






118 PAi^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS j 

tember, 1826, he learned of the revolutionary movement whi(|_ 
had shortly before taken place in that department. In viei 
of the reports which had for some time past been reaching hiDJ 
respecting the state of affairs in Colombia, he was doubtless nCi 
surprised at what had occurred, nor was he disposed to coij 
demn the acts of rebellion. On the contrary, his mild reproc , 
of the insurrectionists and his promotion of the intendani 
Mosquera, who had lent his support to the uprising, warraiLli 
the suspicion that the Liberator might have regarded with satiijj 
faction the movement to overthrow the established order. Hi! 
procedure shortly afterward at Quito, where he granted amnesty 
to those who had renounced the constitution, gives furthe. 
ground for the suspicion.'^^ Before he had been long in thrj. 
republic it became clear that his powerful influence was ncj 
to be exerted toward the restoration of the constitution of 1821] 
That instrument had never met with his hearty acquiescend' 
and it now stood in the way of the realization of his politic^; 
plans. By its own provisions it could not be legally supeij 
seded until after a period of ten years from the time of it! 
adoption. The empire of the Andes could not wait. Bolivi; 
and Peru had just adopted the Bolivian constitution. Colomji 
bia must find the means to do likewise and the union of thjj 
three republics must at once be accomplished. Otherwise, the, 
golden opportunity for the establishment of a great South Amerj; 
ican state would be forever lost. i 

Bolivar arrived at Bogota in November. Assuming the of, 
fice of president to which he had been reelected the year before]] 
he immediately suspended the constitutional guarantees, in acij 
cordance with a provision of the constitution granting the chie:^J 
executive that authority in times of extraordinary danger, an(^ 
at the same time issued a proclamation to the Colombian peoplfij 
declaring that he had returned anxious to comply with the will 
of the nation. He added, however, that he had taken upon him^ 
seK with repugnance the exercise of the supreme power, be-i- 

78 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 671-674; Ibid., XXIV, 432-434. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 119 

cause by so doing lie laid himself open to the charge of being 
ambitious and of desiring to establish a monarchy. " What," 
he exclaimed, " am I believed to be so insensate as to desire to 
descend? Is not the destiny of Liberator more sublime than 
the throne ? " '^^ Nevertheless he continued to exercise dic- 
tatorial authority. Instead of taking steps to compel the re- 
bellious departments in the south to render obedience to the 
fundamental law, he permitted them to maintain an anomalous 
status with responsibility to himself alone. A little later he 
made a similar arrangement with Paez in Venezuela; and as 
other sections of the republic had repudiated the constitution 
while protesting allegiance to Bolivar personally, the situation 
appeared to favor the execution of his plans. 

Accordingly, at the instance of Bolivar, the Colombian con- 
gTess, in August, 1827, convoked an assembly to meet at Ocana, 
early the next year, ostensibly to revise the constitution of 1821, 
but really to adopt the Bolivian constitution. For some months 
past, opposition to the Liberator's plans had been gaining ground 
under the leadership of Vice President Santander, and when 
the convention assembled it was discovered that the partisans of 
Bolivar were in the minority. By skillfully appealing to the 
sentiment of respect for the law, and by taking a stand in favor 
of the growing demand for the adoption of the federal system 
in Colombia, Santander had been able to attract to his standard 
a sufficient number of followers to defeat the ends of the oppos- 
ing party. Finding that they were outnumbered, Bolivar's 
partisans withdrew from the convention, and as this left it 
without a quorum, the attempt to revise the constitution was 
abandoned. ^° 

As soon as this was known at Bogota, the public authorities 
and a number of the citizens of the capital assembled and 

79 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 512. 

80 Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitucional de Venezuela, I, 423-433. For a 
full account of this attempt at constitutional reform see a work by Jos6 
Joaquin Guerra entitled La Gonvencidn de Ocana. 



120 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

adopted a resolution requesting the Liberator to assume full 
authority and to continue to exercise it until he should deem it 
convenient to convoke a national assembly. The example of 
Bogota was followed in time by a number of municipalities in 
other parts of the republic. But Bolivar did not wait for a 
further expression of the popular will. In June, 1828, he re-( 
turned to Bogota — he had been spending the past few months 
at Bucaramanga — and resumed the chief magistracy, virtually 
as dictator. Three months later his enemies made an unsuc- 
cessful attempt to dislodge him from power by force of arms,[; 
and this led him to cast aside the few remaining constitutional 
restraints in order that he might employ the most stringent 
means to maintain order and prevent the dissolution of the re-i; 
public. ^^ 

Foreign complications no less than domestic troubles now 
demanded the attention of the Liberator. Late in 1828 hos-,, 
tilities broke out with Peru, and, taking the field to direct opera- 
tions against the enemy who had invaded the southern depart- 
ments, Bolivar remained in the South until the autumn of 
1829, when, peace having been restored, he returned to the 
capital. During his absence he continued, in spite of his pre- 
occupation with military matters, to give to the question of thejj 
political organization of the state all the attention the circum- 
stances would permit. He was particularly anxious on the 
one hand to lay the rumors which were being spread abroad by !* 
his enemies, charging him with plotting the establishment of 
a monarchy, and on the other to keep before the minds of the 
people the fact that they themselves were to determine the fate 
of the republic through their representatives soon to be con- 
vened in a new assembly.®^ But as time passed he despaired 
of effecting without foreign assistance the political stability 
which he so ardently desired for Colombia and for the other 
countries to whose emancipation he had so largely contributed. 

81 Gil Fortoul, Historia Gonstittbcional de Venezuela, I, 434-436. 

82 Bolivar to Vergara, Dec. 16, 1828. O'Leary, Meinorias, XXXI, 264. 



1 



TAILUEE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 121 

In April, 1829, Bolivar wrote from Quito to the Minister 
of Foreign Relations at Bogota recommending tliat he speak 
in a confidential manner with the diplomatic representatives of 
the United States and Great Britain respecting the state of 
anarchy into which the South American countries would likely 
fall unless some gTeat Power should intervene in their af- 
fairs. A few months later his Secretary, who accompanied 
him in the South and who doubtless faithfully expressed the 
views of his chief, put the matter more insistently. " How is 
America," he wrote, " to be freed from the anarchy which is 
consuming it and from the European colonization which threat- 
ens it? There was convened an Amphictyonic Congress 
(that of Panama)," he continued, " and its work was disdained 
by the nations most interested in its decisions. There was 
proposed a partial federation of three sovereign states and 
maledictions and scandal were raised to the skies. In short, 
America needs a regulator. . . . His Excellency has not the 
remotest personal interest in this matter further than that of 
Colombia and of America. He adheres not to the word but 
to the thing. Call it what you will, if only the result corre- 
sponds with his desire that America be placed under the cus- 
tody, protection, mediation or influence of one or more power- 
ful states, who shall preserve it from the destruction to which 
it is being led by systematic anarchy and from the colonial 
regimen by which it is threatened. Did not England offer spon- 
taneously her mediation between Brazil and Rio de la Plata? 
Did she not intervene by arms between Turkey and Greece? 
Let us seek therefore. Sir, something to which to cling, or re- 
sign ourselves to sink beneath the flood of evils which rise to 
overwhelm unhappy Ajnerica." ^^ 

The Council of Ministers, upon whom the duties of govern- 
ment devolved in Bolivar's absence, took this note under con- 
sideration on September 3, 1829, and, convinced that the Lib- 
erator's idea could not be carried into execution until there 

83 Gil Fortoul, Historia Constitucional de Venezuela, I, 459. 



122 PAN--AMEEICA]SriSM: ITS BEGHSTNIIlTGS 

should be in Colombia a " stable government," directed tbe- 
Minister of Foreign Kelations to open negotiations witb tlie.c 
diplomatic representatives of England and France in accord- 
ance with instructions which, were substantially as follows : 

1. It should be made clear why Colombia found it necessary 
to change its form of government from a republic to a consti- 
tutional monarchy. Although the nation had the indisputable^ 
right of adopting the form of government which it deemed mosts 
appropriate, yet in order to act in harmony with his Britannic^ 
Majesty and his Most Christian Majesty, the Council of Min-R 
isters desired to know whether those governments, in the eventf 
the congress should agree to establish a constitutional mon-j) 
archy, would give their assent to it. 

2. In case assent were obtained, it was the opinion of the 
Council of Ministers that Bolivar should rule for the rest of his 
life, using the title of Liberator, and that the title of king or(! 
emperor should not be employed until his successor should comeP 
into power. f 

3. Inquiry should be made as to whether Colombia wouldi'! 
be left free to designate the Liberator and such prince, house,! 
or dynasty to succeed him as the interests of the country mightll 
demand. 

4. Finally, the importance of the steps which Colombia con- 
templated with a view to its own political organization and that 
of the rest of America should be made clear to the representa-'' 
tives of Great Britain and France. But as it was probable 
that the United States and the other American republics would 
become alarmed at the action of Colombia, the effective and 
powerful intervention of England and France should be sought 
to the end that Colombia be not disturbed in the exercise of 
her right to adopt the form of government that she might find 
most acceptable. It should be made clear to France, though 
without entering into any engagement on the subject, that in the 
event some branch of the royal families of Europe should be 
gelected, Colombia would prefer a prince of the house of 



FAILURE OF MONAHCHICAL PLOTS 123 

France, for he would have the same religion as that which 
prevailed in Colombia, and for other reasons of a political na- 
ture would be most acceptable to the Colombian people.** 

The Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs complied with 
the instructions, and without delay the project was brought to 
the attention of the governments of Great Britain and France. 
But the plan was not well received. France did not wish to 
take any steps which might make it appear that she opposed the 
reestablishment of Spanish power in the Western Hemisphere. 
England was no less opposed to the scheme in so far as it in- 
volved the royal families of Great Britain and of France. In 
a dispatch dated December 16, 1829, the minister of Colombia 
in London gave the verbal reply of Lord Aberdeen to the pro- 
posal. " The government of his Majesty," said Lord xiber- 
deen, " far from opposing the establishment in Colombia of a 
government similar to that of this country, would be very glad 
to see such a reform effected, for they are convinced that it 
would contribute to the order and therefore to the prosperity of 
that part of America; but the British Government would not 
permit a prince of the French house to cross the Atlantic to 
be crowned in the J^ew World. . . . And in order that you may 
be convinced that there is no inconsistency or ulterior motive 
on our part, I declare also that the government of his Majesty 
could not allow a prince of the royal family to rule in any part 
of Spanish America, if this were proposed." *^ 

This attitude of the British cabinet is confirmed in a dispatch, 
dated February 20, 1830, from the Spanish minister at Lon- 
don to his government. Lord Aberdeen, he said, had told him 
confidentially that the existing government of the so-called 
republic of Colombia had lately sent an official communication 
to the British Government, indicating that the pretended Lib- 
erator, Simon Bolivar, who was soon to be given supreme au- 
thority for life with the title of president, dictator, king, em- 

84 Gil Fortoul, Historia Gonstitucional de Venezuela, I, 460. 

85 lUd., 1, 465. 



124 PAN-AMEKICANISM: ITS BEGINNmGS | 

peror, or other such, title, and to be vested with the power to 
appoint his successor, proposed to England that the succession 
be allowed to fall upon a prince of the reigning family; or if 
this were not agreeable, that no opposition be made to the elec-j 
tion of a prince of some other royal family of Europe. Lordp 
Aberdeen declared, furthermore, that while opposing the estab-i: 
lishment of a member of any of the reigning families of Europe, p 
with the exception of that of Spain, upon the throne of Bogota, [■ 
there was no objection to Colombia's placing the supreme au-,: 
thority of the state in the hands of one of its own citizens un-|;; 
der the form of government which might be deemed most suit-i 
able. But the whole plan seemed to Lord Aberdeen imprac-ii 
ticable, and the Spanish minister was given to understand that I" 
the British Government would not encourage it in any form.*® 

Bolivar did not approve the step taken by the Council of J! 
Ministers. Late in the autumn, while on his way to the capi- 
tal he directed after " mature reflection " his Secretary, Espi- ^ 
nar, to write the Minister of Eoreign Relations at Bogota re- 
questing that " every proceeding tending to forward the pending 
negotiation with the governments of France and England " be 
suspended in view of the " resolution of his excellency to in- f 
vite the nation to freely express its preference respecting the 
political system which should be established." ^'^ Years after- 
ward Yergara, the Minister of Foreign Relations, declared that 
the whole responsibility belonged to the Council of Ministers,** 
and that the Liberator was in no wise to be blamed unless it j^ 
were for his delay in officially disapproving a project which I 
was repugnant to his sentiments. Thus by the close of 1829 I 
monarchical plotting in Colombia had come to an end. j 

Some months later however a dying echo of the Colombian I 
plots was heard in Peru. It appears that during the month s 
of April, 1830, there were circulated in Lima copies of alleged 

86 lUd., 1, 467. I 

S7 Posada Gutierrez, Memorias Mstdrico-politicas, I, 211. 

88 Monsalve, El ideal politico del Libertador Simon BoUvar, 391. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 125 

instructions given by Bolivar to Mosquera, the Colombian 
minister to Peru.^^ These instructions were said to have been 
sent to the Peruvian capital by General Demarquet, one of 
Bolivar's aids-de-camp, who, through failure to observe due 
precaution, allowed copies of them to be made. The sup- 
posed instructions were thus secretly passed from hand to hand 
in Peru ; and in Chile, where they were sent, extracts of 
them were published. A manuscript copy was obtained by 
the United States minister, Lamed, at Lima and sent by him 
to the Secretary of State at Washington. ^° On June 30, El 
Conciliador, a government organ published at Lima, gave a 
summary of the instructions but maintained with well grounded 
reasons that they were apocryphal. 

The instructions were in substance as follows : " The em- 
pire will be realized or rivers of blood will flow in America; 
therefore, I charge you to act with energy and constancy. 
What have you to fear from those impotent Peruvians ? Have 
you not already obtained the assent of Gamarra and of La 
Fuente ? ^^ Are not our friends in control of the cabinet ? 
. . . Are they not protected by our warships and by our 
power? Leave the llanero, Paez, and these doctors of Bogota 
to me. If you do your work well there, I will answer for the 
outcome ; not, it is true, as soon as I should like. In the mean- 
time let the government of Peru destroy the liberals on the pre- 
text of anarchy. . . . Lead Gamarra on by telling him that he 
will have the best dukedom, the richest, the most civilized, and 
the most extensive, for it will stretch from the Santa to the 
Apurimac. There could not be a better division. Tell La 
Fuente, confidentially, the same thing with reference to his 
dukedom which will embrace the territory between the Apuri- 
mac and the Desaguadero; and maintain continual jealousies 
between them and Elespuru. 

88 Odriozola, Documentos Historicos del Peru, X, 130. 

90 lamed to Van Buren, June 24, 1830, No. 25: MSS. State Department 

91 President and vice president respectively. 



126 PAI^-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINNIE'GS 

" Proceed in the fullest harmony with General Santa Cruz,®^ 
and when you note that he is becoming uneasy about his fate, i 
because of what he may learn from talebearers, inform him that 
I intend to give the dukedom of Bolivia to Sucre, and that he[ 
may rely on my word of honor to award him the dukedom of 
Lima, by which means I shall punish Gamarra for his past un- 
faithfulness. Much care with O'Higgins.^^ Have him main- 
tain discord in Chile so that I may be compelled finally to in- 
tervene in that country in his behalf with the forces of Peru. 
Do not extend your activities to Buenos Aires, for I have my 
spies and agents there. . . . See that the squadron is well sup- 
plied. Let it be your principal care to disarm the Peruvian 
forces, whether they be civil, veteran, or naval. . . . You un- 
derstand the necessity for putting men devoted to me in the 
public offices ; so you must intervene in the government in their 
behalf. 

" I do not need to warn you to prevent those who are not 
good Colombians from getting into positions of influence with 
Gamarra and La Fuente; for they might bring these function- 
aries to realize their political situation; and in truth, if the 
cabinet should suffer a change in views or there should occur 
a change of government, everything would be lost. And what 
then would be our lot? . . . Let it always be understood that 
I am already old and worn out, and that I shall not, accord- 
ingly, live to see my plans put into effect ; that I am not pro- 
moting the scheme for selfish motives but for the consolidation 
of America ; that on this supposition the most worthy of the 
dukes of the empire will succeed me." ^* 

Bolivar was now ill and discouraged. The constituent as- 
sembly which he had summoned met in January, 1830, and 
attempted to forestall the rapidly approaching dissolution 
of the republic. But all efforts proved to be useless. With- 

92 President of Bolivia. 

93 O'Higgins was still an exile in Peru. 

94 Lamed to Van Buren, June 24, 1830, No. 25, MSS. State Department. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 12Y 

out further delay Venezuela seceded from the union, and the 
departments of the central and southern portions of the re- 
public were ready to establish independent states as soon as 
Bolivar should relinquish the supreme authority. This he did 
in March. The congress made one more ineffectual effort to 
conciliate the disaffected departments and then the end quickly 
came. In May, Bolivar left Bogota for the coast with the in- 
tention of embarking for Europe, where he hoped to spend his 
remaining days in peace. This aim was unfortunately not to 
be realized. Persuaded by his friends to await the outcome of 
their last efforts to maintain the unity of the Colombian repub- 
lic, ^^ the Liberator's health continued to decline. In a procla- 
mation which he addressed to the Colombian people shortly 
before his death, he declared that he aspired to no other glory 
than the unity of Colombia; and that if his death might con- 
tribute to the cessation of party strife and to the consolidation 
of the union he would descend in peace to the grave. On De- 
cember 17, 1830, he died, under the roof of a Spaniard to whose 
villa near Santa Marta he had retired a few days before in the 
hope that the air of the country would restore his waning 
strength. 

Viewing Bolivar's political career as a whole, taking into 
consideration his public acts and utterances as well as his secret 
dealings with Great Britain and France, it seems futile to try 
to determine whether or not he was at heart monarchist or re- 
publican. Of his Americanism there is no doubt. His great 
aim was to organize into a strongly centralized and effective 
government the vast territory which he had liberated. He 
would have preferred to accomplish this under the Bolivian 
constitution with himself as life president. Failing that he 
would have accepted possibly, in order to save his country from 
ruin, a monarchy under British protection with a British or 
French prince on the throne. But he insisted always upon the 
severing absolutely of all political connections with Spain, and 

95 Gil Fortoul, Historic Constitucional de Venezuela, I, 496. 



128 PA:N'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNIl^GS 

he never, even in his moments of greatest discouragement, con- 
templated submission to the Holy Alliance. He believed the 
protection of Great Britain to be essential to the independence 
of the new states and his manifest willingness to accept British 
cooperation in the establishment of stable governments was con- 
sistent with that belief. To his national aims and to his 
conception of the international situation he was loyal rather 
than to any less clearly defined and less fundamental principle 
of interior governmental organization. 

In conclusion a word must be said as to the attitude of the 
United States toward the question of monarchy. Although 
the general sentiment of the country naturally favored the estab- 
lishment of republican institutions throughout the continent, 
yet the government at Washington, in accordance with the 
national policy of nonintervention and neutrality, refrained 
from all interference. Though the mission which was sent to 
Buenos Aires in 1818 arrived there at a time when monarchistic 
plotting was at its height, the commissioners, however much 
their personal predilections might have prompted them to in- 
termeddle, limited themselves to the most formal expressions in 
behalf of the republican system. Later, when recognition was 
extended to some of the new states, the question of independence 
alone was considered — monarchies and republics alike being 
recognized. The minister of the empire of Mexico was received 
in 1822 and some two years later the Brazilian monarchy was 
recognized. When recognition of the latter was under consid- 
eration in the cabinet, some interesting discussion took place. 
Wirt thought that immediate recognition of Brazil would be 
represented as favoring the Holy Alliance and monarchies gen- 
erally ; and alluded to General Jackson's refusal of the mission 
to Mexico when Iturbide was emperor, and to his assigning, as 
his reason for the refusal, that he would give no counsel to that 
usurpation. Calhoun maintained that the established policy 
of the country in relation to the new states had been to look only 
to the question of independence and invariably to recognize the 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 129 

government de facto; that to decline to recognize the empire of 
Brazil because it was monarchical would be a departure from 
the policy hitherto observed and would introduce a new prin- 
ciple of interference in the internal government of foreign na- 
tions.^^ This, of course, was the view that prevailed. 

Afterward, during the administration of J. Q. Adams, it 
appears that the monarchical schemes in some parts of Spanish 
America, rumors of w'hich reached Washington, gave the gov- 
ernment so much concern that it came near to departing from 
the policy of non-interference. This was especially true in the 
case of the alleged monarchical designs of Bolivar. Secretary 
of State Clay, once his profound admirer, wrote the Liberator 
adjuring him not to abandon the cause of liberty. In Novem- 
ber, 1827, Bolivar had taken advantage of the departure of 
Colonel Watts, charge d'affaires of the United States at Bogota, 
to send Clay a polite letter, expressing admiration for the secre- 
tary's " brilliant talents and ardent love of liberty " and grati- 
tude for the " incomparable services " which he had rendered 
the cause of the Patriots. Nearly a year later Clay replied in 
a not too cordial manner. " I am persuaded," he said, " that 
I do not misinterpret the feelings of the people of the United 
States, as I certainly express my own, in saying that the in- 
terest which was inspired in this country by the arduous strug- 
gles of South America, arose principally from the hope that, 
along with its independence, would be established free institu- 
tions, insuring all the blessings of civil liberty. To the accom- 
plishment of that object we still anxiously look." Continuing, 
Clay admitted the difficulties which opposed the achievement 
of this end, but notwithstanding those difficulties the people 
of the United States, he said, cherished the hope that Providence 
would bless South America, as he had her northern sister, with 
the genius of some great and virtuous man, to conduct her se- 
curely through all her trials. " We had even flattered our- 
selves," he said, " that we beheld that genius in your Excel- 

96 Adams, Memoirs, VI, 281. 



130 PAK-AMERICAIi[ISM: ITS BEGINOTNGS 

lencj. But I should be unworthy of the consideration with 
which your Excellency honors me and deviate from the frank- 
ness which I have ever endeavored to practice, if I did not on 
this occasion state that ambiguous designs have been attributed 
by your enemies to your Excellency, which have created in my 
mind great solicitude." Declaring that he could not allow 
himself to believe that Bolivar would abandon the " bright 
and glorious path " for the " bloody road passing over the 
liberties of the human race," Clay continued as follows: " I 
will not doubt that your Excellency will, in due time, render 
a satisfactory explanation to Colombia and the world of the 
parts of your public conduct which have excited any distrust ; 
and that preferring the true glory of our immortal Washington 
to the ignoble fame of the destroyers of liberty, you have formed 
the patriotic resolution of ultimately placing the freedom of 
Colombia upon a firm and sure foundation." ^^ 

About the time Clay's letter was dispatched to Bolivar, Wil- 
liam Henry Harrison started on what proved to be an ill-fated 
mission to Colombia. The story of Harrison's brief diplomatic 
experience in Colombia has only recently been fully related, in 
a study by a Venezuelan writer.^^ It constitutes an interest- 
ing episode in the foreign relations of America, involving as it 
does the Liberator of half a continent and a future President 
of the United States. Harrison's " thirst for lucrative office," 
according to Adams, was " absolutely rabid." He had been 
" as hot in pursuit " of the office of vice president, major gen- 
eral of the army, and minister to Colombia " as a hound on the 
scent of a hare." Adams was opposed to sending Harrison on 
a diplomatic mission to Colombia, but at last acquiesced, as all 
the other members of the administration favored his appoint- 
ment. The next year the Adams administration went out of 
office, and complaints having been made by Colombia against 
Harrison, he was promptly recalled by the new administration. 

97 Colton, The Works of Henry Clay, I, 267. 

98 Rivas, A. C, Ensayos de Historia PoUtica y Diplomdtica. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 131 

On the occasion of a visit of the returned minister, Adams re- 
corded in his journal a succinct account of what had happened. 
After reviewing the political situation in Colombia at the time 
Han'ison arrived there, Adams declared : " He soon found 
himself an object of jealous observation. Inattentive to the 
admonitions of time and place, he indulged himself in pane- 
gyrics upon the freedom of speech and action enjoyed in the 
United States. He was immediately marked as an enemy of 
the government of Bolivar. From that moment every step he 
took was watched, every word he said was caught, scrutinized, 
and perverted. He was made accountable for the loose talk of 
his son and of his secretary of legation, and soon signalized 
as a conspirator against the Liberator. He visited the British 
consul, and they were both charged with plotting projects of 
assassination. He dined with a friend, and that friend was 
cast into a dungeon. His own life was not safe, and he was 
at last fortunate in getting safe out of the country." After 
he had taken leave of the Colombian Government Harrison 
wrote a letter to Bolivar to dissuade him from making himself 
king or dictator. This letter, Harrison published, upon his re- 
turn in 1830 to the United States, in a pamphlet which was 
intended to justify his conduct in Colombia. Moreover, Clay's 
instructions to the representatives of the United States to the 
congress at Tacubaya, in which the " ambitious projects and 
views " of Bolivar were referred to, were made public at the 
close of the Adams administration. All these things taken 
together must have greatly exasperated Bolivar. It was re- 
ported, indeed, that he had written Lord Aberdeen complaining 
that the greatest obstacle to the settlement of affairs in Colombia 
was the government of the United States. " But," Adams la- 
conically remarks, " I doubt this." ^^ 

Harrison was succeeded as minister to Colombia by Thomas 
Patrick Moore. In the summer of 1829 he was instructed by 
Van Buren, the new Secretary of State, to place the matter of 

99 Adams, Memoirs, VIII, 211. 



13^ PAl^-AMERICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

the Tacubaya instructions, which, had just been made public, 
before the Colombian Government on its true ground. It was 
the undoubted right of the late President, said Van Buren, 
to form such opinions as to the conduct and views of the public 
functionaries of other countries as he might deem just, and to 
give them such publicity as might comport with his views of 
propriety; but the disposition of the Colombian Government 
toward the United States " should not take its character from 
sentiments which have been expressed by those whom the peo- 
ple of these states, in the exercise of their sovereign power, have 
divested of executive authority." ^°^ Continuing, he declared 
that events in Colombia had undoubtedly produced in the 
minds of the friends of liberty occasional and painful appre- 
hensions as to the ultimate views of President Bolivar. In the 
opinion of the administration, however, " he ought to be con- 
sidered responsible to the cause of free and liberal principles 
only for the honest and faithful application of the means placed 
under his control, and a liberal allowance should be made for 
the difficulties incident to all attempts to convert long oppressed 
subjects into discreet depositories of sovereign power. The 
application of a different rule," continue the instructions, 
" would be to make President Bolivar answerable for the op- 
pressions which have been for a succession of years heaped upon 
his countrymen, and to the removal of which the best portion of 
his life has been devoted." ^^^ These instructions, together with 
Moore's discreet conduct, resulted in restoring the customary 
cordiality between the two countries. In dispatches to the De- 
partment of State during the summer of 1829, the new minis- 
ter succeeded in removing much of the suspicion which had 
arisen as to Bolivar's designs. Toward the end of the year, 
Van Buren wrote again to Moore saying that he had read his 

100 In 1832, Van Buren having been appointed minister to England and 
having arrived at his post, learned that his nomination had been rejected 
by the Senate, partly on the ground that he had criticized and extenuated 
the acts of a previous administration. Moore, Digest Int. Lwic, VII, 787. 

101 Moore, Digest Jnt, Law, VII, 788. 



FAILURE OF MONARCHICAL PLOTS 133 

observations with, profound interest and satisfaction. " It 
would be superfluous," be said, " to repeat what was said to you 
in general instructions as to the policy of this government re- 
specting intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries. 
You are well informed as to this point and as to the President's 
determination to demand of our public agents abroad the most 
scrupulous obedience to those instructions." ^^^ 

102 Van Buren to Moore, December 12, 1829. O'Leary, Memorias, XII, 
420. 



CHAPTER IV 

UNITED STATES ANB HISPANIC AMEKICAN INDEPENDENCE 

"^ The relation of the United States to the Hispanic American 
straggle for independence is often made a matter of contro- 
versy. An illustration of the sort of discussion to which the 
subject gives rise appeared some years ago in the North Amer- 
ican Review. Matias Elomero, then Mexican minister at Wash- 
ington, opened the debate with a paper in which he maintained 
that " the United States Government did not render either ma- 
terial or moral assistance to the cause of the independence of 
the Spanish American colonies." Among other things he ad- 
duced in support of his contention certain statements in Lyman's 
Diplomacy of the United States affirming that the patriot cause 
did not awaken any great general interest in the citizens of the 
United States; that the government was left free and unem- 
barrassed to pursue its steady course of good faith and exact 
neutrality toward Spain and of justice and policy toward the 
colonies; that neither the vicinity of some portions of their 
respective territories, nor the circumstance of being members of 
the same continent, nor the benefit to be derived from com- 
mercial relations, nor the similarity of their struggles for inde- 
pendence, appears in the least to have influenced the definite 
arrangements of the government; that on the contrary the au- 
thorities at Washington conducted the business with the utmost 
* caution and circumspection, doing nothing to give offense to 
Spain, or to awaken in other nations the slightest suspicion of 
their loyalty to the system of neutrality.^ y-^^^ 

In a subsequent article Senator Money of Mississippi took 
the other side of the question. He declared that the view ex- 

iThe North American Review, CLXV, 70-86 (July, 1897). 

134 



THE UNITED STATES A:ND INDEPENDENCE 135 

pressed in Romero's paper " leaves a disagreeable impression on 
the mind of the American citizen, who has always gloried in the 
belief that his government had cordially sympathized with any 
people anywhere in their struggle for liberty, and especially 
with those of this continent." He maintained that in permit- 
ting the revolutionists to buy in our cities all kinds of supplies 
not contraband of war; that in expressing interest and sym- 
pathy for them in Congress, in the public press, and through 
other channels of publicity; that in recognizing them before 
other nations had done so ; and that in arresting the movement 
designed by the Holy Alliance to reduce them again to subjec- 
tion to Ferdinand, the government and people of the United 
States undoubtedly rendered their cause both material and 
moral assistance.^ ^ 2_ 

The discussion, as may be readily perceived, hinges upon the 
definition of the terms " material and moral assistance." The 
disputants did not reach an accord on this point. Had " ma- 
terial assistance " been defined as substantial military and naval 
support such as that given by France to the Thirteen Colonies, 
this phase of the question would have been eliminated at once ; 
for the United States formed no alliance with the Spanish pos- 
sessions against the mother country. Had it been defined as 
such support given in violation of professed neutrality, then 
the problem would have been to determine its extent and im- 
portance; that is, whether or not it were material in the sense 
of affecting the outcome of the struggle. It is evident that 
assistance afforded by supplies, openly purchased in the mar- 
kets of the United States and equally accessible to both parties 
to the contest need not be considered. Had " moral assistance " 
been defined as encouragement derived from the example and 
from the interest and sympathy of a neighboring people; the 
advantages flowing from the recognition of belligerency and of 
independence ; in short, as every aid or support not originating 
in the violation of or departure from neutrality, then this phase 

illid., 356-363 (September, 1897). 



136 PAl^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINISTIE-GS 

of the subject would have been greatly simplified. It would j 
have become a matter of weighing the effect of certain undis- 
puted facts upon the fortunes of the insurgent cause. 

If the writers in the North American Review had placed 
some such limitation on the discussion, they would have arrived, 
doubtless, at substantial agreement. But in their case the fail- ' 
ure to agree was due in part to another cause; namely, thej 
confusion of government and people. Romero's proposition! 
referred to the government of the United States. Money speaks 
of the government and people, or of one or the other, indiffer-; 
ently. This divergence of view on the part of men exception- , 
ally well qualified to analyze the subject and to draw just con- 
clusions from it but demonstrates the necessity for a careful j 
review of the whole matter. Such is the purpose of the present 1 
chapter. As to whether, or to what extent, the patriots de-j 
rived material or moral assistance from their relations with the 
United States the reader may be safely left to draw his own 
conclusions. 
^ ^ The United States maintained a neutral policy in the con- 
flict between Spain and her colonies. This was in harmony \ 
with an already well-established tradition. At the beginning 
of its independent existence, the nation adopted a distinctive 1 
foreign policy, the first and foremost principle of which was [ 
nonintervention. By this was meant not only noninterference [, 
in the internal aff'airs of other nations, but also nonparticipation i, 
in the political arrangements between other governments and 
especially those of Europe. The system of neutrality was a | 
logical derivative of this principle. The first occasion for its i 
application was the war which broke out in 1793 between j, 
France on one side and Great Britain and her European allies 
on the other. In his famous proclamation, issued on April 22, 
1793, Washington declared that " the duty and interest of the 
United States require that they should with sincerity and good 
faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 137 

the belligerent powers." Warning the citizens against " aiding 
or abetting hostilities against any of the said powers," he made 
known to them that prosecutions would be instituted against all 
persons violating the law of nations with respect to the powers 
at war. ^ '2 

At about the time this proclamation was issued the French 
minister, Genet, arrived in the United States and began fitting 
out and commissioning privateers and inciting the people to 
hostility to Great Britain. As is well known, this conduct led 
to his recall. In the correspondence growing out of the inci- 
dent, Jefferson, as Secretary of State, set forth with clearness 
and force the principles of neutrality. Its bases he found in 
the exclusive sovereignty of the nation within its own territory 
and in the obligation of impartiality toward belligerents.* Not 
only did the administration enunciate principles, but it adopted 
measures to make them effective. To assist the judgment of 
officers on this head, Hamilton prepared a set of " Instructions 
to the Collectors of the Customs " which he directed to "be 
executed with the greatest vigilance, care, activity, and impar- 
tiality." * And on June 5, 1794, these principles and rules 
were embodied in the first neutrality law ever enacted by any 
nation. This act " forbade within the United States the accept- 
ance and exercise of commissions, the enlistment of men, the 
fitting out and arming of vessels, and the setting on foot of 
military expeditions in the service of any prince or state with 
which the government was at peace." ^ The law was limited 
in duration to two years, but was later reenacted with some 
changes and continued in force indefinitely.® Having brought 
the nation safely through these first years of trial, Washington 
gave the policy of nonintervention and neutrality a sort of 
sanctity for succeeding generations of American statesmen by 
the following words of counsel in his farewell address : 

3 Moore, The Principles of Americwn, Diplomacy, 45. 

4 Hamilton, J. C, Works of Alexander Hamilton, III, 576. 

5 Moore, The Principles of American Diplomacy, 46, 

6 Bemis, American Neutrality, 52. 



138 PAE'-AMEEICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

" The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign na- 
tions," he said, " is, in extending our commercial relations, to j 
have with them as little political connection as possible. . . . 
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none 
or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in fre- 
quent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign 
to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to 
implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes 
of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of 
her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situa-t 
tion invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If wei) 
remain one people, under an efficient government, the period r 
is not far distant when we may defy material injury fromb 
external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will[ 
cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be 
scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the 
impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly 
hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace 
or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why 
forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit 
our own to stand upon foreign ground ?' Why, by interweaving 
our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace 
and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, 
interest, humor, or caprice V '^ 

Under increasingly trying circumstances this policy was main- 
tained by John Adams. It was during his administration that 
a new factor arose to complicate the situation ; namely, the re- 
volt, actual or threatened, of the American colonies of France 
and Spain. The efforts of Miranda to obtain the support of 
the United States in carrying out his schemes for revolutioniz- 
ing South America have been noted elsewhere. Although his 
plans met with more or less favor in the eyes of Hamilton and 
some of his prominent contemporaries, yet they were never 
countenanced by the government. In connection with Santo 

7 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I, 222. 



THE TTNITEI) STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 139 

Domingo, however, there occurred during Adams's adminis- 
tration an incident which threatened to swerve the nation from 
its neutral course. 

As a result of the serious diflficulties between France and the 
United States, Congress passed the Act of June 13, 1Y98, sus- 
pending commercial relations with France and her dependencies. 
This act threatened to create distress in the French part of the 
island of Santo Domingo, where the revolted inhabitants had 
been receiving many of their supplies from the United States. 
Here Toussaint L'Ouverture held sway nominally as comman- 
der in chief under the French, but in reality as an independent 
ruler. Acting on the suggestion of the American consul he sent 
an agent to the United States with a letter to the President con- 
taining the assurance that if commercial intercourse were re- 
newed between the United States and Santo Domingo, it would 
be protected by every means in his power. In consequence the 
President obtained from Congress a new act, approved February 
9, 1799, which was intended to meet the situation. He also 
sent Dr. Edward Stevens, a friend of Hamilton's, to Santo 
Domingo with the title of consul general and with diplomatic 
powers. The British ministry dispatched General Maitland to 
the island with orders to go first to Philadelphia and arrange 
with the government of the United States a general policy with 
regard to Toussaint. Negotiations followed, which resulted on 
June 13 in a secret treaty between Toussaint and Maitland, by 
the terms of which the former agreed to abandon all privateering 
and shipping, receiving in return free access to those supplies 
from the United States which were required to meet the de- 
mands of his people. 

Stevens was not openly a party to this treaty ; but Toussaint 
believed him to be the real negotiator and his influence, no 
doubt, was paramount. Under the agreement supplies of every 
kind reached the island, and Toussaint was enabled to con- 
tinue the struggle for independence. He began the siege of 
Jacmel, for which he could not bring the necessary supplies 



140 PAK-AMERICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

and materials by land. The seizure by English cruisers of a| 
flotilla which, after his promise to abandon shipping, was bring- 
ing his munitions of war along the coast for the siege, made 
Toussaint fear for the result of his enterprise. Writing once 
more to the President, he requested him to send some frigates 
to enforce the treaty by putting an end to all trade with the j; 
island except such as the treaty permitted. The request was jj| 
granted and the frigate General Greene was sent to cruise off 
Jacmel in February and March, 1800. Later, other vessels d 
were sent. The French garrison was starved out and Jacmel l 
was abandoned. ^ 

When Jefferson became President, the situation changed, jf 
The treaty of Morfontaine, negotiated in the latter part of i 
Adams's administration and ratified by the Senate in the first ) 
year of Jefferson's, restored relations between France and the i 
United States. Santo Domingo was henceforth to be treated |i 
as a French colony and the negro chief to be left to his fate.^ 

The treaty with Toussaint can be explained only in the light 
of the maritime warfare then existing between France and the 
United States. It by no means signified an abandonment of 
the policy of neutrality. Hamilton, in spite of his predilec- 
tions, wrote Pickering that the United States must not be com- 
mitted on the independence of Santo Domingo ; that it must give 
no guaranty, make no formal treaty, do nothing that could rise 
up in judgment. " It will be enough," he said, " to let Tous- 
saint be assured verbally, but explicitly, that upon his declara- 
tion of independence, a commercial intercourse will be opened, 
and continue while he maintains it, and gives due protection to 
our vessels and property." ^ A few weeks later, Adams, 
writing from Quincy on the proposed participation of the United 
States in a project of the British ministry for liberating Santo 
Domingo, raised the question as to whether it would not involve 

8 Adams, Eistory of the United States, I, 383-389. 

9 February 9, 1799, Hamilton, J. C, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 
\1, 395. 



THE UNITED STATES Al^B IISTDEPENDENCE 141 

the nation in a more inveterate and durable hostility with 
France, Spain, and Holland, and subject it more to the policy 
of Britain than would be consistent with its interest and honor. 
And he concluded that " it would be most prudent for us to have 
nothing to do in the business." ^° Sixteen years later he re- 
verted to the subject. Speaking of Jefferson's " reign," he said 
that he had expected it to be very nearly what it had been. 
'^ I regretted it," he said, " but could not help it. At the same 
time I thought it would be better than following the fools who 
were intriguing to plunge us into an alliance with England, an 
endless war with all the rest of the world and wild expeditions 
to South America and Santo Domingo." ^^ 

The overthrow of the Spanish Bourbons by the Emperor IN'a- 
poleon in the spring of 1808 aroused anew the interest of the 
United States in the fate of Spain's American colonies. In 
October of that year, after news had reached America of the 
resistance of the Spanish patriots and of their victories over 
the French invaders, the subject was discussed in the cabinet 
and Jefferson recorded the result in his memoranda as follows : 
" Unanimously agreed in the sentiments which should be un- 
authoritatively expressed by our agents to influential persons 
in Cuba and Mexico ; to wit : ' If you remain under the do- 
minion of the kingdom and family of Spain, we are contented ; 
but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass under the 
dominion or ascendancy of France or England. In the latter 
case, should you choose to declare independence, we cannot com- 
mit ourselves by saying we would make common cause with 
you, but must reserve ourselves to act according to the then 
existing circumstances; but in our proceedings we shall be 
influenced by friendship for you, by a firm feeling that our 
interests are intimately connected, and by the strongest repug- 
nance to see you under subordination to either France or Eng- 
land either politically or commercially.' " 

10 Adams to Pickering, April 17, 1799, Life and Works, VIII, 634. 

11 Adams to James Lloyd, April 5, 1815, Life and Works, X, 155. 



142 PAN-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Writing a few days later to Governor Claiborne of Louisiana, 
Jefferson said: " The truth is that the patriots of Spain have 
no warmer friends than the administration of the United States, 
but it is our duty to say nothing and to do nothing for or against 
either." Eepeating what he had written in his memoranda 
about Mexico and Cuba, he added : " We consider their inter- 
ests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be 
to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere." ^^ 

It was not until two years afterward that occasion arose for 
a more definite consideration of the matter. When news 
reached Washington of the important events taking place at 'i 
Caracas, Buenos Aires, and elsewhere in the Spanish colonies, 
President Madison hastened to appoint agents to visit the prin- f 
cipal centers of disturbance. One of these agents, Joel Roberts 
Poinsett, destined to play for many years an active and effective 
part in international American affairs, was appointed to Buenos 
Aires. His instructions, dated June 28, 1810, contain, it may 
be presumed, an exposition of the policy which the government 
proposed to follow in the impending struggle. 

" As a crisis is approaching," ran the instructions, " which 
must produce great changes in the situation of Spanish Amer- 
ica, and may dissolve altogether its colonial relations to Europe, 
and as the geographical position of the United States and other 
obvious considerations give them an intimate interest in what- 
ever may affect the destiny of that part of the American con- 
tinent, it is our duty to turn our attention to this important sub- 
ject, and to take such steps not incompatible with the neutral 
character and honest policy of the United States as the occasion 
renders proper. With this view you have been selected to 
proceed without delay to Buenos Aires, and thence, if con- 
venient, to Lima in Peru or Santiago in Chile or both. You 
will make it your object, whenever it may be proper, to diffuse 
the impression that the United States cherish the sincerest 
good will toward the people of South America as neighbors, 

12 Adams, History of the United States, IV, 340-342. 



THE UmTED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 143 

as belonging to the same portion of the globe, and as having 
a mutual interest in cultivating friendly intercourse ; that this 
disposition will exist whatever may be their internal system 
or European relations, with respect to which no interference 
of any sort is pretended; and that in the event of a political 
separation from the parent country and of the establishment 
of an independent system of national government, it will co- 
incide with the sentiments and policy of the United States to 
promote the most friendly relations and the most liberal inter- 
course between the inhabitants of this hemisphere, as having 
all a common interest, and as lying under a common obligation 
to maintain that system of peace, justice, and good will which 
is the source of happiness for nations. 

" Whilst you inculcate these as the principles and disposi- 
tions of the United States, it will be no less proper to ascertain 
those on the other side, not only toward the United States, but 
in reference to the great nations of Europe, as also to that of 
Brazil and the Spanish branches of the government there ; and 
to the commercial and other connections with them respectively, 
and generally to inquire into the state, the characteristics, in- 
telligence, and wealth of the several parties, the amount of the 
population, the extent and organization of the military force, 
and the pecuniary resources of the country. 

" The real as well as ostensible object of your mission is to 
explain the mutual advantages of a commerce with the United 
States, to promote liberal and stable regulations, and to transmit 
seasonable information on the subject." ^^ 

Poinsett exceeded his instructions and became an enthusiastic 
collaborator in the propagation of revolutionary ideas. The 
Chilean historian, Barros Arana,^^ describes him as alert, ener- 
getic, intelligent, and profoundly democratic and liberal in his 
views. At Buenos Aires he appointed William Gilchrist as 
vice consul and proceeded to Chile, where he arrived in Decem- 

13 Paxson, The Independence of the South American Republics, 107-109. 

14 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, VIII, 564. 



144 PAlT-AMERICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

ber, 1811. His arrival in Chile gave great satisfaction to the 
Patriots. He was received by the revolutionary junta with 
grand ceremony, as though he were a public minister accredited 
to a sovereign nation. The president, Jose Miguel Carrera, 
welcomed him in a speech filled with the warmest expressions 
of friendship for the United States. Poinsett spoke briefly in 
Spanish, explaining the object of his visit and manifesting a 
spirit of international confraternity which greatly raised the 
hopes of the Chilean revolutionists. " The Americans of the 
North," said Poinsett, " view with the greatest interest the 
events taking place in these countries and they ardently desire 
the prosperity and happiness of their brothers of the South. 
I shall be pleased to inform the government of the United States 
of the friendly sentiments of your Excellency and I am happy 
to be the first to have the honor of establishing relations between 
two generous nations which should be united as friends and 
natural allies." ^^ Everything appeared to justify the high ex- 
pectations of the Chileans. Poinsett became an active propa- 
gandist. The government looked to him for counsel, and on 
every hand he left it to be understood from his conversations 
that the government and people of the United States had the 
liveliest interest in the triumph of the revolution. He gave the 
impression that military supplies were to be easily obtained in 
the United States and he gave the names and addresses of manu- 
facturers and merchants who could furnish them. 

Chile was soon to be disillusioned. The War of 1812 came 
on and distracted the attention of the United States from the 
events occurring in the southern continent. Moreover, the revo- 
lution in Chile received a backset as the result of civil strife 
which was followed by the temporary ascendancy of the Penin- 
sular authorities. Poinsett, desiring to take part in the war in 
which his own country was engaged, made his way back to the 
United States, but arrived after peace had been declared. His 
unneutral activities in Chile apparently passed unnoticed and 

15 lUd., 566 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 145 

he continued to enjoy the confidence of the administration. 

Another of these early agents was Robert K. Lowry. He 
was dispatched to Venezuela, and, as he arrived at his post ahead 
of Poinsett, he bears the distinction of being the first represen- 
tative of the United States in any of the revolted colonies. His 
conduct was more discreet than that of his colleague in Chile, 
though he maintained friendly relations with the revolutionists, 
and, it appears, gave the leaders counsel in their first essays at 
political organization. He remained in Venezuela throughout 
the period of revolution, was United States consul at La Guayra 
after the new states were recognized, and later engaged in busi- 
ness enterprises in Venezuela until his death some years later. 

In his annual message of November 5, 1811, President Madi- 
son declared that it was impossible to overlook the scenes " de- 
veloping themselves among the great communities which occupy 
the southern portion of our own hemisphere and extend into 
our own neighborhood. An enlarged philanthropy and an en- 
lightened forecast," he added, " concur in imposing on the na- 
tional councils an obligation to take a deep interest in their 
destinies, to cherish reciprocal sentiments of good will, to re- 
gard the progress of events, and not to be unprepared for what- 
ever order of things may be ultimately established." ^^ The 
committee to whom was referred this part of the President's 
message reported in the form of a public declaration, a resolu- 
tion in which it was affirmed that the Senate and House of 
Eepresentatives beheld with friendly interest the establishment 
of independent sovereignties by the Spanish provinces in Amer- 
ica; that as neighbors and inhabitants of the same hemisphere, 
the United States felt great solicitude for their welfare; and 
that when those provinces had attained the condition of nations, 
by the just exercise of their rights, the Senate and House would 
unite with the executive in establishing with them, as independ- 
ent states, amicable relations and commercial intercourse.^''^ 

16 Richardson^ Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I, 494. 

17 American State Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 538. 



146 PAN'-AMEEICAKISM: ITS BEGINN^GS 

From the instructions to Poinsett and from the declarations I* 
of the President and of Congress, it would appear that the r 
United States thus early recognized the revolted colonies as r 
belligerents. President Monroe declared at a later date, in fact, 
that the contest was regarded from the first " not in the light of 
an ordinary insurrection or rebellion, but as a civil war between 
parties nearly equal, having as to neutral powers equal 
rights." ^^ Legally, however, the situation remained for some 
time without definition. This was due mainly to the following 
causes: First, diplomatic relations between the United States 
and Spain were suspended during the early years of the revo- 
lution. Casa Yrujo, the Spanish minister at Washington, was 
dismissed in 1806 and no new minister came to take his place 
until Luis de Onis arrived in 1809 as the representative of 
the Spanish Patriots. On account of the anomalous state of 
affairs in Spain, the United States declined to receive the new 
minister until a general peace was declared. ^^ The exigencies 
of diplomatic intercourse with Spain then demanded that the 
situation be more clearly defined. Secondly, the conflict be- 
tween Spain and her colonies being carried on at first almost 
wholly on land, the demand for the formal recognition of bellig- 
erency was not urgent. And finally, the strained relations be- 
tween the United States and the two great maritime powers of 
Europe, resulting at last in war with one of them, kept the 
government at Washington absorbed in matters of more vital 
concern. 

Conditions having changed, the legal status of the revolted 
provinces could no longer be left in doubt. The first authorita- 
tive statement on the subject appears to have been contained in 
a letter of July 3, 1815, from the Secretary of the Treasury 
to the collector at IS^ew Orleans. It was the President's desire, 
the collector was informed, that intercourse with the revolted 
provinces should strictly conform to the duties of the govern- 

18 Moore, A Digest of International Law, I, 173. 

^9 Ibid., 131. See also Onis, Memoir upon the Negotiations between Spain 
amd the United States of America, 10-13. 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 147 

ment under the law of nations, the Act of Congress and the 
treaties with foreign powers; that there was no principle of 
the law of nations which required the United States to exclude 
from its ports subjects of a foreign power, in a state of insur- 
rection against their own government ; that any merchant vessel 
conforming to the laws of the United States was entitled to an 
entry to the customshouses whatever flag she might bear; that 
while a public war exists between two foreign nations, or when 
a civil war exists in any particular nation, the provisions of the 
Act of June 5, 1794, must be strictly enforced. A few weeks 
later the President issued under this Act a proclamation for- 
bidding the setting on foot in the United States of military 
expeditions or enterprises against the dominion of Spain. ^^ 
Thus the belligerency of the insurgents was at last definitively 
recognized. 

Against the admission of vessels under the insurrectionary- 
flags, Onis protested on the ground that it was subversive of 
the most solemn stipulations in the treaties between Spain and 
the United States. He maintained, moreover, that it was op- 
posed to the general principles of public security and good 
faith and to the law of nations ; and that as the independence 
of none of these provinces had been acknowledged, it was an 
offense against the dignity of the Spanish monarchy and against 
the sovereignty of the king. He protested also against the activ- 
ities of a " factious band of insurgents and incendiaries " who 
were raising and arming troops in Louisiana " to light the flame 
of revolution in the kingdom of New Spain." Continuing, he 
declared that all Louisiana had witnessed those activities and 
that other expeditions under the ring-leaders, Jose Alvarez de 
Toledo and Jose Manuel de Herrera, the latter of whom had 
just arrived as representative of the Mexican Congress, were 
on foot to invade the dominions of his Catholic Majesty. ^^ This 

20 American State Papers, Fed. Rel., TV, 1. 

21 Onis to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1815. American State 
Papers. For. Rel., IV, 422. 



148 PAN^-AMERICAii[ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

was the beginning of a voluminous correspondence "Wliicli Onis 
carried on during the next five or six years with the State De- 
partment. 
^ The Spanish minister without doubt had grounds for com- 
plaint. But he was not without prejudice. He viewed every 
move with suspicion. Soon after his arrival he declared that 
there was no hope of obtaining anything favorable from the 
United States except " by energy, by force, and by chastise- [ 
ment." ^^ And in 1812 he informed the viceroy of Mexico \ 
that the United States contemplated extending its southwestern f 
boundary to the Eio Bravo ; that East Elorida and Cuba would f] 
be seized as West Florida had been; that emissaries of the 
United States had been sent throughout the Spanish possessions 
to foment revolution; that great assistance in arms had been 
given to Caracas and to Buenos Aires; that an agent had been 
appointed to treat with the insurgents in Mexico and to offer 
them aid in money, arms, and ojSicers ; that in order to remain 
on good terms with Spain the United States affected to give the 
greatest attention to the repeated remonstrances which had been 
made against the arming of privateers in its ports, and had in 
fact given strict orders to prevent violations of the laws; but 
that in spite of this, the government was then raising seventy- 
five thousand troops, on the pretext of taking Canada, but really 
for the purpose of robbing Spain of her colonies. ^^ 

Alvarez Toledo, whom Onis mentioned as one of the " ring- 
leaders," was a Cuban by birth. He represented Santo Do- 
mingo in the Cortes at Cadiz, where his radical opinions made 
him obnoxious to the peninsular authorities. Fleeing to the 
United States he arrived at Philadelphia in September, 1811. 
He soon entered into informal relations with Secretary Monroe, 
to whom, it appears, he gave information of an alleged design 

22 Onis to the Captain General of Caracas, February 2, 1810. American 
State Papers. For. Rel., Ill, 404. 

23 Onis to the Viceroy of Mexico, Philadelphia, April 1, 1912, AlamSn, 
Eistoria de Mexico, III, app. 46. 



THE UOTTED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 149 

of Great Britain, acquiesced in by the Cortes, to take posses- 
sion of Cuba, Santo Domingo, and Porto Eico. Claiming to 
represent his Spanish American associates in the Cortes, he 
sought the aid of the United States in forming these islands 
into an independent confederation, k > 

Shortly before these informal relations began, a Mexican, 
Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara, appeared at Washington as 
the diplomatic representative of Hidalgo's government, seeking 
assistance for his countrymen in men, money, and arms. The 
two agents became acquainted, and after further conferences 
with representatives of the State Department revealed the fact 
that the government would not give the desired assistance, they 
turned their attention to the organization of an expedition to 
invade Texas from the Louisiana border. ^^ With a force com- 
posed of some four hundred and fifty Mexican refugees and 
American adventurers, the invasion began in August, 1812.^^ 
Gutierrez de Lara was nominally head of the expedition, but 
was later superseded by Toledo. The real commanding officer, 
however, was Colonel Augustus W. Magee, who resigned a 
commission as lieutenant in the United States Army to assume 
command. Hence the expedition is known to history as the 
" Gutierrez-Magee raid." Welcomed by the Creole population 
and opposed but ineffectively by the weak Royalist garrisons, 
the invaders, styling themselves the " Eepublican Army of the 
North," marched through the province to the capital, San An- 
tonio de Bejar, where they established themselves and set about 
organizing a civil government. Here they remained until Au- 
gust, 1813, when a superior force of Eoyalists engaged them 
in a bloody battle and cut them to pieces. A few of the sur- 
vivors, among them Toledo and Colonel Perry, an able Amer- 
ican officer, escaped to Louisiana, where they joined with the 

24 Cox, Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents. Am. Hist. 
Assn. Rep., 1, 199-208. 

25 Alaman, Historia de Mexico, III, 481, McCaleb, The First Period of 
the Gutierrez- Magee Expedition in Texas Hist. Assn. Qimr., IV, 229. 



150 PAIT-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Mexican refugees and the adventurers of different nationalities, | 
who, undiscouraged, were planning new undertakings.^^ 

It was against such enterprises, fomented for the most part 
by this polyglot group in Louisiana, that the Spanish minister ' 
urged the government to act. Before the correspondence of 
Onis with the State Department began, however, measures had 
been taken to frustrate the designs of the plotters. Arms sup- 
posed to be intended for an expedition which, according to ru- 
mor, was being organized by Colonel Perry were seized. It 
was later ascertained that Perry and a number of his follow- 
ers, crossed the border separately and embarking from some ' 
point below the mouth of the Sabine for the coast of Mexico, ! 
were wrecked and dispersed. Toledo and a number of his j 
associates were indicted in the United States District Court of j 
Louisiana, and this had a tendency to check their activities. ^^ ! 
Toledo himself shortly afterward deserted the Patriot cause, 
and, proceeding to Spain, was received with open arms and 
sent as ambassador to Naples. ^^ 

As to Herrera, whom Onis evidently regarded as particu- 
larly dangerous to Spanish interests, it appears that he never 
proceeded further than New Orleans, established no connections 
with the government at Washington, and accomplished nothing 
beyond dispatching small quantities of arms and anununition 
to the insurgents. Associated with him was a Mexican, An- 
tonio Francisco Peredo by name, who was furnished with a 
limited amount of funds and authorized to procure merchant 
vessels and privateers to sail under the flag of the new repub- 
lics^ Exactly what Peredo accomplished is not clear; but as 
from this time a number of vessels were added to the Mexican 
fleet, it is to be presumed that he effected, with the concurrence 
of Herrera, some arrangement by which the acquisitions could 

26 Alaman, Historia de Meocico, III, 480'-492. Yoakvim, History of Texas, 
I, 75-85. 

27 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 431. 

28 Alam&n, Historia de Mexico, IV, 395. 
23 Ibid., 186, 395. 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 151 

be made. The authority to commission the vessels was dele- 
gated to Luis Aury,^^ formerly in the naval service of New 
Granada, and at this time, according to Yoakum, " Commo- 
dore of the fleet of the republics of Mexico, Venezuela, La Plata, 
and New Granada." ^^ By what authority this office of " Com- 
modore " of the combined fleet was established, Yoakum does 
not explain; nor do other historians throw any light on the 
point. The title was of doubtful validity. But it ' is with 
Aury as an officer of the republic of Mexico that we are at 
present interested. 

In September, 1816, Herrera went with Aury and his fleet 
to Galveston Island, where a government for the province of 
Texas was organized under the Mexican republic. Aury was 
chosen civil and military governor. From Galveston as a base, 
the vessels of the fleet were sent out to cruise against Spanish 
commerce. Prizes were brought in and adjudicated in a Court 
of Admiralty in which Aury himself sat as a judge.^^ The 
men whom Aury gathered about him were not all of spotless 
character. Many of them had been followers of the pirate, 
Jean Lafitte, at Barataria, near the mouth of the Mississippi, 
until that establishment, harboring more than a thousand men, 
was broken up in 1814. It will be recalled that this band of 
freebooters under Lafitte had been pardoned by the President 
as a reward for the valiant part they played in the battle of 
New Orleans. They were now gradually returning to their 
old occupation of piracy and smuggling along the coast. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that among Aury's sea rovers, some 
should have failed to distinguish between friend and foe, espe- 
cially when specie or other valuable article formed part of the 
cargo ; that they should have found a way, as they did, to bring 
the slaves taken from Spanish slavers into the hands of Louisi- 
ana planters; that they should have disposed of the articles 

30 Robinson, W. I>., Memoirs of the Mexican Revolvtion, 61. 

31 Yoakum, History of Texas, I, 88. 

32 Ibid., 1, 89. 



152 PAK-AMEEICAHISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

of merchandise, with which their numerous prizes were laden, [' 
to smugglers engaged in an illicit trade along the bays and f 
bayous of the Louisiana coast.^* 

Though Galveston was the base of this fleet, the vessels came 
with great frequency to New Orleans. At least on one occa- 
sion reported by the collector, there were six privateers in the 
port, commissioned by Aury. It was reported and generally 
believed that many of the vessels of Aury's fleet were owned 
by persons resident in New Orleans and enjoying the privileges F] 
of American citizens. In admitting these vessels, the collector 
averred, great care was taken not to permit any violation of 
the Neutrality Act; but in defiance of every precaution, they f' 
violated the law, not while in port, but before they left Amer- I 
ican waters. Nothing was easier, said the collector, when a j- 
privateer was ready for sea, than to send both men and guns I* 
to Barataria, or any other convenient place where the vessel f 
could sail, and take them on board. At the end of the cruise i 
the same farce would be played over again. Thus it might 
be said that each cruise began and ended at New Orleans. At- 'I 
tempts had been made to secure convictions, but without sue- , 
cess ; for witnesses were difficult to obtain.^* j 

It was by no means with the Southwest alone that the govern- I 
ment had to deal in maintaining neutrality. Along the Atlantic i 
seaboard, numerous unneutral activities mainly connected with [ 
privateering had to be watched for and, if possible, frustrated. ! 
Of this character was the Mina expedition, which sailed un- 
hindered from the port of Baltimore. Xavier Mina was born 
in Navarre, Spain, in 1789. In the war against the French 
invaders, he distinguished himself. He was captured in 1811 
and held a prisoner in France until peace was declared. As 
soon as he was at liberty, he returned to Spain and, with his 
uncle, Espoz, raised the standard of revolt against the reaction- 

33 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 134. Yoakum, Hislkiry of Texas, 
I, 92. 

34 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 136. 



THE UNITED STATES A^B IKDEPENDE:N^CE 153 

ary Ferdinand. The conspiracy having failed, he fled to Eng- 
land, where he was well received. It is said he was granted 
a pension by tlie British Government. Desiring to continue 
his revolutionary activities in Mexico, he obtained a ship, arms, 
and military stores from some " English gentlemen attached 
to the cause of freedom," and, settii^ig sail, accompanied by fif- 
teen Spanish, Italian, and British officers, arrived at Balti- 
more in the summer of 1816. On the way over, four of the 
Spanish officers became disaffected, and, upon arriving in the 
United States, deserted the enterprise and gave such informa- 
tion of it as they possessed to the Spanish minister at Wash- 
ington, who immediately called upon the government to sup- 
press the threatened undertaking. But the complaints of the 
minister were not sustained by any positive data and the execu- 
tive did not think proper to interfere as long as Mina and his 
agents moved within the sphere of the laws of the republic. 

Quantities of military stores were put aboard the ship as 
cargo and, late in August, some two hundred " passengers " 
under the direction of Colonel the Count de Ruuth, having em- 
barked, the vessel put to sea with a clearance for Saint Thomas. 
She was accompanied by a Spanish schooner which had been 
hired by Mina, and on board of which was Lieutenant Colonel 
Myers with a company of artillery. Mina and his staff sailed 
four weeks later aboard a fast sailing brig pierced for guns, 
joining the rest of the expedition at Port-au-Prince early in 
October.^^ Here Mina met Bolivar who had been driven a 
second time from his native shores.^® From Petion, the negro 
president of the republic of Haiti, he received generous assist- 
ance, as had Bolivar a few months before. On October 24 the 

35 Robinson, W. D., Memoirs of the Mewican Revolution, 43-55. The 
author of this memoir was an American who had spent some years in 
Venezuela and Mexico. He accompanied the Mina expedition to Mexico, 
was captured, and sent a prisoner to Spain. Escaping and returning to the 
United States, he published his memoir at Philadelphia in 1820. This is 
the account, with minor corrections, which AlamSn follows in his Historia 
de Mexico. 

36 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVII {Narracidn I), 356. 



154 PA^-AMERICAlSnSM: ITS BEGINNmGS I 

expedition, consisting of the brig, ship, and schooner, made 
sail for Galveston Island. Arriving safely the troops were dis- 
embarked and the work of organization and training was begun. | 
Mina made a trip to 'N&w Orleans where he purchased a trans-' 
port to replace the ship with which he left England, and, hav- 
ing arranged the purchase of another smaller vessel, he re- 
turned with a few American and European officers to Galveston J^ 
Among the recruits who joined Mina at Galveston Island wasfj 
a small band of Americans under Colonel Perry. These, to-n 
gether with a number of Aury's men and a few additions fromi^ 
miscellaneous sources, gave him about three hundred fightingr 
men. On April 5, 1817, the expedition, accompanied by the^ 
whole Galveston Island naval establishment, sailed southward" 
and, bearing down the coast, reached Soto la Marina, where ar 
successful landing was made. Successes and reverses followed''' 
alternately during the next four or five months until finally 
Mina was captured. On ISTovember 11, 1817, he paid the pen- 
alty. He met death at the hands of a firing squad. ^'^ 

In discussing Mina's failure, Robinson, the historian of the 
expedition, declares that the first great obstacle which Mina 
had to contend against was the want of proper support from 
the mercantile world. The giving of such support, he main- 
tained, did not constitute either in the United States or Great 
Britain a breach of neutrality. " We have heard much," he 
said, " of the assistance which the Mexican Patriots have re- 
ceived from individuals in the United States; and indeed if 
we were to believe one tenth part of what the Chevalier Onis 
has stated on this subject, we might suppose that the American 
merchants had been liberal in the extreme in the supplies af- 
forded to the Mexican people ; but the real fact is, that a single 
house in London has supplied a larger amount of arms and 
clothing to Venezuela than has been afforded by all the mer- 
chants of the United States to Mexico; at the same time that 

37 Robinson, Memoirs, 58-62, 78-80, 259, 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 155 

the royal armies [of Spain] were fed and furnished with 
ammunition, ships, and every species of supply from our prin- 
cipal seaports." Continuing, he declared that the resources 
which Mina obtained at Baltimore were small, though in the 
eyes of the Spanish minister they were greatly magnified, the 
expedition becoming in his terrified imagination a formidable 
army. " It was in vain," says Eobinson, " that Mina endeav- 
ored to convince some merchants of the United States of the 
advantages they would derive from the political and commercial 
emancipation of Mexico. It was in vain that he offered the 
most flattering terms for ample supplies; while the influence 
of the Spanish agents, through the contracts which they were 
enabled to bestow, produced such an influence on the monied 
men, and the monied institutions of some of our principal cities, 
as to interfere materially with the necessities of Mina and the 
emancipation of Mexico." ^^ 

But in Mina's case as in numerous other cases the neutrality 
laws of the United States were, doubtless, violated. The fail- 
ure to prevent these violations was due to certain defects in 
the laws. The Act as it stood did not give the executive, in 
cases where there might be reason to suspect an intention to 
commit the offense, authority to demand security or to adopt 
any other preventive measure. Thus it frequently happened 
that vessels belonging to citizens of the United States or to 
foreigners would arm and equip in the ports of the United 
States, and clearing as merchant ships, cruise as privateers 
under one or another of the belligerent flags, either immediately 
after getting to sea or after touching at other ports. In other 
instances, foreign vessels would abuse the privileges allowed in 
the ports, augment their armaments, as Mina did, and take on 
board citizens of the United States, who later assumed a mili- 
tary character. Accordingly, President Madison, in a special 
message to Congress of December 26, 1816, recommended the 

38 Kobinson, Memoirs, 262-263. 



156 PAi^-AMERICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

adoption of sucli additional legislation as the situation might 
require.*^ 

On January 14, 1817, a bill was introduced in the House of 
Representatives and on March 3, following, after a long debate, 
in which Henry Clay led the opposition, it was enacted into 
law. This Act contained two provisions intended to remedy 
the defects in the old law. The first of these was a provision 
requiring the American owners, or part owners, of armed ships 
to give bond that such ships would not be used in hostilities 
against any " prince or state, colony, district, or people " with 
whom the United States was at peace. The second authorized 
the collectors of the customs to detain any vessel manifestly 
built for warlike purposes, when the arms and number of men 
shipped aboard, or other circumstances, rendered it probable 
that such vessel was intended to be used in violation of the 
law.^® The law contained one other new feature. The statute 
of 1794 contemplated wars between " princes or states." This 
was disclosed as a defect in the case of Gelston v. Hoyt, where 
the fitting out of the ship American Eagle for one of the Haitian 
combatants, Petion, to be used against another Haitian com- 
batant, Christophe, was held to be no offense, for the reason 
that neither of the chieftains had been recognized as a " foreign 
prince or state " under the statute of 1794. Hence the law of 
1817 contemplates belligerents, princes, states, colonies, dis- 
tricts, or peoples. ^^ This Act was superseded by the compre- 
hensive law of April 20, 1818, the provisions of which are now 
embodied in the Revised Statutes of the United States.*^ 

The Act of 1817 was passed in the House of Representatives 
by a vote of 83 to 62. The opposition did not spring from any 
widespread desire to intervene in the contest. It was at- 
tributable in part to party spirit, and in so far as it had any 

39 American State Papers, For. Bel., IV, 102-103. 

40 Annals of Congress, 14th Cong., 2d Sess., 477, 740, 1308. 

41 Moore, A Digest of International Law, VII, 1076. Bemis, American 
'Neutrality, 35. 

42 Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, 49. 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 157 

solid basis, it rested on the ground that the Act would increase 
the already existing inequality of condition as between the two 
contending parties. One of them, said Clay, had an accredited 
minister to watch over its interests, while the other had no 
organ through which to communicate its grievances. The na- 
tion being in a state of neutrality respecting the contest, and 
bound to maintain it, the question, according to Clay, was 
whether the provisions of the bill were necessary to the per- 
formance of that duty. " We ought to perform our neutral 
duties," he declared, " whilst we are neutral, without regard 
to the unredressed injuries inflicted upon us by Old Spain on 
the one hand, or to the glorious objects of the struggle of the 
South American Patriots on the other. We ought to render 
strict justice and no more." But, as the bill was not limited 
to that object, he could not give it his assent. ^^ 

On the day following the enactment of this new legislation 
James Monroe was inaugurated President. He appointed as 
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, then serving as min- 
ister to Great Britain. Adams was an unwavering advocate of 
the system of neutrality. When but twenty-six years of age, 
he wrote, under the signature of " Marcellus," several articles 
in which he contributed greatly, at the critical moment of 
Genet's arrival in America, to the formation of a sound public 
opinion on the subject. These writings commended him to the 
favor of Washington and won for him the appointment in 1794 
as minister to the Netherlands.'** Sent as minister to Prussia 
in 1797, elected United States Senator in 1803, returned to 
Europe as minister to Russia in 1809, named one of the com- 
missioners to negotiate a peace with Great Britain in 1818, 
appointed minister to the court of St. James in 1815, Adams 
had enjoyed an unparalleled opportunity for acquiring a knowl- 
edge and grasp of the international situation commensurate 
with the high office to which he was called. Moreover, his long 

43 Annals of Congress, IJtth Cong., 2d Sess., 740-743, 

44 Adams, J. Q., Writings, I, 135, 148. 



158 PAN^-AMEEICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

residence in Europe had not left him unacquainted with the 
special set of relations which had developed between the United 
States and the belligerent communities in the southern part of 
the continent. Not only did he see those relations clearly but 
he saw more clearly, perhaps, than any of his contemporaries 
their wide-spreading European connections. Long before his 
return to the United States he had begun to point out the com- 
plications to which an abandonment of the traditional policy 
might give rise. In 1816 he told Del Eeal, a representative 
of New Granada, who called upon him in London, that the 
policy of the government of the United States, a policy dic- 
tated equally by duty to its own country, by amity with Spain, 
and by good will to the South Americans, was a strict and im- 
partial neutrality between them and Spain. And he explained 
that he meant by saying that the policy was dictated by good 
will to the South Americans, that the neutrality of the United 
States was more advantageous to them, by securing the neutral- 
ity of Great Britain, than any support which the United States 
could give them by declaring in their favor and making com- 
mon cause with them, the effect of which would probably have 
been to make Great Britain declare against both.*^ A few 
months later, commenting on news from the United States, he 
wrote : " There seemed to me too much of the warlike humor 
in the debates of Congress — propositions even to take up the 
cause of the South Americans. ... A quarrel vvdth Spain for 
any cause can scarcely fail of breeding a quarrel with Great 
Britain." ^^ 

But it was not merely with British hostility that the United 
States had to contend. " All the restored governments of Eu- 
rope," declared Adams, " are deeply hostile to us. The Royal- 
ists everywhere detest and despise us as Republicans. All the 
victims and final vanquishers of the French Revolution abhor 
us as aiders and abettors of the French during their career of 

45 Adams to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1816, Writings, V, 551. 

46 Adams to George William Erving, June 10, 1816, Writings, VI, 45. 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 159 

triumpli. Wherever British influence extends it is busy to 
Uacken us in every possible manner. In Spain the popular 
feeling is almost as keen against us as in England. Emperors, 
kings, princes, priests, all the privileged orders, all the estab- 
lishments, all the votaries of legitimacy eye us v^^ith the most 
rancorous hatred. Among the crov^ned heads the only friend 
we had was the Emperor Alexander, and his friendship has, 
I am afraid, been more than cooled." ^"^ Adams's view was not 
a passing fancy. About six months later he returned to the 
subject, expressing more emphatically than ever his belief in 
European hostility to the United States. " There is already," 
he said, " in all the governments of Europe a strong prejudice 
against us as Republicans, and as the primary causes of the 
propagation of those political principles which still made the 
throne of every European monarch rock under him as with the 
throes of an earthquake. . . . We are considered not merely as 
an active and enterprising, but as a grasping and ambitious 
people. We are supposed to have inherited all the bad quali- 
ties of the British character, without some of those of which 
other nations in their dealings with the British have made 
their advantage. They ascribe to us all the British rapacity, 
without allowing us the credit of the British profusion. The 
universal feeling of Europe in witnessing the gigantic growth 
of our population and power is that we shall, if united, become 
a very dangerous member of the society of nations. They 
therefore hope what they confidently expect, that we shall not 
long remain united. That before we shall have attained the 
strength of national manhood our Union will be dissolved, and 
that we shall break up into two or more nations in opposition 
against one another." *^ 

Thus, conscious of the difficulties and dangers of the interna- 
tional situation, Adams returned to America to take up at 
Washington the duties of Secretary of State. He found upon 

47 Adams to John Adams, August 1, 1816, Writings, VI, 61. 

48 Adams to William Plumer, January 17, 1817, Writings, VI, 143. 



160 PAN"-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINmNGS 

his arrival a growing demand for the early recognition of the [ 
new states. This was due to the more hopeful aspect which 
their affairs were assuming. The United Provinces of Kio de 
la Plata had declared and were maintaining their independence ; 
San Martin had crossed the Andes and won the great victory 
of Chacabuco; Bolivar and his exiled followers had returned 
to Venezuela, where they were gradually gaining ground ; and 
finally, the Mina expedition had entered Mexico and friends 
of the Patriots in the United States entertained hopes of sue- ^ 
cess in that quarter. The President, however, did not trust \\ 
wholly in the correctness and comprehensiveness of the infor- 'i^ 
mation which was reaching him. Accordingly he determined [ 
to seek the truth through agencies of his own choosing. Tie |{ 
turned first to Poinsett, writing him a personal note on April \ 
25, 1817, and asking him to undertake a mission to Buenos 
Aires. But having entered the legislature of South Carolina, i 
Poinsett declined the appointment. Then the President settled 
upon a commission which was partly constituted at once by the j 
appointment of Csesar A. Eodney and John Graham. The in- [ 
structions were prepared during the summer by Richard K^sh, ! 
who, until Adams's arrival in September, filled the office of 
Secretary of State. On December 4, Rodney and Graham, !. 
with Theodorick Bland as the third member and Henry M. \ 
Brackenridge as secretary, sailed from Hampton Roads aboard [ 
the frigate Congress. At about the same time John B. Prevost ' 
was sent on a similar mission to Peru and Chile. ^^ j 

Two of the commissioners, Rodney and Graham, returned to j 
the United States in July, 1818. Bland, who proceeded from ' 
Buenos Aires to Chile, returned in October. The work of the i 
commission was not harmonious. Bland and Brackenridge 
quarreled and no two agreed. Each commissioner made a sep- I 
arate report, those of Rodney and Graham being communicated ' 
to Congress in l^ovember and that of Bland in December.^® 

49 Paxson, The Independence of the South American Republics, 119-121. 

50 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV., 217-348. Niles' Weekly Reg- 
tster, XIV, 356, 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 161 

These reports were voluminous and in addition to them Brack- 
enridge published in two volumes, a few months later, an ex- 
tended account of the voyage and of the mission. Neither in 
the reports nor in Brackenridge's account was any important 
information given in addition to that already known. Accord- 
ing to Adams, Brackenridge was a mere enthusiast and so de- 
voted to South America that he wished to unite all America 
in conflict against all Europe. Eodney, who was suspected of 
being under his influence, traced the South American to the 
North American revolution, identifying them together in a 
manner which the President thought would be offensive to the 
European allies. His report, as did his personal efforts, tended 
to strengthen the party favoring immediate recognition. Gra- 
ham was less enthusiastic, and Bland held views which were 
not at all favorable to the Patriots. ^^ 

But recognition became a pressing question before the com- 
missioners had even left the United States. In September, 
1817, the subject was discussed in the Richmond Inquirer; and 
a few weeks before the opening of Congress the editor of the 
Intelligencer announced that, if the President failed to treat 
the subject adequately in his message, it would be taken up in 
the House of Representatives, where it would form a good 
theme for the display of oratorical abilities.^^ Monroe was im- 
pressed and presented the question to his cabinet for advice. 
The Secretary of State, finding that his colleagues were back- 
ward in giving their opinions, explicitly avowed his as opposed 
to the expediency of recognition.^^ That opinion prevailed, and 
in his annual message of December 2, 1817, the President lim- 
ited himself to expressions of sympathy and good will for the 
Patriots, and to a reiteration of the policy of neutrality.^'* 

The display of oratorical abilities began without delay. As 
soon as the President's message was received, a series of resolu- 

51 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV., 156, 159; V., 57. 

52 Paxson, The Independence of the South American Republics, 126. 

53 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV., 15. 

54 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 13. 



162 PAK-AMEEICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

tions embracing references of parts of it to appropriate com- 
mittees was introduced in the House of Representatives. To 
the first, relating to foreign affairs, Clay proposed an amend- 
ment instructing the committee to inquire what provisions of 
law were necessary to insure the American colonies of Spain 
their rights as belligerents. He was moved to this course in 
consequence of certain cases which had been . tried under the 
neutrality laws, resulting in decisions unfavorable to the Pa- 
triot cause. He cited a case in point. Nine or ten British, 
disbanded officers desiring to join the Patriots, had sailed from 
Europe, and in their transit to South America had touched at 
Philadelphia. During their stay there they wore the arms and 
habiliments of military men, making no disguise of their inten- 
tion to participate in the struggle. They took passage in some 
vessel bound to a port in South America. A knowledge of this 
fact having come to the ears of the public authorities, a prose- 
cution was commenced against them, and, from their inability 
to procure bail, they were confined in prison. Clay felt, he 
declared, perfectly sustained in saying that, if such proceed- 
ing were warranted by the existing law, it was the imperious 
duty of Congress to alter the law. Eor the essence of neutral 
obligation, as he conceived it, was that the belligerent means 
of the neutral should not be employed in favor of either of the 
parties. It certainly did not require one nation to restrain 
the belligerent means of other nations. To further illustrate 
the point he referred to the application of the law to privateers. 
" We admit the flag of those colonies into our ports," he said ; 
" we profess to be neutral ; but if our laws pronounce that the 
moment the property and persons under the flag enter our ports 
they shall be seized, the one claimed by the Spanish minister 
or consul as the property of Spain, and the other prosecuted 
as pirates, that law ought to be altered if we mean to perform 
our neutral professions." Continuing, he declared that what- 
ever had been our intentions, our acts had been on one side; 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 163 

thej all bore against the Patriot cause. We had had one great 
and magnanimous ally to recognize us; but no nation had 
stepped forward to acknowledge any of these provinces. The 
disparity between the contestants, said Clay, demanded a just 
attention to the party which was unrepresented ; and if the facts 
which he had mentioned and others which had come to his 
knowledge were correct, they loudly demanded the interposition 
of Congress. 

The amendment moved by Clay was agreed to without oppo- 
sition ; but it had no importance beyond offering an opportunity 
for expressions of sympathy for the Patriots and furnishing 
an occasion for an opening onslaught on the administration.^^ 

On one pretext or another, similar discussions were con- 
stantly recurring in the House until late in the spring, v^hen 
the session adjourned. Early in December a resolution re- 
questing the President for information relative to the inde- 
pendence and political condition of the belligerent provinces 
led to discussion, which was renewed, a few days later, on a 
resolution calling for information respecting the Amelia Island 
affair. In January a bill for the general revision of the neu- 
trality laws was introduced and in March it was debated at 
some length and passed. That disposed of, discussion arose 
over a clause in the appropriation bill voting compensation for 
the commissioners to South America. Then followed an ex- 
tended debate occasioned by an amendment offered by Clay to 
appropriate a sum of money for the outfit and salary of a 
minister to Buenos Aires, It was on this occasion that Clay 
spoke in advocacy of the " system of the New World," to which 
reference has been made elsewhere. This measure having been 
disposed of by an adverse vote, the discussions for this session 
came to a close. ^® On no occasion did the forces marshaled by 
Clay, though showing a strength which gave the administration 

55 Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 401-404. ; 

56 lUd., 406, 408, 1406, 1655. i 



164 PA:Nr-AMERICAOTSM: ITS BEGINmNGS 

concern, accomplisli their ends. Unhampered by Congress the 
executive continued to pursue the policy of neutrality. Recog- 
nition, however, as an issue w^as not dead. 

In August, 1818, Adams set forth very clearly in a letter to 
the President the principles upon which the act of recognition 
should be based. " There is a stage in such contests," he said, 
" when the party struggling for independence have, as I con- 
ceive, a right to demand its acknowledgment by neutral par- 
ties, and when the acknowledgment may be granted without 
departure from the obligations of neutrality. It is the stage 
when the independence is established as a matter of fact, so as 
to leave the chance of the opposite party to recover their do- 
minion utterly desperate. The neutral nation must, of course, 
judge for itself when this period has arrived, and as the bellig- 
erent nation has the same right to judge for itself, it is very 
likely to judge differently from the neutral and to make it a 
cause or a pretext for war, as Great Britain did expressly 
against France in our Revolution, and substantially against 
Holland. If war thus result in point of fact from the measure 
of recognizing a contested independence, the moral right or 
wrong of the war depends upon the justice and sincerity and 
prudence with which the recognizing nation took the step. I 
am satisfied that the cause of the South Americans, so far as 
it consists in the assertion of independence against Spain, is 
just. But the justice of a cause, however it may enlist indi- 
vidual feelings in its favor, is not sufficient to justify third 
parties in siding with it. The fact and the right combined can 
alone authorize a neutral to acknowledge a new and disputed 
sovereignty. The neutral may indeed infer the right from the 
fact, but not the fact from the right." ^'^ 

The subject of recognition again came under consideration 
in the early part of the following l^Tovember. The President, 
who was drafting his second annual message, appeared to have 
some hesitation what to say, and requested Adams to sketch a 

57 Adams, J. Q., Writings, VI, 442. 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 165 

paragraph on tlie subject.^® The secretary complied, with the 
result that, when the message was sent to Congress a few days 
later, it embodied his views. They were briefly that there 
should be no departure from the neutral policy hitherto pur- 
sued. This he based upon two grounds : First, that the inde- 
pendence of none of the regions aspiring to statehood was estab- 
lished as a matter of fact; and secondly, that the European 
allies had undertaken to mediate between Spain and her col- 
onies. It was understood that the powers would confine their 
interposition to the expression of their sentiments, abstaining 
from the application of force. ^^ And it was known that the 
mediation must fail, because there could be no resubjugation 
without the use of force. It was thought best, therefore, to 
let the experiment have its full effect, and after it had failed, 
as fail it must, the United States would then be at liberty to 
recognize any of the governments without collision with the 
allies. ^*^ Congress did not venture to dissent and thus for a 
time the matter rested. 

The President's third annual message, sent to Congress on 
December 7, 1819, contained, contrary to Adams's advice,®^ 
passages from which the Patriots might well draw encourage- 
ment. The progress of the war, said the President, had oper- 
ated manifestly in favor of the colonies. Their distance from 
the parent country and the great extent of their population and 
resources gave them advantages which, he believed, would be 
diflScult for Spain to surmount. " The steadiness, consistency, 
and success," he declared, " with which they have pursued their 
objects, as evidenced more particularly by the undisturbed 
sovereignty which Buenos Aires has so long enjoyed, evidently 
give them a strong claim to the favorable consideration of other 
nations." But, he maintained, " it is of the highest importance 

58 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 164. 

59 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 44. 

60 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 166. 
^1-Ibid., IV, 460-461. 



[ 



166 PAI^-AMERlCAE^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

to our national character and indispensable to tlie morality of ji 
our citizens that all violations of our neutrality should be pre-f 
vented." ^^ 

The President did not succeed, however, as he had hoped to 
do, in forestalling discussion in Congress. Clay again intro- 
duced a resolution upon which he spoke on May 10, 1820, pro- 
viding for the outfit and salary of such ministers as the Presi- 
dent might deem it expedient to send to the new states. For- 
getting for the moment the principles of neutrality, to which 
he had always professed the strongest attachment, he declared 
that two years before would have been the proper time for 
recognizing the independence of , the South; for then the strug-l 
gle was somewhat doubtful, and a kind oflBce on the part of thet 
government would have had a salutary effect. Since then 
nothing had occurred to make recognition less expedient. The 
independence of several of the provinces was, in fact, estab- 
lished; and as to their capacity for self-government every evi- 
dence was in their favor. The delay. Clay believed, was duelt 
to the excessive deference on the part of the administration forfl 
the powers of Europe. We had gone about, he said, among jtj 
foreign powers, seeking aid in recognizing the independence of jJi 
these states. Was it possible, he scornfully inquired, we could b! 
be content to remain looking anxiously to Europe, watching [ 
the eyes of Lord Castlereagh and getting scraps of letters, ji 
doubtfully indicative of his wishes; and sending to the Czari) 
of Eussia and getting another scrap from Count Nesselrode?p 
"Why not," he asked, "proceed to act on our own responsi- 
bility, and recognize these governments as independent, instead! 
of taking the lead of the Holy Alliance in a course which J" 
jeopardizes the happiness of unborn millions? . . . Our insti-j 
tutions now make us free ; but how long shall we continue so, \ 
if we mold our opinions on those of Europe? Let us break} 
these commercial and political fetters ; let us no longer watch ! 
the nod of any European politician; let us become real and' 

62 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 59, i 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 167 

true Americans, and place ourselves at the head of the American 
system." ^^ 

Though Clay's resolution now passed -the House, yet no action 
was taken by the executive. Accordingly, at the next session, 
the attack was renewed. After an ineffectual attempt to revive 
his old resolution, Clay introduced on May 10, 1821, a new one 
to the effect that the House joined with the people of the United 
States in their sympathy with the South Americans; and that 
it was ready to support the President whenever he should think 
it expedient to recognize their governments. The question was 
divided and the first part was carried by the vote of 134 to 12 ; 
and the second by 86 to 68.^^ The executive, however, was still 
unmoved. Eecognition was not yet to be accorded. \ 

The " deference " of the administration for the powers of 
Europe, which Clay treated with such scorn, dem^^ids a word 
of explanation. It will be recalled that Adaras returned to 
America in the summer of 1817 firmly convinced that the na- 
tions of Europe were moved by a strong feeling of hostility to- 
ward the United States. Moreover he had observed that in all 
their councils they showed a perpetual tendency to interference 
against the American insurgents, upon the principle of legiti- 
macy.^^ Nothing would have been easier, he believed, and 
with reason, than to precipitate a general conflict with mon- 
archist Europe arrayed against republican America. Such a 
conflict he desired by every means in his power to avoid. 
Hence the caution which Clay professed to believe was born 
of weakness. 

Monroe, though at times vacillating, shared his secretary's 
views. In a " sketch of instructions " ^^ prepared early in 
1819, in which he reviewed at length the policy of the govern- 
ment in the contest between Spain and her colonies, the Presi- 
dent explained the attitude assumed with respect to the Euro- 

63 Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 2223-2230. 

64 Paxson, The Independence of the South American Republics, 142. 

65 Adams, J. Q., Writings, VI, 176. 

66 Monroe, Writings, VI, 92-102. 



168 PAK-AMERICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

pean powers. The best service we could render the Patriots], 
he thought, was to keep our ports open and to extend to them al^ 
the adva;ntages enjoyed by Spain, at the same time promoting |5 
by communications with other powers a like neutrality on theif^ 
part, so as to leave the future of the war to be decided by ihej 
parties themselves. If this were done the result could not be, 
doubted. On the other hand, had we recognized them, there 
was much reason to believe that we should have given offens^,' 
to every other power, and excited in them a disposition to coun-j; 
teract its probable effect. The least injury which could havelj 
attended such a measure, said the President, would have been^, 
to increase the indisposition of other powers to recognize thel 
new states ; and it might have resulted in war with Spain, the, 
allies being drawn into it equally against the United States and 
the colonies. By the course pursued, therefore, the United 
States had given the belligerent provinces all the advantages 
of recognition without any of its evils. Declaring that ourj 
relations with the allies were of the most friendly character, 
he continued as follows : " We have been long in free com-fj 
munication with them in favor of the colonies, pushing their^ 
cause to the utmost extent that circumstances would permit. 1j 
Our object is to promote a recognition of their independence!) 
by the allies at the earliest day at which it may be obtained, jj 
and we are satisfied that the best mode of accomplishing it is[| 
by moving in concert with the allies, postponing the recognition [ 
on our part until it can be obtained from them, or until it shall || 
be manifest that it will at least do no harm." l 

In the course of time it became evident that nothing could i 
be accomplished by concerted action with other powers. Eng-, 
land, though gradually withdrawing from the European alli-j' 
ance and assuming an intermediate political position with re-| 
spect to the Old and the New World, was not yet inclined tojs 
cooperate with the United States in the recognition of the new !| 
states. She had from the first, Lord Castlereagh declared in •> 
February, 1819, anxiously desired to see the controversy be- 1 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 169 

tween Spain and her colonies at an end, and had done her best 
to effect this result; but always upon the basis of the restora- 
tion of the supremacy of Spain. The intervention of force as a 
means of its accomplishment, however, she had ever repudiated. 
When some months later Lord Castlereagh assured the American 
minister that, in the event of a rupture between Spain and the 
United States, Great Britain would not take the part of the 
former, the danger of a general conflict with all Europe against 
America had vanished.^'^ Whether or not the United States 
should recognize the new states was therefore reduced from a 
proposition based largely upon expediency to one based wholly 
upon the fact of independence. In a previous chapter it has 
been shown that that fact became clearly established in 1821. 

On March 8, 1822, the President transmitted to the House 
of Representatives certain documents called for by that body 
relating to the independence of the Spanish American prov- 
inces. In complying with the request, the President briefly 
reviewed the history of the struggle which had so long held the 
attention of the world. He declared that in Buenos Aires, 
Chile, Colombia, and Mexico it had been attended with com- 
plete success, and that these provinces " which had declared 
their independence and were in the enjoyment of it ought to be 
recognized." In proposing this measure, the President added, 
it was not contemplated to change our friendly relations with 
either of the parties, but to observe as theretofore the most per- 
fect neutrality between them.^^ Congress concurring, made, 
some weeks later, the necessary appropriations. 

67 Rush, The Court of London, III, 154. 

The British attitude was known in the belligerent colonies. Referring to 
the revolt of troops which occurred in Spain in 1820, Bolivar made the 
following estimate of the situation : — " She [England] fears revolution 
in Europe and desires it in America; there it gives her infinite concern, 
and here furnishes her inexhaustible resources. North America, pursuing 
its arithmetical course of business, will take advantage of the opportunity 
to acquire the Floridas, our friendship, and a dominion of trade. It is truly 
a conspiracy of Spain, of Europe, and of America against Ferdinand." 
Bolivar to Guillermo 'White, May I, 1820. CPLeary, Memorias, XXX, 159, 

68 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 117. 



ITO PAN'-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

{ W On June 19, 1822, Manuel Torres was received as cliargejj 
d'affaires from the republic of Colombia. Relative to this in- 
cident, which was the first formal recognition of a Latin Amer- 
ican state by the United States, Adams makes the following 
interesting remarks in his Memoirs: " Torres, who has scarcely 
life in him to walk alone, was deeply affected by it. He spoke^ 
of the great importance to the republic of Colombia of this'i 
recognition, and of his assurance that it would give extraordi-l 
nary gratification to Bolivar. The President invited him to be' 
seated, sat down by him, and spoke to him with kindness which : 
moved him even to tears. The President assured him of the; 
great interest taken by the United States in the weKare and 
success of his country, and of the particular satisfaction with 
which he received him as its first representative." ^^ Mexico 
was recognized on December 12, 1822, by the reception of 
Manuel Zozaya as minister plenipotentiary. '^•^ Buenos Aires 
and Chile were recognized on January 2T, 1823, by the ap- 
pointment of Csesar Eodney and Heman Allen, respectively, as 
ministers plenipotentiary to those governments. Brazil was 
formally recognized by the reception of Senhor Rebel] o as 
charge d'affaires on May 26, 1824 ; the Central American states 
by the reception of Antonio Jose Canas, August 4, 1824 ; and 
Peru by the appointment of James Cooley as charge d'affaires 
to that government on May 2, 1826. ''^ ^ Z^ 

News of recognition by the United States was in due time[ 
disseminated throughout Latin America. It was treated in the ' 
public press as an event of transcendent importance. A single j, 
example may be cited. In the Gaceta de Colombia of June 2, 
1822, a leading article commenting upon President Monroe's 
message of March 8, and upon the report of the Committee i 
on Foreign Relations to which the message had been referred, ' 
declared that these two documents " honor the United States 

69 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, VI, 23. 

70 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and 
Mexico, 12. 

71 Moore, A Digest of InterrMpional Law, I, 90-92, 



THE UNITED STATES AND INDEPENDENCE 171 

as greatly as does the declaration of independence written by 
the pen of the immortal Jefferson," Continuing, the writer 
said, among other things : " Palpable are the inconveniences 
to which undefined relations give rise. The increase of our 
commerce and of our industry since we became masters of our 
extensive coast lines should convince Europe and America of 
the necessity of entering into friendly arrangements with us 
upon matters of such high importance. A magistrate like Mr. 
Monroe, whose private opinions, it appears, have been con- 
stantly in opposition to the duties which his public character 
imposed, has been able with most propriety to take the initia- 
tive and to enlighten the whole world respecting the true state 
of a country which is to-day the object of the animadversions 
of our enemies and of the praises of our friends. The United 
States has always given careful attention to the origin and 
progress of the war in which its neighbors are engaged and in 
which its foreign policy has been and is to some extent compro- 
mised. Its government never acted upon impressions of the 
moment. The deliberateness of its procedure, which is a mat- 
ter of comment in Europe, is an additional proof of the recti- 
tude with which it has acted on this occasion. There is noth- 
ing, therefore, which we can present so effectively to Spain and 
to the rest of Europe, to demonstrate the justice of our preten- 
sions, as the impartial judgment of a foreign nation which, 
established in our continent, has had frequent opportunity to 
observe our conduct and to give to our actions the merit which 
they deserve." 



CHAPTER V 



INTEKNATIOiNAL. COMPLICATIONS 



The execution of the neutrality laws was a source of many 
difficulties to the government at Washington and required its 
constant watchfulness. The legislation of 1817 and 1818 was 
not sufficient in itself to prevent such violations as were prac 
ticed with impunity under the old laws. There were still 
difficulties in the way of a perfect observance of neutral duty, 
the chief of which was the sympathy felt on all sides for the 
cause of the Patriots. Adams, who was less subject to its in- 
fluence than any of his distinguished contemporaries, repeat-; 
edly testified in his writings to its existence. In 1812 he told, 
Count Romanzoff, Chancellor of the Russian Empire, that the|, 
government of the United States regarded with favorable senti-i 
ments the change that was taking place in the Spanish prov-, 
inces, believing it would be generally advantageous to the inter-ji 
ests of mankind.^ In 1816 he said to the agent of New Granada 0: 
in London, Del Real, that the general sentiment in the United jj 
States was certainly in their favor. ^ In 1817, commenting on 
one of Abbe de Pradt's pamphlets, Les trois demiers mois de 
I'Amerique Meridionale, he declared that " the republican spirit 
of our country not only sympathizes with people struggling in 
a cause so nearly, if not precisely, the same which was once our 
own,. but it is working into indignation against the relapse ofi 
Europe into the opposite principle of monkery and despot- j, 
ism." ^ In 1818 he remarked to Onis that if Spain had taken \ 
-more pains to adjust her differences with the United States,! 
there would probably have been less ardor in the country against ', 

1 Adams to the Secretary of State, February 29, 1812. Writings, IV, 300. j 

2 Adams to the Secretary of State, March 30, 1816. Writings, V, 551. 

3 Adams to John Adams, December 21, 18'17, Writings, VI, 275. 

172 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 1Y3 

Spain and consequently less in favor of tlie South Americans.^ 
If the testimony of such a witness were not sufficient, abundant 
corroboration might be found in the writings of Jefferson, Madi- 
son, Monroe, and others. Moreover the debates preserved in 
the annals of Congress show that the nation's legislators with- 
out exception desired to see the Patriots succeed; and similar 
views were generally reflected in the public press. The inde- 
pendence of the Spanish colonies was, indeed, according to a 
foreign observer, Hyde de Neuville, " the only cause popular 
here." ^ 

The Spanish Americans themselves were convinced of the 
sympathy of the citizens of the United States, if not of that of 
the government. " Here as well as in Spain and in every other 
nation," said Juan German Eoscio in 1819, " it is well not to 
compare the operations of the government with the sentiment 
of the people and of individuals, in order not to impute to them 
the intrigues and vices of their rulers, or of their system of ad- 
ministration. The great majority of the people of the United 
States are decidedly for our cause." And he goes on to men- 
tion the fact that in the invasion of Texas in 1813 and of Mex- 
ico in 1817 a large number of Americans took part ; that a 
great part of the privateers sailing under the Patriot flags were 
fitted out and manned in the ports of the United States ; that 
the juries never conformed to the " unneutral " Act of 1817, 
and that the state of Kentucky had made a declaration in favor 
of their cause. ^ 

It is readily to be understood what an obstacle this propen- 
sity to sympathize with the cause of the Patriots constituted 
for the government in the execution of the neutrality laws. 
Through its influence citizens who were otherwise law-abiding 
embarked shamelessly upon illegal enterprises in aid of the in- 
surgents; Federal judges failed to render strict justice under 

* Adams, Memoirs, IV, 200. 

5 Hyde de Neuville, Memoirs et Souvenirs, II, 203, 205. 

6 Urrutia. Pdginas de Historia Diplomdtica, 207. For the Kentucky 
resolutions, see Niles' Weekly Register, XIII, 371. 



174 PAI^-AMEEICA^ISM: ITS BEGIIOIKGS 

the law; and executive officers of the government not only 
winked at violations but actively aided and abetted them. Pri- 
vateering after 1815 was the chief source of annoyance. Un-I 
fortunately it came to be disgraced by a buccaneering and pi- 
ratical spirit for which citizens of the United States were largely 
responsible. The vessels were " for the most part fitted out 
and officered in our ports and manned from the sweepings of 
our streets." '^ The center of illicit enterprises shifted from 
ISTew Orleans and the Southwestern border to the Atlantic sea- 
board and more particularly to the port of Baltimore. In the 
course of time Baltimore became so notorious in its failure to i 
suppress the illegal acts of the privateers that the matter was 
made the subject of a memorial by the government of Portugal 
to the Congress of Sovereigns at Aix-la-Chapelle. A declaration 
of displeasure concerning these practices was entered upon 
the protocols of the conferences and it was agreed that amicable 
expostulations concerning it should be made to the United 
States.^ 

When Hyde de ISTeuville told Adams of the action of the Con- 
gress of Sovereigns, the secretary vented his wrath in a long 
entry in his journal. " The misfortune," he wrote, " is not 
only that this abomination has spread over a large portion of 
the merchants and of the population of Baltimore, but that it 
has infected almost every officer of the United States in the 
place. They are all fanatics of the South American cause. 
Skinner, the postmaster, has been indicted for being concerned 
in the piratical privateers. McCulloh, the collector, Crawford 
says, is a very honest man, but only an enthusiast for the South 
Americans and easily duped by knaves, because he thinks all 
other men as honest as himself. . . . The district judge, Hous- 
ton, and the circuit judge, Duval, are both feeble, inefficient 
men, over whom William Pinkney, employed by all the pirates 
as their counsel, domineers like a slave driver over his negroes. 

7 Adams to A. H. Everett, December 29, 1817. Writings, VI, 282. 

8 Adams, Memoirs, TV, 317. 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 175 

After the pirates were indicted last September, and before they 
were tried, a piece was published in the National Intelligencer, 
threatening that any judge who should condemn them could 
not be expected to live long, either as a judge or as a man. 
The paper containing this piece was sent under a blank cover 
to Judge Houston just before he opened court. He read the 
paragraph in open court, blustered about his independence and 
how impossible it was to intimidate him, and then (as well as 
Judge Duval), Wirt says, was perfectly subservient to what- 
ever Pinkney chose to dictate. Middleton told me that he had 
seen that threatening piece in the handwriting of Skinner, the 
postmaster, one of the parties indicted. When the trials came 
on, Glenn [district attorney] wrote to me asking to be assisted 
in the management of the causes. I prevailed upon the Presi- 
dent to direct the Attorney-General, Wirt, to assist him; but 
Wirt considered it as extra official, and made the public pay him 
fifteen hundred dollars for losing the causes. The grand jury 
indicted many, and the petit jury convicted one man, but 
every one of the causes fell through upon flaws in Glenn's bills 
of indictment. The conduct of the juries proves the real sound- 
ness of the public mind. The soldiers are good men and true. 
But the officers ! the commanders ! what with want of honesty 
in some and want of energy in others, the political condition of 
Baltimore is as rotten as corruption can make it. Now that 
it has brought the whole body of European allies upon us in 
the form of remonstrances, the President is somewhat concerned 
about it, but he had nothing but directions altogether general 
to give me concerning it. I must take the brunt of the battle 
upon myself, and rely upon the justice of the cause." ® 

Some time after this Adams received information from 
Brackenridge which put a still worse light on the whole affair. 
It appears that Theodorick Bland and the Baltimore postmaster. 
Skinner, who was his son-in-law, together with others associated 
with them, had entered into relations with the Carreras, exiles 

Adams, Memoirs, IV, 318. 



ire PAIT-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNI:N^GS 

from Chile and Buenos Aires and conspirators against the exist- 
ing gover«nnients there. They had lent these political refugees 
large sums of money and had obtained from them stipulations 
for exclusive privileges of commerce for a period of years. 
This private speculation, Adams believed, was the source of all 
the excitement stirred up in the newspapers during the autumn 
of 1817 over the question of recognition. The articles were 
written by Skinner aided by some others. The same cabal 
obtained the appointment of Bland as one of the commission- 
ers and made him their private agent to recover from the gov- 
ernments of Buenos Aires and of Chile the moneys lent to the 
Carreras. These connections of Bland, with their links of 
attachment to the Baltimore privateering piracies, influenced 
and pervaded his conduct as a commissioner and were the cause 
of his quarrel with Brackenridge.^'' 

" It is, in theory," said Adams, " one of the duties of a 
President of the United States to superintend in some degree 
the moral character of the public officers who hold their places 
at his pleasure. But the difficulty of carrying it into practice 
is great, and the number of instances in which I see corrup- 
tion of the deepest dye, without being able to punish or even to 
displace it, is among the most painful appendages to my situa- 
tion." ^^ Adams evidently felt that, if the President had used 
his authority to remove certain Federal officers who were guilty 
of corrupt practices, the neutrality laws would have been more 
strictly observed. This doubtless was true. In certain cases 
the President was lenient. There was, however, no disposi- 
tion on his part toward a general tolerance of these irregulari- 
ties. On the whole, the administration adopted effective means 
to enforce neutrality. The legislative branch of the government 
lent its cooperation by passing early in 1819 " An act to pro- 
tect the commerce of the United States and punish the crime of 
piracy." This law empowered the President to instruct the 

10 Adams, Memoirs, V, 158, 

11 Ibid., Y, 159. 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 177 

naval commanders of the United States to capture any vessel 
committing piratical aggressions upon ships of the United 
States or of any other nationality ; and it authorized merchant 
vessels owned by citizens of the United States to resist aggres- 
sions by all vessels except the public anned ships of the nations 
in amity with the United States. Finally, a section of the law 
prescribed the death penalty for persons convicted of piracy 
as defined by the law of nations. ^^ 

A few months after the passage of this act an expedition was 
sent out under Commodore Perry to carry it into execution, to 
communicate the terms to the governments of Venezuela and 
Buenos Aires, and at the same time to make representations 
to those governments against the privateering piracies carried 
on in their names and under their commissions.^^ A number 
of piratical vessels were captured and within the next year 
some ten or twelve of the pirates were executed, executions 
taking place at Boston, Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, and 
New Orleans. A number of others of the culprits, after trial 
and conviction, were pardoned. -^^ Although the executions 
produced a salutary effect, yet piracy continued for several 
years longer to thrive, especially around the island of Cuba. 
In the course of time the incipient South American navies be- 
coming better organized, the line between legitimate privateer- 
ing and piracy was more clearly distinguishable. Thus the 
task of suppressing the pirates became less complex and less 
likely to cause international friction. 

In the meantime, however, numerous cases of friction did 
occur, involving not only the relations of the United States with 
the European powers, but with the new states and Brazil as 
well. With the latter the situation became tense. Brazil, it 
will be remembered, was raised in 1815 to the dignity of a 
kingdom coordinate with the mother country. As long as the 

12 Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 2d Sess., 2523. 

13 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 389. 

14 Adams, J. Q., Writings, VII, 45; Memoirs, Y, 147. 



178 PA^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

court resided at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was in effect the Portu- 
guese power. The memorial on privateering presented to the 
Congress of Sovereigns may be regarded, therefore, as having 
been presented by Brazil. And Brazil had cause to protest. 
It will be recalled that the territory now constituting the re- 
public of Uruguay, the Banda Oriental, was occupied in 1816 
by the Portuguese who, after driving out the forces of Buenos 
Aires and of the independent leader, Artigas, occupied Monte- 
video. Retiring northward, Artigas continued the struggle 
to recover Montevideo. Though he had no port, he managed 
to enlist a number of privateers in his service. The Portu- 
guese minister, the Abbe Correa, made frequent complaints to 
the State Department at Washington of the depredations of 
these privateers, which he declared were fitted out and officered 
and manned in the ports of the United States. Adams be- 
lieved that the situation was so serious that if the United States 
had been the injured party it would have declared war without 
hesitation. ^^ 

The Abbe Correa resided for many years in the United 
States, first as a fugitive from the Inquisition and afterward 
as minister plenipotentiary. In 1820 he returned to Brazil. 
At that time he was seventy years of age, though, as Adams 
described him, full of spirit, vivacity, and wit. " He is among 
the men I have known," said Adams, " one of the most enter- 
taining conversation." Just before returning to Brazil, he 
went upon a visit to Jefferson, to whom he talked much about 
an American system, in which his government and that of the 
United States should be united, and, by concert with the Eu- 
ropean powers, should agree to keep the coasts of this hemi- 
sphere clear of pirates, on condition that they should clear the 
seas of the Eastern Hemisphere of the Barbary pirates. Jeffer- 
son was disposed to favor the project and thought that it might 
be carried into effect so that the United States vessels might be 
withdrawn from the Mediterranean. But Monroe believed, and 

15 Adams, Memoirs, V, 177. 



INTERNATIOl^AL COMPLICATIONS 1T9 

Adams was of the same opinion, that an American system, upon 
that plan would be an alliance between the United States and 
Portugal against the South American independents, which was 
hardly reconcilable with any just view of our policy.^* 

Insisting that it was impossible for Portuguese subjects to 
obtain justice in the courts of the United States, Correa pro- 
posed the appointment of special commissioners to investigate 
their complaints. Told by Adams that such an arrangement 
was impossible, the Portuguese minister painted the situation 
in the darkest colors. Adams reported to the President, in 
part as follows : " These things had produced such a temper 
both in Portugal and in Brazil against the people and govern- 
ment of the United States that he was unwilling to tell me the 
proposal which had been formally made in the King's Council 
concerning them. That five or six years ago the people of the 
United States were the nation of the earth for whom the Portu- 
guese felt the most cordial regard and friendship. They were 
now those whom they most hated, and if the government had 
considered the peace as at an end, they would have been sup- 
ported in the declaration by the hearty concurrence of the peo- 
ple. . . . The desire of the king was to be on good terms with 
the United States, but the property of his subjects was robbed 
upon the high seas by pirates sallying from the ports of the 
United States, without the trouble to assume a disguise. This 
practice was continued year after year in the midst of profes- 
sions of friendship from the American Government. It was 
impossible that he should put up with it." ^"^ 

Events over which the United States had no control had 
already solved this difficulty with Brazil. Unknown to tbe 
Portuguese minister, the power of Artigas had been completely 
broken some months before and he was already a prisoner in 
Paraguay. Other events which soon followed — the return of 
the king and his court to Portugal in 1821 and the declaration 

16 Adams, Memoirs, 172, 176. 

17 Adams to Monroe, August 30, 1820, Writings, VII, 70, 



180 PA]^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNIN^GS 

of independence by Brazil in 1822 — marked the beginning of 
a new era in the relations between these two great American 
states. 

Other incidents caused friction between the United States 
and the new governments. The privateering enterprises of 
Thomas Lloyd Halsey, the United States agent at Buenos Aires, 
resulted in his dismissal. Another representative at Buenos 
Aires, W. G. D. Worthington, though not violating neutrality, 
did swell upon his agency, as Adams expressed it, until he 
broke out into a self -accredited plenipotentiary,^^ causing his 
dismissal also. The government of Buenos Aires was no less 
unfortunate in its early representatives to the United States. 
The first, Martin Thompson, sent to Washington in 1816, was 
dismissed by his government for having transcended his author- 
ity in granting commissions.^® Manuel H. de Aguirre, who 
succeeded him the next year, suffered persecution, personal 
humiliation, and imprisonment. He was commissioned by his 
government to obtain the recognition of Argentine independ- 
ence and to induce the United States to favor the interests of 
the new states.^*' And as a private agent of Chile, in addition 
to his public representation of Buenos Aires, he was authorized 
to build and dispatch six sloops of war to aid in the expedition 
against Peru which was then being organized.^^ 

Arriving in the United States during the summer of 1817, 
Aguirre had an interview with the President and with the Sec- 
retary of State, Eush, the latter of whom informed him that 
nothing in the law prevented the building and sending away 
the vessels as a commercial speculation.^^ Not until October 
29, did he communicate with the government on the subject of 
recognition. Receiving no reply, he wrote again on December 

18 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 158 ; V, 93. 

19 Palomeque, Origenes de la Diplomacia Argentina, I, 28. Adams, J. Q., 
Memoirs, IV, 46. 

20 Mitre, Historia de Belgrano, III, 309. 

21 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 123. 
g2 Ibid., IV, 124. 



IN"TERNATIOI^AL COMPLICATIONS 181 

16. " My government," he said, " considering that of the 
United States as one of the first of whom it ought to solicit 
this acknowledgment, believed that the identity of political prin- 
ciples, the consideration of their inhabiting the same hemi- 
sphere, and the s^onpathy so natural to those who have expe- 
rienced similar evils, would be so many additional reasons in 
support of its anxiety. . . . The recollection that it was these 
states which first pointed out to us the path of glory, and the 
evidence that they are enjoying most fully the blessed effects of 
liberty, inspire me with the conviction that it is for them also 
to show that they know how to appreciate our efforts." ^^ 

Failing in his effort to obtain recognition, Aguirre went to 
New York, where he had two sloops of war constructed, his 
funds not being sufficient for more. It was in this transaction 
that his troubles arose. At the instigation of the Spanish con- 
sul, he was once arrested in the streets, and at another time he 
was taken out of bed at midnight. For some weeks, his house 
became " a mere house of marshals and sheriffs and officers of 
the law." ^* When the vessels were ready for sea they were 
attached for personal debts of the captains in whose names they 
were registered. His officers and crews had been bribed; his 
funds were exhausted; and the two sloops were lying at New 
York at an expense of a thousand dollars a day. Aguirre's 
only resource was to sell them. But, being built as vessels of 
war, they were not salable for purposes of commerce. Hence, 
he turned to the government, complaining bitterly of his treat- 
ment and inquiring if it would purchase the vessels. 

At the President's request, Adams wrote to Aguirre inform- 
ing him that the executive was not authorized to make the pur- 
chase. Explaining that the interpretation and exposition of 
the laws, under the free institutions of the United States, be- 
longed peculiarly to the judiciary, and reminding Aguirre as 
a stranger, unacquainted with the legal provisions of the United 

23 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 180. 

24 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 123. 



182 PAN-AMEEICA^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

States, he might have recurred to professional men of eminence 
for advice, Adams continued as follows : " You have, therefore, j] 
constantly been aware of the necessity of proceeding in such a 
manner, in executing the orders of your government, as to avoid 
violating the laws of the United States, and although it has not 
been possible to extend to you the privilege of exemption from 
arrest (an exemption not enjoyed by the President of the United 
States himself, in his individual capacity), yet you have had|j 
all the benefit of those laws which are the protection of the i' 
rights and personal liberties of our citizens. Although you had b 
built and equipped, and fitted for sea, and manned, two vessels r 
suitable for purposes of war, yet as no proof was adduced that j 
you had armed them, you were immediately liberated and dis- 
charged by the decision of the judge of the Supreme Court, be- 
fore whom the case was brought. It is yet impossible for me 
to say that the execution of the orders of your government is 
impracticable ; but the government of the United States can no 
more countenance or participate in any expedient to evade the 
intention of the laws than it can dispense with their oper- 
ation." ^^ Shortly afterward Aguirre made the financial- ar- 
rangements necessary to enable him to take the vessels away. 
As they sailed unarmed, their departure was not hindered by 
the government.^® 

Three questions connected with the acquisition of Florida 
ajffected to a greater or less degree the relations of the United 
States with the belligerent provinces. The first of these was 
the occupation of West Florida. The strip of territory lying 
south of the thirty-first parallel, between the Perdido Eiver on 
the east and the Mississippi on the west, and known as West 

25 Adams to Monroe, August 27, 1818, Writings, VI, 450. 

26 The vessels reached Buenos Aires in November, 1818. One of them 
later joined the Chilean Navy. The other was taken away by her captain 
to Rio de Janeiro and sold to the Portuguese Government, the failure of the 
Buenos Aires Government to pay the crew and to reimburse the captain for 
funds advanced by him being alleged as the reason. Barros Arana, Historia 
Jeneral de Chile, XII, 280. 



INTEKNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 183 

Florida, was claimed by the United States as a part of the 
Louisiana purchase. It had never been delivered to the French, 
however, and it continued under Spanish rule until 1810, when 
the inhabitants, as elsewhere in Spanish America, rose in revolt. 
Representatives of the several districts convened at Baton Rouge 
and on September 26, 1810, declared the territory to be a free 
and independent state. The convention then requested the 
government at Washington to take the infant state under its 
'* immediate and special protection, as an integral and inalien- 
able portion of the United States." The President deemed it 
" right and requisite " that possession should be taken of the 
territory, but on the ground of the claim to it under the treaty 
of cession. Accordingly, ignoring the independent government 
established there, he ordered Governor Claiborne to occupy the 
territory and administer it as a part of the Orleans Territory.^''' 
This transaction appears to have aroused at the time no re- 
sentment on the part of the Patriots in Mexico or in South 
America. 

The next incident, however, did affect to some extent the 
relations of the United States with certain of the new states. 
This was the suppression of an insurgent establishment on what 
is known as Amelia Island at the mouth of St. Mary's River, 
near the boundary of the state of Georgia. The facts of the 
case are stated by the President in divers messages to Congress. ^^ 
In the summer of 1817, Amelia Island was taken possession of 
by persons claiming to act under the authority of some of the 
revolutionary governments. As the island lay within territory 
which had long been the subject of negotiation with Spain, its 
occupation excited surprise. The unfolding of the undertaking, 
however, in the opinion of the President, marked it as a 
mere private, unauthorized adventure. " Projected and com- 
menced," he declared, " with an incompetent force, reliance 

27 American State Papers, For. Rel., Ill, 395-397. For a full history see 
The West Florida Controversy by Isaac Joslin Cox. 

28 Richardson, Messages and Papers, II, 13, 23, 32, 40, 51. December 2, 
1817; January 13, 1818; November 16, 1818; January 30, 1819. 



184 PA^q^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

seems to have been placed on what might be drawn, in defiance 
of our laws, from within our limits; and of late, as their re-| 
sources have failed, it has assumed a more marked character of 
unfriendliness to us, the island made a channel for the illicit [ 
introduction of slaves from Africa into the United States, 
an asylum for fugitive slaves from the neighboring states, 
and a port for smuggling of every kind." ^^ Moreover, 
like Galveston Island, the place was made the rendez- 
vous for privateers illegally fitted out in the ports [^ 
of the United States. Under the secret Act of January 
15, 1811, the President was empowered to occupy any part of [j 
East Florida in the event of an attempted occupation by anyH 
foreign government or power. ^*' The Spanish authorities hav-f 
ing made a feeble and ineffectual attempt to dislodge the in-P 
vaders, the executive dispatched the United States ship John 
Adams, Captain Henley commanding, to the island with in- 
structions to break up the establishment. This was accom- 
plished with the cooperation of land forces in the latter part of 
December, 181T.^^ Subsequently the United States held the 
place, subject to negotiations pending with Spain. j 

The President expressed full confidence that the revolutionary i 
governments would disclaim any connection with the enterprise, | 
and the several agents who were being dispatched toward the| 
end of 1817 to South America were instructed to bring the sub- \ 
ject to the attention of the governments which they might visit. ! 
Aguirre, the Argentine agent, declared to Eodney and Bland! 
before they set out for Buenos Aires, that the adventurers never | 
had any authority from his government whatever; that in his! 
judgment the United States was fully justified in breaking up ; 
the establishment ; and that he was assured it would be consid- 1 
ered in the same light by his government. ^^. O'Higgins, the 
'Director of Chile, declared to Bland that he had never heard j 

29 Richardson, Messages and Papers, II, 14. 

30 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 132. 

31 Mies' Weekly Register, XIII, 347. 

32 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 46. 



inter:n"atioe'al complications ISS 

of such a place as Amelia Island. ^^ And Bolivar assured Ir- 
vine, an agent sent to Venezuela, that his government had no 
knowledge of or part in the enterprise.^* Mexico and ISTew 
Granada, the other governments supposedly connected with the 
scheme, appear to have made no formal disavowal. The former 
possessed no responsible revolutionary government at the time, 
and as the latter was on the point of union with Venezuela, its 
failure to disavow, if indeed it did fail to do so, need not be 
regarded as a serious omission. 

Inasmuch as certain recent Spanish American writers at- 
tribute to Bolivar the design of erecting a barrier in the Gulf of 
Mexico against the expansion of the United States toward the 
south, it will be of interest to inquire further into the insurgent 
occupation of Amelia Island with a view to determining whether 
or not it constituted a part of any such plan. Although there 
is much about the affair that remains obscure, yet certain facts, 
relating especially to the chief actors, throw light upon it. 

Sir Gregor McGregor was the leader of the expedition which 
took possession of the island. Sir Gregor had then been in 
America for several years, having gone first to Venezuela in 
1811. There he served under Miranda, rising to the rank of 
brigadier general. After Miranda's downfall, he joined Bolivar 
in the renewed struggle, and on a number of occasions distin- 
guished himself. For a short time in 1816, during Bolivar's 
absence, he was in chief command of the forces in northern 
Venezuela. Later he surrendered the command to General Piar 
and abandoned the country. Had he already been designated 
as the leader of the Amelia Island expedition ? Such evidence 
as is available proves the contrary. Early in 1817 news of his 
being at Saint Thomas was published in the United States. 
The reasons assigned for his quitting Venezuela were " the 
futility of his endeavors to establish concert, discipline, and a 
regular government." ^^ That he abandoned the Venezuelan 

33 American State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 292. 

34 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 42, 

35 Niles' Weekly Register, XI, 380. 



186 PAN'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

cause in disgust is confirmed by Larrazabal, by Baralt, and by 
the anonymous author of a Voyage to the Spanish Main.^^ It 
is further confirmed by circumstances and by the character of 
the man. After the close of the Napoleonic wars, foreign i 
officers flocked to the standards of the revolutionists in great 
numbers. These officers, among whom many were unfit for the 
positions which they received, were inclined to despise the na- 
tive officers under whose orders they had to serve. Hostility 
of the natives to the foreigners naturally arose, leading many of 
the latter to quit the service. Sir Gregor was an exceedingly 
vain man and it is not unlikely that the surrender of the com- 
mand, the exercise of which for a short time must have given 
him great satisfaction, to a native officer whom doubtless he 
regarded as his inferior, was more than his pride could bear. 

McGregor now had no other aim, apparently, than to seek 
some new field of adventure in which he could himself be the 
chief figure. His exploits were heralded to the world. It was 
reported that he was proceeding to Mexico ; that upon arriving 
at Saint Thomas he had immediately recruited one hundred and 
fifty " choice spirits of various nations and complexions " ; that 
with these he had embarked for Port-au-Prince, expecting to j 
raise there enough men to get a footing in Mexico, where he sup- I 
posed the natives would flock to his standard. He is next heard | 
of at Baltimore, but without foUowers.^^ On March 31, 1817, | 
he was commissioned at Philadelphia by certain " deputies of ' 
Free America " to take possession, either wholly or in part, of i 
East and West Florida.^^ With a small expedition organized 
in the United States, he proceeded to Amelia Island, which he | 
took without a struggle. His plans were next to attack St. ! 
Augustine. But almost immediately dissensions arose, and in I 

September he resigned. Louis Aury, who put into the harbor ! 

I 

36 Vida de Bolivar, 1, 444; Resumen de la Historia de Venezuela, 1, 285. [ 
Narrative of a voyage to the Spanish Main in the ship Tito Friends, The i 
occupation of Amelia Island by McGregor, etc. i 

37 Niles' Weekly, XI, 380. | 
fis Executive Document, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 175, 33. j 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 187 

about the time McGregor resigned, assumed command. Sir 
Gregor, it was reported, sailed away for England in his priva- 
teer. The General McGregor, to arrange his personal affairs. 
In 1819 he made a descent on Porto Bello, which he captured. 
Although this place lay within the territory claimed by the new 
republic of Colombia, Sir Gregor acted independently.^^ Sur- 
prised by Spanish forces and compelled to flee, he next estab- 
lished himself on the Mosquite shore, where he adopted the title 
of his Highness Gregor, Cacique of Poyais. In this enterprise 
he failed also. In 1839, he was naturalized by the Venezuelan 
Government and restored to his former military rank. His 
death occurred, it is said, at Caracas a few years later. ^*^ 

It is even more clear that Aury as the head of the Amelia 
Island enterprise was not an agent of Bolivar. The privateer- 
ing activities of this buccaneer, piraite, or patriot,^ ^ as he is vari- 
ously called, have already been adverted to. He was originally 
a French sailmaker, becoming afterward a sailor. He lived in 
Santo Domingo until 1813. He then offered his services to the 
Patriots of New Granada, who gave him a commission as lieu- 
tenant in their navy, and promoted him afterward to the rank 
of commandant general of their naval forces.^^ In 1816, when 
the exiled leaders of Venezuela and New Granada met at Aux 
Cayes, in the republic of Haiti, to adopt measures for renewing 
the war, Aury alone opposed the election of Bolivar as supreme 
chief with full military and civil authority. But he was joined 
by Montilla, Bermudez, and a few others who were also discon- 
tented with Bolivar's leadership. This small group attempted 
to break up the Venezuelan expedition by offering extraordinary 
rewards to those who would enroll in the service of Mexico. 

s9 0'Leary, Memorias, XVI, 390. 

40 Lee, Dictionary of National Biography, XXXV, 95. 

41 It is of especial interest to note that Alaman (Historia de Mexico, 
IV, 553) calls him "the chief of the pirates." See also Adams, J. Q., 
Memoirs, IV, 58. Parton {Life of Andrew Jackson, II, 423) says that he 
seems to have been a man of honor, sincerely devoted to the cause. 

4" Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 75; Executive Document 115, 15th Cong., 
1st Sess., 36. 



188 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINOTNGS 

Failing to interfere materially with Bolivar's plans, Aury, with j 
his band, proceeded to join the Mexicans. ^^ His establishment [ 
at Galveston, his appointment as civil and military governor of ^. 
Texas, and his connection with the Mina expedition have been 
noted. After having convoyed Mina's vessels down the coast 
of Mexico, he established his headquarters for a while at Mata- 
gorda Bay. Thence he proceeded late in the summer of 1817 
to Amelia Island to join McGregor. Assuming co mm and un- 
der the doubtful authority of the commission issued to him by 
the Mexican, Herrera, he hoisted the Mexican flag.^* After 
his departure from Amelia Islaaid he was employed in the serv- 
ice of Colombia.*^ 

It appears, then, that Bolivar had no connection with either 
of these agents. But what of his relation to the principals? 
McGr^or's commission was signed by Lino de Clemente as 
De'puty of Venezuela; by Pedro Gual as deputy for ISTew 
Granada, and as proxy for F. Zarate, the Mexican deputy ; and 
by Martin Thompson as deputy for Buenos Aires.*® Of these. 
Lino de Clemente and Gual alone need be considered; for 
Thompson was without standing in Buenos Aires and, more- 
over, he was dismissed for exceeding his authority. The Mexi- 
can representative appears to have had no part in the undertak- 
ing. Clemente was most active in promoting the enterprise. 
He was Bolivar's brother-in-law, having married Maria Antonia 
de Bolivar. He was sent as an agent to the United States early 
in 181Y. Nothing in the published documents and correspon- 
dence shows that in the Amelia Island affair he acted on any 
but his own responsibility; though there is some evidence that 
Bolivar did not strongly condemn the conduct of his agent. 
Writing to Clemente after the conference with Irvine, Bolivar 
said that his reply had reduced itself to a declaration that the 

43 Larrazabal, Vida de Bolivar, I, 417. 

*i Executive Document 115, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 16. Adams, J. Q., 
Writings, VI, 284. 

45 O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 510. 

46 Executive Document 175, 15th Cong., Ist Sess., 34. 



mTEKNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 189 

government of Venezuela was ignorant of what was going on at 
Amelia Island and that it did not recognize either McGregor or 
Aury as legitimate parties to the contest against Spain unless 
they had received authority from some independent government, 
" Mr. Irvine," he added, " expressed the greatest satisfaction at 
this reply, although it was nothing more than a private opinion 
confidentially expressed." ^'^ Moreover Bolivar now dispatched 
to Clemente an appointment as envoy extraordinary and minis- 
ter plenipotentiary near the government of the United States.^^ 
This appointment proved to be offensive to the government at 
Washington. But there is no reason to believe that it was so 
intended. Irvine, another of the " mere enthusiasts," in all 
probability, had not given Bolivar any reason to suppose that 
Clemente's actions in the United States were regarded there as 
reprehensible. The administration, however, took a decidedly 
different view of them, and when Clemente, after receiving his 
commission, presented himself at Washington and requested a 
conference, the Secretary of State, by direction of the President, 
replied in the severest terms. " I have to inform you," he 
wrote, " that your name having been avowedly affixed to a paper, 
drawn up within the United States, purporting to be a commis- 
sion to a foreign officer for undertaking and executing an ex- 
pedition in violation of the laws of the United States, and also 
to another paper avowing that act, and otherwise insulting to 
this government, ... I am not authorized to confer w^ith you, 
and that no further communication will be received from you 
at this department." ^^ When Clemente shortly afterward re- 
turned to Venezuela, he not only manifested great resentment 
toward the United States, but insisted that the Venezuelan 
Government approve his conduct in the Amelia Island affair. 
Bolivar being absent from the seat of government, it fell to 

47 Bolivar to Lino de Clemente, July 24, 1818. Urrutia, Pdginas de His- 
toria Diplomdtica, 120. 

48 76id., 116. 

49 Adams to Lino de Clemente, December 16, 1818, Am, State Papers, For. 
Rel., IV, 414. 



190 PAI^-AMEEIOANISM: ITS BEGIIJ^KENGS 

the vice president, Zea, to pass upon the matter. Zea denied 
Clemente's request, and in writing to Bolivar on the subject |i 
expressed the opinion that the United States was well disposed p 
toward the cause of the Patriots and that the impolitic con- 
duct of Clemente had alone prevented a positive declaration in 
their favor. ^° 

Of Gual's connection with Amelia Island less in known. He 
resided there for a time and took part in the management of 
the establishment. Adams, who regarded him as the most re- 
spectable of all the men connected with the enterprise, leaves 
it to be inferred from an entry in his journal that Gual's con- 
duct may have been influenced by his desperate circumstances 
and by the lack of means of subsistence. The President, how- 
ever, regarded the project as peculiarly Gual's own, and at- 
tributed to him a feeling of acrimonious resentment for its 
failure.^ ^ 

The names of Xavier Mina and Alvarez de Toledo were also 
connected with the enterprise. When the establishment was sup- 
pressed, Aury designated one of the adventurers, Vicente Pazos, 
to inform the United States of the grounds on which " this part 
of East Florida was dismembered from the dominions of the 
King of Spain," In his exposition, Pazos declared that the en- 
terprise was decided upon in consequence of the arrival, in the 
summer of 1816, of Mina from England and of Toledo from 
'New Orleans ; and in consequence of the interception of a dis- 
patch indicating the probable transfer of the Floridas to the 
United States. The plan was to launch two simultaneous at- 
tacks from Port-au-Prince under Mina and Toledo. But the 
damage sustained by Mina's fleet in a storm and the desertion of 
Toledo, says Pazos, frustrated the plan.^^ 

It has already been stated that Mina and Bolivar met at 
Port-au-Prince. The two leaders discussed their respective 

50 Zea to Bolivar, June 8, 1819. O'Leary, Memoriae, XVI, 398. 

51 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 775; VI, 146. 

52 Executive Document 115, 15th Cong., 1st Sess., 23. 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 191 

plans, Mina having already proposed by letter the union of 
their forces in the liberation first of Mexico and then of Vene- 
zuela. This combination Bolivar did not approve.^ ^ Nor does 
it appear that either Bolivar or Mina designed measures for 
the wresting of Florida from Spain. Eobinson, the historian 
of the Mina expedition, mentions in this relation only an over- 
ture made to Mina by certain persons at Nev7 Orleans for an 
attack upon Pensacola, This overture Mina rejected because 
it appeared to be nothing more than a mercantile speculation. 
" As a soldier and as a pati'iot," says Eobinson, " he disliked to 
war for mercenary considerations and he was most decidedly 
hostile to all predatory projects." ^^ 

But the occupation of Florida may have formed at one time 
a part of Mina's plans. These plans, it will be recalled, were 
laid in England, and there, if anywhere, the plot to keep the 
United States out of Florida was hatched. During the War of 
1812 the British used Florida as a base of operations against 
the United States, and after the war a certain Colonel Nicholls 
and other British subjects, among whom were Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister, remained there to perpetuate British influence.^^ 
During 1815 the English papers frequently discussed the sub- 
ject of Florida, in a tone hostile to the United States. Humors 
of the cession of the province by Spain to Great Britain were 
constantly circulated.^^ It was even reported that there was in 
preparation an expedition of ten thousand men, to be sent out 
from Great Britain and Ireland to take possession of it. The 
intimations of these things reaching Washington were so strong 
and confident that Adams was finally instructed to bring the 
matter to the attention of the British Government.^^ In Feb- 
ruary, 1816, he obtained from Castlereagh the assurance that 
there was not and never had been any foundation for the re- 

53 Larrazabal, Vida de Bolivar, I, 442. 

54 Robinson, Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, 69, 76, 261. 

55 Bassett, Life of Andrew Jackson, 253. 
56Niles' Weekly Register, IX, 197, 200, 215, 252. 

57 Monroe to Adams, December 10, 1815. Monroe, Writings, V, 380. 



192 PA^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGIl^NINGS 

ports. " Military positions," lie said, " may have been taken by I 
US during the war of places which yon had previously taken from 
Spain, but we never intended to keep them. Do you only ob- 
serve the same moderation. If we shall find you hereafter 
pursuing a system of encroachment upon your neighbors, what 
we might do defensively is another consideration." ^^ Later, 
when the expedition against Amelia Island was being organized n 
in the United States, McGregor went to Bagot, the British min- 
ister at Washington and, unfolding the plans for taking Florida, 
asked him what the opinion of the British Government upon it 
would be. Bagot replied that he could give no answer to that 
question and could say nothing about it. In the Seminole j 
War the British subjects, l!^icholls, Arbuthnot, Ambrister, and \ 
others, incited the Indians to hostilities against the United f 
States, and the fact that they acted in concert with McGregor f 
was established. The British Government, however, disavowed 
the acts of its subjects.^ ^ 

Hyde de ISTeuville, who kept his government informed of the 
Amelia Island affair, was convinced that the British Govern- 
ment was back of it. In June, 1817, he expressed his views 
in the following terms : " The eclat of this expedition, the funds 
which have been put into it, the affectation on the part of the 
leaders of encouragement by the Federal Government, the origin 
of McGregor, his secret relations with English agents, his con- 
fidences to some of the members of his party, all concur to con- 
vince me of what I have sought to make sure of ; that is, that it 
is chiefiy English influence which is at work in the ports of the 
United States and that McGregor is nothing more than a British 
agent. The English wish to compromise the Americans ; they 
wish to create for themselves a pretext and to mask their own 
ambition, from the necessity of putting a check on that of the 
Federal Government. If Florida is attacked by the insurgents, 
the adventurers of the Union will flock to them from all sides. 

58 Adams to Monroe, February 8, 1816. Adams, Writings, V, 502. 

59 Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, IV, 50, 179. 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 193 

The English would then have to choose whether to come to the 
aid of Spain against the Americans, or to support openly the 
insurgents, in either case under the pretext of the conduct of 
the government and people of the United States." Three 
months later, Hyde de Neuville, though still believing that Mc- 
Gregor was a British agent and that his mission was to make 
trouble and to compromise the Americans, thought that he had 
indirectly served the Americans, as the attack on Amelia would 
result in forcing Spain to the cession of the Eloridas. A year 
later he again declared : " McGregor is certainly an agent of the 
English Government." ®° 

In maintaining that the British Government directly sup- 
ported the Amelia Island enterprise, Hyde de Neuville was in 
error, if the declarations of that government are to be credited. 
But the complicity of certain British subjects does not admit of 
question. What part they may have had in conceiving the plan 
is not known and, indeed, the final word on the subject cannot 
be spoken until the facts relative to its origin are revealed. Of 
all the explanations of the undertaking, however, the most im- 
probable is that which attributes it to distrust of the United 
States on the part of Bolivar or of other influential Spanish 
Americans. That sentiment was the conjecture of a later day. 
The South American promoters of the scheme for seizing the 
Eloridas, whatever hidden motives may have instigated their 
backers, professed to act in no unfriendly spirit toward the 
United States. They maintained that the occupation of Florida 
by the Patriots would in every way be beneficial to the United 
States, especially since Spain had manifested a willingness to 
transfer it to some European power. It is true that the United 
States had declared more than once that it would not consent 
to such a transfer and for obvious reasons; but it was no less 
obvious, they insisted, that those reasons did not apply to the 
other American states. The Erench or the English in Florida 
would be commercial and political rivals, whereas the Patriots 

60 Memoirs et Souvenirs, II, 271, 324, 369. 



194 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

would be friends politically and commercially. With the inde- j 
pendence of Florida established, they said, it would be recog- 
nized as a part of the confederation of South America ; but this 
they did not wish to have interpreted as denying to the people of 
Florida the right to become a part of the United States if they 
and the people of the United States so desired.^ ^ 

The suppression of the Amelia Island establishment appears 
to have aroused no great resentment except on the part of the 
insurgent agents in the United States. A long article, it is 'h 
true, was published in the Correo del Orinoco^^ the semi-official \ 
organ of the Venezuelan Government, in which the action of the I 
United States was severely criticized. But this article has Ij 
every evidence of having originated with Lino de Clemente, and \ 
it is to be doubted whether it reflected any widespread feeling 
among the leaders of Venezuela. That Bolivar knew nothing \ 
about the inception of the undertaking and that he did not ob- 
ject to the acquisition of the Floridas by the United States is 
singularly confirmed by two of his letters. Writing to Piar on 
June 14, 1817, about the time the Amelia Island expedition 
was ready to set out, Bolivar said : " Brion writes me of the 
early arrival of McGregor from Baltimore with seven large ves- 
sels loaded with arms and munitions. They are coming to join 
Brion and us." ®^ A little more than a year later, writing to 
Briceiio, and referring in a spirit of exultation to the victory of 
San Martin in Chile, and to the campaigns in Venezuela and 
New Granada, he declared : " The day of America has arrived, 
and everything appears to announce the end of our glorious and 
terrible struggle. The war of the United States leaves now no 
doubt. The American general, Jackson, has taken by assault 

61 Urrutia, Pdginas de Historia Diplomdtica, 108. 

62 Blanco- Azpurfla, Documentos, VI, 565-570. It is to be noted also that 
Roscio, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at Angostura, and one of the editors 
of the Correo del Orinoco, was in the United States early in 1818 just after 
the suppression of the Amelia Island establishment. He returned later In 
the year to Venezuela. Blanco-Azpurtla, Documentos, VI, 360. 

63 0'Leary, Memorias, XXIX, 111. 



mXERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 195 

the fort of Pensacola, and the Floridas, East and West, are in 
the possession of the Americans." *^^ 

The third of the Florida incidents which, it is sometimes said, 
affected the relations of the United States with the revolutionary 
governments, was the negotiation and final ratification of the 
treaty of cession. The United States had long desired to ac- 
qnire the Floridas and efforts were repeatedly made during 
Jefferson's presidency to bring Spain to agree to the transfer. 
The breaking off of diplomatic relations between the two coun- 
tries in 1806 put an end to the discussions and the matter re- 
mained in abeyance until relations were restored in the early 
part of Monroe's first administration. Negotiations were then 
renewed and, under the able direction of John Quincy Adams, 
brought to a successful conclusion on February 22, 1819, when 
the treaty of cession was signed. The United States Senate im- 
mediately ratified the treaty, but Spain delayed; and the final 
act giving full force to the instrument, the exchange of ratifica- 
tions, was not consummated until exactly two years after the 
date of signature.^ ^ 

It has been charged that in these negotiations with Spain 
the United States pursued a purely selfish policy; that its one 
great desire being to acquire the Floridas, everything else was 
subordinated to that end ; specifically, that the neutrality law of 
1817 and the long-deferred recognition of the new states were 
a part of the price which the government at Washington had to 
pay for the cession of the Floridas.^ ^ The charge is, of course, 
without foundation. The system of neutrality, already a tra- 
ditional policy of the nation, had the preponderant support of 
public opinion and of all branches of the government. The 
executive, being responsible for recognition, withheld it not in 
order to facilitate the negotiations with Spain, but on solid 
grounds of fact. The Spanish Government attempted, it is 

^'^ Cartas de Bolivar {Sociedad de Ediciones) , 236. 

65 Davis, Treaties and Conventions concluded between the United States 
and other Poioers, 785. 

66 Calvo, Recueil des Traitis, V, 174, 17S. 



196 PAI^-AMEE.ICA:^riSM: ITS BEaiNNINGS | 

true, to exact a promise as a conditioii of the ratification of tliei^ 
treaty that the United States should abandon the right to recog-i! 
nize the revolutionists or to form relations with them ; ^"^ and,|J 
though the promise was not given, the Spanish Government, it|j 
seems, regarded the United States as morally bound. Such atl 
least is the inference from the protest which the Spanish minis- [ 
ter at Washington made to the Secretary of State upon learning] 
of the President's message of March 8, 1822, proposing thel 
recognition of the new states. " How great my surprise was," i 
he wrote, " may be easily judged by any one who is acquainted l 
with the conduct of Spain toward this republic, and who knows 
the immense sacrifices which she has made to preserve her; 
friendship. In fact who could think that, in return for the| 
cession of her most important provinces of this hemisphere ; for | 
the forgetting of the plunder of her commerce by American citi- 
zens ; for the privileges granted to their navy ; and for as great 
proofs of friendship as one nation can give another, this execu- 
tive would propose that the insurrection of the ultramarine pos- 
sessions of Spain should be recognized ? " ^^ 

It is to British rather than to Spanish sources, however, that 
the aspersions on the motives of the United States in the Florida 
negotiations are to be traced. In this, much more than in the 
Amelia Island affair, the British manifested a spirit of jealous 
resentment and of suspicion, and their attitude was reflected, 
as they desired it should be, in the minds of some of the Spanish 
American leaders. As soon as it became known in England 
that the Treaty of Cession had been concluded, certain British 
agencies, if not the government itself, began to take measures 
to counteract the supposed advantage which the United States 
had obtained by the peaceable transfer of the Floridas, and 
which, it was feared, would now be greatly increased by an 
early recognition of the new states. A leading article published 
in the London Times of April 19, 1819, is typical of the means 

67 Davis, Notes upon the Treaties of the United StO/tes, 153, 

68 American State Papers, For, Rel., IV, 845. 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 19Y 

employed. Declaring that Great Britain and every Christian 
nation had an interest in seeing the war between Spain and her 
colonies terminated, the writer continued as follows : " It cannot 
be said that America [the United States] has not an interest in 
the conclusion of these fatal troubles; at least she has shown 
that she has been able to sack no small advantage from their 
continuance and that to our great and lasting detriment. Old 
Spain having rejected arbitration may carry on the contest more 
feebly and more feebly still, till at last she may concede all her 
trans- Atlantic possessions to America, one after another, simply 
because she herself is unable to reduce them, and because Amer- 
ica finds their occupation necessary for the tranquillity of her 
contiguous provinces." 

Having raised before the eyes of the Spanish American as- 
pirants for statehood the specter of absorption by the United 
States, the writer reassures them by suggesting the means of 
their salvation. " Are we to stand by," he inquires, " and 
suffer a procedure which in its sinister effect upon us will have 
all the consequences of collusion between Old Spain and the 
United States? Are we to refrain from intercourse with the 
insurgent provinces of South America (simply because the 
Spanish Government at home calls itself at war with them) 
till they drop at last exhausted into the hands of our great com- 
mercial rival ? The court of Madrid will be pleased to observe 
that America has been paid for her forbearance. If she has 
hitherto abstained from acknowledging the trans-Atlantic states, 
she has had her price for it, in the cession by Old Spain of cer- 
tain wealthy provinces. Far indeed from Great Britain be 
such conduct as this ! Far removed from us be the baseness of 
extorting a bribe from the impotence of the old government in 
order to induce us to disown the rising liberties of the new ones ! 
No ; let us remember that we are England still ; that we have 
an established name for honor and integrity, as well as for 
valor and enterprise, among the nations of the world ; and that, 
if we have hitherto abstained from interfering in the sanguinary 



198 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINmNGS 

troubles which, desolate the fields and towns of New Spain, itjJ 
has been from dignity and moderation, not from the sordid hopell 
of gain. We have not hovered like the vulture over the contend- 
ing armies till we could seize a breathless carcass for our prey." jf 
Continuing, the writer becomes more specific and reveals the 
secret of his choler. It was not the fear that the United States 
might become sovereign throughout the continent, but the fear 
that it might gain in the American family of nations a moral 
predominance detrimental to the interests of Great Britain. 
" We believe it is some time," he says, " since America proposed | 
to us to acknowledge the government of Buenos Aires. This * 
is an important fact ; and so far the conduct of America ap- ^ 
peared to be candid and friendly to England. We know not \ 
whether her secret objects might not be to quicken Spain in her \ 
bargain about the Floridas. However, the result is such as | 
we have seen. America has not acknowledged any of the in- \ 
surrectionary states as she proposed to us ; and she has accepted [ 
a valuable cession from the court of Madrid. Hence, therefore, 
commences a fresh epoch in the war. Shall we suffer this or i 
any similar trafiic to succeed ? We do not use the language of 
menace; there is no occasion to go to war; but shall we allow 
America to reap first the advantage of many valuable posses- 
sions from Old Spain as the price of withholding her acknowl- 
edgment of the Patriot governments; and then shall we suffer 
her to insure the gratitude of those Patriot governments by 
being still the first to treat with them as independent ? Amer- 
ica cannot deny this fact — she is at present leagued with Old 
Spain against the colonies. She has accepted the Floridas as 
the price of that union; for we know that she did propose to 
us to acknowledge the new states ; that she has not so acknowl- 
edged them; and that she has, without the slightest pretext of 
justice, accepted the Floridas from Old Spain. She has, in 
familiar language, been, for a while at least, bought off. Our 
course is now, therefore, not one of our own choosing, it is im- 
posed on us by the necessity of things; we cannot, without 



INTEENATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 199 

madness, desist from acknowledging the independence of Buenos 
Aires and the other Spanish provinces. The court of Madrid 
must have looked to this as a result, when it gained the forbear- 
ance of the United States by consigning to them the Floridas 
in our detriment; and we should be sunk into a very abject con- 
dition, indeed, if we allowed Spain to think it of more impor- 
tance, even to purchase the neutrality of America than to retain 
ours as a boon, or as the natural consequence of our disinter- 
estedness." 

Articles published in foreign newspapers, and especially in 
those of Great Britain, relating to the struggle between Spain 
and her colonies were widely copied in papers which had sprung 
up in those parts of Spanish America controlled by the revolu- 
tionists. The " leader " of the London Times was no excep- 
tion. In the latter part of August, 1819, a translation of it 
appeared in the Correo del Orinoco and it may have been in- 
serted in other South American papers. A curious evidence of 
its effect is found in the instructions of September 1, 1819,^^ to 
Manuel Torres, who had been appointed to succeed Lino de 
Clemente as agent of the Venezuelan Government in the United 
States. In the instructions to Torres, Juan German Roscio, 
the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declared that in the light 
of the Times article of April 19, the conduct of the United 
States had acquired a new meaning. It is now revealed, says 
Roscio in substance, that the eyes of the United States have been 
upon the Floridas from the beginning, and though there may 
have been some other motive for the Neutrality Act of 1817, 
the obvious one was the acquisition of the Floridas. But, having 
come into possession of the coveted territory, the United States 
will be more likely to give its support to the Patriots. Unlike 
the British writer, Eoscio drew comfort from the probability 
of such an outcome. 

In instructions of July 7, 1819, to Penalver and Vergara, 
agents of Venezuela to Great Britain, the question of Florida 

69 Urrutia, Pdginas de Eistoria Diplomdtica, 138-140. 



200 PAN-AMEEICAKISM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

is considered more at length J^ Eoscio here says that there are 
two things to note relative to the Neutrality Act of 181 Y : First, 
that the United States, being desirous of acquiring the Floridas, 
sacrificed its neutrality, convinced that any act of hostility to- 
ward the Patriots would contribute to the attainment of the de- 
sired end; and secondly, that the British minister at Washing- 
ton was most active in promoting the passage of the Act. With- 
out reflecting, one might judge from this, said Eoscio, thatj^ 
Great Britain did not desire the emancipation of Spanish Amer-j, 
ica ; but, viewing the matter in its true light, the English Gov-L 
ernment appeared to be striving to deprive the United States of ij! 
the advantages which it might obtain from an independentJ 
South America, indebted to the elder republic for generous as-'^ 
sistance. The object of the maneuver was to bring the Unitedjj 
States into bad odor with the Patriots, so that in commercial!- 
and other relations it would receive but little consideration,!, 
whereas Great Britain would gain favor with the Patriots byi 
giving them commercial and military aid. Eeturning again 
specifically to the subject of Florida, Eoscio ventured th^ 
opinion that the English Government would not be pleased at| 
the transfer of that territory to the United States, increasingjJ 
thus the political importance of the American Confederation.l! 
And finally, he said that if it were true that Spain had money tofi 
send another expedition to America, it must have come from the] 
sale of the Floridas.'^ ^ | 

To what extent views such as those expressed by Eoscio pre-j 
vailed it is impossible to say, but there is reason to believe thatt 
they were not generally held. The great mass of the Spanishj 
American population knew nothing about the Floridas, and thei^ 
great majority of the leaders, it appears, were either indifferent 
to their fate, or regarded their acquisition by the United States!) 
as a natural outcome of the break up of the Spanish Empire. 

70 Urrutia, Pdginas de Historia Diplomdtica, 202-204. | 

71 By the terms of the treaty the United States undertook to make satis4 
faction for the claims of American citizens against Spain to an amount noc 
exceeding $5,000,000. No money was paid directly to Spain. 



INTEKNATIO:NrAL COMPLICATIONS 201 

The latter was the point of view of the author of an article pub- 
lished in the Correo del Orinoco, while the ratification by Spain 
of the treaty of 1819 was pending. During the Peninsular 
War, according to this writer, there was neither Spanish nation 
nor true sovereign, and the United States would have been 
justified in taking out of the ruin of the empire in payment of 
its claims, a part of what was being saved. But, added the 
writer, it should be said to the honor of the American republic, 
whether it was due to respect for that part of the people who 
were struggling for independence or to confidence in the justice 
and in the sincerity of him who then aspired to the throne, or 
whether it was due to the belief that the opportune moment had 
not arrived, it abstained from taking advantage of the weakness 
of its opponent. The occupation of the Floridas in 1818 and 
the failure of the other nations, from whom Spain expected 
support, to protest, demonstrated that the United States could, 
whenever it desired, obtain justice. It was then, therefore, 
that the treaty was concluded. After discussing the causes 
which were delaying the ratification of the treaty, the writer 
concluded that, if a new war should be the result of the refusal 
of Spain to comply with its obligation, the Americans would 
seize the two Floridas without difiiculty and would advance into 
New Spain, where the people were awaiting and would welcome 
their coming. The Floridas would then be held by right of 
conquest. Mexico would be avenged, the debts of Spain would 
remain unpaid, and the rest of America would have acquired 
indirectly a powerful ally."^^ 

The reference to Mexico serves to raise the question as to what 
was really the attitude of that country to the transfer of the 
Floridas to the United States. As has already been intimated, 
the revolution in Mexico during these years had reached such a 
low ebb that it seems futile to attempt to discover its official at- 
titude toward any important question. In consequence of the 
precarious situation, newspapers did not spring up until later, 

72 Blanco-Azpurtia, Documentor, VJ, 371. 



202 PAl^-AMEEICAJ^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

and contemporary documents, such, as those which, have been 
cited in the case of Venezuela, are not available. The contem- 
porary historians, Alaman, Bustamente, and others, wrote their 
works some years afterward, when relations between Mexico 
and the United States had become embittered by numerous con- 
flicting interests and finally by war. Even so, the question 
of the Eloridas received but little consideration at their hands. 
There was published, however, in 1821, at Philadelphia, a little 
volume under the title of Memoria Politico-Instructivw, which 
contains some indication of the Mexican point of view. It was 
distributed to the independent leaders in Mexico, and it was r&- 1 
printed there in 1822. This book, published anonymously, has \ 
been attributed to Vicente Eocaf uerte, a citizen of Ecuador, j 
then, and for several years afterward, in the service of Mexico ; 
but every evidence points to Father Mier as author of the 
work.'^^ Mier was, as has been pointed out in a previous chap- 
ter, one of the ablest and most influential Mexicans of his time. 
It will be of interest, therefore, to note his views on the cession 
of the Eloridas. He, as did many others, regarded the neu- 
trality of the United States as purchased by Spain, the Eloridas 
being ceded as a part of the consideration. " All the cessions," 
he declared, " are injuries to us, not only by virtue of the rights 
acquired from our mothers, all of whom were Indians, but by 
virtue of the pacts of our fathers, the conquistadores (who won 
all on their own account and at their own risk) with the Kings 
of Spain, who, according to the laws of the Indies, cannot under 
any condition whatever alienate the least part of America. 
And if they do, their act has no binding force." '^* 

And yet Mier was by no means unfriendly to the United 
States. He was an ardent republican and thought that the 
predictions often heard that the government of the United! 

i: 

73 The internal evidence points unmistakably to Padre Mier. See pp.! 
74-105, 127. Bustamente {Historia del Emperador Iturbide, 201) con- 
firms the authorship of Mier. 

74 Memoria PoUtico-Instructiva, 15. 



INTEKN'ATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 203 

States would not survive were a sad consolation to royalists 
and had no basis in fact. " Why should we be compared," he 
inquired, " with the corrupt peoples of Europe, unacquainted 
with the virtues of republicanism, rather than with our com- 
patriots of the United States, among whom the republican form 
of government has had excellent results ? " The interests of 
Europe and America, he declared, were diverse. The counsels 
of the crowned heads of Europe should not be heeded, and es- 
pecially should England be distrusted. The philanthropy of 
British nationals should not be confused with the Machiavellian 
practices of the British ministry. Hiding her ambition under 
the veil of measures necessary to check the power of N^apoleon, 
Great Britain, declared Mier, had proceeded with her system 
of seizing the strategic points in the waters of Europe, and she 
intended to follow the same practice in America. She was 
deeply wounded by the cession of the Floridas, which gave to 
the United States, the only power able to dispute her maritime 
supremacy, control of the Gulf of Mexico. The writer goes on 
to point out the places held in American waters by Great Britain 
— the Bermudas, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad, and other 
places which she had her eye upon. In the Guianas, she had a 
foothold on the continent of South America ; and she was show- 
ing a disposition to occupy the Isthmus of Panama, so that she 
might raise her trident in both seas. Moreover, in the southern 
continent, Brazil was, he said, little more than a British colony, 
and in that quarter Great Britain had acquired or was attempt- 
ing to acquire other points of vantage. In the northern con- 
tinent not only did she possess the Canadas, but she held the 
coast of Honduras, in ISTew Spain, and she was going on extend- 
ing her dominion toward Yucatan. The British were so rooted 
in the country, said Mier, that the kings of the Mosquito nation 
received their authority at the hands of the governors of Ja- 
maica. It was not, therefore, Spain, their open enemy, with 
whom they had mainly to contend in order to be truly inde- 



204 PAK-AMEKlCA:t^lSM: ITS BEGINmKGS | 

pendent ; but anotlier, more formidable, because hidden — the \ 
British ministry.'^ ^ ! 

l^Tot only did the author of this Memoria regard the tendency p 
of Great Britain to add to her possessions in America as of 
much greater consequence to the continent than any similar 
tendency manifested by the United States, but he was so far 
from being intolerant of the cession of the Floridas to the 1] 
United States that he included in the appendix of his book an j! 
extract from the Letter of a Patriot "^^ in which that transac- I 
tion was decidedly approved. The minister of his Catholic ll 
Majesty, said the writer of the letter, upon offering to the i 
United States the Floridas — which were, and with reason, the \ 
object of their most ardent desires — demanded nothing less 
than an offensive and defensive alliance against the insurgents j 
of South America and Mexico; that is, he demanded that the 
government at Washington obligate itself to guarantee the in- 
tegrity of the Spanish dominions in America. Did the Spanish 
minister know, inquired the writer, that in putting forward 
this illegal, inhumane, scandalous proposition, he was placing 
the sword in the hands of the enemy ? The Americans, feeling 
aggrieved, presented the dilemma, either Spain would deliver 
the Floridas in payment of the just claims against her, or the 
United States would occupy them by force and recognize the 
new governments. Spain could make but one choice. The 
Americans waited patiently and confidently and at the end of 
twenty months obtained the ratification of the treaty. Thus had 
the Floridas attained liberty. To-day they formed a part of 
the United States, and though sold, they escaped from the hu- 
miliating servitude and from the state of languor in which the { 
mother country had held them for centuries. I 

There occurred in the southern part of the continent also a i 
number of incidents affecting the relations of the United States i 

75 Memorial PoUtico-Instructiva, 81, 90, 95. ' 

76 Memoria PoUtioo-InstrucUva, 140. The letter was published in full in I 
the Correo del Orinoco early in 1820 and reprinted in Blanco- Azpurtia, j 
VII, 446-449. i 



INTEENATIO:NrAL COMPLICATIONS 205 

with the belligerent colonies. One of these, involving in a 
singular manner the principle of neutrality, is briefly related by 
Barros Arana.'^'^ In 1813, during the war between Great 
Britain and the United States, the famous American frigate, 
Essex, under the command of Captain David Porter, made a 
munber of prizes in the southern Pacific, and arming and equip- 
ping one of them — at first the Georgiana, later the Atlarv- 
Ucj rechristened the Essex Junior — sent it out to cruise under 
Lieutenant Downes. No less fortunate than his chief. Lieu- 
tenant Downes captured a number of enemy vessels, which he 
was ordered to take to Valparaiso and dispose of to the best 
advantage. The government of Chile, believing that the United 
States was resolved to aid the Spanish colonies to achieve their 
independence, placed no obstacles in the way of the disposal 
of the prizes. The Viceroy of Peru and the Spanish officials 
generally had attempted to convince the insurgents that the 
alliance between Spain and England against Napoleon extended 
to America and that England would help to reduce the rebellious 
colonies to obedience. It was not strange that this propaganda 
should have had effect in a country which, like Chile, was lo- 
cated at such a great distance from the sources of information. 
Poinsett's activities, referred to in the preceding chapter, doubt- 
less contributed also to the erroneous impression that assistance 
might be expected from the United States. Not only was Lieu- 
tenant Downes permitted, therefore, to dispose of the prizes, 
but the government itself manifested a disposition to acquire 
some of the vessels for the purpose of arming and equipping 
them as the beginning of the Chilean navy. This conduct of 
the government of Chile elicited from the junta at Buenos Aires 
a remonstrance, but expressed, says Barros Arana, in the most 
moderate and discreet terms it was possible to employ. The 
admission into the port of Valparaiso of an American war vessel 
with British prizes which had been permitted to be disposed of 
and sold in the country, declared the Buenos Aires junta, in- 

T7 Barros Arana, Eistoria Jeneral de Chile, IX, 220, 



206 PA:N^-A1IEEICANISM: its BEaiNKINGS 

fringed tlie strict neutrality which should be maintained in the j 
conflict between the two belligerents, England and the United 
States. In order that embarrassing consequences might be 
avoided, the junta suggested that reparation be made " to the 
satisfaction of the British commanders in these seas." Al- 
though it was thought in Chile that the commercial interests of 
the Buenos Aires Government might have prompted its action, It 
most of the Chilean trade having been effected hitherto through 8 
Buenos Aires, yet the junta at Santiago, perceiving the danger j 
of international complications, thereafter treated the Americans 'i 
with greater reserve, maintaining as between them and the 'f 
British strict neutrality. f 

The friendly attitude of the Chilean Patriots on the one hand 
and the hostile attitude of the Spanish authorities on the other, 
toward the United States is reflected in the pages of Captain 
Porter's Journal. When he first entered the port of Valparaiso 
in the spring of 1813, he believed the Spanish to be in control; 
and from the stand the United States had taken against British 
aggressions and from its conduct with respect to the Floridas 
he had no reason to expect a friendly reception. Before he 
cast his anchor, however, the captain of the port, accompanied 
by another officer, came on board with an offer of every civility, 
assistance, and accommodation that Valparaiso could afford. 
To his astonishment. Porter was informed that the country had 
shaken off its allegiance to Spain ; that the ports of Chile were 
open to all nations; that they looked up to the United States 
for example and protection; and that the arrival of the Amer- 
ican vessels would be regarded as most advantageous to their 
commerce, which had been much harassed by Royalist corsairs 
from Peru. On shore, Captain Porter was given a very cordial 
reception by the governor. He found that he had happily got 
among stanch republicans, men filled with revolutionary princi- 
ples and apparently desirous of a form of government founded 
on liberty. As soon as his arrival was announced at Santiago, 
bells were rung the whole day and illuminations took place in 



INTERNATIOI^AL COMPLICATIONS 20Y 

the evening. It was generally believed that the appearance of 
an American frigate in the Pacific signified nothing less than the 
offer of a friendly alliance and assistance in the struggle for in- 
dependence. The captain and his officers were invited to 
visit Santiago. He was told that the president with a large 
military escort would meet them on the road and accompany 
them to the city ; and he was assured that, from a political point 
of view, their coming was a most happy event.'^^ 

But, said Captain Porter, time was too precious to be spent 
in amusements. Preparations for continuing the cruise went 
busily forward. And not until the vessel was ready for sea 
did the captain determine to devote a few hours to relaxation. 
He then invited the ladies and gentlemen of Valparaiso on 
board the Essex. As they were on the point of embarking, 
however, a strange vessel appeared in the offing. The guests 
were left on shore, and the officers returned on board, where 
everything was found prepared for getting under way. The 
cables were cut, and in an instant, as Captain Porter expresses 
it, the frigate was under a cloud of canvas. On board were 
Poinsett and Luis Carrera, together with other Americans and 
Chileans who had come down from Santiago to visit the ship. 
As there was every expectation of an engagement, they requested 
the privilege of sharing the dangers. Luis Carrera was the 
brother of the Chilean president, Jose Miguel Carrera. He was 
a spirited youth, says Captain Porter, and evidently anxious 
to take part in an engagement. His constant request was to 
board the stranger and his disappointment was great when she 
was discovered to be a Portuguese frigate. " We could per- 
ceive the hills," records Captain Porter in his Journal, 
" crowded with men, women, and children, all equally and per- 
haps more anxious than Don Luis to see the fight. Among 
them, as it afterward proved, were our fair guests, who did not 
hesitate to declare their disappointment; and frankly acknowl- 
edged that a sight of a sea engagement would have had more 

78 Jou/rnal of a Cruise to the Pacific, I, 94, 97, 



208 PAIiT-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINlSriNGS 

charms for them than all the entertainments we could afford li 
them on board the ship." Returning to port the American 
officers were given a dinner by order of, and at the expense of, 
the supreme government of Chile. There were present the 
officers of the Portuguese ship and some English merchants; 
" but/' says Captain Porter, " when the wine began to circu- 
late and the Chilean officers to feel the ardor of their patriotism, 
such flaming toasts were given as to make them think it prudent 
to retire." '^^ 

Cruising along the coast of Peru, the Essex fell in with the 
Nereyda, a Spanish privateer out of Callao, and took possession 
of her. Captain Porter having discovered that she had been 
cruising for, and had captured, some American vessels. Her 
captain stated that as Spain and Great Britain were allies, he 
always respected the British flag; and that his sole object was 
the capture of American vessels. Captain Porter disarmed the 
privateer and, removing the American prisoners whom she had 
on board, sent her into the port of Callao with a letter to the 
viceroy, requesting that her captain be punished. At Tumbez, 
where the Essex touched a little later. Captain Porter found 
that the Royalist authorities there also were uncertain whether 
the war between Great Britain and the United States did not 
extend to the former's allies, the Spaniards. ^*^ In time, how- 
ever, the relationship of the several belligerents to each other 
was better understood. Captain Porter continued his cruise, 
temporarily breaking up British navigation in the Pacific. At 
last, in March, 1814, a superior British squadron under Com- 
modore Hillyar, composed of the frigate Phoebe and the sloop 
of war Cherub,, appeared off the port of Valparaiso, where the 
Essex and the armed prize, Essex Junior, lay at anchor. Com- 
ing in and taking on provisions, the British vessels then cruised 
off the port for nearly six weeks, blockading the American ves- 
sels. Finally, the Essex attempted to escape, but becoming dis- 

1^ Journal of a Cruise to the Pacific, I, 100-102,. 
so Ibid., 1, 193. 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 209 

abled in a gale, put back into port and cast anchor in a small 
bay on the east side of the harbor, for the purpose of repairing 
damages. The enemy approached and here, in the territorial 
waters of Chile, the fierce battle, so well known to naval his- 
tory, was fought. The American vessels were compelled to 
surrender.^ ^ No claim for reparation was ever made nor does 
it appear to have been alleged that there was negligence on the 
part of the territorial sovereign in not preventing the attack. ^^ 
As a result of the surrender of the Essex, the prestige of the 
Americans on the Pacific coast of South America suffered a 
decline. British influence was henceforth in the ascendant. 
Commodore Hillyar offered his services as mediator between the 
Royalist authorities at Lima and the revolutionary government 
of Chile. The Royalists accepted at once, and the Patriots, 
having suffered reverses, accepted somewhat later. The outlook 
for the revolution was dark not only in Chile but throughout the 
revolted provinces. As a result of Commodore Hillyar's media- 
tion, the Treaty of Lircay was concluded on May 3, 1814, By 
the terms of this treaty the Chileans recognized their dependence 
on the metropolis, but demanded and were promised an autono- 
mous national government.*^ Of the subsequent disapproval of 
the treaty by the viceroy at Lima, of the renewal of the war 
and of the complete reconquest of Chile, it does not concern 
us here to speak. Captain Porter and the survivors of his 
crew were sent under parole to the United States aboard the 
Essex Junior, which was disarmed and used as a cartel. Por 
the next four or five years relative quiet reigned on the Pacific 
coast. iWith the renewal of the war, however, and the prepa- 
ration in 1819 of the expedition against Peru, the interests of 
the United States again became involved, through the opera- 
tion, as on so many other occasions, of the principle of neu- 
trality. 

^^ Journal of a Cruise to the Pacific, II, 161-168. 

82 Moore, A Digest of International Law, VII, 1092. 

83 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, IX, 416 et seq. 



210 PAIT-AMEKECANISM: ITS BEGIITNII^GS 

Late in 1818, Lord Cochrane, it will be recalled, arrived in 
Chile to assume command of the naval forces of that republic. 
His presence there, as may well be inferred from his imperious 
character and from the fact that the feeling between Great 
Britain and the United States was still bitter, was not calculated 
to contribute to cordial relations between the Patriots and the 
Americans, who for one reason or another happened to visit that 
quarter. He had no sooner entered upon his duties than an 
acrid correspondence between him and Captain Biddle of the 
Ainerican sloop of war Ontario arose over the question of sa- 
lutes.*^ 

On March 1, 1819, acting under the authority of the Chilean 
Government, Cochrane issued a proclamation declaring the 
whole coast of Peru to be in a state of formal blockade. ^^ His 
forces being insufficient to maintain an effective blockade of 
such a great stretch of coast, the United States held that it was 
illegal throughout its whole extent ; for otherwise, every capture 
under a notified blockade would be legal, because the capture 
itself would be proof of the blockading force. Lord Cochrane 
disavowed all claim of forfeiture as to any place where no ac- 
tual force was employed; but this disavowal was not wholly 
satisfactory^^ and numerous disagreeable incidents involving 
American ships and merchants occurred and continued to occur 
until the Royalists were finally driven out of Peru. 

A brief reference to the case of the Macedonian, an Ameri- 
can brig, taken by her captain, Eliphalet Smith, to trade on 
the Pacific coast in 1818, will illustrate the friction which arose. 
On September 23, 1818, the Supreme Director of Chile, in 
order to keep secret certain measures of a naval and military 
character, issued a decree declaring an embargo for one month 
upon all ships in the ports of the country. The Macedonian had 
been lying in the harbor of Valparaiso, but a few days before 

84 Niles' Weekly Register, XVI, 204. 

85 The proclamation was published in Niles' Weekly Register for July 3, 
1819, XVI, 318. 

86 Americcm 8tate Papers, Naval Affairs, II, 557. 



INTEKNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 211 

the decree was issued put to sea and made for tlie port of Callao, 
arriving there early in October. Captain Smith, according to 
Barros Arana, was an unscrupulous adventurer who saw in 
the countries struggling for their independence nothing more 
than a field for his speculations. He gave the viceroy all the 
information which he had been able to obtain in Chile, and 
offered to sail out to meet the Spanish squadron, which was 
expected in the Pacific, to warn it of the naval preparations 
which were going on in the ports of Chile. This offer was not 
accepted by the viceroy. Smith continued to traffic along the 
coast, serving the interests of the Royalists, says Barros Arana, 
and giving rise to diplomatic complications which were not set- 
tled for many years afterward. ^^ When Lord Cochrane ap- 
peared before Callao, the Macedonian proceeded to Huarmey, 
a little port some twenty or thirty miles to the north. Near 
that place Cochrane's forces captured the sum of $80,000 which 
was being transported overland by Captain Smith under a 
small Royalist guard to be taken aboard the Macedonian. This 
sum, together with $60,000 taken by Cochrane from a French 
vessel and claimed by Captain Smith, as the proceeds of the 
sale of his cargo, was confiscated as enemy property, which 
it was alleged. Smith was attempting to smuggle out of the 
country. These two seizures were the subject of a negotiation 
between the United States and Chile in 1820, the Chilean gov- 
ernment agreeing to pay the sum of $104,000 with interest in 
full settlement of the claims. Two years later another large 
sum of money which Captain Smith claimed as the proceeds of 
a cargo brought by the Macedonian from China and sold to 
Royalist merchants at Arica was seized by Chilean forces, de- 
livered to Lord Cochrane, and distributed by him among his 
squadron. This seizure became the subject of a separate claim 
which the two governments agreed, in 1858, to submit to the 
King of Belgium for arbitration. By the award, which was 
not rendered until 1863, three-fifths of the claim, $42,400, that 

8T Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XI, 634. 



212 PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

proportion being owned by Smith and his American associates, 
was allowed. 

The Macedonian was the cause of still another claim against 
Peru. After the Patriots came into control of the government 
at Lima, Captain Smith took his vessel to Callao to dispose of 
the residue of the cargo brought from China. The brig was 
now seized and condemned as the property of Spanish refugees. 
By the terms of a convention entered into in 1841 between the 
United States and Peru the latter agreed to pay the United 
States the sum of $300,000 in full satisfaction of all its claims ; 
and of this sum nearly one-third was apportioned on account of 
the Macedonian.^^ 

It would appear from the settlement of the various claims 
growing out of the trading of the Macedonian in Peru, that Cap- 
tain Smith, in so far as these particular incidents were con- 
cerned, was guilty of no oifense under international law. Apart 
from his trading activities, however, the Patriots believed him 
to be in sympathy with the Royalists, and actively engaged in 
promoting their interests. This charge was never the subject 
of judicial investigation, as were the claims. But, whatever 
may have been the truth of the matter, the conduct of Captain 
Smith, supported in so far as it was legal, by the government 
at Washington, contributed, together with other incidents of a 
similar sort, not a little to the dimming of the earlier impression 
of the Patriots that the United States would be, in the struggle, 
their friend and ally. 

The Macedonian was only one of a number of American ves- 
sels trading with the Royalists in defiance of the so-called block- 
ade. After Lord Cochrane returned to Chile in 1822, the 
Peruvian navy was organized and for the next two or three 
years thereafter attempted to prevent intercourse with the 
enemy. The United States maintained a squadron in Peruvian 
waters during this period and its commander, in looking out for 

88 Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations, II, 1451 
et seq.; V, 4602, 



INTERNATION"AL COMPLICATIONS 213 

the interests of American shipping, incurred the ill will of the 
Patriot government. The Peruvian historian, Paz Soldan, de- 
clares that " the decided and vituperable partiality " of Captain 
Stewart of the U. S. S. Franklin aided the viceroy in keeping 
informed of the movements of the Patriots ; that under the guns 
of the Franklin arms and ammunition were debarked at Arica 
for the Poyalists ; that the government of Peru asked in vain to 
have Captain Stewart relieved ; that during the South American 
struggle for independence the United States gave more than 
one proof of its protection to Spain and of its lack of interest in 
the political fortunes of the former Spanish colonies ; and that 
Great Britain pursued a wholly different course.^® 

The contrast, suggested by Paz Soldan, between the attitude 
of the United States and that of Great Britain toward the strug- 
gle of the Spanish American colonies to achieve independence 
demands a word of consideration. Both governments professed 
a policy of strict neutrality. The United States, as has been 
pointed out, in order better to comply with its neutral duty, 
passed the Act of March 3, 1817. This law was declared by 
Clay and his partisans to be " anti-neutral " and this character- 
ization was widely copied throughout Spanish America, often 
with the implication that British legislation was more favorable 
to the insurgents. But the Foreign Enlistment Act, passed by 

^9 Historia del Peru Independiente, II, 115. 

Captain Stewart was recalled and tried by court-martial in 1824. In a 
letter to him dated November 16, 1824, the Secretary of the Navy said: 
" You have been already apprised that the government of Peru has made 
complaints against a part of your official conduct, while in command of the 
squadron in the Pacific Ocean, and that these complaints have been seconded 
by public rumor, and confirmed by the agent of our government in that 
country. I have, also, to inform you that other complaints have been 
made, though in a less imposing form." Captain Stewart was tried under 
the following charges : Unofficerlike conduct, disobedience of orders, neglect 
of duty, and oppression and cruelty. Under the first charge there were 
twenty-nine separate specifications, most of which set forth alleged un- 
neutral conduct on the part of the accused. By the judgment of the court- 
martial, Captain Stewart was acquitted most honorably of all the charges 
which had been made against him. The record of the trial is found in 
American State Papers, Naval Affairs, II, 487-597. 



214 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINmNGS 

Parliament in 1819, was avowedly based on the American Act 
of 181Y as amended in 1818. Prior to the enactment of this 
law, Great Britain had attempted to enforce neutrality under 
the provisions of international law. But violations were fre- 
quent. In 1818 alone six expeditions are said to have been 
dispatched by Lopez Mendez to Venezuela. One of these, a 
brigade under Colonel English, consisted of some two thousand 
men. Even subsequent to the passage of the Foreign Enlistment 
Act, General D'Evereux, after an elaborate public banquet in 
Dublin, took out another expedition to South America.®'^ 

Out of these illicit expeditions grew the British Legion which 
served under Bolivar and which, in conjunction with the native 
troops, played a decisive part in the liberation of the northern 
part of South America.®-*- Eor this assistance, however, and 
for the invaluable aid rendered in the south by Cochrane, 
Miller, and others, whose services were enlisted in England, no 
credit can be given to the British Government without con- 
victing it of a shameless disregard for its own laws and 
of duplicity toward one of the parties to the contest. It was 
a question of individual enterprise. That citizens of the United 
States played no such part was due not at all to lack of sym- 
pathy with the cause, but to a stricter enforcement of the Amer- 
ican neutrality laws and to the circumstance that the relatively 
small number of adventurous spirits who might have been drawn 
into the contest found agreeable occupation at home. The 
country was new. Savage tribes on the frontiers had to be 
subdued. Vast tracts of unoccupied territory called for settlers. 
Industry and commerce flourished. In Great Britain the situ- 
ation was altogether different. The conclusion of the Euro- 
pean wars turned many thousands back to peaceful pursuits. 
A period of industrial distress and of unemployment followed. 
Emigration set out for foreign shores. The countries of Cen- 
tral and South America, struggling to be free, offered promis- 

90 Paxson, The Independence of the South American Republics, 126. 
9iO'Leary, Memorias, XVII, 571; XVIII, 80. 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 215 

ing rewards to those bred to arms. To these causes and 
not to governmental policy was due the relatively large con- 
tribution of British subjects to the emancipation of Spanish 
America. 

Although the British Government and that of the United 
States were in substantial accord on the subject of neutrality, 
yet, as to the question of the independence of the colonies, they 
differed widely. The United States, while maintaining neu- 
trality, did not hesitate to express its sympathy with the cause 
of independence, and was never in the least inclined to con- 
tribute to any arrangement for reestablishing the authority of 
the mother country. Great Britain, on the contrary, made 
several attempts to bring about a reconciliation between the in- 
surgents and the Peninsular authorities on the basis of the 
supremacy of the latter, and not until the United States had 
formally recognized the new states did the British Government 
finally give up hope of accomplishing such a result. The first 
of these attempts was made in 1810 at the solicitation of a 
Venezuelan delegation headed by Bolivar. In a memorandum 
on the subject. Marquess Wellesley concluded that by a skillful 
use of Ferdinand's title as sovereign — the insurgents still pro- 
fessed loyalty to him — it would be possible for England to pre- 
vent a sudden and complete emancipation of the Spanish col- 
onies and yet compel Spain to modify her colonial system ; but 
that it was chimerical to suppose that the mother country could 
preserve her colonies otherwise than as allied states under a 
common sovereign. The regency at Cadiz, however, declined to 
enter into negotiations upon such a basis and no further effort 
was made for the time to bring about the desired reconcili- 
ation..®^ 

In May, 1811, the British diplomatic representative at Cadiz 
was instructed to renew and urge the offer of mediation of Great 
Britain for the purpose of checking the progress of the unfor- 
tunate civil war and of effecting at least such a temporary ad- 

92 Satow, DiplomatiG Practice, II, 335-337. 



216 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

justment as might prevent, during the contest with France, 
so ruinous a waste of the general strength of the Spanish Em- 
pire. " Heads of Articles of Adjustment " were drawn up as 
a basis for the proposed mediation. The provisions were in 
substance for a cessation of hostilities; a general amnesty; 
representation of the colonies in the Cortes; free trade with 
preference for Old Spain and her colonies; native Americans 
to be viceroys or governors ; native representation in the cabildos 
and no appeals to Spain; and cooperation in the war against 
France. The articles were to be guaranteed by Great Britain. 
But it was understood that the British Government would not be 
induced to commit acts of hostility against the colonies on the 
ground of a refusal to recognize the constituted authorities 
in the Peninsula, because such a course would merely drive 
them into the arms of the enemy. The mediation was not pro- 
posed by Great Britain for her own benefit, it was declared, but 
in order to reconcile the colonies with the mother country and 
maintain the integrity of the Spanish monarchy. This attempt 
having failed because of Spain's insistence on the help of Great 
Britain to resubjugate the colonies in case the mediation failed, 
negotiations were once more renewed, in 1812, on the occasion 
of the election of a new regency. But Spain remained obdurate 
and no agreement was reached. The reestablishment of Spanish 
authority in Chile in 1814 through the mediation of Commo- 
dore Hillyar has been referred to above. And in a previous 
chapter attention has been called to the treaty of July 5, 1814, 
between Great Britain and Spain, in which his Britannic Ma- 
jesty, being anxious that the insurgents " should return to their 
obedience to their lawful sovereign," engaged to prevent his 
subjects from furnishing them " arms, ammunition, or any 
other warlike article." In 1815 Spain asked for the mediation 
of Great Britain, but refused to state the terms to which she 
was willing to agree. In 1818, at Aix-la-Chapelle, the question 
of an arrangement between Spain and her colonies was discussed 
by the five great powers. The British attitude continued to 



INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 217 

be that they could only mediate and facilitate and not compel or 
menace. But not even an approximation of opinion was 
reached. ^^ 

As Great Britain consistently refused to intervene by force 
to resubjugate the Spanish colonies, and as revolutionary prin- 
ciples showed a constant tendency to spread in Europe as well 
as in America, the allied sovereigns of Russia, Prussia, Austria, 
and France resolved to take the matter in hand. At the Con- 
gress of Verona, in 1822, they agreed to restore, through the 
arms of France, the absolute power of Ferdinand VII, of which 
he had been deprived by a movement setting up a liberal gov- 
ernment under the Spanish Constitution of 1820. This stand 
of their allies brought the British cabinet to a realization of the 
hopelessness of further attempts to mediate between the parties 
to the conflict in America, on the basis of the supremacy of the 
mother country. Moreover the government at Washington had 
just recognized the independence of the new states. The line 
of cleavage between liberal America and absolutist Europe was 
now clearly drawn. It was necessary for Great Britain to take 
her position definitively on one side or the other. At the Con- 
gress of Verona the British representatives had opposed the 
hostile intentions of the allies, and on April 14, 1822, Canning, 
who had succeeded Castlereagh as Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 
made a declaration on the subject in the House of Commons.^* 
With regard to the Spanish possessions in America, he said, 
there was no choice. As long as peace continued and Spain 
had no enemies in Europe, Great Britain was free to determine 
how far she could intervene in the contest in America. The 
situation, however, had changed. Spain had acquired a power- 
ful and active enemy in Europe and it had become necessary 
for England to declare her views on the struggle of the colonies 

93/&MZ., 340-350. 

94 The papers relating to the subject were given to the press. On July 
20, 1823, the Gaceta de Colomiia published an article based on an account 
in the Jamaica Courant, containing the substance of Canning's declaration. 



218 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

for independence. As France might send fleets and armies to 
conquer and take possession of them, and as at the termination 
of the war a settlement might be made transferring some of 
them to Trance, Great Britain felt obliged to declare that she 
considered the separation of the Spanish colonies had reached 
such a point that she could not tolerate the cession of them to 
any other power. 

In spite of the British attitude, the Holy Alliance persisted 
in its plans. The French army, which early in 1823 invaded 
Spain, soon accomplished its mission. Apprehensions were 
aroused in both Great Britain and the United States. It was 
stated and generally believed that the plan was the reestablish- 
ment of Spanish authority over all the American possessions, 
except Mexico and California, which were to be ceded to France 
and Russia, respectively, in consideration of the military aid to 
be rendered to Spain by these two powers in the work of res- 
toration.®^ Toward the latter part of August, 1823, Canning 
sounded Bush, the United States minister at London, as to 
whether the two governments might not come to an understand- 
ing on the subject of the Spanish American colonies, and as 
to whether it would not be expedient for themselves and bene- 
ficial for the world that its principles should be clearly settled 
and plainly avowed. The British Government, he added, con- 
sidered the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless, and 
the question of recognizing their independence to be one of 
time and circumstances, but were not disposed to put any im- 
pediment in the way of a settlement by amicable negotiation. 
Disclaiming any selfish aim on the part of his government, he 
declared, finally, that Great Britain could not see with indiffer- 
ence the transfer of any portion of them to any other power. 
Rush, not being authorized to enter into such an agreement, 
communicated the substance of the conversation to the Secre- 
tary of State at Washington.®^ The circumstances which fol- 

95 Burgess, The Middle Period, 124. Oaceta de Colomhia, July 13, 1823, 

96 Satow, Diplomatic Practice, II, 353. 



IN'TERN"ATIONAL COMPLICATIONS 219 

lowed and which led up to the famous declaration contained in 
Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, are well known. 

Without waiting for the decision of the United States, Can- 
ning declared in an interview with Prince de Polignac, on Oc- 
tober 9, that in the conflict between Spain and her colonies 
Great Britain would remain neutral ; but that, if any foreign 
power joined with Spain against the colonies, an entirely new 
question would be created upon which Great Britain must take 
such decision as her interests might require.^'^ In January 
following, Canning declared that, in the opinion of the British 
Government, it was vain to hope that any mediation not founded 
on the basis of independence could be successful, but if the 
court of Madrid desired it, they would willingly afford their 
countenance and aid to a negotiation commenced on the only 
basis which then appeared to be practicable, and would see with- 
out reluctance, the conclusion, through a negotiation on that 
basis, of an arrangement by which the mother country should be 
secured in the enjoyment of commercial advantages superior to 
those conceded to other nations.®^ A year later Great Britain 
recognized the independence of the new states, but she continued 
her efforts, as will be seen in a subsequent chapter on the Pan- 
ama Congress, to mediate in favor of a settlement of the con- 
flict on the basis of certain pecuniary advantages to the mother 
country. 

It is not proposed to give a resume of the history of the 
Monroe Doctrine. Numerous histories of it have been written 
and many able minds have been devoted to the analysis of its 
provisions. Relatively little, however, has been published in 
English on the subject from the standpoint of Hispanic Amer- 
ica. Accordingly, in the next chapter, an effort will be made to 
determine from contemporaneous sources the attitude which the 
new states assumed toward the declaration at the time of its 
promulgation. For reference the paragraphs of Monroe's mes- 

97 Moore, Principles of America/n Diplomacy, 243. 
»8 Satow, Diplomatic Practice, II, 353. 



220 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINISTINGS 

sage commonly accepted as constituting the basis of the doc- 
trine are given below. They cannot be too often read. 

In the first part of the message, referring to an attempt 
which was being made to arrange by amicable negotiation with 
the Russian Government the rights and interests of the two na- 
tions on the northwest coast, President Monroe said : 

" In the discussions to which this interest has given rise and 
in the arrangement by which they may terminate the occasion 
has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which 
the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that 
the American continents, by the free and independent condition 
which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to 
be considered as subjects for future colonization by any 
European powers." 

Toward the end of the message, Monroe refers to events in 
Spain and Portugal and continues as follows : 

" Of events in that quarter of the globe, with which we have 
so much intercourse and from which we derive our origin, we 
have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citi- 
zens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly 
in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow men on that 
side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in 
matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, 
nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when 
our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent in- 
juries or make preparation for our defense. With the move- 
ments in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately 
connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlight- 
ened and impartial observers. The political system of the 
allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that 
of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in 
their respective governments; and to the defense of our own, 
which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treas- 
ure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citi- 
zens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity. 



INTERN^ATION^AL COMPLICATIONS 221 

this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor 
and to the amicable relations existing between the United States 
and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt 
on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemi- 
sphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the exist- 
ing colonies or dependencies of any European power we 
have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the 
governments who have declared their independence and main- 
tained it, and whose independence we have, on great con- 
sideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not 
view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or 
controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any Euro- 
pean power in any other light than as the manifestation of an 
unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war 
between those new governments and Spain we declared our neu- 
trality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have 
adhered, and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall 
occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of 
this government, shall make a corresponding change on the part 
of the United States indispensable to their security. 

" The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe 
is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can 
be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it 
proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have 
interposed by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To 
what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same 
principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose 
governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most 
remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our 
policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage 
of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the 
globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere 
in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the 
government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to 
cultivate friendly relations with it and to preserve those rela- 



222 PAl^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

tions by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting in all in- 
stances the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries 
from none. But in regard to these continents circumstances 
are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible 
that the allied powers should extend their political system to 
any portion of either continent without endangering our peace 
and happiness; nor can any one believe that our southern 
brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their ovni ac- 
cord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold 
such interposition in any form with indifference. If we look 
to the comparative strength and resources of Spain and those 
new governments and their distance from each other, it must 
be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true 
policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, 
in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course." ^^ 

99 Monroe, Writings, VI, 339. 



CHAPTEK VI 

HISPANIC AMERICA AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

It is important to keep in mind the fact that the former col- 
onies of Spain, and to a greater or less extent Brazil also, dur- 
ing their struggle for independence and for some years after- 
ward had their gaze constantly fixed on Europe. From that 
source would come, they feared, the forces which might succeed 
in subjecting them again to the hated authority of the mother 
country; and from that source also they hoped to receive the 
succor which would complete their independence and protect 
them in the continuous enjoyment of it. Mexico and Central 
America, after their disastrous experience as an empire, frankly 
accepted the republican system ; but not for this reason did they 
cease to rely upon European and especially upon British assist- 
ance to fix their independence. Argentina, and to a less de- 
gree Chile, continued throughout the revolutionary period to 
look to Europe for a solution of their political problems. The 
Bolivarian republics — that is. Great Colombia, Peru, and Bo- 
livia — although they achieved their emancipation mainly 
through their own efforts under the leadership of the Liberator, 
yet had received material aid from Great Britain and expected 
from her protection against reconquest by the allied powers of 
Europe. Brazil, likewise, owing to the peculiar relation exist- 
ing between Portugal and Great Britain, was indebted to Brit- 
ish influence in great part for the relative ease with which her 
independence was effected, and for the prospect of being able 
to live in undisturbed exercise of sovereignty over her vast 
territory. 

Great Britain, in fact, had become strongly intrenched in the 
affections of the new American states. She, more than any 

2%Z 



224 PAJSr-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINmN'GS | 

other foreign power, had contributed to their independence. !i 
From her shores, regardless of treaty obligations, and the obli- 
gations of international law, armed expeditions had sailed to 
aid the revolted colonists ; in her ports ships had been fitted out 
to form units in the insurgent navies or to operate as privateers 
against Spanish commerce; from her citizens loans had been I 
obtained and by them military supplies had been furnished; | 
and on British soil thousands of men had been enlisted to serve ! 
in the revolutionary ranks. Moreover the prestige which Great ^ 
Britain had acquired through the part she had played in the I 
overthrow of ]^apoleon, together with her gradual withdrawal I 
from the trammels of the allied powers of Europe, and finally 
her stand against the intervention of those powers in American 
affairs, tended very much to enhance friendly relations be- 
tween her and the American beneficiaries of her policy, and to 
cause them to rely more strongly upon British protection.^ 
The United States on the other hand enforced its neutrality 
laws with relative strictness and thus contributed much less 
in a material way to the outcome of the revolution than did 
Great Britain. And, as the military and naval strength of 
the United States was considerably inferior to that of Great 
Britain, it is not surprising that of the two nations that stood 
between the Hispanic American states and the Holy Alliance, 

1 During the greater part of the period of revolution in Hispanic Amer- 
ica the interests of Great Britain were looked after by British naval offi- 
cers, but special agents were later sent out and to their activities, no 
doubt, the good disposition toward England can in large measure be 
attributed. The following from a letter of Naval Lieutenant Samouel, an 
agent whom France sent to Mexico early in 1824 to effect a reconciliation 
between that republic and Spain is significant. Writing to the Minister 
of Marine and Colonies from Habana under date of August 14, 1824, he 
says : " I made strong efforts to destroy the lack of confidence with respect 
to the intentions of France, who is thought to be supporting King 
Ferdinand, and on all sides I noted great animosity toward the Spaniards, 
who are quite numerous in that province. Spain is considered as incapable 
of carrying out any undertaking unless she is aided by some power of the 
Continent, and the English have given out the information that if this 
should occur they would give Mexico strong support." — Villanueva, La, 
Santa Alianza, 38', 283, 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 225 

Great Britain should have occupied by far the more prominent 
place in the opinion of those states. Striking illustrations of 
this fact are to be found in the manner in which the new states 
received the Monroe declaration. 

News of President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, 
apparently did not arrive in the City of Mexico -until near the 
middle of the following February. The first direct reference 
to the message in the press of the Mexican capital occurs in the 
Aguilci Mexicana ^ of February 12, 1824, when the following 
brief notice appeared: "A person who left New Orleans on 
the fifteenth of last month says that the message of the President 
of the United States of North America containing a declara- 
tion with regard to maintaining the independence of Mexico 
and South America was received with the greatest approval 
and satisfaction ; and that though the President insinuates that 
no intervention would be called for in case Spain alone under- 
took the reconquest of her colonies, nevertheless it is said the 
states of the West are determined to oppose reconquest under 
whatever circumstances and to assist in any way they may be 
able to defend the United Mexican states." ^ 

Several days later the Aguila Mexicana received a letter and 
newspapers from a correspondent writing from Habana under 
date of January 15. This correspondent discussed the interna- 
tional situation in such a way as to indicate that he had read 
the Monroe declaration, though he made no direct reference to 
it. He expressed the opinion that England and the United 
States would oppose foreign intervention in the affairs of the 
American states, but he believed that their action would be 
limited to opposition to what he called ostensible intervention, 
which would not prevent aid being given Spain through loans. 
He was of the opinion, therefore, that it was best for the Amer- 

2 This paper, the first daily to be published in Mexico, was the organ of 
the Federalist group of the Republican party. The Centralists depended 
upon El Sol to defend their interests. The Federalists were in power at 
this time. — Zavala, Ensayo Histdrico, I, 256. 

3 Aguila Mexicana, February 12, 1824. 



22e PA^-AMEElCAKISH: ITS BEGlKKtNGS | 

i 
ican states to trust to their own resources and not to rely too- 
much on foreign protection.* ., 

Among the papers received from the Habana correspondent), 
there must have been one or more which contained either ex-, 
tracts from Monroe's message or possibly the message in full ; i 
for in the same issue of the Aguila Mexicana in which thisj 
correspondent's letter was inserted there was published a lead- 1 
ing article entitled " Politica," which embodied a short extract ji 
from that famous document. It is worthy of note that on this [ 
occasion, when the declaration of President Monroe might have [, 
been expected to arouse the liveliest interest, another question) 
which in the mind of the editor was of much greater impor-| 
tance; namely, the recognition of Mexican independence byj 
Great Britain and the establishment of diplomatic relations be- 1 
tween the two countries, received the paper's chief attention, j 
while the declaration of President Monroe was treated as purely 
incidental to that question. The author of the article, declar- 
ing that the British cabinet was in favor of the independence 
of Mexico, expressed the opinion that with England on their 
side the goal was already practically attained; for Spain in 
her weakness would be obliged to heed the least intimation of 
that great power. A favorable circumstance, he added, was the 
fact that the United States, naturally the friend of Mexico, 
had come to its aid in accord with the only nation capable of 
commanding respect in case opposition of interests should arise. 
Then to make clear the position of the United States an extract 
from that part of Monroe's message referring to the noninter- 
vention of Europe in the affairs of the American states was 
given; but this was followed by no comment.^ 

In the course of a review of the year 1824, El 8olj another 
daily of Mexico City, though not referring to Monroe's mes- 
sage, makes the following significant observations : " The 
termination of the war in Spain we believe turned the attention 

*IUd., February 26, 1824. 
5 lUd. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 227 

of the powers of Europe to independent America. The despot 
Ferdinand as soon as he saw himself reestablished in what he 
calls his rights, solicited the aid of his allies for the purpose 
of restoring his authority on this side of the Atlantic. To this 
end he proposed the convocation of a congress in the expecta- 
tion that one of those reunions in which the sovereigns of Eu- 
rope conspire against the liberties of the people would resolve 
upon the oppression of the Americas. In this he was disap- 
pointed, for the firm, constant, liberal conduct of the British 
Government prevented such a congress from meeting, and the 
positive declarations of that government closed the door to the 
idea of aggression by other arms than those of Spain. More- 
over the power of a nation in a state of dissolution and anarchy, 
such as that in which Spain finds herself, is to be but little 
feared. Thus it is that though our independence has not been 
recognized it has been respected." ^ 

The foregoing expressions, unofficial though they are, never- 
theless undoubtedly make manifest in a fairly exact way the 
relative importance which was attached in Mexico to the Monroe 
Doctrine at the time of its proclamation. Fortunately, how- 
ever, a more authoritative statement is at hand. In a report 
which the Minister of Foreign Relations, Don Lucas Alaman,''^ 

6 El Sol, January 2, 1825. 

7 Lucas Alaman was born in Guanajuato, Mexico, in 1792. He received 
his early education in the city of his birth, and afterward continued his 
studies in Mexico City and in Europe, where he remained from 1814 to 
1820. During these years he traveled over the greater part of Great 
Britain and the Continent, perfecting himself in moden languagesi and pur- 
suing studies in the natural sciences. On his return to Mexico he was 
elected deputy to the Spanish Cortes for the province of Guanajuato and 
thenceforth he occupied a prominent place in Mexican history. Keturning 
once more to Mexico in March, 1823, he was shortly afterward made 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and with the exception of short intervals served 
in that office until the end of 1825, after which he retired to private life. 
At various times subsequently, however, he held high office in the republic 
and at the time of his death in 1853 he was once more occupying the post of 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

AlamSn's Eistoria de Mexico (5 vols.) is perhaps the most reliable and 
satisfactory history that has yet been written of the Eepublic of Mexico. 
This work was preceded by his Disertaciones soire la historian de la 



228 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

made to tlie Mexican Congress on January 11, 1825, he men- 
tions, in discussing the state of affairs in Europe, the message 
of President Monroe. This he does in such a connection as to 
leave little doubt as to his estimate of its relative importance. 
Speaking of the invasion of Spain by France and of the desire 
of Ferdinand to secure the intervention of the Holy Alliance 
in his favor, Alaman says : " This conduct of the Spanish 
Government has given an entirely new direction to European 
policy. England refused Ferdinand's invitation to join in the^ 
proposed congress, and the papers presented by the English j" 
minister to Parliament, which were published, set forth withf 
admirable frankness the liberal principles which were to guide "^ 
her conduct. While not opposing the recognition of our inde-f 
pendence England desired that Spain should be the first of the ^ 
European powers to take this important step, though she has ' 
indicated that the circumstances are such that she will not wait 
very long for the results of Spain's tortuous procedure, and 
she has openly declared that she will not permit any power or 
league of powers to undertake armed intervention in favor 
of Spain in the pending questions with her former colonies. ( 
Very similar also was the resolution announced by the Presi-j" 
dent of the United States of the North as set forth in his mes- 
sage presented to a former Congress. And as the French Gov- 1 
emment at about the same time manifested friendly intentions f 
toward us there are very strong reasons for believing that the J 
moment for the recognition of our independence by other Eu- - 
ropean nations is at hand." ^ | 

Republica Mexicana desde la Conquista hasta la Independencia, forming in ! 
effect an introduction to the former. Alaman possessed ability of a high i 
order, and he cultivated it with industry. He spoke English, French, and j 
Italian fiuently. He not infrequently displayed leanings toward monarchy, \ 
though he himself declared that his experience in Europe had converted him ' 
- to republican principles. — Bancroft, History of Mexico, TV, 823 ; Bocanegra, j 
Hist, de Mex., 241, 557, 574; Apuntes para la Biografia del Exmo. 8r. D.\ 
Lucas Alamdn. 

8 Memoria presentada a la^ dos Cdmaras del Congreso General de la ' 
Federacion al ahrirse las Sesiones del Ano de 1825, 4. See also British ! 
and Foreign State Papers, XII, 983, | 



THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 229 

As it is desired at this point merely to determine the imme- 
diate effect produced throughout Latin America by the message 
of President Monroe, but little importance will be attached to 
views expressed long posterior to that event. It is worth not- 
ing, however, that Alaman in his Historia de Mexico^ published 
about a quarter of a century later, found no reason to give a 
more important place in Mexican history to the Monroe Doc- 
trine than he had ascribed to it in the report referred to above. 
Indeed the pages of his work may be searched in vain for any 
reference whatever to the Monroe declaration, whereas along 
with a brief notice of the recognition of the independence of 
Mexico by the United States, the author gives a relatively full 
account of the attitude of Great Britain respecting recognition 
and the opposition of that power to the interference of the Holy 
Alliance in American affairs.^ 

Other Mexican historians, contemporaries of Alaman, in like 
manner attached relatively less importance to the policy of 
Monroe than to that of Canning. Tornel,-^^ in his Breve- Resena 
Historica, affirms that if the United States had been content 
with exercising the supremacy to which every circumstance 
called her, or if she had been satisfied with laying the founda- 
tions for an American continental system, she would have met 
the expectations of the world and she would not have been re- 
proached with having proceeded with selfish motives, rather 
than with the noble purpose of leading, counseling, and de- 
fending the American nations in their tempestuous infancy. 
Reviewing in detail the conduct of Great Britain in her rela- 
tions to the continental system and to the Western Hemisphere, 
the author concludes by saying that the words of Canning to 
the effect that he had called a new world into existence, were 

9 Alaman, Hist, de Mex., V, 815-818. 

10 General Jose Mar!a Tornel was a firm supporter of Santa Anna. He 
was twice appointed as Minister of War and on one occasion represented 
Mexico at Washington. He died in 1853, leaving his Resena Historica 
incomplete. Bancroft, Hist, of Mexico, Y, 254; Bocanegra, Hist, de Mex., 
II, 577. 



230 PAIT-AMEEICAITISM: ITS BEGUSTNINGS 

in the nature of a boast for which he could be excused out of 
gratitude for the immense benefit conferred upon the Am erican 
states by England in disconcerting the designs of the Holy Alli- 
ance. In this respect they had been favored also, he admits, 
by the United States, who opposed with energy and firmness 
the interposition of the powers of Europe in the affairs of the 
ISTew World." 

Bocanegra, in his Memorias para la Historia de Mexico In- 
dependiente, referring to the arrival at Vera Cruz in December, 
1823, of a commission which the British Government had sent|^ 
to Mexico to report on its political condition, says that this? 
event was made much of on account of the prevailing conviction 
that recognition by Great Britain was essential to the conserva-'^ 
tion of the independence of the republic. ^^ In May, 1824, 
news reached Mexico of certain conferences which Canning had 
held with the Erench ambassador at London, and in which 
Canning had declared in substance that he believed it to be 
useless for Spain to try longer to recover her colonies, and ' 
that if she insisted on making the effort England would not 
permit any other power to aid in the reconquest. In virtue 
of this stand, the fame of Canning, Bocanegra declares, spread 
throughout America, and in Mexico he was looked upon as the | 
great champion of natural rights and of the independence of \ 
the Mexican nation. ^^ Erom this writer President Monroe | 
received no such praise as was given the " immortal Canning." j 
Indeed the only reference to Monroe or to his doctrine to be l 
found in Bocanegra's history is contained in a short discourse 
spoken by the minister of the United States, Poinsett, upon \ 

his reception by President Victoria on June 2, 1825. Vic- c 

\ 

11 Breve Resena Histdrica de los Acontecimientos mds notables de la \ 
Nacidn Mexicana, 31-32. \ 

12 Jos6 Maria Bocanegra was for a short time provisional president of the |, 
republic. In 1829, 1837, and 1841-1844 he served as Minister of Foreign j, 
Relations. He died in 1862 without having published his Memorias. They ! 
were not published until 1892, when an official edition appeared under the i 
direction of J. M. Vigil. 

13 II, 288'. 



THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 231 

toria, however, in his reply made no reciprocal reference to the 
Monroe declaration.^^ 

To cite opinions formed after the annexation of Texas and 
after the War of 1847 between Mexico and the United States 
had embittered the relations between the two countries, would 
not contribute to the aims of this chapter. Although the works 
of Alaman, Tornel, and Bocanegra were not published until 
toward the middle of the century or later, yet they appear to 
reflect faithfully the early attitude. This is confirmed by an- 
other Mexican author, Lorenzo Zavala, ^^ whose sympathies 
were decidedly favorable to the people and to the institutions 
of the United States and whose work was published in 1831, 
at which time no serious friction had yet arisen between Mex- 
ico and the United States. 

" It is evident," says Zavala, " that if it had not been for 
the forceful declarations of the governments of England and 
of the United States to the effect that they would not permit 
Spain to receive aid from any of the powers in her attempts 
to recover her colonies, France would have done in America, 
or at least would have attempted to do, what she had just ac- 
complished in the Peninsula. At that time the propaganda 
of the Holy Alliance was altogether in Spain's favor. The 
undertakings in Naples, in the Piedmont, and in Spain ap- 

14 II, 381-382. 

15 Lorenzo de Zavala was born in Merida, Yucatan, in 1781. In 1820 he 
■was elected deputy to the Spanish Cortes and later served as deputy and 
then senator in the Mexican Congress. From 1827-1830 he was governor of 
the State of Mexico. Upon the downfall of Guerrero in December, 1829, 
Zavala left Mexico and traveled in the United States and Europe. Return- 
ing in 1833 he was again elected to Congress, serving also as governor of 
Mexico. In the following year he was appointed minister to France but 
resigned upon perceiving the direction toward centralism of the party in 
power in Mexico, and cast his lot with the Texans. He was a member of 
the convention which declared the independence of Texas, March 2, 1836, 
and was elected vice-president of that republic. He died in November of 
the same year. His Ensayo Histdrico de las Revoluciones de Mexico 

(2 vols.) was first published at Paris in 1831. There he also published in 
1834 his Viaje a los Estados Unidos del Norte de America. Bancroft, 
Hist, of Mex., V, 87; North Mexican States and Texas, II, 218. Wooten, 
A Comprehensive History of Texas, I, 238. Alamdn, Hist, de Mex., V, 576. 



232 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

peared to encourage the Holy Alliance in its crusade against thej^ 
Americans, who, according to the phrase employed, were rebels 
against their legitimate sovereign. If it had not been for Eng- 
land and the United States the seas would have been covered 
with embarkations bearing new conquistadores to America. 
The language of Canning, though somewhat pompous and in- 
flated, had nevertheless the positive effect of prohibiting the 
intervention of any other power in transatlantic affairs." ^'^ 
Then, referring to the famous speech of Canning, made in the 
House of Commons on December 12, 1826, on which occasion l 
he boasted that he had called a new world into existence, 
Zavala declares that the language was poetic and exaggerated; 
but that it could not be doubted that though Canning did not. 
give existence to the new states — for they existed without i 
British recognition, Mexico first of all — he consolidated their i 
independence and placed Spain in a position of isolation in her \ 
efforts to resubjugate them.^''^ 

President Victoria,^^ in a manifesto dated October 5, 1824, 
on the eve of the conversion of the provisional government into 
a constitutional one, reviewed the international relations of the 
republic but did not mention Monroe's message of December 2, 
1823. In a similar document issued five days later he recom- 
mended to his countrymen, among other things, the advice of 
Washington on the importance of leaving to Congress the exer- 

10 Ensayo Historico de las Revolucidnes de Mexico, 1, 325. 

17 The exact quotation to which Zavala refers is as follows : " If France 
occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that 
occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz ? No. I looked another way — 
I sought materials of compensation in another hemisphere. Contemplating 
Spain, such as our ancestors had known her, I resolved that if France had 
Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New World 
into existence, to redress the balance of the Old." Speeches of the Right 
Honorable George Canning. {Third edition) VI, 111. 

18 The real name of Victoria was Juan F6lix Fernandez, but during the 
war he changed his first name to that of Gruadalupe, in honor of the Virgin 
patroness of Mexico, and his surname to that of Victoria to commemorate 
a victory over the Spaniards. He retired from office in 1829, never to 
appear again in public life except in an inferior rSle. He died in 1843. 
Bancroft, Hist, of Mew., V, 28, 44, 45. 



THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 233 

cise of the functions which the Constitution undoubtedly con- 
ferred upon it and to the executive the general direction of the 
government in the interests of the federation. " My feeble 
voice," said Victoria, " v^ill be listened to v^hen it mentions 
with profound respect the Hero of the North and I do not 
fear to be censured when covered by his august shade." In a 
speech on the opening of the first Constitutional Congress, Jan- 
uary 1, 1825, the Mexican president again referred to Wash- 
ington and eulogized the United States as the land of liberty. 
But on neither of these occasions did he refer to Monroe. ^^ 

In his message on the opening of Congress, January 1, 1826, 
Victoria made some pertinent remarks which it will be of in- 
terest to transcribe. Speaking of the relations of the republic 
of Mexico with the powers of Europe, and first of all with 
England, he said: 

" The month of January of last year is deserving of eternal 
record, as the government of his Britannick Majesty then 
evinced a disposition, to the Diplomatic Agents in London, to 
enter into friendly relations with, and to recognize the inde- 
pendence of, the ISTew American States. This proceeding of 
the wise British Cabinet has strengthened our interests, and 
at the same time disconcerted the plans of external Enemies, 
surprising the Cabinets of the Allied Powers. The latter have 
disclaimed all interference with the affairs of the Americans, 
and have thus discovered the ulterior plans which lay latent in 
their bosoms: they wished to waft across the ocean the absurd 
principles of Legitimacy, and to smother liberal ideas in the 
New World. All their intercourse with the court of Madrid 
indicated a wish again to subjugate the ancient Colonies of 
Spain by Foreign Forces. The invasion of the Peninsula, in 
1823, had for its object to enable Ferdinand VII to undertake 
the reconquest of his former Colonies. The French Generalis- 
simo proclaimed this to be the object of his august uncle. Eng- 
land has the credit of flying to the assistance of reason, justice 

19 British and Foreign State Papers, XJI, 875, 884, 963. 



234 PA:N'-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

and liberty, and of rescuing America from tlie disasters of war, [ 
by the interposition of her Trident. ^'^ This eventful circum- 
stance has opened the means of communication between the 
two worlds ; and Mexico, blessed by the inexhaustible resources 
of its soil, occupies a high station in the new order of things." ^^ 
After rapidly reviewing the relations of the United Mexican 
states with the other powers of Europe, President Victoria 
passed to a consideration of the relations with the nations of 
this hemisphere. " Justice and gratitude," he said, " compel 
us to mention, before all others, the most ancient State of Amer- 
ica, and the first of the Civilized World which solemnly pro- 
claimed our rights, after having preceded us in the heroick 
resolution of shaking off a dependence on the Mother Country. 
The United States of the North, models of political virtue and 

20 Victoria's evident partiality for Great Britain did not pass unnoticed 
in the United States. William Cabell Rives of Virginia, speaking in the 
House of Eepresentatives, April 6, 1826, on a resolution which he had 
introduced respecting the proposed mission to Panama adverted to the 
partiality of President Victoria for Great Britain. "I have already 
briefly alluded," he said, " to the various offices of kindness, and manifesta- 
tions of friendship, which we have exhibited towards these people. With 
what return have they ever met? Let any gentleman read the late t 
message of the President of Mexico to his congress, and then let his j 
feelings of mortified and indignant pride give the answer. Sir, we have l 
vainly imagined that by the acts of disinterested friendship, and the solid [ 
and useful services we have rendered our southern neighbors, we had I 
won their gratitude and confidence; that they looked up to us as their 
patron and guide, and regarded us with filial reverence — to use the 
language of a gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Metcalfe), as the mother of | 
Republics. But, sir, this fine delusion is dissipated. The message of the 
Mexican president begins with celebrating, in the most fulsome strains, 
the power, the wisdom, the magnanimity of Great Britain, in her trans- 
actions with the Spanish American states, and distinctly attributes the ! 
disconcertion of the schemes of their enemies to the interposition of the ■ 
British trident — which trident was never interposed in any other way j 
than by forming commercial relations with them, for her oicn benefit, and i 
even this was not done until three or four years after we had made a | 
formal and explicit acknowledgment of their independence. But we recog- j 
riize no traces of that ardent devotion, that fervent gratitude, that affec- i 
tionate confidence, which we have been taught to believe were cherished in I 
all Spanish American hearts toward us, and of which there are such ample i 
and gratuitous displays toward Great Britain." Register of Delates i» I 
Congress (1825-26) Vol. II, Part II, 2085. 

21 British and Foreign St^te Papers, XIII, 1068, 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 235 

moral rectitude, have advanced under the system of a Federa- 
tive Republick, which, having been adopted amongst us, by 
the most spontaneous act on record, exalts us to the level with 
the Country of Washington and establishes the most intimate 
union between the neighboring countries." ^^ 

The Central American provinces, during the greater part of 
the period of the wars of emancipation, constituted a sort of 
eddy in which the general movement of revolution produced 
but few of the destructive effects suffered by other sections. 
Their independence was achieved with relatively little sacri- 
fice.'^ Their contact vnth foreign powers had been limited, 
and though the government took measures, upon the establish- 
ment of the Federation in 1824, to encourage immigration and 
to promote intercourse with the nations of Europe and Amer- 
ica,^"* progress in this direction was effectively checked by civil 
strife which soon began, and which in some parts of Central 
America has scarcely abated to this day. Under the circum- 
stances it would not be surprising to find that public opinion 
with regard to international affairs was less definite there than 
in other quarters. Such indeed was the case. 

An examination of the pages of the Gaceta del Gohierno Su- 
premo de Guatemala from its first issue on March 1, 1824, in 
an unbroken series to November of the same year, reveals the 
fact that practically all that was printed in that paper, during 
the period mentioned, with reference to the Monroe Doctrine 
was taken from a foreign source. For example, on March 26 
there appeared an article entitled " Reflections on the message 
of the President of the United States," which was copied from 
El Sol of Mexico. ^^ An article which appeared in the number 
for July 30, 1824, and which declared that the independence 
of the Hispanic American states, protected as it was by the 

22 British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 1069. 

23 Gaceta del Gohierno Supremo de Guatemala, March 1, 1824. 
2i British a/nd Foreign State Papers, XII, 979. 

25 The article was originally copied by El Sol from the National Gazette 
of Philadelphia for December 9, 1823. 



236 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGmNIKGS 

nations that possessed the institutions and spoke the language 
of liberty — Great Britain and the United States — was no 
longer in danger, is credited to the Gaceta de Cartagena, Co- jj 
lombia. In the issue for August 30, 1824, there was inserted 
a letter, written from London early in the preceding January, 
which contained interesting observations on the Monroe Doc- 
trine and on the policy of Great Britain with regard to the 
intervention of the Holy Alliance in the affairs of the new 
states of the Western Hemisphere. But this communication 
also was first published in one of the gazettes of Colombia. 

The Central American state papers also lacked positive ex- 
pressions of opinion on the declaration of President Monroe or 
on the situation which that declaration was intended to meet. 
The message of the executive upon the opening of the congress 
at Guatemala on March 1, 1826, reviews the foreign relations 
of the republic, and in referring to the United States says 
merely that they " have acknowledged our independence with 
the greatest good will, and have given us testimony of great 
friendship and good understanding." ^® The executive, how- 
ever, on a previous occasion was somewhat more definite. In 
a circular which he addressed to the provincial governors he 
declared that " England protects our just cause. She has dis- 
patched consuls to the American nations. She cooperates in 
the development of our resources. She promotes our progress 
and she has decided to recognize our independence. The United 
States has a well-defined interest in the southern republics. 
That nation has recognized our independence and has sent us 
consuls. Moreover the message of the President on the open- 
ing of the Congress, December 2, 1823, declares in unmistak- 
able terms that the government would resist an attack on our 
rights by the allied powers of Europe. ^'^ 

Before passing to the continent of South America a brief 
reference may be made to the republic of Haiti. It will be re- 

26 British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 1020. 

27 Oaceta del Gobierno Supremo de Guatemala, September 13, 1824. 



THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 237 

called that the independence of that republic had been declared 
as early as 1804 ; that France was never able thereafter to re- 
establish her authority over the colony ; that the unification of 
the conflicting factions into a single government effective 
throughout the island had been accomplished by the time the 
United States resolved in 1822 to recognize the governments 
set up by certain of the former Hispanic American colonies. 
Haiti, however, was not included among the number to be recog- 
nized, and apparently the declaration of President Monroe of 
December 2, 1823, did not embrace that republic. In a com- 
munication to the Senate on the political condition of Santo 
Domingo, Monroe stated on February 26, 1823, that the gov- 
ernment of the island had not been molested in the exercise of 
its sovereignty by any European power and that no invasion 
of it had been attempted by any power. He added, however, 
that it was understood that the relations between the republic 
and the government of France had not been adjusted. 

The President had been requested to communicate to the Sen- 
ate not only such information as he might possess as to the 
political condition of Haiti and as to whether sovereignty over 
it were claimed by any European nation, but also as to whether 
any further commercial relations with it would be consistent 
with the interests and safety of the United States. In com- 
plying with this request Monroe called attention to the provi- 
sions of the Haitian constitution which prohibited the employ- 
ment of all white persons who had immigrated there since 1816, 
and which prohibited also the acquisition by such persons of 
the right of citizenship or of the right to 6wn real estate in the 
island. The establishment of a government on such princi- 
ples, he thought, evinced distinctly the idea of a separate inter- 
est and of a distrust of other nations. To what extent that 
spirit might be indulged or to what purposes applied, experience, 
he declared, had been up to that time too limited to make pos- 
sible a just estimate. Commercial intercourse existed, he added, 
and it would be the object of the government to promote it. 



238 PAN'-AMEEICAITISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

But in this connection he assured the Senate that every cir- 
cumstance which might by any possibility affect the tranquillity 
of any part of the Union would be guarded against by suitable 
precautions.^^ 

It was evident, therefore, that Haiti was not placed by the 
United States on an equal footing with the governments which 
had been set up on the mainland. In this attitude toward 
Haiti the United States was not alone. England and France 
for obvious reasons looked with disfavor upon the establish- 
ment of a black republic in the West Indies. ^^ And even 
Bolivar, who had received aid from President Petion in 1816 
and who professed great friendship for the Haitian people, re- 
frained from inviting the government of that island to partici- 
pate in the congress of Panama.^^ 

The omission of any allusion to Haiti in the message of De- 
cember 2, 1823, met with protest on the island. A Haitian 
newspaper, Le Propagateur, commenting upon the declaration 
of President Monroe and applauding the procedure of the 
United States in extending the hand of friendship to the rising 
nations of South America, remonstrated against the treatment 
of Haiti as follows : 

" But why has not the name of Haiti been mentioned in this 
message? Does our course differ from that of the southern 
nations? Have we shown less courage, less idolatry, in the 
cause of liberty? Are we less advanced in civilization, or is 
our government weaker and less stable? To all these we an- 
swer in the negative. If we morally compare our population 
with that of Mexico or Peru, the result will be entirely to our 

28 Am. state Papers, For. Bel., Y, 240. 

29 L^ger, La Politique Exterieure d'Haiti, 6. 

aoLeger, Haiti, Her History and her Detractors, 171. Haiti sent an 
agent to propose a defensive alliance with Colombia, but not wishing to 
antagonize France and resenting the absorption by Haiti of the Spanish 
portion of the island, which had resolved upon annexation to Colombia, 
this republic declined the proposal. See the message of the vice-president 
to the Congress of Colombia, January 2, 1825. British and Foreign Papers, 
XII, 822. 



THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 239 

advantage. We have proved our strength by long and terrible 
conflicts, and the troops that we have vanquished were neither 
small in number nor of ordinary bravery. They were the vic- 
tors of the pyramids of Abouker and Marengo, whose remains 
now sleep on our plains." ^^ 

Continuing, the writer sets forth in greater detail the claims 
of Haiti upon the United States for recognition and for its 
good offices. The Americans, he averred, especially those of 
the north, were the natural friends of Haiti ; and an extensive 
commerce already existed between the two countries. America 
could supply the articles which Haiti received from Europe, 
but Europe could never supply those furnished by America. 
Time would bring about closer relations which no future diffi- 
culties could interrupt. The people of the United States might 
possess the commerce of both Indies and the Haitians would 
not envy them the enjoyment of it. They were content to live 
on the soil where Providence had placed them. They would not 
emigrate. Haiti was justified, therefore, in desiring the good 
offices of the United States. It had been intimated, the writer 
added, that the question of color embarrassed the cabinet at 
Washington. He thought that if such pitiful considerations 
existed they would gradually lose their force. The red chil- 
dren of the American forests were admitted into the halls of 
Washington — why was that favor denied to the citizens of 
Haiti ? They should not despair of obtaining it, for that era 
in America was so splendid, so magnificent in promises that it 
forcibly recalled to the writer's mind the prediction of a mon- 
arch of the preceding century : " L'Europe finit, I'Amerique 
commence." ^^ 

Turning now to the continent of South America, the state of 
opinion in the Bolivarian republics may first be considered. 
And in order that that opinion may be justly appreciated it 

31 Niles' Weekly Register, XXV, 413; The Examiner (London), October 
24, 1824. 

32]Sriles' Weekly Register, XXV, 413. 



240 PAI^-AMEEICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

will be indispensable to view it in its proper historical perspec- 
tive, for which the preceding chapters have in general furnished 
the guiding lines. There is, however, one important detail, 
barely referred to in the preceding pages, which must now re- 
ceive fuller treatment: the opposition of the vice president of 
Colombia, Santander, to the policies of the Liberator. 

It must be remembered that Bolivar believed that the people 
of the former Spanish colonies were not prepared to conduct 
highly democratic governments. He believed, on the contrary, 
that the aristocratic principle was essential to good government, 
especially where, as was the case throughout Spanish America, 
ignorance and political inexperience prevailed among the great 
mass of the people. He believed that the executive should be 
elected for life, should exercise his authority without responsi- 
bility, should name his successor; should, in fact, be king in 
everything except name. His dream was of a great federation 
of Hispanic American states of which his own Great Colom- 
bia should be the head. In this he undoubtedly had the 
good will of Great Britain, who viewed with jealousy the in- 
evitable expansion of the United States toward the south and 
west.^^ 

Francisco de Paula Santander, elected as vice president of 
the republic of Colombia in 1821, exercised the chief magistracy 
during the five years of Bolivar's absence in the south. He had 
been one of Bolivar's generals and, though still under thirty 
years of age and untried in statecraft when he was called to the 
presidential chair, he apparently enjoyed the fullest confidence 
of his chief and of the people as a whole. The origin and cul- 
mination of the break in friendly relations between the two 
men constitutes a long chapter in the history of Colombia. It 
is essential to the present purpose, however, to know merely 
the main issue. It is likely that the quarrel had an earlier 
origin than appears on the surface. Possibly, the beginning 

33 For the British attitude see Adams, E. T>., British Interests and 
Activities in Texas, 15. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 241 

of the trouble goes back to the adoption of the constitution it- 
self. The Liberator, displeased that so democratic and as he 
believed impractical an instrument as was the constitution of 
Cucuta should have been accepted, finally countenanced, if he 
did not foment, its overthrow to make way for his Bolivian 
constitution. Santander on the other hand became the cham- 
pion of the constitution of 1821, whether sincerely and patri- 
otically as his partisans declare or whether as a demagogue, in- 
tent on selfish ends as his detractors maintain, is a matter of 
controversy with which this «tudy has no concern. 

The essential fact is that in the republic of Colombia there 
were, at the time the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed, in proc- 
ess of formation two main currents of opinion which were to 
become clearly defined two or three years later ; one favorable to 
Bolivar and to the promotion of his political designs and an- 
other to Santander and to his conception of a democratic re- 
publics^ The former group inclined toward Great Britain and 
the latter toward the United States. In the light of these re- 
marks, attention may now be directed to some of the comments 
evoked in Colombia by the message of December 2, 1823. 

The following article appearing in La Gaceta de Colombia, 
a newspaper published at Bogota, if not written by Santander 
himself must have been inspired by him.^^ 

" The United States has now begun to play among civilized 
nations of the world that powerful and majestic role which 
befits the oldest and most powerful nation of our hemisphere. 
We deeply regret our inability to publish all of the message 
of the President to Congress of December 2, for it is one of the 
most interesting documents which has emanated from the Amer- 
ican Government up to this time. It abounds in those sug- 

3* O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, Villanueva, El Imperio de los Andes, 
62-80 and passim. Ibid., Bolivar y el General San Martin, 270-277. 

35 La Gaceta de Colombia, though not an official government organ, was 
at least friendly to the administration and responded to the desires of Vice 
President Santander. He often spoke of it as " our gazette " and according 
to his own statements frequently wrote articles for publication in its 
columns. O'Leary, Memorias, III, 105, 111, 124, 137, 353, 390. 



242 PA]!^-AMERICA¥ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

gestions and details which every free govemraent ought to fur- 
nish its citizens in order that they may judge in regard to the 
interests of the nation with the proper exactness and discern- 
ment. How different is this frank and loyal mode of procedure 
from that horrid system which finds its stability in the secrets 
of the cabinet and in ministerial maneuvers. The enemies of 
liberty may take pleasure in the triumphs of that system on the 
European side of the Atlantic, where its favorite principle of 
legitimacy has numerous partisans. In this favored continent 
there are no classes interested in perpetuating the ignorance 
of the people that they may thrive upon prejudice and stupid- 
ity. In America man is only the slave of the law, while in a 
large part of the Old World people still believe and obstinately 
maintain that kings are an emanation of divinity. 

" The partisans of this impious doctrine defend it rather be- 
cause of self-interest than because of conviction. But, as they 
find some credulous persons and some persons who are victims 
of their own voluntary errors, they find support in them for 
their system of pretended legitimacy. Well and good, let the 
supporters of legitimacy extend their senseless system over that 
continent which, because of its enlightenment, is worthy of a 
better fate. If they wish, let them reduce to ashes the Swiss 
cantons, which rebelled against the august house of Hapsburg 
and established their independence by their own efforts. Let 
them take the throne of the Low Countries away from the house 
of Orange which to-day enjoys the fruit of its religious and 
practical rebellion against the Catholic kings. Let them punish, 
if they are able, the thousandth generation in their and other 
countries of Europe for the sins of their ancestors against legiti- 
macy. Their rage will ever be impotent on this side of the 
Atlantic. America is separated from those less fortunate re- 
gions by a vast ocean in which there will be drowned forever the 
hopes of those who imagine that we have not yet emerged from 
the darkness of the fifteenth century. 

" The perusal of the message which we have before us has 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 243 

consequently furnished us with much pleasure, for the Presi- 
dent of the United States has profited by the opportunity 
afforded by the differences pending with Russia to assert that 
the American continent is now so free and independent that 
henceforth it cannot be made the theatre of colonization by 
any European power. Indeed the Americans of the North and 
of the South of this continent shall not behold again in their 
lands those hordes of foreigners, who, with the cross in one 
hand and a dagger in the other, would disturb the happiness 
and the peace which they to-day enjoy." ^^ 

On April 6, 1824, Vice President Santander sent a message 
to the Colombian congress in which he referred to the Monroe 
declaration as follows : 

" The President of the United States has lately signalized 
his Administration by an Act eminently just and worthy of 
the classic land of liberty: in his last Message to the Con- 
gress he has declared that he will regard every interference of 
any European Power directed to oppress or violate the destinies 
of the Independent Governments of America as a manifestation 
of hostile dispositions toward the United States. That Govern- 
ment considers every attempt on the part of the Allied Powers 
to extend their System to any portion of the American Hemi- 
sphere as perilous to the peace and safety of the United States. 
This policy, consolatory to human nature, would secure to 
Colombia a powerful Ally should its Independence and Liberty 
be menaced by the Allied Powers. As the Executive cannot 
regard with indifference the march which the Policy of the 
United States has taken it is sedulously occupied in reducing 
the question to decisive and conclusive points." ^"^ 

The foregoing expressions are of still greater force when they 

36 La Gaceta de Colombia, February 1, 1824. The translation employed 
by W. S. Robertson in his article on South America and the Monroe 
Doctrine in the Political Science Quarterly for March, 1915, Vol. XXX, 
is followed. 

37 O'Leary, Memorias, 492. A translation of the message is found in 
British and For, State Papers, XI, 808, from which the above extract i^ 
taken. 



244 PAlSr-AMERICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

are taken in connection with the brief remarks in the same mes- 
sage respecting Great Britain. The relations of the republic 
with Europe had been limited, the vice president declared, to 
Great Britain, whose policies were favorable to the American 
cause and whose commercial intercourse had been most ex- 
tensive and active in Colombia. The sympathy of the public 
in England and the justice of the British Government in- 
spired in the executive the most encouraging prospects ; but he 
was sorry that he could not say what had been the final reso- 
lution of the government of his Britannic Majesty with respect 
to the republic. He concluded by referring to the presence in 
Bogota of a British commission, which he considered a satis- 
factory sign of the interest that Colombia had inspired in the 
people of Great Britain.^^ 

The friendly attitude of the Santander administration toward 
the United States is succinctly set forth in a dispatch of Richard 
C. Anderson, the American minister at Bogota. Writing under 
date of February lY, 1824, he said : 

" Much of that solicitude, to which I have recently referred 
in my letters to you, in relation to the public affairs of this 
country as connected with the designs of certain European 
powers, is still felt by the persons in authority here and indeed 
by others; but great and I believe unaffected joy was expressed 
on the arrival of the President's message, at the views therein 
communicated to Congress, regarding the feelings and policy 
of the United States in the event of European interference in 
the political affairs of this continent. Some declared that it 
would have the salutary effect of repressing the designs and 
averting the calamity so much deprecated, while others, less 
sanguine in their opinion of its preventive tendencies, seemed to 
derive their joy from the contemplation of the actual aid which 
the course indicated might give in the expected contingency; 
but all declared that the views assume the true American 
ground. Erom the conversations, which I have hitherto de- 

38 O'Leary, Memorias, III, 495. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 245 

tailed to you, between the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and 
myself, you will readily believe that the language and senti- 
ments of the message were very acceptable to him, and he took 
occasion in a recent conversation to tell me that they were pe- 
culiarly grateful to the vice president." ^^ 

The article of the Gaceta de Colombia quoted above and the 
message of Vice President Santander credit the United States 
with taking a high and independent stand with regard to the 
affairs of the New World. The contemporary discussions in 
Mexico, as has been shown, invariably placed Great Britain in 
first place as a champion of the rights of the new governments, 
leaving the United States in a secondary if not in a dependent 
position with respect to England. And indeed such was usually 
the case in Colombia also,^^ the attitude of Santander and per- 
haps of a few others to the contrary notwithstanding. Curi- 
ously enough, Santander himself in his correspondence with 
the Liberator, reflecting, no doubt, the common opinion and 
that of the strong, overpowering personality of the great leader 
whose influence was ever present to him, gave expression to 
views much more favorable to Great Britain and correspond- 1 
ingly less so to the United States. 

Writing to Bolivar five days after the article on Monroe's 
message appeared in the Gaceta de Colombia, Santander ex- 
pressed the opinion that England would prevent other powers 
from intervening in the war in America. He had received 
from the message of President Monroe, he said, a similar im- 
pression respecting the United States.^^ A month later, re- 
ferring to the congress of the powers which it was proposed to 
convene for the purpose of discussing American affairs, San- 
tander informed Bolivar that it had become clear that the 

39 Robertson, South America and the Monroe Doctrine in Polit. Sci. 
Quar., XXX, 84. 

40 See Lc Gaceta de Colombia for March 21, 1824, April 4, 1824, and 
August 29, 1824; El Venezolano, for January 17, 1824; El Patriota de 
Guayaquil for May 1, 1824, and August 28, 1824; O'Leary, Memorias, 
VIII, 29. 

41 O'Leary, Memorias, III, 137. 



246 PAK-AMEEICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

United States and Great Britain would not intervene as long 
as Spain alone and with lier own resources continued the war. 
Moreover the British commissioners who had recently arrived 
at Bogota gave assurance that England would not permit Co- 
lombia to be subjugated. ^^ In a letter dated March 15 he gave 
an account of the formal reception of the British agents, trust- 
ing that the news would cause in the Liberator an agreeable im- 
pression and inspire in him hopes of great consideration. 
Whatever proposals these commissioners had to make it seemed 
clear that England would take the part of Colombia against the 
Holy Alliance. And referring again to the message of Presi- 
dent Monroe he said it had made a strong impression in Eu- 
rope, causing the Holy Alliance to be extremely incensed, not 
merely because the President spoke in a threatening tone but 
because the Powers suspected that Great Britain had a 
hand in the declaration. King Eerdinand had solicited the 
mediation of the Powers, he said finally, but England per- 
sistently refused to take part in a congress to discuss American 
affairs.*^ 

By the middle of the next year the importance of the United 
States as a factor in the international situation had, in the 
opinion of Santander, greatly diminished, while that of Eng- 
land had correspondingly, increased. Meanwhile a most sig- 
nificant event for Colombia had occurred — %he recognition of 
its independence by Great Britain. ''^ Spain, protesting against 
this procedure of the British Government, obstinately continued 
the war. France still occupied the Peninsula and, though pro- 
fessing neutrality in the war in America, sent a squadron to 
Martinique. On the pretext of illegal seizure of her merchant 
vessels by Colombian privateers, she also maintained men of 
war in front of Puerto Cabello while the claims were being 
adjusted. Moreover it was believed that French troops were 
being sent to Porto Rico and Cuba to relieve the regular garri- 

42 O'Leary, Memorias, III, 139. 
« Ibid., Ill, 141. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 247 

sons for service against some one of the Central or South Amer- 
ican states. These circumstances, together with the fact that 
the general disposition in Europe toward the new states had 
apparently not improved, convinced Santander that there still 
existed a propensity on the part of the Powers to intervene. 
Such at least seemed to be the situation as he saw and described 
it in letters to Bolivar in the first half of the year 1825. And 
it is significant that in view of the danger which he believed to 
exist he declared that the United States would do nothing; for 
the country was completely permeated with the idea of peace 
and President Adams was, as he was painted, a man of peaceful 
disposition and of but little force of character.^* As to Eng- 
land he seemed to be more confident. Parliament had aug- 
mented the military forces of the nation, and Canning in recent 
negotiations with Spain had declared that Great Britain would 
not take a backward step in her American policy.*^ 

During the early part of 1824, Bolivar was in northern Peru 
engaged in organizing his final campaign against the Royalists. 
It does not appear at what moment he first received intelligence 
of President Monroe's message. On March 21 he apparently 
had not yet heard of it; for, writing to Sucre on that date, 
he said : "I do not believe at all in the league between Erance 

4* Los Estados XJnidos Amalgamados con su estado de paz, que s6 yo que 
hardn: el Presidente Adams es homhre muy pacifico y de poca energia 
segun lo pintan. — Santander to Bolivar, June 21, 1825; O'Leary, Memorias 
III, 184. On a previous occasion Santander writing to Bolivar (May 6, 
1825), had expressed a more favorable opinion. He said: "Mr. Adams, 
who was Secetary of State, is now President and Clay, our ardent friend, 
is Secretary of State. Rush, who was Minister to England, and was there 
of great service to Revenga, is Secretary of Treasury. I do not believe we 
could have an administration more friendly and decided for American 
interests and especially those of Colombia." — O'Leary, Memorias, III, 175. 
On January 21, 1826, Santander wrote Bolivar that " If the Holy Alliance 
has not taken action against us actively and specifically I attribute it to 
two principles: First, to the policy of England, who fortunately was 
obliged by her own interests to take the part of the American states; 
second, to our not having given the sovereigns cause for provocation, for 
on the one hand our protests of respect and on the other our great suffer- 
ings have calmed the anger of the European cabinets." Ibid., Ill, 239. 

45 O'Leary, Memorias, III, 164, 172, 175, 179, 183. 



us PAIT-AMERICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

and Spain. We have documents which prove the contrary. 
But I do believe that the English are resolved to protect us." *® 
Between this date and April 9 following he must have received 
news from the northern coast of Colombia, probably by way 
of Panama, including information respecting the Monroe 
declaration, if not a copy of the message, for he then wrote 
to Sucre as follows : " The English commissioners who have 
arrived at Santa Marta have assured us that their government 
will soon recognize us and, if we should break with France, 
give us aid against that power. Spain can do nothing because 
she has no navy, no army, nor money ; and whatever she should 
attempt would be attributed to France, and therefore opposed 
as a foreign usurpation directed against England and her lib- 
erty. Any move that the Holy Alliance might make would 
be checkmated by England and the United States." ^'^ Writ- 
ing again to Sucre, five days later, Bolivar returns to the as- 
surances made by the British commissioners, expressing the 
belief that England would protect Colombia not only against 
the Holy Alliance but against Spain as well, for Spain had come \ 
to be looked upon as one of the allies. He expressed also the | 
conviction that recognition might be expected from Great [ 
Britain at any moment. If in the former letter he had really | 
had in mind the declaration of President Monroe he did not ( 
on this occasion again refer to it.^^ [ 

In none of his published writings does Bolivar mention spe- | 
cifically the Monroe declaration. A letter which he wrote to i 
Admiral Guise of the Peruvian Navy, however, on April 28, 
1824, contains what is undoubtedly a reference to it. On this | 
occasion he made a brief summary of what he considered to be i 
the international situation. He had received gazettes up to j 
March 15 from Jamaica. They contained, said Bolivar, many ! 
extracts from the columns of a London paper which assured I 
in the most positive manner : ' 

46 Ibid., XXX, 459. j 

47 O'Learv, Memorias, XXX, 465. 

isiUd., XXX, 473. I 



THE MONEOE DOCTRINE 249 

" 1. That Spain has neither the means nor the credit to fit 
out a single man-of-war. In England therefore they regard her 
proposed expeditions as quixotic. 

" 2. That France and Austria, in reply to England's official 
inquiry as to what will be their attitude relative to Spain and 
her former colonies, have replied: France, that she will not 
intervene or take any other part; and Austria, that she will 
not go beyond mediation or the tender of good offices. 

" 3. That England has definitely decided to recognize the 
independence of the republics of South America and to con- 
sider as an unfriendly act any intervention on the part of any 
European power in the affairs of America. 

" 4. That the United States has solemnly declaned that it 
will consider as an unfriendly act any measure that the powers 
of Europe should take against America and in favor of 
Spain." 49 

Admiral Guise had become dissatisfied in the service of Peru 
and had threatened to return to Chile, whence he had come 
with Lord Cochrane in 1821. Bolivar wrote with the evident 
intention of conciliating him and of preventing his departure by 
presenting to him the prospect of victory and an early return 
to the pursuits of peace. He therefore brought forward all 
the factors that seemed to favor the cause. It is a remarkable 
fact that the only subsequent reference that the Liberator ap- 
pears to have made to the declaration of Monroe had for its 
object to induce the Spanish general, Olaneta, to join the Pa- 
triot cause. " England and the United States," Bolivar wrote 
him on May 21, 1824, " protect us, and you must know that 
these two nations are the only maritime powers and that no aid 
can come to the Royalists except by sea." ^" 

Whether Bolivar had by this time received the Bogota 
gazettes and the letters of Santander, referred to above, his 
writings do not show; nor does he subsequently make any ref- 

49 O'Leary, Memorias, XXX, 486-488'. 

50 Jbid., XXX, 496. 



250 PA^-AMEKICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

erence to them. This may be explained by the fact that the 
information therein contained had ceased to be news, or by 
the fact that other matters of more immediate importance oc- 
cupied his attention. Leaving the coast early in April, Bolivar 
established his headquarters in the mountains and began an 
active prosecution of the campaign against the Eoyalists. Dur- 
ing the next seven or eight months he appears to have been com- 
pletely absorbed in the attainment of a final victory over the 
enemy. His letters, usually abounding in references to inter- 
national affairs, were during this period confined almost ex- 
clusively to military matters. ^^ Not until success was prac- 
tically assured did he again turn his attention to the broader 
realm of international politics. It was on the eve of the 
battle of Ayacucho that he sent out his circular inviting the 
Spanish American states to the Congress of Panama. Hence- 
forward his heart was set upon the building up of a great Hi- 
spanic American state or confederation under the powerful in- 
fluence of Great Britain. In a word he did not greatly rely 
upon any protection that the United States might afford nor 
accept the leadership in this hemisphere which was implied in 
President Monroe's declaration.^^ 

Brazil at the beginning of 1824 occupied with respect to 
Portugal a position analogous to that which the former Spanish 
colonies occupied with regard to Spain. Independence, which 
had been achieved in the one and the other case, had not been 
recognized by the mother country, and Brazil, like the Spanish 
speaking states, stood in more or less danger of subjugation in 
the event that the Holy Alliance should attempt to carry out its 
designs. If, however, the hopes of the Legitimists of Europe 
were illusory in so far as the recovery of the colonies of Spain 
was concerned, they were much more so with respect to Por- 
tugal and her American possessions ; for this little kingdom was 

51 O'Leary, Memorias, XXX, 465 et seq. 

52 For a fuller treatment of Bolivar's international policies see the pre- 
ceding chapter on monarchy in America and those on the Congress of 
Panama. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 251 

even less able than Spain to provide the military forces required 
to reduce and to hold in subjection its vast expanse of American 
territory. Moreover the relation which had subsisted for more 
than a century between Portugal and Great Britain — at this 
time in reality almost one of suzerain and subject — made any 
interference of the continental powers in Portuguese affairs, in- 
ternal or external, practically impossible without provoking war 
with the virtual sovereign. But in spite of this relation, the 
British Government, far from attempting on its own part to 
establish the authority of the mother country over her American 
colony, favored the separation. It was in fact through a British 
diplomat. Sir Charles Stuart, that the negotiations were begun 
in March, 1824, which resulted a year and a half later in the 
signing of a treaty in which Portugal recognized the inde- 
pendence of Brazil. ^^ 

Thus, in its actual and prospective relations with Europe, 
Brazil stood in a fairly satisfactory position. With regard to 
its South American neighbors, however, conditions were less 
favorable. The seizure of the Banda Oriental and later its in- 
corporation into the empire was now a source of friction and of 
possible war with Buenos Aires. It was at this time that the 
train of circumstances was set in motion which led to the out- 
break, in 1825, of hostilities between the two states.^* And to 
add to Brazil's difficulties the sympathies of the Spanish speak- 
ing states ran strongly against the empire. Bolivar, for exam- 
ple, after his victory over the Royalists in Peru, actually had 
under consideration a plan for joining forces vdth the United 
Provinces and leading an expedition against Brazil for the pur- 
pose of effecting the overthrow of the monarchy. And it was 
rumored that the Congress of Panama would support such a 
design.^ ^ Isolated, then, in the southern continent, Brazil un- 

53 Cambridge Modern History, X, 319, British and Foreign State Papers, 
XIII, 933, Constancio, Historia do Brasil, II, 378. 

^^ British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 748-774. 

55 O'Leary, Memorias, III, 215-216, 235, Villanueva, El Imperio de las 
Andes, 328-334. Senator Berrien of Georgia in a speech on the Panama 



7 



252 pa:n'-ameeicanism: its beginnings I 

doubtedly welcomed the policy of President Monroe not merely 
as constituting a barrier against the Holy Alliance, but as 
offering the hope of a friendly interest on the part of 
the United States which might redound to the benefit of 
the empire in its threatened conflict with the neighboring 
V republic. ^^ 

Brazil had not yet been recognized by the United States. Its 
status with respect to the declaration of President Monroe was 
therefore not so clear as was that of those governments who had 
" declared their independence and maintained it," and whose 
independence the United States had, " on great consideration 
and just principles," acknowledged. Desiring to terminate this 
undefined state of affairs the government of Brazil appointed 
Jose Silvestre Rebello as charge d'affaires to the United 
States. His instructions, dated January 31, 1824, referred to 
the message of President Monroe as being applicable to all the 
states of the continent, since it recognized the necessity of com- 
bining and standing shoulder to shoulder for the defense of 
American rights and for the integrity of American territory. 
Rebello was accordingly instructed first to urge the recognition 

mission delivered in the United States Senate in March, 1826, said: 
" Brazil yet bows beneath the imperial sway. The glitter of diadem is 
offensive to the Spanish American republics. The Liberator pants to 
finish the great work to which he thinks he is called — the emancipation 
of a continent. Ere long the arms of the confederacy will press upon 
Brazil." Register of Debates in Congress, 1825-1826, II, part I, p. 280. 

56 In Cartas PoUticas by " Americus," published in London in 1825, 
from letters first appearing in the Brazilian newspaper, Padre Amaro, 
frequent references are found indicating that in Brazil as in other sections 
of Latin America the United States and Great Britain were associated 
together in interposing a common barrier to the designs of the Holy 
Alliance. Such expressions as the following appear : " Fortunately the 
policies and interests of the two powerful nations, England and the United 
States, are opposed to the project of reconquest " (I, 25) . . . " It will be 
impossible for any European power or all of them together to subjugate 
Brazil, principally because of the aid which is offered by the maritime 
power of Great Britain and the United States" (I, 26) ... "England 
and the United States oppose all cooperation of this sort "... ( Coalition 
for the subjugation of the new American states) (I, 50). These letters 
have been attributed to the Brazilian statesman, J. Severiano Maciel da 
Costa. 



THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 253 

of the independence of Brazil, and secondly to sound the gov- 
ernment of the United States as to its attitude toward an offen- 
sive and defensive alliance to be based not on mutual conces- 
sions but on the general principle of mutual benefits. Rebello 
was received and thus the empire of Brazil was recognized on 
May 26, 1824, On this occasion the Brazilian spoke of a " con- 
cert of American powers to sustain the general system of Ameri- 
can independence." To this the President did not particularly 
allude in his reply, confining himself rather to general expres- 
sions of friendly interest. The idea of forming an alliance with 
the United States was kept alive however, by the Brazilian rep- 
resentative for nearly a year afterward until finally, a definite 
proposal having been made in writing, Clay, then Secretary of 
State, disposed of the matter by declining to enter into any 
such agreement on the ground that it was contrary to the policy 
of the United States.^ ^ 

The efforts of Brazil were thus directed from the beginning 
toward securing a definition of the Monroe Doctrine on the 
basis of what was called the principle of mutual benefits ; that 
is, its transformation from a unilateral to a bilateral policy. 
As has been suggested above, the empire doubtless wished to 
strengthen its position among its neighbors by forming an al- 
liance with the United States. This is not, however, the whole 
explanation. It was felt that the acceptance of the protection 
offered by the United States without giving anything in return 
placed Brazil in a position of inferiority. Accordingly Eebello 
in his written proposal, called attention to the fact that if the 
government of the United States should be obliged to put into 
practice the principles enunciated in President Monroe's mes- 
sage, thus giving proof of generosity and consistency, it would 
do so only at the sacrifice of men and treasure, and that it was 

57 Adams, Memoirs, VI, 484. Moore, Digest of Int. Law, VI, 437. 
Adams speaking in his diary of the proposed treaty of alliance between 
Brazil and the United States says that Rebello agreed that " on certain 
contingencies the republican governments of South America should also 
be parties." — Memoirs, VI, 475. 



254 PA]Sr-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINOTlirGS 

not in accordance with reason, justice, and right that the gov- \ 
emment of Brazil should receive such services gratuitously. It 
was for this reason therefore that the convention had been 
proposed.^^ 

In Argentina the first public notice of President Monroe's 
declaration appeared on February 9, 1824, when extracts from 
the message of December 2 were published in La Gaceta Mer- 
cantil of Buenos Aires. A few days later El Argos of the same 
city printed passages from the message and called attention es- 
pecially to the noncolonization and the nonintervention clauses. 
On February 10 the American minister, Rodney, wrote Presi- 
dent Monroe that his message had been received two days before, 
that it had inspired them all there and that it would have 
the " happiest effect throughout the whole Spanish provinces." 
On May 22 he wrote Secretary Adams that the frank and firm 
message of the President had been productive of happy effects ; 
but that he looked not so much to its temporary influence as to 
its permanent operation. " We had it immediately translated," 
he wrote, " into the Spanish language, printed and generally 
distributed in this quarter, Peru and Chile." ^^ 

In a message of the provincial executive authority of Buenos 
Aires to the legislative assembly on the occasion of its opening 
on May 3, 1824, the following reference was made to the declar- 
ation of President Monroe: 

" Peace has been maintained with the nations of the con- 
tinent ; and every true American heart has been filled with satis- 
faction at the reception in our city of the first minister pleni- 
potentiary of the republic of the United States ; an honor which 
has been returned by the appointment of a minister of corre- 
sponding rank, who has already departed for Washington. He 
has been instructed to suggest to the government of that republic 
how desirable it would be if, in addition to those two great 

58 Eobertson, South America and the Monroe Doctrine in Polit. Sci. Quar., 
XXX, 95. 

59 lUd., 98. 



THE MONKOE DOCTRINE 255 

principles; namely, that of the abolition of piratical warfare, 
and that of the non-European colonization of American terri- 
tory, it could also be declared that none of the new governments 
of this continent shall alter by force their respective boundaries 
as recognized at the time of their emancipation. Thus may be 
destroyed the germ of future dissensions which, springing up 
amongst new states, might have a fatal influence upon their 
civilization and manners. . . . The analogy of feelings and 
principles manifested by the cabinets of London and Washing- 
ton will convince Spain that she must contend singly with the 
free nations of the ^ew World. This conviction will perhaps 
introduce into her councils that wisdom and moderation which 
are of so much importance to her existence." ^^ 

On December 16, 1824, the congress of the United Provinces 
of Rio de la Plata opened its sessions at Buenos Aires. In a 
message of the government of Buenos Aires, laid before that 
body on the same date, the American policy of the United 
States was referred to in the following terms : 

" We have fulfilled a great national duty toward the republic 
of the United States of ]^orth America. That republic, which, 
from its origin, presides over the civilization of the New World, 
has solemnly acknowledged our independence. It has at the 
same time made an appeal to our national honor by supposing us 
capable of contending single-handed with Spain ; but it has con- 
stituted itself the guardian of the field of battle in order to pre- 
vent any foreign assistance from being introduced to the aid 
of our rival." ^^ 

A just estimate of the value of the foregoing expressions re- 
quires that they be regarded in their proper historical setting. 
As for the views of Rodney, his arrival in Buenos Aires in 
November, 1823, allowed him but little time to become ac- 

60 British mid Foreign State Papers, XI, 803, 805. 

61 A translation of this message is found in British amd Foreign State 
Papers, XII, 858. For the original in Spanish see El Nacional (Buenos 
Aires) for December 23, 1824. 



256 PAN^-AMERICA]!^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

quainted with the political opinions of the leaders of the coun- i 
try to which he was accredited.^ ^ He was moreover already? 
suffering from the illness of which he died the following June.^^ [ 
Under the circumstances therefore his impressions are of little 
value. He merely served as a means for transmitting the 
formal expressions of diplomatic intercourse. And as for the 
official utterances of the government of Buenos Aires, they must 
be viewed in the light of the policies of the responsible leaders 
of the administration. 

Elsewhere an account has been given of the efforts made by 
the United Provinces to solve the problems growing out 
of their revolt by establishing some sort of relation, dynastic or 
other, with some power of Europe, preferably Great Britain or 
France. Those efforts failed, and, the government responsible 
for the negotiations being driven from office, a new era domi- 
nated by republican aspirations began. An excessive spirit of 
localism, however, made impossible all progress toward the es- 
tablishment of an effective national government. The constitu- 
tion of 1819, promulgated with high hopes, being soon aban- 
doned, the term " United Provinces " continued to be, as it 
had always been, more or less a fiction as the expression of or- 
ganized nationality.®^ Such national functions as were exer- 
cised at all were exercised by the provincial authorities of 
Buenos Aires, whose leadership within certain limits was tacitly 
recognized. The governor of the province, General Martin 
Rodriguez, brought into his cabinet two of Argentina's ablest 
statesmen, Bemadino Eivadavia and Manuel Jose Garcia, both 
of whom had played important roles during the preceding five 
or six years in the negotiations looking to the establishment of 
a monarchical form of government. Rivadavia, who was ap- 
pointed Minister of Interior, conducted the foreign affairs of 

62 Registro Oficial de la Republica Argentina, II, 46. For an account of 
Rodney's reception by the government of Buenos Aires see Palomeque, 
Origines de la Diplomacia Argentina, I, 114. 

63 Monroe, Writings, VI, 430. Registro Oficial, II, 61. 

64 Vedia, Constitucidn Argentina, 13. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 257 

Buenos Aires and of the other provinces as far as they had any 
intercourse with the exterior. He had been greatly influenced 
by the reaction toward absolutism in Europe and though he had 
given up the idea of seeing a throne erected at Buenos Aires, 
he looked with little favor upon the attempts to introduce too 
strong a democratic element into the government.^ ^ Moreover, 
his sympathies were decidedly European and he advocated meas- 
ures calculated to bring Europe and America into more inti- 
mate relations rather than to divide them into hostile camps.^^ 
For nearly a year past negotiations had, in fact, been going 
on with agents of the Spanish Government who had arrived in 
Buenos Aires in May, 1823, with instructions to effect a recon- 
ciliation with the American states. Rivadavia was appointed 
to represent the government of Buenos Aires in the negotiations 
and by a resolution of the Provincial Assembly, passed on July 
19, he was authorized to treat with the Spanish commissioners 
on the basis of the cessation of hostilities against all the new 
states of the continent and the recognition by Spain of their 
independence. A preliminary treaty was signed on July 4, 
providing for an armistice of eighteen months within which 
period it was agreed that there should be negotiated a " definitive 
treaty of peace and amity between his Catholic Majesty and 
the states of the American continent." It was also provided 
by a separate agreement that the governments of the states 

65 L6pez, Historia de la RefAhUca Argentina, IX, 79. 

66 The Argentina publicist, Alberdi, referring to the Panama Congress, 
among whose aims he believed to have been: First, the formation of a 
permanent league against Spain or any other power that should attempt to 
dominate America; and secondly, the prevention of all European coloniza- 
tion on this continent and of all foreign intervention in the affairs of the 
New World, says : " To the honor of Rivadavia and of Buenos Aires be it 
remembered that he was opposed to the congress of Panama and to its 
principles, because he comprehended that if he favored it he would destroy 
all his hopes of European immigration and of establishing closer relations 
between this continent and the Old World, which had always been and 
would continue to be the source of our civilization and progress." 
Organizacidn de la Confederacidn Argentina, I, 34. See Registro Oficial, 
II, 46, 47. The late president, Roque Saenz Pefia, entertained similar 
ideas. See an article by him in Ateneo (Madrid), III, 368-394. 



258 PAIST-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

which should be recognized as independent under the proposed 
treaty should pay to Spain the sum of twenty million pesos 
through a loan to be raised in England. The government of 
Buenos Aires engaged to obtain the accession of Chile, Peru, 
and Colombia, and with that end in view immediately dis- 
patched an agent to those countries. Other agents were ap- 
pointed to treat with the provinces of Eio de la Plata, Paraguay, 
and Upper Peru. Chile promptly declined to become a party 
to the convention, and Peru and Colombia after consideration 
likewise declined to accede to it. But this was not known in 
Buenos Aires until some time after the news of President 
Monroe's message arrived there early in February, 1824. By 
this time, however, there was probably no longer any hope of 
attaining the object of the negotiations.^"^ 

Though these negotiations came to nothing they are worthy 
of note not merely as the mark of a conciliatory attitude toward 
the mother country, but as the concrete expression of the desire 
on the part of Buenos Aires to revive and tr extend the in- 
fluence which it had formerly exercised in Chile and Peru es- 
pecially, and to a less extent throughout the continent.^^ 
Buenos Aires, in short, disputed the leadership of Colombia. 
A " circular to the American states," signed by Eivadavia and 
dated February 5, 1824, singularly enough just three days be- 
fore the news of the message of President Monroe reached 
Buenos Aires, furnishes evidence of this aspiration. Eivadavia 
declared that his government, being under the obligation to de- 
fend the independence which the united sister republics of the 
American continent had proclaimed, addressed their respective 
governments for the purpose of informing them of the steps 
being taken in Europe to prolong the war in Peru (the only 
part not yet freed), and to prevent the full enjoyment of the 

67 Registro Oficial, II, 38, 41, 42,. L6pez, Historia de la Republica Ar- 
gentina, IX, 186, 189. Villanueva, Fernando VII y los Nuevos Estados, 
272-287. 

68 See a chapter entitled Hegemonia de la RepHblica Argentina in 
Guastavino's San Martin y Simdn Bolivar. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 259 

emancipation for which that country was struggling. Discuss- 
ing the propensity of the European powers to intervene in 
American affairs and the form that such intervention might 
take, the author of the circular assured the several governments 
that Buenos Aires was resolved to lend its active cooperation to 
whatever plan the necessities of the case might demand, and 
that it would work with energy and zeal to bring about a general 
peace based on independence and liberty.^ ^ 

It appears, therefore, that the enthusiasm over the declaration 
of President Monroe was not as great as certain expressions of 
the American minister and of the Buenos Aires Government 
would seem to indicate. The message of May 3, cited above, 
was signed by Rivadavia and Garcia and not by the governor 
of the province.''^^ The references in that document to the 
United States are very friendly; but it is to be noted that 
President Monroe was credited with having enunciated two 
great principles; namely, the abolition of piratical warfare 
and the proscription of colonization of American territory by 
European powers. Why should no mention have been made 
of the nonintervention clause? It would not, perhaps, be far 
from the truth to say that the government of Buenos Aires was 
not inclined to accept that part of the Monroe declaration. 
Not that the nonintervention of Europe in American affairs was 
unacceptable in principle, but because it was not desired that 
any limitation should be placed by the United States upon 
the possibility of the adjustment of the difficulties between the 
new states and the mother country through the interposition of 
European powers. Significant also is the statement in the mes- 
sage of December 16, 1824, to the effect that the United States 
had constituted itself the guardian of the field of battle to 
prevent any foreign assistance from being given to the adversary 
of the American states. Thus far not even the full significance 
of the Monroe Doctrine had been recognized. 

69 Guastavino, San Martin y Simdn Bolivar, 429-437. 

70 British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 808, 



260 PAI^r-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

In May, 1824, General Las Heras succeeded Rodriguez as 
governor of Buenos Aires and Garcia was appointed Minister I 
of Foreign Affairs, Eivadavia having retired upon the change 
of administration J ^ On August 28, 1825, Las Heras, on the 
occasion of the reception of John M. Forbes, who had been ap- 
pointed to succeed Rodney as American minister, declared un- 
equivocally at last that the government of the United Provinces 
knew the importance of the two great principles laid down in 
President Monroe's message, and being convinced of the utility 
of their adoption by all the states of the continent, would con- 
sider it an honorable duty to avail itself of every opportunity 
to second them. These remarks were elicited by a speech of 
Forbes in which he restated the principles proclaimed by Mon- 
roe and announced that the views of President Adams entirely 
coincided with them.'''^ 

^ Of all the Hispanic American states, Chile, perhaps, gave the 
most genuine response to^resident Monroe's message; that is 
to say, a response the cordiality of which was least affected by 
such extraneous motives as those which complicated the attitude 
of Mexico, Colombia, I Brazil, and the United Provinces. The 
possibility of territorial disputes such as were to embitter the 
relations between the United States and Mexico were absent; 
ideas of leadership such as prevailed in Colombia and the 
United Provinces were not entertained by the Chilean leaders, 
and no impending conflict with a neighboring state suggested 
such an amplification of the doctrine as that proposed by Brazil. 

It was not until April, 1824, that the papers of Santiago pub- 
lished the message of President Monroe. They seemed to dis- 
cover in the document a frank and explicit promise of effective 
protection for the Spanish American republics against the 
political combinations and military projects of European mon- 

71 Las Heras was elected on April 2, 1824. Absent at the time on a 
mission to Upper Peru, he took office immediately upon his return, May 9, 
following. L6pez, Historia de la RepiibUca Argentma, IX, 238-240. 

72 Robertson, South America and the Monroe Doctrine in Polit. Sci, 
Quarterly, XXX, 101. 



THE MONROE DOCTRINE 261 

archs. It was believed also that the government of Great 
Britain, opposed as it v^as to the intervention of the Holy Alli- 
ance in the political affairs of Spain, was resolved to take a 
more decided stand to prevent the allied powers from carrying 
out any act of aggression against the new states of America. 
The arrival at this time of Heman Allen, accredited as United 
States minister to Chile, was considered as an event of great 
significance. He was received publicly and with great cere- 
mony on April 22. In addition to the expressions of courtesy 
and good will customarily employed on such occasions, Allen 
assured Chile that pursuing an honorable and just course to- 
ward others she need not fear alliances or coalitions which 
might threaten her tranquillity and independence. The dele- 
gate of the chief executive who replied to Allen's speech ex- 
pressed the gTatitude of his government for the recognition of 
the independence of the new states, and for the recent declar- 
ation of President Monroe which placed them beyond the reach 
of the coalitions of European monarchs.'^^ 

-** Briefly summarizing the foregoing discussion, we may say 
;^at the Monroe declaration was welcomed throughout the 
newly erected states of America with no more than moderate 
enthusiasm; for the opinion generally prevailed that Great 
Britain constituted the real and most effective barrier to the 
aggressions of the Holy Alliance. In contemporary discussions 
the declaration of Monroe was seldom referred to without a 
corresponding reference to the policy of Canning ; and although 
the interests of the two nations were thought to be identical 
respecting the nonintervention of the powers of Europe in 
American affairs, yet it was desired, at least in some quarters, 
that the influence of England should intervene to prevent the 
preponderance of the United States among the nations of this 
hemisphere. This appears to be the explanation of the attitude 
of Mexico, and it seems clear that Bolivar hoped by British pro- 
tection to obtain superiority for a confederation of Hispanic 
73 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XIV, 367-8. 



262 PAK-AMERICAmSM: ITS BEGINNII^GS 

American states of whicli Colombia, united with Peru and 
Bolivia, should be the head. Central America received the 
declaration with mild satisfaction. Haiti complained of not 
being included in its benefits. Brazil wished to give it bilateral 
force. The United Provinces of Rio de la Plata were inclined 
to regard it at first as not altogether in harmony with their 
national policies. And finally, Chile received it with unmixed 
if not extreme satisfaction. Such in brief was the reception 
which the Hispanic American states accorded the Monroe 
Doctrine. 



CHAPTER VII 

EAULT PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 

The idea of continental solidarity was not a sudden develop- 
ment. On the contrary it was of slow growth, and its roots 
reach far back into the colonial history of the continent. As 
early as 1741 a vast conspiracy against Spain was formed in 
Peru with centers in ISTew Granada, Venezuela, Chile, and 
Buenos Aires. Though this revolt aimed to reestablish the Inca 
dynasty, the movement was not a mere Indian rebellion ; for it 
was supported by both Creoles and Spaniards and enjoyed the 
protection of the Jesuits. At about the same time, Mexico, 
probably in accord with the southern colonies, was also planning 
to strike for its independence. Mexican commissioners were 
sent to the colony of Georgia, Spain and Great Britain then be- 
ing at war, to confer with General Oglethorpe and to ask the 
aid of the British in the accomplishment of their purpose. It 
was the intention of the conspirators to establish in Mexico an 
independent kingdom with a prince of the house of Austria on 
the throne. In return for her help England was to be given 
a monopoly of the foreign trade of the kingdom. An agent 
whom Oglethorpe sent to Mexico to investigate the matter 
brought back a favorable report and Oglethorpe thereupon com- 
municated the proposal to the home government. The scheme 
was looked upon with favor and some steps were taken to carry 
it into effect; but before anything was accomplished the project 
was abandoned.^ 

1 Villanueva, Resumen de la Historia de America, 190. 

It was in 1741 that Admiral Vernon's expedition agai'^gt Cartagena was 
undertaken. See in this connection a memorial {Amer. Hist. Rev., IV, 
325-328) to the British Government, dated June 6, 1741, recommending 
that Great Britain aid the Spanish colonies in America to obtain their 

263 



264 PAK-AMEEICAiq^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

During the remainder of the eighteenth century several revo- 
lutionary movements of more or less importance were set on 
foot in different parts of Spanish and Portuguese America. 
These movements often had ramifications which extended widely 
throughout the continent. They were usually undertaken in 
the expectation of receiving the support of Great Britain, and 
after 1783, of the United States also. Knowledge of a con- 
spiracy formed in 1Y87 by a number of Brazilian students for 
the purpose of effecting the independence of Brazil was com- 
municated in a letter by one of the conspirators, Maia by name, 
to Thomas Jefferson, who was at that time minister of the 
United States to France.^ It was necessary, Maia wrote, that 
the colony should obtain assistance from some power and the 
United States alone could be looked to with propriety, " be- 
cause nature in making us inhabitants of the same continent 
has in some sort united us in the bonds of a common patriot- 
ism." ^ By appointment, the Brazilian met Jefferson shortly 
afterward and gave him further information. Jefferson dis- 
creetly avoided committing himself, but appeared not to disap- 
prove of the scheme and assured Maia that a successful revolu- 
tion in Brazil could not be uninteresting to the United States. 

Some time before this occurrence Jefferson had a conversation 
with a native of Mexico about the possibility of revolution in 
that colony. Though convinced by the information which he 
received, that Mexico was not so well prepared for a move for 
independence as was Brazil, he wrote Jay, nevertheless, that 
" however distant we may be, both in condition and dispositions, 
from taking an active part in any commotions in that country, 
nature has placed it too near us to make its movements alto- 
gether indifferent to our interests, or to our curiosity." * 

independence rather than attempt to take them and hold them by right of 
conquest; and that an alliance be then formed with them as with a free 
people. 

2 Varnhagen, Hisforia Geral do Brasil, II, 1013-1017. 

3 Jefferson, Writings, VI, 115. For Maia's letter to Jefferson, see Oliveira 
Lima, Formation Historique de la NationalitS Bresilienne, 115-116, 

4 Jefferson, Writings, VI, 122. 



EAELY PKOJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 265 

At this time the revolutionary activities of the Precursor, 
Francisco de Miranda, had already begun. Certain features of 
his general plan may be adverted to. It was in 1Y97 that he 
received from a revolutionary junta in Paris, composed of 
Spanish Americans who had gathered there, powers and instruc- 
tions for directing a general movement for the liberation of 
Spanish America, Crossing over to London he entered into 
negotiations with the British Government. He approached at 
the same time Eufus King, the American minister to England, 
for the purpose of obtaining through him the cooperation of 
the United States. According to the plan which Miranda had 
been charged to carry out, an alliance was to be formed between 
Great Britain, the United States, and the governments which 
it was proposed to set up. The two powers thus cooperating in 
the liberation of the colonies were to receive certain trade ad- 
vantages in compensation for their assistance. Deputies rep- 
resenting the different parts of Spanish America were to meet, 
after independence had been achieved, to make general regula- 
tions regarding commercial relations among themselves.^ 

The British Cabinet took under consideration Miranda's plan 
for revolutionizing Spanish America, and after some months 
of deliberation decided not to lend it support. In the mean- 
time Miranda had frequent conferences with King, who, being 
enthusiastic in his support of the project, wrote in advocacy of 
it to Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, then in France on their 
famous mission to the Directory. He wrote also to Alexander 
Hamilton and Secretary Pickering in the United States. Mi- 
randa himself wrote to President Adams and to Hamilton, with 
the latter of whom he had maintained friendly relations for 
some years past. Hamilton declared that he wished the enter- 
prise to be undertaken and that he wished the principal agency 
in carrying it out to be in the United States. He would em- 

5 Robertson, Francisco de Miranda OMd the Revolutionizing of Spanish 
America, 319-23; Baralt y Diaz, Resumen de la Historia de Venezuela, 1, 
22. See also C. J. Ingersoll, Recollections, 218. 



266 PA:N"-AMERICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

bark upon the sclieine, however, only on condition of its being 
officially sanctioned by his government. Adams did not reply 
to Miranda, but referred the matter to Pickering, remarking 
that the United States v^as at peace with Spain and inquiring 
whether the project would be useful in the event that that con- 
dition should change. Pickering made no response to Miranda's 
appeal and thus the matter rested.^ 

Upon the failure of the United States to give assistance to 
this project of Miranda's, was grounded in part the refusal of 
Great Britain to provide the aid which was sought of her. If 
the strained relations which then existed between the United 
States and France had resulted in war, the alliance which 
Miranda hoped to bring about would, in all probability, have 
become effective; for war with France would have meant war 
with Spain also, those two powers having entered into an al- 
liance after the Peace of Basel. That war did not occur was 
due in part to the firm resolve of Adams to prevent it, in spite 
of the strong provocation which France gave the United States, 
and in part to the aversion of public opinion to a British al- 
liance.'^ Whatever might have otherwise been the outcome of 

the project, the fact remains that its aim was not merely to | 

I 

6 Eobertson, Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish 
America, 328-32. 

7 Ihid., 336. 

Schouler, History of the United States of America, 1, 362, 395. | 

The idea of an alliance with Great Britain to combat the designs of j 
Napoleon in America was later suggested by Jefferson in a letter which 
he wrote on April IS, 1802, to Eobert Livingston, United States minister 1 
to France. He said : " The day that France takes possession of New j 
Orleans fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever within her low- I 
water mark. It seals the union of two nations, who, in conjunction, can j 
maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must , 
marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our ! 
attention to a maritime force, for which our resources place us on very | 
high ground; and having formed and connected together a power which | 
may render reenforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, | 
make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for the | 
tearing up any settlement she may have made, and for holding the two 
continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the ■ 
united British and American nations." Writings, X, 313. | 



EAELY PKOJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 267 

achieve the independence of the American colonies but to effect 
as well some such continental unity as that which Bolivar strove 
ineffectually to achieve two or three decades later. 

Miranda remained in England until near the close of 1805 
when, having given up hope of securing assistance from the 
British Government, he set sail for the United States. Arriv- 
ing at New York and beginning active preparations for an 
expedition to South America he went shortly afterward to Wash- 
ington, where he met Jefferson and where he had more than one 
conference with Madison, the Secretary of State. Erom Madi- 
son, it appears, he received the impression that the project had 
" the tacit approbation and good wishes " of the government 
and that there were no difficulties in the way of private citi- 
zens of the United States promoting the enterprise provided 
" the public laws be not openly violated." Madison later de- 
clared that he warned Miranda that the government would not 
countenance or embark insidiously in any enterprise of a secret 
nature. But whatever may have been the attitude of the ad- 
ministration, Miranda succeeded in organizing without inter- 
ference from the United States authorities an expedition con- 
sisting of two hundred men and three ships with an abundance 
of arms and supplies. Two of the ships having sailed some 
time before, Miranda with his recruits put to sea in the remain- 
ing vessel early in 1806.^ 

A few days before setting sail from New York Miranda 
wrrote Jefferson a note in which the following interesting state- 
ment is found : " If the happy prediction which you pronounced 
on the future destiny of our dear Colombia is to be accom- 
plished in our day, may Providence grant that it may be under 
your auspices and by the generous efforts of her own children."^ 
What Jefferson's happy prediction may have been does not ap- 
pear, but in view of his well-known ideas respecting the destiny 

8 Robertson, Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish 
America, 361-369. 

9 King, Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, IV, 584. 



268 PAK-MiERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

of the Western Hemispliere it may be inferred that inde- 
pendence and some degree of continental solidarity were im- 
plied. Miranda's plans, indeed, seem to have been continental 
in scope and to have enjoyed the tolerance and the good will 
of the government of Great Britain as well as that of the United 
States ; for upon his arrival in the West Indies he received ma- 
terial aid from the British navy and from the civil authorities 
of the islands; and there are good reasons for believing that 
his expedition proceeded in accordance with a secret under- 
standing with Sir Home Popham, who was carrying out simul- 
taneously an enterprise against Buenos Aires. ^" 

Failing in this undertaking, Miranda continued his revolu- 
tionary activities until he was at last captured in 1812 by the 
Spanish forces in Venezuela and taken away to die in prison in 
Spain. His later plans were magnificent in scope, as had been 
his earlier ones. In a frame of government for Spanish Amer- 
ica which he prepared about the year 1808 provision was made 
for establishing the capital of this new empire at the most cen- 
tral point, perhaps, it was stated, on the Isthmus of Panama. 
It is to be inferred from this that his scheme embraced all the 
American colonies of Spain. The extension of the projected 

30 "A symbolic design on a handkerchief of English manufacture found 
in the colonies near Miranda's point of attack in the spring of 1807 illus- 
trates some contemporary sentiment on the English attitude toward 
Spanish America so well that it is worth a brief description. On this hand- 
kerchief were portraits of Sir Home Popham, General Beresford, Washing- 
ton, and Miranda, associated, as it were, to obtain the same end, or because 
of the similarity of their undertakings, with many sketches of naval 
battles and bordered with these four inscriptions : It is not commerce tut 
union; Let arts, industry, and com,merce flourish; Religion and its holy 
ministers be protected; Persons, conscience, and commerce be at liberty. 
The apotheosis of Christopher Columbus filled the center and English colors 
adorned the sides. England was depicted as goddess of the seas, the lion 
of Spain at her feet. A youth was pictured rolling up the French colors, 
and poking the lion with the hilt of his sword. On the handkerchief was 
the inscription : The dawn of day in South America. The captain general 
of Caracas declared, in referring to this handkerchief, that the rebel 
Miranda worked in connivance and with the support of the English as the 
result of a comprehensive plan of Spanish American conquest formed by 
that government." Robertson, Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutioniz- 
ing of Spanish America, 397. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 269 

state was more definitely indicated in a plan which he presented 
for the consideration of the British prime minister in 1790. 
His proposal then was that its boundaries should be: on the 
east, Brazil, Guiana, the coast line, and the Mississippi Eiver ; 
on the north, a straight line, the parallel of 45 ° north latitude, 
from the source of the Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean; and 
on the west, the Pacific coast line to the uttermost point of 
Cape Horn.^^ 

Many examples might be given to show that the ideal of 
American unity appealed to men of vision in both North and 
South America during the first decade or two of the nineteenth 
century. Two years after the Miranda expedition sailed from 
New York, President Jefferson, feeling that the interests of the 
United States were intimately connected with those of the 
Spanish colonies, particularly of Mexico and Cuba, send unwill- 
ing to see them fall into the hands of England or France, either 
politically or commercially, appointed General James Wilkin- 
son as an envoy to bear them a message of friendliness. De- 
siring to strengthen the position of the United States in the 
region of the Gulf of Mexico, Jefferson was doubtless influenced 
by m.otives of national expansion. His agent, who had unfor- 
tunately been discredited by the relations which he had main- 
tained with the Spanish authorities in the Southwest and later 
by his connections with Aaron Burr, may not have been wholly 
free from motives of a baser sort.-^^ 

But motives apart, the history of these negotiations reveals 
the fact that America was being thought of as a whole. How- 
ever corrupt Wilkinson may have been, his long experience on 
the western border had given him a comprehensive view of the 
possibilities of continental union. In a letter to Jefferson dated 
March 12, 1807, he declared that the United States and Great 
Britain should combine to preserve the Western World from 

11 Robertson, Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish 
America, 272, 417, 471, 486, 525. 

12 Cox, The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson. (Reprint 
from the Miss. Valley Hist, Rev., Sept., 1914) 212-214. 



270 PAN"-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Napoleon and his unwilling ally, the King of Spain; and later 
in the same month he suggested that Mexico, Peru, and Cuba if 
allied as independent states might, with the aid of the United 
States, bid defiance to the Old World. Writing a little more 
than a year later, but still before he had started on his mission, 
he expressed the hope of seeing Mexico and South America 
speedily emancipated. Advocating the termination of all trans- 
atlantic connections, he made the following extravagant declar- 
ation : " Our acquaintance with the European world would 
gradually subside, fleets and armies would insensibly become 
useless to a people of self-government ; and a persevering respect 
for ancient habits, and a fine adherence to principle, would per- 
petuate the freedom and happiness of the people of United 
America, to endless time." And in a letter to Governor Folch 
of West Florida he declared that should Spain fall into the 
power of Napoleon, Spanish America, united, organized, and 
in alliance with the United States, might bid defiance to all 
the v/arring nations of Europe. ^^ 

Wilkinson started upon his mission in January, 1809, but 
having been delayed at Charleston did not reach Habana, where 
he was to confer with the captain general, Someruelos, until late 
in March. Thus Jefferson's administration had come to an end 
before Wilkinson began negotiations with the Spanish authori- 
ties. Proceeding from Habana to Pensacola and finding that 
Governor Folch had gone to Baton Rouge, the American agent 
continued his journey westward. In the meantime some dis- 
cussion had taken place between Claiborne, governor of Orleans 
Territory, and Vidal and Folch, Spanish vice consul at New 
Orleans and governor of West Florida, respectively, with regard 
to an alliance between the United States and the Spanish pos- 
sessions, in the event that they should declare their inde- 
pendence as the result of an unhappy outcome of Napoleon's 
invasion of Spain. Yidal spoke with reserve, but Folch ad- 
mitted that Mexico and Cuba would need a foreign alliance to 

13 Cox, The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson, 217. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 271 

ij 

! maintain their independence, and he declared that they would 
; approach both Great Britain and the United States on the 
I subject, but preferably the latter. Claiborne spoke of the ex- 
clusion from this continent of all European influence, particu- 
larly British and French, as a guarantee that in their straggle 
for independence Mexico and Cuba might rely absolutely on 
the friendship of the United States. 

At a dinner given while these discussions were going on, 
Folch gave, though with doubtful sincerity, the following toast : 
" The liberty of the New World ; may it never be assailed with 
success by the Old World." Upon his arrival Wilkinson had 
some conversations with Folch and Vidal, and on one occasion 
proposed that in the event of Spain's succumbing to Napoleon it 
would be highly desirable to form an alliance to embrace Span- 
ish America, Brazil, the United States, and, if necessary, Eng- 
land. The latter power was included, doubtless, as a conces- 
sion to the friendly feeling aroused in the colonies by the efforts 
which were being made by Great Britain to drive the French 
from the Peninsula.^* 

Although Madison discontinued the negotiations, and al- 
though the nation's freedom of action was greatly restricted by 
the increasing strain and final break with Great Britain, yet 
there was manifested during his presidency no less interest in 
the ideal of American unity than had been shown during previ- 
ous administrations. Early in his first term, Spanish American 
revolutionary agents began with Monroe, then Secretary of 
State, a series of negotiations aimed at obtaining from the 
United States the aid necessary to make successful resistance 
to the rule of Napoleon, if not to achieve a complete separation 
from the mother country. ^^ As earlj as July, 1809, it was 
suggested by the government at Washington, it is claimed, to 
certain of these agents that if the Spanish colonies would de- 

14 Cox, The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson a/nd Wilkinson, 222-236. 

15 Cf. Cox. Monroe and the Early Mexican Revolutionary Agents (In: 
An. Rep. Am. Hist. Assn. for 1911, pages 197-215). Gil Fortoul, Historia 
Constitucional de Venezuela, I, 128. 



272 PAN^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

clare their independence, their representatives would be ad- 
mitted to the Congress of the United States and an effort would 
be made to form a confederation of the whole of America. -"^^ 
In 1811 an agent of the revolutionary party in Mexico asked 
for " men, money, and arms " to aid the Mexicans in their 
struggle for independence and offered in return mutually ad- 
vantageous commercial treaties that would serve to cement the 
friendship of all American peoples. Monroe, it appears, was 
interested, sympathetic and ready to give advice, but not in- I 
clined to compromise his government with Spain or with Spain's I 
ally. Great Britain. ■^'^ I 

In the midst of growing international difficulties, President 
Madison's thoughts were of the continent as a whole. ^^ Speak- 
ing in his annual message of November 5, 1811, of the great j 
communities occupying the southern portion of the hemisphere, i 
he declared, as has been pointed out in a previous chapter, that ' 
" an enlarged philanthropy and an enlightened forecast concur 
in imposing on the national councils an obligation to take a deep 

16 Gil Fortoul, Historia Gonstitucional de Venezuela, I, 128. 

17 Cox, Monroe and the Early Meficican Revolutionary Agents, 201. 

18 At this time Canada was included in the idea of American solidarity. 
The United States, about to go to war with Great Britain, proposed to 
wrest it from the mother country. The Annals of Congress, summarizing 
the speeches made in the House of Representatives during the first session 
of the Twelfth Congress on the subject of foreign relations, records the 
following remarks, in substance, of the eccentric Randolph of Roanoke: 
" He could but smile at the liberality of the gentleman ( Grundy of Ten- 
nessee) in giving Canada to New York, in order to strengthen the northern 
balance of power, while at the same time he forwarned her that the 
western scale must preponderate. Mr. R. said he could almost fancy that 
he saw the capitol in motion toward the falls of the Ohio — after a short 
sojourn taking its flight to the Mississippi and finally alighting on Darien, 
which, when the gentleman's dreams are realized, will be a most eligible 
seat of government for the new Republic (or Empire) of the two 
Americas! " 426, 446. 

Under the treaty of alliance of 1778 between France and the United 
States, it was provided that, if the remaining British possessions in North 
America should be wrested from the mother country, they were to be 
" confederated with or dependent upon " the United States, and provision 
was made in the Articles of Confederation (Article XI) for the full 
admission of Canada into the Union, Cf. Moore, American Diplomacy, 224. 



EAELY PEOJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 273 

interest in their destinies " ; and on December 10, following, a 
committee to whom that part of the President's message had 
been referred, submitted a report declaring that the Senate 
and House of Representatives beheld with friendly interest the 
establishment of international sovereignties by the Spanish 
provinces in America. 

With the War of 1812 at an end and peace established in 
Europe, the policy of neutrality which the United States had 
maintained from the beginning between Spain and her revolted 
colonies became more clearly defined. It was in September, 
1815, that President Madison issued his proclamation warning 
the citizens of the United States, especially those of Louisiana, 
from conspiring together to set on foot hostile expeditions 
against the dominions of Spain; and it was in response to his 
recommendation that Congress passed the Neutrality Act of 
March 3, 1817. When Monroe became President, more cordial 
relations with Spain had been established. But in his first 
annual message he declared that it had been anticipated that 
the contest between Spain and her colonies would become highly 
interesting to the United States; that it was natural that the 
citizens of the United States should sympathize in events which 
affected their neighbors ; that the prosecution of the conflict 
had interrupted the commerce of the United States, and other- 
wise had affected the persons and property of its citizens; but 
that strict neutrality had nevertheless been maintained. ^^ 

In 1815 there was published in the city of Washington a 
pamphlet under the title of Outlines of a Constitution for 
United North and South Columhia.^^ The author was William 
Thornton, who had long been interested in the fate of the part 
of the continent which still remained under the dominion of 

19 Eichardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IT, 13. 

20 The copy in the New York Public Library, which has been used by the 
present writer, is bound with ten other pamphlets in a volume containing 
the following inscription : " M. Dickerson — bo't at the sale of President 
Jefferson's Library — Mar. 6, 1829." On a fly leaf is written an index of 
the volume in Jefferson's handwriting. 



274 PAN'-AMERICAiq^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

European powers. Thornton was born on the island of Tortola 
in the West Indies, was educated as a physician at the Univer- 
sity of Edinburgh, and, toward the last decade of the eighteenth 
century, came to the United States, settling finally at Philadel- 
phia. In 1802 he was appointed to fill the newly created office 
of Commissioner of Patents, in which position he continued un- 
til his death, twenty-six years later. He was a man of great 
versatility and boldness of intellect. Chosen a member of the 
American Philosophical Society, he was awarded by that or- 
ganization the Magellanic prize for an essay which he published 
in 1T93 under the title of Cadmus: or a Treatise on the Ele- 
ments of Written Language. He was a painter of no mean 
ability, and that he was an architect of merit is attested by the 
fact that he designed, among other notable buildings, the Phila- 
delphia public library and the capitol at Washington. More- 
over, he was an inventor. He became associated with John 
Fitch, who constructed, about 1789, a steamboat which was able 
to creep through the water at the rate of three miles an hour. 
Thornton made improvements which raised the speed of the 
vessel to eight miles an hour. This velocity the boat was able 
to sustain, and on one occasion was propelled a distance of 
eighty miles in one day. Hoping to make further improve- 
ments, the inventors began the construction of a new boat, which 
Pitch completed and tested while Thornton was away on a visit 
to the West Indies. As this boat proved to be a failure, Pitch 
became discouraged and went to France to continue his ex- 
periments. Upon resuming his residence at Philadelphia, 
Thornton turned his attention to other things, thus abandoning 
the honor which might have been his as a coinventor of the 
steamboat.^^ Other inventions which he made entitle him, 
however, to a place among American inventors. 

Thornton's many-sided ability and his more or less intimate 

21 See article by Gaillard Hunt in The Nation for May 21, 1914; also a 
paper read before the Columbia Historical Society on May 19, 1914, by Allen 
C. Clark and printed in the Records of the Society, XVIII. 



EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 275 

association with Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and other 
eminent men of his time give added interest to his views on the 
subject of a " United North and South Columbia." In a short 
introduction to his pamphlet he declared that the plan which 
he was then giving to the public was taken principally from 
what he had written on the subject some fifteen years before. 
Referring without doubt to Miranda, he declared that the plan 
was made " known to one in whom the worthy Patriots of Ca- 
racas since confided and who promised he would endeavor to 
execute what he appeared so much to approve; but," he con- 
tinued, " unhappily the love of power dazzled a mind too weak 
for that magnanimous impulse of pure virtue. . . . He sought 
power on the ruins of his country, and wished to establish a con- 
sular government, expecting thereby to obtain supreme com- 
mand." 22 

These remarks show that Thornton had an exaggerated idea 
of the importance of the venture which he had made as a politi- 
cal organizer. Nevertheless, he manifested an unusually clear 
understanding of the difficult situation in which the New 
World was placed, and in proposing his vast scheme, his aim 
was to prepare by means of union to meet the dangers which 
threatened the continent as a whole. At the time the plan was 
published, none of the new states, it must be remembered, had 
as yet definitely established its independence. That they were 
all destined to attain the status of free people, Thornton firmly 
believed. But he was afraid that " if nothing be done ; if 
governments form themselves around us essentially different; 
if daring chiefs at the head of armies and ambitious politicians 
disturb our repose, it will be vain to offer the branch of peace. 
Our pacific system, if continued, would then but offer tempta- 
tions to aggression, and we would repine at the necessity of 
armies and warfare, now so justly deprecated. . . . Men vested 
with high military authority have more generally obtained by 
promises of reward the support of the armies they commanded, 

22 Outlines of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia, 2. 



276 PAN-AMEKICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

and then assumed the power. We learn this not only from 
ancient but modern example, and millions now groan under 
the oppressive tyranny of despicable upstarts whose depravity is 
unbalanced by a single virtue. . . . With a knowledge of all 
that has preceded, who would leave to chance the fate of the 
Western Empire ! The fool only that cannot think ! " 

Continuing, Thornton declared that it was essential to the 
future undisturbed repose of Columbia that a complete accord 
in political sentiments should be established ; and that if all the 
nations of this vast continent were to constitute as rapidly as 
possible governments on the plan of the United States, as nearly 
as their traditional principles and practices would allow, the 
whole continent being divided into states under the confederate 
plan, but one more step would be required to complete " the 
grandest system that has ever been formed by the most ex- 
panded mind of man — a system that would secure to the re- 
motest ages the tranquillity and peace, the virtue and felicity 
of countless millions." ^^ In order that this high end might 
be realized, he proposed that the continent and its islands 
should be divided into thirteen sections or commonwealths. 

The first and second sections or commonwealths were to em- 
brace the whole of the North American continent lying north of 
the forty-fourth degree of north latitude, the first being the 
western half of the territory and the second the eastern half, 
each with the islands adjacent included. The third, fourth, and 
fifth commonwealths were to be comprised in the territory lying 
between the forty-fourth parallel of north latitude and the 
tropic of Capricorn. One of these, the third, was to be bounded 
by the Pacific, the Tropic of Capricorn, the Gulf of Mexico, the 
Rio Grande to the point at which it intersects the thirty-third 
degree of north latitude, thence by a line north to the southern 
boundary of the first commonwealth and along this line to the 
Pacific. It was to include, in short, what are to-day the Pacific 
and the extreme southwestern states of the United States and 

83 O'dtUnes of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia, 6. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 2Y7 



I northern Mexico. The fourth republic was to lie between the 
j third and the Mississippi River. The fifth was to be comprised 
in the remaining territory of the United States and the Floridas. 
The sixth was to include the portion of Mexico lying south of 
the Tropic of Capricorn and including Central America as far 
south as the present boundary between Nicaragua and Costa 
Rica. The region which is to-day embraced in the republic of 
Costa Rica and Panama was to be known not as a common- 
wealth, but as the District of America, and contain on the 
" healthy hills that intersect the Isthmus at or near Panama, 
and where a canal may be made from sea to sea, by locks," the 
City of America. The seventh commonwealth was to embrace 
the West India islands. 

The continent of South America was to be divided into six 
republics, from the eighth to the thirteenth, inclusive. The 
eighth was to include that part of the continent lying north of 
the equator; that is, what is to-day Colombia, Venezuela, the 
Guianas, and a narrow strip of northern Brazil, together with a 
small part of northern Ecuador. The ninth was to be com- 
prised between the equator, the sixty-second degree of west longi- 
tude,^"^ the thirteenth degree of south latitude, and the Pacific, 
including nearly all of Ecuador and Peru, northern Bolivia, 
and a part of western Brazil. The tenth was to include Brazil, 
with the limitations already indicated, as far south as the fif- 
teenth degree of south latitude, west along that line to the Para- 
guay River, then northerly along that river to the eastern bound- 
ary of the ninth, and thence to the equator.^^ The eleventh 
was to be bounded by the southern boundary of the ninth, the 
Paraguay River to the twenty-eighth degree of south latitude, 
and thence westward to the Pacific. This would have included 

24 The author makes this line intersect the Paraguay Eiver and follow 
that stream to the thirteenth degree of south latitude. Modern maps, how- 
ever, indicate that the Paraguay does not extend so far north. 

25 This line would have been in effect along the fifteenth degree of south 
latitude to the sixty-second degree of west longitude and thence to the 
equator. 



2T8 PA:N'-AMERICA]SriSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

tlie greater part of Bolivia, southern Peru, and the northern 
parts of Chile and Argentina. The twelfth was to be com- 
prised between the southern boundary of the tenth, the Atlantic 
Ocean, and the Paraguay River. It would have included south- 
ern Brazil, the greater part of Paraguay, Uruguay, and a small 
part of Argentina. The thirteenth was to include the remainder 
of the continent south of the twenty-eighth degree of south lati- 
tude; that is, the greater part of Chile and of the Argentine 
republic. ^^ 

The division in some instances, Thornton admitted, appeared 
unequal, but it arose from the situation of the countries with 
respect to soil, climate, natural boundaries, and political rela- 
tions; and it was his opinion that, everything considered, a 
more equable division could not be easily made. If, however, 
the ancient attachment of the inhabitants to accidental bounda- 
ries, already established, should induce them to wish the con- 
tinuance of the former boundaries, they ought to weigh ma- 
turely all the advantages that would be obtained in the equali- 
zation of limits ; for whatever might be lost on one side would 
probably be more than compensated on the other. Besides, 
since all would be under the same general government, why 
should there be any petty disputes about limits ? In the United 
States, individual states had given up as much, voluntarily, as 
was sufficient to create new states. The lines of the new states 
were imaginary with relation to the connection of the in- 
habitants ; for the produce of all was sent to the nearest and best 
market, and it ought to be the same, Thornton thought, in the 
combined commonwealths or sectional governments ; for it would 
be considered as a fundamental principle, that whoever was a 
citizen of one should be a citizen of all, with his rights extend- 
ing throughout the whole. ^^ 

Thornton recommended that each commonwealth adopt, as 
far as circumstances would permit, the constitution of the 

26 Outlines of a Constitution for United North and South Columbia, 7-9. 
'i'' Ibid., 10. 



EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 279 

United States. The Columbian, Incal, or supreme government, 
lie would have to consist of an Inca,, or chief executive, twenty- 
six sachems, two from each commonwealth, constituting a coun- 
cil of sachems, or senate, of the supreme government; fifty-two 
caciques, four from each commonwealth, constituting a council 
of caciques, or house of representatives, and thirteen judges, 
representing each of the commonwealths, forming a supreme 
court. It was proposed that the Inca should be elected from the 
council of sachems by a joint ballot of the sachems and caciques. 
The next on the ballot would be the grand sachem, who would 
preside in the council of sachems. In the event of the death, 
removal, or resignation of the Inca the grand sachem would suc- 
ceed him. The Inca might be elected for eight years, but 
should not be reeligible. The sachems and caciques might be 
elected for eight and four years respectively, and they might be 
reeligible. 

The Inca should have authority to make treaties with foreign 
nations, with the advice and consent of a majority of both houses 
of the legislature ; and with the advice and consent of two-thirds 
of both houses he should have the power of declaring war. He 
should be commander in chief of the army and navy, with au- 
thority to call on each commonwealth for one-third of its marine 
force, in time of peace ; but in time of v/ar, he would command 
an vessels, no commonwealth being allowed to retain any war- 
ships except those necessary for the protection of trade and 
revenue. It was thought proper to clothe the chief executive 
with great naval power, because he would be able, by such au- 
thority, not only to repel the attacks of foreign enemies, but 
also to preserve uninterrupted harmony between the govern- 
ments over which he would preside. The authority of the com- 
monwealth presidents would extend over the armies of their 
respective sections during peace times, so that the Inca would not 
actually have at his command an army except in time of war.^^ 

28 Tbid., 11-13. 



280 PAIsT-AMEIlICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

The members of the Supreme Court were to be elected by the 
legislatures of the commonwealths upon nomination by the re- 
spective presidents. The judges should hold office during good 
behavior. They should have original jurisdiction in all dis- 
putes between the different sectional governments, in all cases 
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls from 
foreign states, and treaties entered into by the supreme govern- 
ment. They would have appellate jurisdiction in all cases in 
law and equity arising from the written laws of the district 
of America, in all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, 
and in controversies in which the supreme government should 
be a party. And finally, their decisions should be given with 
their reasons at length, in writing, in both the English and 
Spanish lang-uages.^^ 

The difficulties which were presented by the establishment 
of a political system, extending over so vast a territory, would 
be overcome, Thornton thought, by the exercise of the federal 
power. It was by means of the federal power that the states 
comprising the United States were prevented from crumbling 
by internal division, the jealousy of rival, or the combination 
of adverse states. In Europe, where another system prevailed, 
the powers were kept continually embroiled by the spirit of 
jealousy. The efforts which had been made, especially by 
Henry IV, to establish and maintain peace by concerted action, 
had failed because based upon wrong principles. In America 
the probability of success was much greater, not only because 
the principle of federation was to be applied, but because " we 
are, happily, far removed from the Old World, where ancient 
prejudices and accustomed modes of thinking might tend to 
exclude extensive improvements as extravagant innovations." 
Eurthermore, the system itself precluded the inconvenience that 
might arise from extent of territory. In the form in which 
the continent was divided, no commonwealth would be of un- 
wieldy proportions, and since each would have immediate ac- 

29 Ibid.. 14. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 281 

cess by sea to the supreme government, the difficulties of com- 
munication would never be great. Moreover, the telegraph, 
when perfected, would convey, from the remotest bounds of 
this vast empire, communication to the supreme government 
with ease ; and any measure dependent on this knowledge would 
be as rapid as the occasion might require ! ^^ 

At this point a brief reference may be made to the views of 
Henry Clay, the most ardent of all the North American advo- 
cates of continental unity. As early as 1810 Clay, at that time 
a member of the Senate, speaking in defense of the occupation 
of West Florida and referring especially to the usurpation of 
the Spanish throne by Napoleon, declared that he had no com- 
miseration for princes; that his sympathies were reserved for 
the mass of mankind. ^^ And, several years later, as a member 
of the House, speaking on the bill for enforcing neutrality, he 
championed the belligerent rights of the colonies and expressed 
a strong desire to see them achieve independence. " I may be 
accused," he said, " of an imprudent utterance of my feelings on 
this occasion — I care not ; when the independence, the happi- 
ness, the liberty of a whole people is at stake, and that people 
our neighbors, our brethren, occupying a portion of the same 
continent, imitating our example and participating of the same 
sympathies with ourselves, I will boldly avow my feelings and 
my wishes in their behalf, even at the hazard of such an im- 
putation." ^^ 

On subsequent occasions Clay gave evidence of his interest 
in the welfare of the new states. On December 3, 1817, he 
called attention to the fact that all the acts of the government in 
enforcing the neutrality laws bore against the colonies. He 
trusted that the House would give the subject their attention 
and show that in that body the obligations of neutrality would 
be strictly regarded in respect to Spanish America. On March 

30 Ibid., 3, 14. 

31 A««.a?s of the Congress of the United States, 11th Cong., 3d Sess., 35. 

32 Annals of the Congress of the United States, lJ{th Cong., 2d Sess., 742. 



282 PAN'-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

24, 1818, when an appropriation to defray the expense of the 
mission to South America was taken up in the House, Clay 
moved an amendment providing for an outfit and a salary for 
a minister to Buenos Aires. In a long and eloquent speech 
which he made on the following day in support of this proposal 
he declared that " there could be no doubt that Spanish Amer- 
ica, once independent, whatever might be the form of the 
governments established in its several parts, those governments 
would be animated by an American feeling, and guided by an 
American policy. They would obey the laws of the system of 
the New World, of which they would form a part, in contradis- 
tinction to that of Europe." 

Clay's motion was lost and for nearly two years the agitation 
in Congress in favor of the recognition of the South American 
governments rested.^^ On May 10, 1820, Clay submitted in 
the House a resolution declaring it to be expedient to provide 
by law for the sending of ministers to such of the new govern- 
ments as had established and were maintaining their inde- 
jpendence of Spain. " It is in our power to create a system," 
he said, " of which we shall be the center, and in which all 
South America will act with us. In respect to commerce, we 
should be most benefited. . . . We should become the center of 
a system which would constitute the rallying point of human 
wisdom against all the despotism of the Old World." ^* 

Discussions of continental unity were not confined to the 
United States. In 1810, in the Politico-Christian Catechism of 
the Chilean, Martinez de Eozas, it was proposed that local gov- 
ernments be set up in the different Spanish provinces of Amer- 
ica and that through a national representation, which should 
reside at some point to be agreed upon, " a single nation and a 
single state " should be formed.^^ Somewhat later in the same 

33 Moore, Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism ( Col. Univ. Quar., Sept., 
1915), 348-350. Awnals of the Congress of the U. 8., 15th Cong., Ist Sess., 
1482. 

34 Moore, Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism,, 351. Annals of the Con- 
gress of the U. S., 16th Cong., 1st Sess., 2226. 

35 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, VIII, 185-186. 



I EAKLY PKOJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 283 



' year, Juan Egana, noted in Chile as a man of learning and abil- 
I ity, submitted to the provisional government of that province a 
I memorial in which he set forth at length a general plan of 
organization for the Spanish possessions in America. Unwill- 
ing that the colonies should accept the domination of France, he 
recommended that an attempt be made to organize them into a 
single nation. " It would be desirable," said Egaiia, " for the 
government to write to the rest of the governments of America 
(or to those of the south only), suggesting that they have their 
deputies for the Cortes ready, to the end that if Spain should 
succumb, they might constitute, at a time and place agreed upon, 
a provisional congress in which the form of union and the re- 
lations of the provinces to the general congress might be deter- 
mined. Otherwise, America, torn by a thousand civil dissen- 
sions, will disintegrate and become the prey of foreigners." ^® 

That the Chilean projects for federation came to nothing is 
easily explained. In the first place Chile occupied a remote 
situation in the continent and communication with the other 
sections was slow and extremely difiicult. Secondly, Peru, the 
contiguous province on the north, was loyal to the Regency and 
being under the immediate control of the viceroy afforded a 
soil none too favorable for the growth of revolutionary ideas. 
And finally Buenos Aires, whose cooperation would have been 
highly desirable, proved to be unfriendly to the plan of feder- 
ating the different parts of Spanish America into one nation. 

At the time the proposals of Rozas and Egana were made, 
Buenos Aires had become practically independent of Spain, the 
viceroy having been deposed and a provisional government ad- 
ministered by a junta having been set up instead. The domi- 
nant figure in this junta was its secretary, Mariano Moreno,^' 

36 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, VIII, 241-244. EgaSa's 
memorial setting forth his plan is printed in full in Alvarez's La Diplo- 
macia de Chile, 257-262. 

37 Mariano Moreno was born in Buenos Aires in 1778. After studying 
in his native city, he went at the age of twelve years to the imiversity of 
Charcas, in Upper Peru, where he studied law. Returning to Buenos 



284 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

who, entertaining certain imperialistic designs which he hoped 
to carry out through an alliance with Great Britain, did not 
favor the plan of federating the colonies. " There would be 
nothing irregular," he wrote in the Buenos Aires Gazette, " in 
the co(3peration of all the peoples of America in the great task 
which the provinces have under consideration. But that co- 
operation would he a question of convention and not of obliga- 
tion, and I believe that it would be impolitic and harmful to 
insist on the adoption of such a convention. How would the 
wills of men who inhabit a continent where distances are meas- 
ured by the thousand leagues be harmonized? Where would 
the great congress hold its sessions, and how could it meet the 
urgent demands of peoples from whom it could receive news 
only after the lapse of three or four months ? It is chimerical 
to pretend that the whole of Spanish America should constitute 
a single state. . . . How could we conciliate our interests with 
those of Mexico? That kingdom would not be content with 
anything less than holding these provinces in the condition of 
colonies. But what American would to-day allow himself to be 
placed in such a condition ? . . . Every effort that is aimed 
at preventing the provinces from establishing their own politi- 
cal systems is meant to paralyze the enthusiasm of the peoples 
until the occasion presents to give them a new master." ^^ 

Moreno's ideas on this subject have been handed down as 
a sort of political legacy to succeeding generations of Argentine 
statesmen. Though he died in 1811, yet his ideas lived after 
him. Thus Argentina has never favored any of the schemes 
for forming a political union of American states, because it 
has always considered that such combinations would be dan- 
Aires he began the practice of his profession. When the provisional govern- 
ment was established on May 25, 1810, Moreno was made its secretary 
and soon became its moving spirit. He died in March, 1811, on his way 
to England. Cortes, Diccionario Biogrdfico Americano, 328. 

38 Moreno, Escritos poUticos y economicos, 297. Antokoletz, Histoire de 
la Diplomatic Argentine, 105, 108. 



;i EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 285 

i| 

|j geroiis to national autonomy. When, therefore, Chile proposed 
i in 1810 the convocation of a general congress the Argentine 
: jnnta replied that the idea was wholly impracticable and sug- 
gested that an alliance of the two countries would be preferable. 
Later the attitude of the United Provinces toward the congress 
of Panama and toward the attempts which were afterwards 
made to bring about the desired confederation, had its inspira- 
tion in this political legacy of Mariano Moreno.^^ This, per- 
haps, is a sufficient explanation of Argentina's historic attitude 
toward the unification of American states ; but if an additional 
motive were sought it would no doubt be found in the aspira- 
tions of Moreno and his successors for Argentine leadership. 
Of this more will be said in subsequent chapters. 

Whatever may have been the political aims which prevented 
the United Provinces from joining in the early attempts to bring 
about a political union of the different nations of the continent, 
nothing stood in the way of their contributing to the general 
good in the struggle for independence. As has already been 
noted, the Argentine general, San Martin, led an army across 
the Andes and clinched the independence of Chile; he it was 
who struck, with an army composed in good part of his fellow 
countrymen, the first gTeat blow for independence in Peru ; and 
Argentine officers and soldiers continued to play an important 
part in the struggle against the enemy wherever he appeared, 
from the Rio de la Plata to the equator, until his power of 
resistance was at last destroyed at Ayacucho. This sort of co- 
operation was not, however, unusual. On the battlefields of 
Peru, men of Colombia, Peru, Chile, and the United Provinces 
fought side by side ; and, but for the difficulties of communica- 
tion, their brothers of Mexico and Central America would 
surely have been found on those same battlefields. While the 
struggle lasted, in fact, there was a strong tendency toward con- 
tinental unity and correspondingly little inclination toward the 

•''9 Antokoletz, Histoire de la Diplomatic Argentine, 109-112. 



286 PA^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINOTNGS 

intense spirit of nationalism which developed rapidly enough 
as soon as independence appeared to be reasonably well estab- 
lished. 

The views of Bolivar must next be considered. At what 
point in his career he first conceived the idea of a union of 
American nations is not known. His first definite utterance 
on the subject is found in his famous " prophetic " letter of Sep- 
tember 6, 1815, cited in a previous chapter. It is evident, how- 
ever, from the thoroughgoing manner in which he dealt with 
the problems of political organization on that occasion, that 
he had given it mature consideration, possibly over a period of 
several years. Indeed, the idea of a great confederation had 
been suggested in Venezuela as early as April, 1810, when a 
circular sent out by the recently constituted provisional govern- 
ment of that province brought the matter to the attention of the 
authorities of the other Spanish American capitals. " The pa- 
triots of Caracas," it was declared, " ought to have imitators 
among all those inhabitants of America in whom the long-con- 
tinued habit of slavery has not deadened the moral sense; and 
their resolution ought to be applauded by all those who esteem 
virtue and enlightened patriotism. Your body affords the most 
appropriate organ for spreading these ideas among the people 
over whom you preside and for arousing their interest and ac- 
tivity in the promotion of the great work of the confederation 
of Spanish America." *® 

Although Bolivar was not a member of the junta which was 
the author of the circular, yet he had already begun to play an 
important part in the affairs of the province and it is not likely 
that the suggestion escaped his attention. Moreover, when he 
was sent later in the same year with Lopez Mendez and Bello 
on a mission to England, he received instructions marked by 
such expressions as the following : " Venezuela will always ad- 
here to the general interests of America and will be ready to 

40 Blanco-Azpiirfia, Documentos, II, 408 ; Mancini, Bolivar et V^mancipa- 
tion des Colonies Espagnoles, 269, 



EAKLY PKOJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 287 

enter into intimate union with all those who escape the domina- 
tion of France. . . . Venezuela will gladly abide by the vote 
of the free parts of the Spanish Empire." *^ If to these cir- 
cumstances be added the fact that, upon the arrival of the mis- 
sion in London, Bolivar became associated with Miranda in 
the prosecution of plans which were, as has been indicated above, 
continental in scope, it may be deduced that the plans of the 
future Liberator for forming a union of American states had 
thus early begun to take shape. 

What his views were three years later scarcely admits of 
question. After the final collapse of Miranda's revolutionary 
enterprises in 1812, Bolivar continued the struggle, and during 
the following year won notable successes in New Granada and 
Venezuela. It was as a result of these victories that he was 
given the title of Liberator. During this period he exercised, 
by common consent, dictatorial authority over the part of the 
country recovered from the enemy. He was assisted in his 
administration of the government by three secretaries, one of 
whom, the Secretary of Foreign Eelations, made a report, dated 
December 31, 1813, in which some remarkable views on foreign 
policy are set forth. These views, Larrazabal, one of Bolivar's 
biographers, considers as the Liberator's own, rather than those 
of his secretary.'*^ In boldness of conception and in broad com- 
prehension of world politics, they are typical of the productions 
of Bolivar's fertile mind. The following quotations from the 
report are given, therefore, in confidence that they represent 
the views of the chief of the state and not merely those of the 
secretary who formulated them. 

" With respect to New Granada, the policy of your Excel- 
lency has been not solely to bring about a closer alliance be- 
tween that region and Venezuela. Your aim has been rather 
to fuse the two into a single nation. Considerations of the 
greatest importance make this measure indispensable. The in- 

41 Mancini, Bolivar et V emancipation des Colonies Espagnoles, 312-314, 

42 Larrazabal, Vida del Libertador, 8im6n Bolivar,' I, 250, 



288 PAK-AMEEICA:NISM: ITS BEGmNINGS 

terest of New Granada, our own interest, and the clearly ex- 
pressed ideas of other cabinets urge your Excellency to take 
this step without delay. Our strength will be bom of this 
union. The enemies of the American cause will tremble before 
so formidable a force, united to resist them on every hand. 
. . . Why should there not exist a close union between New 
Granada and Venezuela ? Not only so, but why should not the 
whole of South America unite under a single central govern- 
ment? The lessons of experience should not be lost to us. 
The spectacle which Europe offers of drenching itself in blood 
to reestablish an equilibrium which is constantly being dis- 
turbed, should correct our policy and save it from that sanguin- 
ary result. . . . We are, happily, so situated at present as to be 
able to give to our policy, without hindrance, the direction which 
we may consider most advantageous. Victorious in the eyes 
of all America, the admiration and hope of all your fellow citi- 
zens, your Excellency is most competent to unite the desires of 
the southern regions, to undertake at once the formation of the 
great American nation and to preserve it from the evils which 
the European system has brought upon the nations of the Old 
World. 

" In addition to the continental balance, which Europe seeks 
where, apparently, it is least to be found — in the midst of war 
and upheavals — there is, Sir, another balance which is the one 
of importance to us : the balance of the world. The ambition 
of European powers imposes the yoke of slavery upon the other 
parts of the world, and these all ought to make an effort to es- 
tablish the balance between themselves and Europe, with a view 
to destroy the preponderance of that part of the world. I call 
this the balance of the world and it should enter into the calcu- 
lations of American policy. 

" It is necessary that the force of our nation be capable of re- 
sisting successfully the aggressions which the ambition of 
Europe might attempt ; and this powerful Colossus which should 
oppose that other Colossus, cannot be formed except by the 



EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 289 

union of all South America in one nation, so that one govern- 
ment may apply all its enormous resources to the single end of 
resisting foreign aggression, and, multiplying mutual coopera- 
tion among the individual members of the union, elevate us to 
the pinnacle of power and prosperity." ^^ 

In his letter of September 6, 1815, Bolivar discussed at some 
length the general political situation in the different sections of 
Spanish America, pointing out the difficulties that had been 
encountered in the struggle for freedom, and in the establish- 
ment of stable national govenonents. Declaring that the 
consolidation of the vast territory of the former Spanish 
colonies into a single monarchy would be extremely difficult, 
and into a republic of like dimensions impossible, he yet con- 
sidered it feasible to associate these widely separated units into 
some sort of political union. " The consolidation of the New 
World," he declared, " into a single nation with a single bond 
uniting all its parts is a grand conception. Since the different 
parts have the same language, customs, and religion, they ought 
to be confederated into a single state; but this is not possible, 
because differences of climate, diverse conditions, opposing in- 
terests, and dissimilar characteristics divide America. How 
beautiful it would be if the Isthmus of Panama should become 
for us what the Isthmus of Corinth was for the Greeks ! Would 
to God that we may have the fortune some day of holding there 
some august congress of the representatives of the republics, 
kingdoms, and empires of America, to deliberate upon the high 
interests of peace and of war not only between the American 
nations, but between them and the rest of the globe." '*^ 

The next reference which occurs in Bolivar's writings on the 
subject of a political union of American states is found in a 
letter dated June 12, 1818, to Pueyrredon, Supreme Director 

43 Larrazibal, Vida del Libertador, I, 250-251. 

44 Moore, Henry Clay and Pan- Americanism, 348; Cartas de Bolivar, 
Sociedad de Ediciones, 145-50. 



290 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNIKGS 

of the United Provinces of Eio de la Plata. In this letter, Boli- 
var, in reciprocating the expressions of friendship contained in 
a communication previously received from Pueyrredon, made 
the following interesting declarations : " Your Excellency may 
assure your compatriots that they will be received and treated 
here not only as members of a friendly republic, but even as 
citizens of Venezuela. We Americans should have but a single 
country, since in every other way we have been perfectly united. 
. . . When Venezuela's triumphant arms shall have com- 
pleted the work of independence, or when favorable circum- 
stances allow us more frequent communication and make pos- 
sible more intimate relations, we, for our part, shall hasten with 
the most lively interest to establish the American compact, 
which, forming all our republics into a single body politic, will 
present America to the world in an aspect of majesty and 
grandeur unexampled among the nations of antiquity. Amer- 
ica thus united, if Heaven grant our desire, may be called the 
queen of nations and the mother of republics. I hope that 
Rio de la Plata will cooperate with its powerful influence in 
perfecting the political edifice whose comer stone was laid the 
day on which we first struck for freedom." *^ 

These ideas were expressed at a time when there could have 
been little hope of carrying them immediately into execution ; 
for the Patriots, having met with reverses on every hand, had 
only begun to achieve the victories which were to fix their 
destiny. By the middle of the year 1822, however, things had 
changed. The republic of Colombia had come into existence; 
Mexico had been proclaimed an empire ; a part of Peru had been 
rendered independent ; and the position of the United Provinces 
of Rio de la Plata and of Chile had become more secure. Al- 
though independence was now well enough established and the 
governments were well enough organized to allow the separate 
units to feel a degree of security, yet prudence seemed to coun- 
sel the formation of some sort of league for the purpose of pre- 

45 Blanco-AzpurGa, Documentos, VI, 402. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 291 

senting a united front to the internal and external dangers 
which were recognized as common to all. Accordingly, Colom- 
bia, at the instance of Bolivar, took the lead, and adopting cer- 
tain preliminary articles as the basis of what was to be a " new 
federal system " dispatched envoys to negotiate treaties with 
the Spanish American governments.^^ 

Joaquin Mosquera, the agent sent to negotiate with the gov- 
ernments of Peru, Chile, and Buenos Aires, received instruc- 
tions in part as follows : 

" Nothing is of so much interest at the present moment as 
the formation of a league truly American. But this confedera- 
tion ought not to rest merely upon the foundation of an offensive 
and defensive alliance; it ought to be more intimate than the 
one which has been lately formed in Europe against the liberty 
of peoples. It is necessary that ours should be a society of 
brother nations, for the present separated and in the exercise 
of their sovereignty through the course of human events, but 

46 O'Leary, Memorial, XXVIII, 120, 537. 

In a report which Pedro Gual, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, made to 
the Congress of Colombia on April 17, 1823, the bases were stated to be as 
follows : 

I. " That the American states be forever in alliance and confederation, 
in peace and war, for the consolidation of the liberty and independence, 
guaranteeing to each other the integrity of their respective territories. 

II. " That in order to render this guaranty effective, the uti possidetis of 
1810, according to the demarkation of territory of each captain-generalship 
or viceroyalty, erected into a sovereign state, be taken as the rule. 

III. " That, with respect to the personal rights, trade, and navigation 
of each state, their citizens and subjects shall enjoy, indiscriminately, in 
their persons, properties, and foreign and domestic traffic, the same privi- 
leges and prerogatives as the natives of the country in which they reside, 
whether domiciled or transient. 

IV. " That, in order to consummate this compact of perpetual alliance 
and confederation, a meeting be held in Panama, of two plenipotentiaries 
from each of the contracting parties, which might serve as a point of 
contact in times of common danger, be the faithful interpreter of their 
public treaties, when diflBculties occur, and judges, arbiters, and concilia- 
tors, in their disputes and differences. 

V. " That this treaty of perpetual alliance and confederation shall not 
interfere, in any way, with the exercise of sovereignty of each and all of 
the contracting parties, with respect to their relations with other inde- 
pendent powers." British and Foreign State Papers, X, 743. 



292 PA:N'-AMEKICANISM: ITS BEGINNrnGS 

united, strong, and powerful to resist the aggressions of the 
foreigner. It is indispensable that you should constantly in- 
sist upon the necessity of laying at once the foundations of an 
Amphictyonic body or assembly of plenipotentiaries^ which shall 
promote the common interests of the American states, which 
shall settle the difficulties which may arise in the future between 
peoples who have the same manners and customs and who, for 
the lack of some such sacred institution, might perchance be- 
come involved in the desolating wars which have afflicted other 
less fortunate regions. The government and the people of Co- 
lombia are strongly disposed to cooperate in so praiseworthy an 
object and will immediately send one or more plenipotentiaries 
to the place that may be designated, provided the other Amer- 
ican states agree to the plan. Then we should be able to deter- 
mine definitely the functions of this truly august assembly." ^"^ 

On July 6, 1822, two treaties between the republic of Co- 
lombia and the state of Peru were concluded at Lima. One of 
these was a general treaty of perpetual union, league, and con- 
federation, and the other a special convention, relating to a 
meeting of plenipotentiaries, for which a provision had been 
made in the former instrument. An examination of these 
treaties is essential to a proper understanding of the subject un- 
der consideration. The following articles of the general treaty 
are quoted in full. 

1. " The republic of Colombia and the state of Peru do 
unite, league, and confederate, from this time forward for ever 
more, in peace and war, to sustain with their influence, and 
forces by sea and land, as far as circumstances may permit, 
their independence of the Spanish nation, and of every other 
foreign dominion; and to secure, after the recognition of their 
independence, mutual prosperity, perfect harmony, and good 
understanding between their peoples, subjects, and citizens, as 
well as with such other powers as may enter into relations with 
them. 

47 Zubieta, Congress de Panama y Tacuhaya, 19. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 293 

2. " With this view, the republic of Colombia and the state 
of Peru do voluntarily engage in, and contract with each other, 
a perpetual treaty of intimate alliance and firm and lasting 
friendship for their common defense, the security of their inde- 
pendence and liberty, their mutual and general good, and for 
their internal tranquillity; binding themselves to succor each 
other and to repel, in common, any attack or invasion that may 
threaten their political existence. 

3. " In cases of sudden invasion, both parties may engage in 
war in the territories of either party, should the exigency of the 
moment not afford time to communicate with the government to 
which the invaded territory may belong. But the party thus 
acting shall observe and cause to be observed, the statutes, ordi- 
nances, and laws of the invaded state, as far as circumstances 
may permit, and shall cause its government to be respected and 
obeyed. The expenses that may be incurred in these operations 
shall be arranged by separate conventions, and shall be settled 
within one year after the present war. 

4. " In order to perpetuate and secure, in the best possible 
manner, a lasting friendship and good understanding between 
both states, the citizens of Colombia and Peru shall enjoy the 
rights and prerogatives which belong to native-born citizens of 
either territory: that is to say, Colombians shall be considered 
in Peru as Peruvians, and the latter in the republic as Colom- 
bians; without prejudice, however, to the amplifications or re- 
strictions which the legislative power of both states may have 
made, or may think fit to make, regarding the qualifications 
necessary in order to exercise the chief magistracies ; but in or- 
der to enjoy the other active and passive rights of citizens, it 
is sufficient that they establish their residence in the state to 
which they prefer to belong. 

5. " The subjects and citizens of both states shall have full 
egress and ingress in their respective ports and territories ; and 
shall enjoy in them all the civil rights and privileges of trade 
and commerce: being liable only to such duties, imposts, and 



294 PAlsT-AMEEICAI^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

restrictions as tlie subjects and citizens of eacli of the contract- 
ing parties are liable." 

Article 6 relates to the payment of duties on importation, ex- 
portation, ancborage, and tonnage, under the general principle 
laid down in the preceding article ; article 7 provides that succor 
be given to ships of war and merchantmen entering the ports of 
the respective states, in distress ; article 8 extends the jurisdic- 
tion of the maritime courts of justice of the contracting parties 
to all privateers of either state and to their prizes ; article 9 pro- 
vides for the settlement of boundaries by a special convention ; 
article 10 binds both parties to make common cause against 
the internal enemies of their respective governments, " lavrfuUy 
established by the voice of the people " ; article 11 provides 
for the extradition of persons guilty of treason, sedition, or 
other grave crime, including desertion from the army and navy ; 
and finally, article 12 describes the manner of ratification.*^ 

The essential articles of the special treaty are as follows : 

1. " In order to draw closer the bonds which should in fu- 
ture unite both states, and to remove any difficulties which may 
arise, and in any way interrupt their harmony and good under- 
standing, a meeting shall be held, composed of two plenipo- 
tentiaries on each side, in like manner, and with the same 
formalities, as are observed according to established usage, in 
the nomination of ministers of similar rank to the governments 
of foreign powers. 

2. " Both parties oblige themselves to interpose their good 
offices with the other states of America, formerly belonging to 
Spain, to induce them to enter into this treaty of perpetual 
union, league, and confederation. 

3. " As soon as this grand and important object shall be at- 
tained, there shall be assembled a general meeting of American 
states, composed of their respective plenipotentiaries, instructed 

i^ British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 105-112. 
Blanco-Azpurlia, Documentos, VIII, 453-455. 
With refeience to article 10 see infra, p. 300. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 295 

to laj the most solid foundation for, and to establish the inti- 
mate relations which ought to subsist between all and each of 
them ; and that may serve them as counsel in great emergencies, 
as a point of union in cases of common danger, as a faithful 
interpreter of their public treaties should difficulties arise, and 
as a judicial reference and mediator in their disputes and differ- 
ences. 

4. " The Isthmus of Panama being an integral part of the 
republic of Colombia, and the best adapted for this august meet- 
ing, this republic pledges itself cheerfully to furnish all the 
aid which hospitality demands among friendly nations, and to 
observe a sacred and inviolable regard toward the persons of 
the plenipotentiaries who may there form the Assembly of 
American States. 

5. " The state of Peru binds itself to the like obligations, 
should the events of the war, or the will of the majority of the 
American states, cause the before-named meeting to be held 
in its territories, in the same manner that the republic of Co- 
lombia has engaged to do by the preceding article ; as well with 
regard to the Isthmus of Panama, as to any other part of its 
jurisdiction, which on account of its central position between 
the northern and southern states of America formerly belong- 
ing to Spain, may be deemed convenient for this most important 
purpose. 

6. " This treaty of perpetual union, league, and confedera- 
tion shall not in any wise interrupt the exercise of the national 
sovereignty of each of the contracting parties, as far as relates 
to their laws, and the form and establishment of their respective 
governments, as well as to their relations with foreign powers. 
But they bind themselves, expressly and irrevocably, not to 
accede to any demands in the nature of tributes or exactions 
which either the Spanish Government may propose on account 
of the loss of its dominion over these countries, or which any 
other nation may prefer in the name, or as a representative, of 
that government ; nor to negotiate any treaty, either with Spain 



296 PAK-AMERICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

or any other nation, in prejudice or depreciation of this inde- 
pendence; sustaining everywhere and on all occasions their 
reciprocar interests, with the energy and dignity of free, inde- 
pendent, friendly, brotherly, and confederated nations. 

7. " The republic of Colombia especially binds itself to keep 
on foot a force of four thousand men, armed and equipped, for 
the ends stated in the foregoing articles. Its national navy, 
whatever it may be, shall likewise be employed in such manner 
as to give effect to the above stipulations. 

8. " The state of Peru shall likewise assist with its maritime 
forces, whatever they may be, and with a like number of troops 
as the republic of Colombia." *^ 

These treaties were ratified by Peru on July 15, 1822, and 
by Colombia on July 12, 1823. Colombia, however, in ratify- 
ing the general treaty made exception of the words " and for 
their internal tranquillity," in the second article; rejected the 
whole of article 10 ; and of article 11 accepted only the part 
relating to deserters from the army or navy. The other treaty 
was ratified without change.^" 

The Colombian envoy, in compliance with his instructions, 
proceeded southward to arrange similar conventions with Chile 
and the United Provinces. With the former he signed, on 
October 21, 1822, a treaty embodying the principal provisions 
of the treaties of July 6 between Colombia and Peru. This in- 
strument, however, was never ratified by the government of 
Chile, the failure being due, perhaps, more to the disorganized 
condition of the country than to indifference or hostility to the 
plan of union, the realization of which was the main purpose 
of the treaty. ^^ Passing to Buenos Aires, Mosquera entered 
into negotiations with the government of that province. True 

^^ British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 115-120; Blanco-Azpurtia, 
Documentos, VIII, 455-457. 

50 Odriozola, Documentos HistdHcos del Peru, V, 161, 165; British and 
Foreign State Papers, XI, 114, 121. 

51 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XIII, 691-693; British and 
Foreign State Papers, XI, 213-225. 



EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 297 

to the policy of Mariano Moreno, Buenos Aires declined to be- 
come a party to the proposed confederation. Accordingly the 
representatives of the two governments — Rivadavia acting for 
Buenos Aires — omitting all reference to an assembly of pleni- 
potentiaries, signed, on March 8, 1823, a brief treaty of friend- 
ship and alliance, which was ratified by Buenos Aires on June 
10 following, and by Colombia exactly a year later. ^^ 

The government of the United States received, through its 
agents, information regarding these negotiations. Todd had 
sent communications on the subject from Bogota ; Prevost had 
written from Peru, and Forbes from Buenos Aires. Secretary 
Adams, in giving instructions, on May 27, 1823, to Anderson, 
the first United States minister to Colombia, declared that Pre- 
vost, as well as Gual, the Colombian Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, entertained higher expectations of the success of the ne- 
gotiation at Buenos Aires than Mr. Forbes ; that Prevost thought 
that it must succeed, although the government of Buenos Aires 
was secretly averse to it, as it was implicated in secret intrigues 
with the Portuguese Government and General Le Cor, for a 
confederacy of a different character; that Gual told Todd that 
proposals had been made by the Portuguese Government at Lis- 
bon, to Colombia, for a general confederacy of all America, 
north and south, together with the constitutional governments 
of Portugal and Spain as a counterpoise to the European Holy 
Alliance, but that the proposals had been rejected on account 
of their European aspect. Adams added that loose and indefi- 
nite projects of the same kind had been presented by the Portu- 
guese Government to the United States, but that they had never 
been considered even as objects of deliberation.^^ 

A treaty of perpetual union, league, and confederation, em- 
bodying in substance the main provisions of the treaties of 

52 Mitre, Historia de San Martin, IV, 57 ; Registro Oficial de la Repiihlica 
Argentina, II, 38 ; Blanco-AzpurQa, Documentos, IX, 298. 

53 Register of Debates in Congress (1826) II, Appendix, 80; American 
State Papers, For. Rel., V, 894. 



298 PAl^-AMERICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

July 6, 1822, was signed by representatives of the governments 
of Colombia and Mexico on October 3, 1823.^* This was, it 
will be noted, some time after the negotiations with Peru, Chile, 
and Buenos Aires had been brought to a close. The delay, 
however, was not due to design on the part of Colombia; for 
President Bolivar appointed in October, 1821, a minister, Mi- 
guel Santa Maria, to the Mexican Empire, with authority to 
negotiate a treaty in accordance with the general plan of un- 
ion,^^ and as this minister arrived in Mexico in April of the 
following year, the treaty might have been concluded within a 
very short time thereafter if the course of events in Mexico had 
not prevented.^® 

Santa Maria, upon reaching Vera Cruz in March, 1822, im- 
mediately wrote Jose Manuel de Herrera, Minister of Eoreign 
Affairs, at Mexico, of his arrival. In the letter to Herrera 
the Colombian envoy spoke of the joy with which the news of 
Mexican independence was received in Colombia and of the 
great interest of his government in extending and strengthen- 
ing the friendly relations of the two countries " called by na- 
ture and impelled by circumstances to lend each other assist- 
ance in a spirit of fraternal good will." He congratulated the 
empire of Mexico upon its brilliant military success, expressed 
the most ardent wishes for its future prosperity, and finally 
invited it to enter into a treaty of perpetual peace, friendship, 
and union with the government of Colombia. ^''^ Upon reach- 
ing the capital, Santa Maria addressed another letter to Herrera 
with which he sent a copy of the constitution of Colombia. 
Santa Maria declared that he had been instructed to assure the 
government of Mexico that whatever its form the republic of 

54 For the treaty see La Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 243-249, and British 
and Foreign State Papers, XI, 784-792. 

55 Santa Maria's letter of credence was dated October 10, 1821. La 
Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 239. 

56 La Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 212. 

57 Santa Maria to Herrera, March 23^ 1822, La Diplomacia Mexicana, 
I, 8-12. 



EAELY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 299 

Colombia, for its part, would always have the glory of con- 
tributing to the maintenance of the cause of national independ- 
ence.^^ Events seemed to show that this assurance may have 
been intended to be ambiguous. On May 11 Santa Maria was 
informed that the regency of the empire recognized him as envoy 
extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of the republic of 
Colombia. ^^ A few days later, May 19, Iturbide was pro- 
claimed emperor, after which Santa Maria, awaiting instruc- 
tions from his government, declined to treat with the new re- 
gime. What instructions he may have received can only be 
inferred from the fact that he soon became involved in a con- 
spiracy aimed at the overthrow of Iturbide and was dismissed 
by the imperial government. ^^ Upon the downfall of the em- 
pire, Santa Maria, who had not yet left the country, was re- 
called by resolution of the congress " to fulfill in accordance 
with the desires of the Mexican nation the high duties of his 
mission." ^^ Under these altered circumstances, negotiations 
were begun, and the treaty having been concluded as indicated 
above was ratified by Mexico on December 2, 1823, and by 
Colombia on June 30, 1824.^2 

The treaty, as has already been said, was substantially the 
same as those concluded with Peru and Chile. But it contained 
one important article on the subject of territorial integrity 
which was not included in the earlier conventions and which 
indeed seems to have been framed to meet a special situation. 
In the case of the treaty between Colombia and Peru the ques- 
tion of the delimitation of their respective territories proved 
to be the only obstacle to the acceptance by Peru of the draft 
of the treaty presented by Mosquera, and as no agreement could 
be reached on that point it was left to be settled by a special 

58 Santa Maria to Herrera, April 16, 1822, La Diplomacia Meayicana, I, 19. 

59 Minuta del Ministro Herrera, La Diplomacia Meocicana, I, 24. 

60 Herrera to Gual, September 28, 1822 ; Herrera to Santa Maria, October 
18, 1822. La Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 33-35; 36. 

61 La Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 211. 

62 Ihid., I, 251, 253. 



300 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGIl!^NI]!^GS 

convention. ^^ In the draft presented by Mosquera as a basis 
of discussion with Chile two articles were proposed, one guar- 
anteeing the territorial integrity of the respective states, and 
the other indicating specifically the boundaries of Colombia. 
But Chile saw no advantage in such an arrangement and con- 
sequently declined to subscribe to the articles.^* The fact that 
Mexico accepted the proposal of a mutual guarantee of terri- 
torial integrity may have been in prevision of future conflicts 
with the United States.^^ 

The article to which reference is made is as follows: Arti- 
cle 8. " Both parties mutually guarantee the integrity of their 
territories on the footing on which they stood before the present 
war, also recognizing as integral parts of either nation every 
province which though formerly governed by an authority 
entirely independent of the late viceroyalties of Mexico and 
New Granada, may have agreed or shall agree in a lawful man- 
ner to become incorporated with it." ^^ 

63 Paz Soldan, Historia del Per4 Independiente, 1, 304 ; Olarte Camacho, 
Los Convenios con el Peru, 21—24. 

64 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XIII, 692. 

What is believed to be the Mosquera draft is printed in Sesiones de los 
Cuerpos Legislatives de la Republica de Chile, 1811 d 18^5 (VI, 328-330). 
A translation of article 10 of that document follows : " Both parties 
mutually guarantee the integrity of their territories on the same footing 
on which they stood before the present war, the limits of each captaincy 
general or vice royalty which has reassumed the rights of sovereignty being 
accepted, unless in some lawful way two or more may have agreed to form 
a single nation, as has happened in the case of the former captaincy 
general of Venezuela and the new kingdom of Granada, which to-day con- 
stitute the republic of Colombia," p. 329. 

65 There is reason for believing that Mexico had for some time past 
foreseen trouble over boundary questions with the United States. On 
October 31, 1822, Zozaya, the minister of the empire to the United States, 
was instructed confidentially to find out the real opinion of " those re- 
publicans " with regard to their limits beyond Louisiana and the Floridas ; 
to learn whether they were content with the last treaties with Spain, and 
whether they had planned or effected any establishments that might in any 
way prove prejudicial to the empire. (La Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 85.) 
Moreover at the time the treaty between Colombia and Mexico was being 
negotiated it was not yet known what would be the outcome of San 
Salvador's move for annexation to the United States. 

66 British and Foreign State Papers, XI, 788. 



EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 301 

At the time the negotiations with Mexico were begun the 
provinces of Central America constituted a part of the empire. 
Upon the overthrow of Iturbide those provinces, it will be re- 
called, withdrew and set up an independent federal republic. 
With this republic there was concluded at Bogota on March 15, 
1825, the last of the treaties of perpetual union, league, and 
confederation. This treaty was ratified by Colombia on April 
12 and by Central America on September 12, 1825.^'^ 

During this period of two or three years of diplomatic nego- 
tiation, a campaign of publicity was carried on with a view 
to the foiTnation of a public opinion favorable to the plan of 
confederation. Newspapers not infrequently published arti- 
cles on the subject and these were widely copied throughout the 
continent. Pamphlets were published in both Europe and 
America and distributed wherever it was believed support might 
be obtained. Finally, private correspondence was employed to 
gain adherents among the influential men of the time. The 
need of propaganda was great, for indiiference was great. 
Moreover the spirit of localism tended to increase as the com- 
mon danger decreased. An idea of the need for the awakening 
of public interest may be obtained from the following extracts 
from an article entitled Confederacion Americana, published in 
El Patriota de Guayaquil and copied by the Gaceta de Colombia. 
" We can do no less," declared the writer of the article, " than 
express our surprise, and we might say our despair, at seeing 
pass unnoticed the greatest of American acts. The Gaceta de 
Lima of September 17, 1822, published the compact of per- 
petual union, league, and confederation between Colombia and 
Peru. Everybody has read this treaty with the indifference 
with which they might read a pastoral or a pamphlet such as 
those which constantly afSict the public. It seems that a gen- 
eral meeting of America under a social pact excites no interest, 
notwithstanding the fact that all men of enlightenment have 

67 Blanco-Azpurtia, Documentos, IX, 717-720; Bancroft, History of Cen- 
tral America, III, 81, 



302 PAiN'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGIITNINGS 

desired this confederation as the means of obtaining the liberty 
and salvation of America. And if at last the editor of La Aheja 
Argentina of Buenos Aires has broken the silence it has been 
to tell ns in the most absolute manner that the best compact of 
league and confederation that America can make, is none at 
all." Following this rather disconsolate introduction the 
writer takes up in detail the objections of the Argentine paper 
— the great distances which separate the parts to be confed- 
erated, the difference in institutions, the inability of a con- 
gress of plenipotentiaries to command obedience to its decrees 
and the like — and arrives at the conclusion that none of these 
obstacles is insuperable. " For," he declares, " in America it 
is a question of unity, unity, unity. . . . From upper Cali- 
fornia to Chile is a single nation. One faith, one language, 
one sentiment, one being, we may say, covers the face of Amer- 
ica." 68 

If space permitted, extensive quotations from newspaper 
articles might be given. ITo more can be done, however, than 
to mention some of the principal discussions appearing in the 
press of the time. In a paper called Noticioso General de 
Mexico there appeared an article in which it was declared that 
the proposed congress would without sword or cannon destroy 
the Holy Alliance and that persecuted liberty would fly to the 
protection of the new league. ^^ The Gaceta del Gobiemo of 
Lima, referring to the entry of Simon Bolivar in that city on 
September 1, 1823, avers that on that occasion there was heard 
in the midst of general applause nothing but repeated expres- 
sions of good will for the formation of a permanent alliance 
between the four great sections of the continent. "^^ An article 

68 Gaceta de Colombia, June 29, 1823. The article of La Aieja Argentina 
referred to was probably one which appeared in the issue of December 15, 
1822 (No. 9, Tomo 2). Another article entitled Nueva Ojeada soire el 
tratado de Colombia y Lima appeared in the number of La Abeja for Feb- 
ruary 15, 1823. 

69 Reproduced in the Gaceta de Colombia of September 21, 1823. 

70 Gaceta del Gobiemo, September 3, 1823. 



i EAELY PKOJECTS OF CON^TIE'ENTAL UNION 303 

i 

• in the Gaceta de Colombia called attention to the fact that the 

[ people of South America, electrified by the idea of independence 
I and moved by the noble desire of following in the footsteps 
of their " brothers of the north," began to form separate fed- 
eral governments, thus destroying the precious unity which 
was the indestructible foundation of freedom. The writer 
recommended the formation of strong central governments as a 
prerequisite to a closer imitation of the sons of Washington. 
With Mexico, Peru, Chile, New Granada, and Buenos Aires 
forming, as before the war, great independent states with a 
strongly centralized administration, he thought that an excellent 
federal system might then be effected. '^-^ In July, 1825, a 
paper published in Cartagena, the Correo de Magdalena, taking 
as a point of departure a letter received from Europe with news 
that the Congress of Milan had probably by that time taken 
place, pointed out in a lengthy article the contrast between the 
two systems represented by the Holy Alliance and the proposed 
American Confederation. It was the opinion of the writer that 
the assemblies of kings, or, tyrants as he preferred to call them, 
had no other object than the extinction of the ideas of liberty; 
that the hopes of the liberals in Spain, in Naples, and in the 
Piedmont had been frustrated by a league which with un- 
heard-of audacity was called holy; that on the contrary the 
proposed congress of plenipotentiaries at Panama had a benefi- 
cent design not only toward America but toward the rest of 
the world as well, and that it aimed to hasten the epoch when, 
with liberty and justice enthroned in America, happiness and 
prosperity would prevail throughout the world. '^^ 

As the agitation of the subject grew in Spanish America, the 
newspapers of the United States became interested and joined 
in the discussion. According to the Gaceta de Colombia, a 
New York paper published on January 6, 1825, extracts from 
a Mexican paper in which the objects of the confederation and 
the nature of its organization were set forth. 

71 Gaceta de Colombia, January 11, 1824. 

72 Correo de Magdalena, July 21, 1825. 



304: PAN'-AMEEICAE^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

The plan suggested was that the congress be composed of 
three representatives from each state and that it meet at any 
place in the Floridas that the United States might choose to 
designate. An expedition composed of the combined forces 
of the confederation — that is, of the United States, Mexico, 
Colombia, Buenos Aires, Peru, Chile, and Santo Domingo — 
would forthwith be fitted out against the island of Cuba. After- i 
ward an amphictyonic council would be formed at Habana, 
which in case of emergency would name a general to command 
the forces of the confederation, though the election might be 
left to each of the states by turn. 

Commenting on the Mexican proposal, a writer in the Gaceta 
de Colombiu,, described as being one of the highest officers of 
state in that republic, expressed the fear that a meeting of 
American plenipotentiaries in Florida would not fail to sug- 
gest objections arising from the neutrality of the United States. 
He believed that the deliberations could be conducted at Panama 
with greater freedom and that if their " good and illustrious 
friends, the United States," were willing to contribute, they 
might do so with propriety by taking part in those delibera- 
tions which were not of a hostile character. Having made this 
distinction the writer proceeded to indicate in detail the objects 
upon which the congress might deliberate. As those objects 
will be considered in the next chapter they need not be men- 
tioned here. A translation of the article of the Gaceta de Co- 
lombia was published some time later in Niles' Weekly Register. 
This paper regarded the congress as of great importance and 
believed that the United States ought to take part in it, for the 
time might come when it would be necessary to rally the free 
nations of the American continent in opposition to " the despots 
of the other with their herds of slaves." ''^ 

73 The article of the Gaceta de Colombia referred to was copied by the 
Gaceta del GoUerno (Peru) in its issue of May 22, 1825, and by Niles' 
Weekly Register of April 30, 1825. For other articles in the press of the 
United States see the National Gazette and Library Register of Phila- 



EARLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 305 

. In Great Britain, interest in the affairs of Spanish and Portu- 
,\ giiese America had always been keen. The English newspapers 
j gave attention to the project of federating the new American 
' states and opinion was generally favorable to the project. The 
j following extract from a leading article of the Times of April 
11, 1825, may be taken as typical of British opinion and of the 
attitude of the British public. 

" It is stated in accounts from the United States," says the 
Times, " that after the return of Bolivar from Peru one of his 
first acts will be to attend a meeting of deputies from all the 
new American states, who are to assemble at Panama to confer 
on such measures as may be necessary for the general safety. 
To contrast this congress and the confederation which may 
probably result from it with the Holy Alliance, it is to be 
denominated the Most Holy Alliance. The name may be need- 
less or ill chosen; but far different is the thing which it signi- 
fies. The most important and alluring event that we can well 
imagine to those against whom it is to operate must undoubtedly 
be a defensive league against the unjust — of the injured against 
the aggressors — of free nations and their magistrates against 
a band of tyrants, who have none to protect them but their own 
dissatisfied and distrusted slaves. In truth, such an union re- 
quires no congress to sanction or attest it. The alliance of all 
the free against all the enemies of freedom exists and flourishes 
at this moment, substantially and sensibly over the whole earth, 
without any formal compact. . . . The free confederacy which 
was acted upon in one shape by the new republics when they 
assisted each other and extingniished the Spanish power in Peru, 
has not been confined to the western coast of the Atlantic. It 
embraces England, as distinctly and specifically, as if she had 
been enrolled by positive treaty among its members. England 
became a member of the league from the moment in which she 
declared that no European power but Spain (and Spain long 

delpMa for April 23, 1825, and the National Intelligencer of Washington for 
April 26, 1825. 



306 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNIITGS 

ceased to be a power), that is, in fact, that no power whatever 
should molest the American republics." "^^ 

In France opinion on the American question was divided, 
the liberal element of the population, as was the case through- 
out Europe, sympathizing with the aims of the new states and 
desiring the government to establish friendly relations with 
them. The liberal paper, Le Constitutionnel, was an important 
organ of propaganda in favor of the American cause. In its 
issue of March 24, 1825, there appeared an article in which the 
success of the revolution in America was described as marking 
the beginning of a new era in the world's history. It was the 
opinion of the writer that Europe could not reduce these coun- 
tries to submission and that consequently everything should be 
done to gain their friendship and to secure a share in their rich 
comnierce.'^^ But in France a special propaganda in favor of 
the new states had been carried on for some time through the 
publications of the Abbe de Pradt. In the month of August, 
1825, the abbe published in Paris a pamphlet on the proposed 
congress of Panama in which the highest praise was given to the 
author of the idea. De Pradt based his study upon an official 
announcement of the objects of the congress which, he says, ap- 
peared in the Oaceta de Colombia, and was reproduced some 
four months later by Le Moniteur of Paris J' ^^ And he may 
have received information direct from the government of Co- 
lombia or from Bolivar himself ; for, with the latter, the abbe 
had been in correspondence for some time past.'^'^ It does not 
appear that De Pradt was commissioned to write the pamphlet 
on the Congress of Panama, but it is known that beginning 
with 1825 he received from Bolivar an annuity of 3,000 pesos, 

''^Supplement to The Times, April 11, 1825. 

75 Oaceta del Oobierno (Peru), September IS, 1825. For the attitude of 
Le Constitutionnel toward the Monroe Declaration of 1823 see Polit. Sci. 
Quar., VI, 555. 

76 Pradt, Congr4s de Panama, 4, 92. 

77 O'Leary, Memorias, XII, 181-188. 



EAKLY PROJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 307 

undoubtedly as compensation for carrying on a general propa- 
ganda in favor of the American cause. "^^ 

That Bolivar should desire his project for holding a congress 
at Panama to be favorably regarded in Europe is not to be ex- 
plained by mere vanity on his part, but by the hard necessity 
in which he found himself of maintaining the credit of the new 
states until their internal affairs should have reached some 
degree of stability and until their relations with Spain and the 
other powers should have been placed on a satisfactory foot- 
ing. It is not unlikely, therefore, that the highly eulogistic 
manner in which De Pradt refers to the Liberator in his Con- 
gres de Panama was meant to give popularity to the movement 
by directing attention to the man who initiated it. But in 
America, naturally, the case was different. It was necessary 
to avoid bringing the prime mover too much into view, for al- 
ready jealousy of his power and suspicion of his designs had 
begun to undermine his influence. In a pamphlet prepared by 
Bernardo Monteagudo and first published in Peru in 1825,"^^ 
the subject was treated in a wholly impersonal way ; and more- 
over the general aims of the congress were dealt with in the 
main, rather than the specific ones as was the case in De Pradt's 
little treatise. Monteagudo's ability and the post of confidence 
which he held under the rule of Bolivar in Peru make it of 
interest to examine briefly the ideas which he advanced on 
the subject of a confederation of American states. 

Monteagudo was bom about 178Y in the viceroyalty of La 
Plata, studied law at Chuquisaca, was involved in the early 
revolutionary movements in Upper Peru, and later took an ac- 
tive and zealous part in the overthrow of Spanish rule in Buenos 

78 Sanchez, Bibliografia. 

79 Monteagudo, Bernardo, Ensayo sobre la necesidad de una federacidn 
jeneral entre los Estados Hispano- Americanos y plan de su organizacio'rh 
(Library of Congress), Guatemala edition. The essay was reprinted from 
the Chilean edition in the Coleccidn de Ensayos y Documentos relativos d 
la unidn y confederacidn de los pueilos Hispano- Americanos, published ii; 
Santiago, Chile, in 1862. 



308 PA:N'-AMEEICANISM: its BEGIISFNINGS 

Aires. Compelled by intrigue to leave the country in 1815, 
lie returned in time to accompany the expedition of San Martin 
to Chile in 1817. Going with San Martin to Peru he served 
as that leader's chief political adviser and as minister of war 
and navy in the provisional government which was organized 
at Lima in 1821. Shortly before San Martin's abdication, 
Monteagudo, who had never been popular, was again forced 
into exile. Upon the accession. of Bolivar he returned and was 
restored to his former position in the government. He was 
later made Minister of Foreign Affairs, at which post he re- 
mained until his death by assassination in January, 1825. 
Among the papers which he left was found an essay in manu- 
script on the necessity of a general federation of the Spanish 
American states. The essay, though unfinished, was imme- 
diately printed at Lima and during the same year it was re- 
printed in Chile and in Guatemala.^*^ And although the pam- 
phlet was not translated and reproduced in the United States, 
yet it was reviewed at length in the North American Review in 
an article attributed to Jared Sparks.^ ^ 

Independence, peace, and security (garantias), according to 
Monteagudo, were the three great interests of the new states. 
Of these, independence was the chief. To throw off the yoke 
of Spain, to destroy the last vestige of her domination, and to 
admit no other was an enterprise which demanded, and would 
demand for a long time to come, a common fund of resources 
and unity of action in the employment of them. There was 
still danger from the Holy Alliance, and although the first ves- 
sel that should sail from the shores of Europe against the lib- 
erty of the ISTew World would give the signal of alarm to all 
those who formed the liberal party in both hemispheres, and 
although Great Britain and the United States would play their 
proper part in the universal conflict which would result, yet the 
dangers were such as to demand that the new states band them- 

80 Paz Soldan, Historia del Per4 Independiente, I, 199-202, 313. 
?i North American Review, XXII; 1^2-176. 



jEAKLY PROJECTS OF COKTINENTAL UNION 309 

I selves together. " Human foresight," he declared, " is unable 
j to predict the accidents and the vicissitudes v^hich our republics 
■will suffer unless thej unite. The consequences of an unfortu- 
iuate campaign, the eft'ects of some treaty concluded in Europe 
between powers that maintain the present balance, a few do- 
jmestic disturbances and the consequent change of principles, 
I might favor the party of legitimacy, unless we assume in time 
an attitude of uniform resistance ; and unless we hasten to make 
I a real compact, which we may call a family compact, to guaran- 
: tee our independence, as a whole and in detail." ^^ 

By the second interest, peace, Monteagudo meant to imply 
peace as between the confederates and the rest of the world, 
peace as between state and sitate of the union, and peace as 
between factions within each separate state.^^ Without attrib- 
uting to the proposed assembly any power of coercion, which 
would degrade its institution, it nevertheless seemed indispen- 
sable that, at least for the first ten years, the general direction 
of the foreign and domestic policy of the confederation should 
be in charge of such a body in order that the peace might not 
be disturbed and in order that its conservation might not be 
purchased at the sacrifice of the very foundations of the Amer- 

82 Coleccion de Ensayos y Documentos relativos a la union y confederacion 
de los Pueblos Hispano-Americanos, 164—169. 

83 Article 10 of the treaty of union, league, and confederation between 
Colombia and Peru signed at Lima, June 6, 1822, provided that in case 
the internal tranquillity of either of the confederated states should be 
interrupted by turbulent and seditious persons, enemies of the governments 
lawfully established by the people, the contracting parties engaged to make 
common cause against them until order should be reestablished. This 
article, it will be recalled, was not ratified by Colombia, on account, prob- 
ably, of the following incident: While the discussion of the ratification 
of the Colombia-Peru treaties was going on in the Colombian Senate, news 
reached Bogota of the revolution which had deposed O'Higgins in Chile 
and placed Freyre at the head of the government. The Senate requested 
the executive to say whether the government of O'Higgins or that of Freyre 
should be recognized. The Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that he 
had no authority to decide the question and the article was rejected. 
Santander, writing to Bolivar concerning this incident, declared that if it 
had not been for the question between Freyre and O'Higgins the article 
would have passed. O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 538, 



310 PAI^-AMEKtCANISM: ITS BEGHsTNINGS 

ican system. The assembly would be able, by tbe influence oii 
its august councils, to mitigate tbe spirit of localism, wbicb iii[ 
tbe first years would be active and destructive. An interrup-: 
tion of tbe peace and barmony of any of tbe Hispano-American 
republics would cause a continental conflagration from wbicb 
none could escape, bowever muob distance migbt favor, at first, 
its neutrality. jFor tbe political affinities created among tbel 
Hispano-American republics by tbe revolution, united to mora^ 
and physical similarities, would cause any stress or movementt 
wbicb any one or more of tbem migbt receive to be communi 
cated to tbe rest, as wben in mountains tbe ecbo of tbe tbunder-ii 
clap rebounds from one peak to another. It seemed clear,' 
therefore, that in case of the disturbance of the internal tran- 
quillity of any one of the states, tbe interposition of tbe assem- 
bly would be necessary to prevent tbe evil consequences wbicb 
migbt arise from tbe spread of the disaster. ^^ 

Discussing tbe third great interest, security, Monteagudo 
declared that among the causes wbicb might disturb tbe peace 
and friendship of the confederates none was more obvious than 
the lack of rules and principles as a basis for their public law. 
Every day there would occur among these new republics ques- 
tions of reciprocal rights and duties. Tbe progress of com- 
merce and navigation, the growing intimacy of their relations 
in general, and the existence of unjust laws and practices would 
demand constant negotiation and tbe formation of numerous 
treaties, from which much friction would arise unless recourse 
to an impartial assembly provided the necessary guarantees.^^ 

Such was Monteagudo' s conception of the nature and func- 
tion of an American League of ISTations. Under tbe conditions 
which then existed it was natural that independence should be 
regarded as tbe chief desideratum. It was tbe great object for 
wbicb tbe struggle had been waged against Spain for fifteen 
long years. Once independence were attained, tbe other in- 

84 Coleccion de Ensayos, etc., 171-172. 
ssrUd., 174. 



EAELY PEOJECTS OF CONTINENTAL UNION 311 

terests, peace and security, would take first place. These in- 
deed have been the aims of all the historic schemes of interna- 
tional cooperation, from the Great Design of Henry IV to the 
Covenant of Versailles. 

An idea has now been given of the early views on the subject 
of continental unity ; of the first positive steps taken to convene 
a general American congress, and of the character of the propa- 
ganda carried on to gain adherents to the plan.^® The congress 
itself must now be considered in detail. 

86 No special consideration has been given to the propaganda carried on 
by means of private correspondence. In the first twelve volumes of 
O'Leary's Memorias, consisting of letters mainly to Bolivar, there may be 
found many evidences of the attention which the subject received in the 
letters of the public men of the time. 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE PANAMA CONGKESS 



Confident of a final victory over the Royalist forces in Peru, _ 
Bolivar began toward the close of the year 1824 to direct hisii 
attention anew to the project which had long been the object! 
of his solicitude; namely, the unification of the new Spanish' 
American states through the medium of an international assem- 
bly composed of representatives of the several independent en-| 
titles. The official action which he had taken three years prior 
to this time, looking to the establishment of such a body, hav- 
ing failed to give the desired results, he now revived the project 
in his well-known circular letter of December 7, 1824, inviting 
the American republics, formerly colonies of Spain, to take part 
in an " Assembly of Plenipotentiaries " to be held at Panama. 
Subsequently the United States and Brazil were invited; the 
United States by the governments of Colombia, Mexico, and 
Central America, and Brazil by that of Colombia alone. It 
was understood that these two powers should participate to 
such extent as their position as neutrals would permit. 

Great Britain was apparently the only non-American power 
to be distinguished with an invitation, though the E"etherlands, 
whether formally invited or not, sent an agent to be present at 
the seat of the council. It was rumored that France would do 
likewise, but this proved not to be true. The invitation to 
Great Britain was extended by the minister of Colombia at 
London with the assurance that a commissioner sent to Panama 
by the British Government would be treated " cordially and 
without the least reserve." The Assembly, usually referred to 
as the Congress of Panama, finally opened its sessions on June 
22, 1826, and adjourned on July 15 following, with the under- 



THE PANAMA CONGRESS 313 

standing that the plenipotentiaries, after having reported to 
their respective governments, should reconvene at Tacubaya, 
near the City of Mexico, where it was proposed to continue the 
labors of the congress.^ 

Of the Spanish American states, Peru, Colombia, Central 
America, and Mexico were represented in the Assembly. The 
United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, for reasons which will be 
explained later, declined to take part. Chile professed to be 
friendly to the movement, and the Supreme Director of the re- 
public, after some delay, submitted the question to the national 
legislature for its approval. Further delays followed, and 
when the Chilean congress finally authorized the appoint- 
ment of representatives the meeting at Panama had long since 
adjourned.^ Paraguay in its self-imposed isolation gave a 
negative reply. Bolivia, the newest of the republics, appointed 
delegates, but too late for them to be able to participate in the 
congress.^ Brazil accepted the invitation and designated a plen- 
ipotentiary ; but for some reason — perhaps for fear of the 
intervention of the congress in the impending conflict of the 
empire with Buenos Aires — he was not dispatched on his mis- 
sion.^ The British Government appointed as its agent Edward 
J. Dawkins. He was present at Panama from the opening of 
the congress to its close, when he returned to England.^ The 
Netherlands were represented by Colonel van Veer, who at- 
tended, however, in a wholly unofficial capacity.^ 

The United States accepted the invitation, and on December 
26, 1825, President Adams nominated to the Senate, Richard C. 

1 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 533-540; Zubieta, Congresos de Panama 
y Tacubaya, 13, 28, 34, 36, 66, 130; International American Conference 
(1889-1890), IV, 23-24, 111; American State Papers, For. Rel., V., 919. 

2 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XV, 87. 

3 Paz Soldiln, Historia del Peru Independiente, Segundo Periodo, II, 178. 

4 Arism.endi Brito, Contestacidn al Disourso de F. Tosta Oarcia, 32 ; 
O'Leary, Memorias, III, 216. 

5 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 555. 

6 Torres Caicedo, Unidn Latino-Americana, 38, citing Kestrepo, Historia 
de la Revolucion de Colombia, 



314 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Anderson of Kenitucky and John Sergeant of Pennsylvania " to 
be envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary to the |i 
assembly of American nations at Panama." '^ These appoint- jt 
ments were not confirmed by the Senate until the middle of p 
the following March, and, owing to a long debate in the House 
of Kepresentatives over the appropriation necessary for carry- 
ing the mission into effect, it was not until May 8 that Clay's I 
general instructions to Anderson and Sergeant were signed. \ 
From the instructions it appears that Anderson, who was United P 
States minister to Colombia, had been directed to proceed from ^ 
Bogota to Porto Bello to be joined by Sergeant, whence the two ; 
should travel overland to Panama.^ 

Under the circumstances Anderson could scarcely have | 
reached Panama until after the congress had adjourned. As j 
it happened he left Bogota on June 12,^ fell ill on the way, 
and died at Cartagena on July 24.^® The departure of Ser- 
geant from the United States was postponed until the end of the 
year, when he went to Mexico for the purpose of attending the 
congress upon the renewal of its sessions at Tacubaya.^^ Joel 
P. Poinsett, minister of the United States to Mexico, was ap- 
pointed to replace Anderson. ^^ As the congress did not reas- 
semble at Tacubaya • at the time set, Sergeant, after a few 
months' sojourn in. Mexico, returned to the United States. ^^ 

7 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 318, 320. 
s International American Conference (ISSO-ISQO), IV, 113. 

9 Oaceta de Colombia, June 18, 1826; Am. State Papers: For. Rel., VI, 
555. 

10 Niles' Register, XXXI, 16. 

11 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 356 ; Adams, 
Memoirs, VII, 183. 

12 Adams, Memoirs, VII, 223. 

13 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 385 ; Adams, 
Memoirs, VII, 312. 

Writers have not always been accurate in their reference to the congress 
of Panama. Lyman, for example (Diplomacy of the United States, II, 
489), and Benton (Thirty Tears' View, I, 66) declare that the congress 
never assembled at Panama. Nearly all fall into error respecting dele- 
gates of the United States. Von Hoist (Constitutional History of the 
U. 8., I, 432) gays that when the ambassadors of the United States arrived 



THE PANAMA CONGEESS 315 

President Adams in his special message of March 15, 1826, 
transmitting to the House of Representatives certain documents 
relating to the Congress of Panama, expressed the opinion that 
accidents unforeseen and mischances not to be anticipated, might 

in Panama the congress had already adjourned; Tucker {The Monroe 
Doctrine, 34 ) , that Anderson and Sergeant at last set out to attend the 
meeting, but before their arrival the congress had assembled and adjourned; 
McMaster (History of the People of the United States, Y, 459), that An- 
derson died on the way and that Sergeant reached Panama to find that the 
delegates had assembled and adjourned to meet again in Tacubaya; Turner 
{Amei'ican Kation: A History, XIV, 285), that one of the delegates died on 
his way and that the other arrived after the congress had adjourned ; O'Leary 
{Memorias, XXVIII, 556), that the delegates of the United States did not 
take their seats in the assembly because Anderson died on the way and upon 
the arrival of Sergeant the representatives of the other countries had left 
for Tacubaya. Torres Caicedo ( Unidn Latino-Americana, 38, quoting the 
Columbian historian, Restrepo), that Anderson died in Cartagena on his 
way to the Isthmus and that Sergeant arrived too late; Calvo (Le Droit 
International, I, 72), that of the two envoys one died on the way to the 
Isthmus and the other arrived after the adjournment to Tacubaya; Zubieta 
(Congresos de Panama y Tacubaya, 42), merely that the representatives of 
the United States did not attend. 

It seems quite clear that Sergeant did not go to Panama at all. Secre- 
tary Clay, in a report dated January 31, 1827 (For. Rel., VI, 555), gives 
the date of Sergeant's commission as March 14, 1826 (Am. State Papers), 
but states that his salary did not begin until October 24, 1826, when he 
was notified to prepare to proceed on the mission. Clay referred here to 
Tacubaya undoubtedly, for before this time the Department of State must 
have received the dispatches of Poinsett, dated August 20 and 26 (Am. 
State Papers, For. Rel., VI, 357) relative to the change of meeting 
place. Moreover, in his annual message of December 5, 1826, President 
Adams says : " The decease of one of our ministers on his way to the 
Isthmus and the impediments of the season which delayed the departure 
of the other, deprived us of the advantage of being represented at the 
first meeting of the congress." (Am. State Papers, For. Rel., VI, 209). If 
further evidence were required it might be mentioned that Adams speaks 
in his Memoirs, (VII, 126, 154) of traveling in July, 1826, with Sergeant 
from Philadelphia to New York and of seeing him again in Philadelphia 
in the following October. He made no reference to the mission to Panama. 
Finally the U.S.S. Lexington which, according to Clay's instructions of 
May 8, should have conducted Sergeant to Porto Bello was later assigned 
to other duty, spending the whole summer from June to September on a 
cruise to northern waters. Immediately upon her return this vessel was 
sent on a mission to the Port of Spain. (American State Papers, Naval 
Affairs, II, 731, 745). Schouler (History of the United States, III, 365) 
makes an exact statement of facts relative to the representatives of the 
United States; likewise Chadwick, The Relations of the United States 
and Spain, 214. 



316 PAN'-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINNrnGS I 

baffle all the higli purposes and disappoint the fairest expecta- 
tions of that undertaking. " But the design," he declared, " is 
gTeat, is benevolent, humane." ^* Clay thought that the assem- 
bling of a congress at Panama composed of diplomatic repre-P 
sentatives from the independent American nations would formj' 
a new epoch in human affairs. " The fact itself," he said, 
" whatever may be the issue of the conferences of such a con- 
gress, cannot fail to challenge the attention of the present gen- 
eration of the civilized world and to command that of pos- 
terity." ^^ And Bolivar, the father of the idea, had previously fl 
predicted, in his circular letter referred to above, that the day f 
on which the plenipotentiaries of the several governments should j* 
exchange their powers, would mark an important epoch in the f 
diplomatic history of America. " When after a hundred cen- [ 
turies," he wrote, " posterity shall search for the origin of our 
public law and shall recall the compacts which fixed our des- 
tiny, it will consult with veneration the protocols of the Isthmus. 1 
In them will be found the plan of the alliances which first gave 
direction to our relations with the world. What, then, will the 
Isthmus of Corinth be compared with that of Panama ? " ^® 

It is needless to say that the Congress of Panama did not 
meet the high expectations of its great protagonist nor of its 
numerous friends and supporters who played a lesser part in 
the attempt to realize its noble aims. Bolivar, in a moment of 
disgust, likened it to the crazy Greek who of old sat on a rock 
in the midst of the sea and tried to direct the ships that sailed 
about him.^''^ The failure of the congress to produce tangible 
results was sufficient to cause it to be passed over with indiffer- 
ence or to be characterized, and thus condemned, as illusory. ^^ 

14 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, II, 340. 

15 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 114. 

16 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 253. 

17 lUd., XXVIII, 563. 

18 Historians of the United States who give any consideration at all to 
the congress of Panama treat it almost wholly from the standpoint of in- 
ternal polities. The fact, for example, that Benton believed the congress 
had never assembled is a strong witness to his lack of interest in it as a 



THE PANAMA COKGKESS 317 

The greatness, the benevolence, the humanity of its design ap- 
peared to make no appeal to men's imaginations. The mere 
fact of a meeting of American states did not command, as 
Henry Clay predicted that it would do, the attention either of 
that generation or of those that immediately followed. !Never- 
theless the central idea, continental solidarity, at no time en- 
tirely ceased to be a force in American affairs. ^^ 

This idea, called to-day Pan-Americanism, is acquiring a 
^vider extension and greater momentum than it ever possessed 
in the time of Bolivar. And the movement is now being carried 
along mainly by states which ninety years ago were but indiffer- 
ent or mildly interested spectators of the Liberator's efforts to 
establish an American political system. The republics which 
he founded and those which adhered without reservation to 
the Congress of Panama are far from occupying at the present 
time the position of influence which he aspired to have them 
occupy in the international affairs of the Western Hemisphere. 
The structure which is to-day being reared wears, therefore, a 
different aspect from that which he would have given it. But 
it rests upon the same foundation of common interests and com- 
mon ideals as that upon which it was proposed to build at Pan- 
matter of continental importance. And yet he says it was a master sub- 
ject on the political theatre of its day (Thirty Tears' View, I, 65). Von 
Hoist treats rather fully the constitutional questions involved. McMaster 
gives some twenty-five pages to a consideration of the debates in Congress, 
but views it mainly from the national standpoint. Schouler declares that 
the whole project, incongruous under any aspect, proved abortive (History 
of the U. S., Ill, 364). Other historians of the United States either give 
the subject scant attention or do not mention it at all. The same criticism 
applies generally to Latin American historians. AlamSn does not discuss 
the congress, nor does Baralt. Restrepo, as might have been expected from 
his intimate association with Bolivar, gives a sympathetic account which 
is closely followed by Paz Soldan. Barros Arana gives a succinct history 
of the movement, but declares it to have been chimerical (Historia Jen. de 
Chile, XV, 87) . Mitre dismisses the subject with a few words as a fantas- 
tic dream (Historia de San Martin, IV, 108). 

19 About the middle of the last century there was manifested a strong 
movement throughout Hispanic America toward a revival of Bolivar's 
scheme of federation. In 1847 and in 1864 congresses were held at Lima, 
Peru, for the piu-pose of putting the idea into effect. 



318 PAK-AMERICAl^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

ama. And as the edifice grows toward perfection it may be [; 
possible to recognize in its general design many of the lines 
traced by the hand of the original architect. Thus posterity 
will ever be more and more constrained to search for the origins 
of American policy not in the protocols of the Isthmus, per- 
haps, but in the political ideals of Simon Bolivar. 

Upon the receipt of Bolivar's circular of December 7, 1824, 
the government of Colombia renewed its activity, and Vice 
President Santander, writing immediately to the Liberator, 
suggested that the governments of Colombia and Peru authorize 
their plenipotentiaries to proceed within a period of four months 
to the Isthmus and having begun their preparatory conferences, 
to enter into direct correspondence with the governments of Mex- 
ico, Guatemala, Chile, and Buenos Aires. He proposed also 
that the plenipotentiaries of Colombia and Peru be given full 
liberty to select a place on the Isthmus for the meeting; that 
as soon as they should be joined by the delegates of Mexico or 
by those of Guatemala, a day for the opening of the assembly 
should be set by common consent ; and that the plenipotentiaries 
of Colombia and Peru should on no account absent themselves 
from the Isthmus until the general congress should have met 
and terminated its sessions. ^'^ 

In accordance with the plan proposed by Santander the gov- 
ernment of Peru, appointed its representatives to the congress 
and dispatched them to the Isthmus in June, 1825.^^ The 
delegates of Colombia were appointed in August of that year 
and they arrived at Panama in December. ^^ Preliminary con- 
ferences were at once begun by the representatives of the two 
countries, and communications were also addressed by them to the 
governments of Mexico, Central America, Chile, and Buenos 
Aires, urging that their plenipotentiaries be sent to the Isthmus 
at the earliest possible moment. The ministers designated by 

20 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 254, 256. 

21 Ibid., XXIV, 262. 

22 Ibid., XXIV, 270, 290. 



I THE PA:N'AMA congress 319 

I the united provinces of Central America soon arrived. Those 
i of Mexico, however, though long expected, did not reach Pan- 
ama until June 4, 1826, almost a year after the delegates from 
Peru.^^ It was then decided not to await the arrival of the 
representatives of other countries, and the congress began its 
sessions on June 22.^* 

The delegates of Peru were Jose Maria de Pando and Man- 
uel Lorenzo de Vidaurre. Pando, though born in Peru, was 
educated in Spain and remained there until 1824. For a time 
during the constitutional regime he occupied a position in the 
cabinet of Eerdinand VII. He was the author of works on 
diverse subjects, among which was a posthumous treatise on 
international law. Before the congress opened he was recalled 
to be appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs at Lima. He was 
superseded by Manuel Perez de Tudela, who, like his colleague, 
Vidaurre, had held high judicial positions under the independ- 
ent government of Peru.^^ 

Colombia was represented by Pedro Gual and Pedro Briceno 
Mendez. The former became prominent in the early revolu- 
tionary movements in Venezuela and served for a while as secre- 
tary to General Miranda. Upon the defeat of the Patriots in 
1812, he escaped to the United States, where, after studying 
law and being admitted to the bar, he began the practice of his 
profession at Washington. ^^ He was involved in the Amelia 
Island affair of 1817, as related elsewhere, and soon thereafter 
returned to South America to become the first Minister of For- 
eign Affairs of Colombia under the constitution of 1821. After 
the dissolution of Greater Colombia in 1830, he lived for some 
years in retirement. In 1837 he was sent on a mission to Eu- 
rope by the government of Ecuador. In 1860 he became Presi- 
dent of Venezuela, but resigned the following year. He died 

zslbid., XXIV, 291, 292, 296-8, 307, 325. 

24 Hid., XXIV, 327. 

25 Calvo, Le Droit International, I, 97 ; O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 468, 
650. 

26 Appleton, Cyclopedia of American Biography. 



320 PAIT-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

shortly afterward at Guayaquil. His associate, Briceno Men- 
dez, had won distinction as a soldier in the wars for independ- 
ence. Both ably represented their government at Panama. 

Pedro Molina and Antonio Larrazabal were the delegates 
of the republic of Central America. Molina had done much 
by his writings to prepare the way for independence. He op- 
posed the union of Central America with the Mexican empire 
under Iturbide, and upon the separation in 1823 became a mem- 
ber of the provisional government of the Central American re- 
public. Sent as minister to Colombia he negotiated with that 
republic in 1825 the treaty of union, league, and confedera- 
tion to which reference was made in the preceding chapter. In 
1830, while he was at the head of the state government of Guate- 
mala, under the federation, charges were brought against him 
as a result of which he was suspended from office and tried. 
He was acquitted, but never occupied a position of prominence 
thereafter. ^'^ His associate, Larrazabal, had been a member of 
the first Spanish Cortes and was reputed to be " a man of much 
learning, of great probity, and of a firm and reliable char- 
acter." 28 

The Mexican delegates were Jose Mariano Michelena and 
Jose Dominguez. The former, having been involved in the 
early revolutionary plots in Mexico, was arrested and sent as a 
prisoner to Spain, where he later served in the army. Having 
returned to Mexico, he became a member of the provisional 
government established after the downfall of Iturbide. In 
1824 he was sent on a diplomatic mission to Colombia, and was 
recalled to be given the appointment to Panama. Dominguez 
had been Minister of Justice in the cabinet of Iturbide and at 
the time of his appointment was president of the Court of Jus- 
tice of Guanajuato.^^ 

Before entering upon the examination of the work of the 

27 Monttifar, Resena Historica, I, 205-217. 

28 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 307. 

29 Bancroft, History of Mexico, IV, 402 ; Zubieta, Congresos de Panamd y 
Tacubaya, 46. 



THE PANAMA CONGKESS 321 

congress, it is desirable to turn back for a moment and con- 
sider certain documents which have essential bearing upon its 
deliberations. 

The first of these is a dispatch dated March 6, 1825, from 
the government of Colombia to Dean Funes, its charge d'affaires 
at Buenos Aires, by which he was instructed to make known to 
the latter sovereignty the objects of the assembly and to express 
the hope that the views of the two governments were in perfect 
accord. The objects of the congress were stated as follows: 

1. "To renew the treaty of union, alliance, and perpetual 
confederacy against Spain or any other power which might at- 
tempt to dominate over us. 

2. " To issue, in the name of their constituents, a suitable 
manifesto upon the justice of their cause, exposing the sinister 
views of Spain and declaring our system of politics with respect 
to the other powers of Christianity. 

3. " To consider the condition of the islands of Porto Rico 
and Cuba; the expediency of a combined force to free them / 
from the Spanish yoke; and the proportion of troops which/ 
each state should contribute for that purpose; and to determine 
whether the islands shall be united to either of the confederated 
states or be left at liberty to choose their own government. 

4. " To conclude or renew a treaty of commerce between the 
new states as allies and confederates. 

5. " To conclude a consular convention between all, which 
should clearly and distinctly lay down the functions and pre- 
rogatives of their respective consuls. 

6. " To take into consideration the means of giving effect 
to the declarations of the President of the United States of 
America, in his message to the Congress of last year, with a view 
to frustrating any future idea of colonization on this continent 
by the powers of Europe, and to resist any principle of inter- 
ference in our internal affairs. 

7. " To establish in concert those principles of the rights of 
nations, which are of a controversial nature, and especially those 



\ 



322 PAN"-AMEK[CANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

which relate to two nations, one of which is engaged in war, 
whilst the other is neutral. 

8. " Lastly, to declare on what footing the political and 
commercial relations of those parts of our hemisphere, which, 
like the island of Santo Domingo or Haiti, are separated from 
their ancient government, and have not yet been recognized by 
any European or American power, should be placed." ^" j* 

A few days before this letter was written, there appeared in | 
the Gaceta de Colombia an article, heretofore mentioned as hav- [ 
ing been copied by newspapers in Peru and in the United I 
States, and as having been used by De Pradt in the prepara- j 
tion of his pamphlet, in which the objects of the congress - 
were stated, with some exceptions, in almost the same language j 
as that employed in the dispatch. The article in the Gaceta, \ 
however, while enumerating as one of the objects of the con- 
gress the adoption of measures for the liberation of Cuba and 
Porto Pico, did not raise the question of the future disposition 
of the islands; nor did it mention the subject of a consular 
convention, or the extension of the war to the coasts of Spain 
or to the Canaries and the Philippines. The last three objects 
specified in the dispatch and in the Gaceta were identical, and 
in both places they werei declared' toi be appropriate for the joint 
consideration of belligerents and neutrals, if any of the latter 
should take part in the congress.^ ^ 

The foregoing details derive importance from the fact that the 
statement of the objects of the congress which must have been 
sent to the rest of the allied governments early in February, 
1825, is not to be found among the published documents relat- 
ing to the Congress of Panama. ^^ Nor does the letter to the 

30 British and Foreign State Papers, XII, 894. 

31 British and Foreign State Papers, VII, 894 ; Gaceta del Qohierno 
(Perti), May 22, 1825; Niles' Weekly Register, XXVIII, 132. 

32 Alaman, minister of Foreign Affairs in Mexico, writing, March 30, 
1825, to Michelena, Mexican minister at London, refers to communications 
received from the governments of Colombia relative to the proposed Con- 
gress of Panama. President Victoria's reply to Bolivar's circular of De- 
cember 7, 1824, was dated February 23, 1825. As the circular was not re- 



[' THE PANAMA CONGKESS 323 

Colombian charge at Buenos Aires appear in either of the col- 
lections published by the government of Venezuela. O'Leary 
in his Memorias says that Colombia proposed to Peru and to 
the rest of the allies the essential matters upon which the con- 
gress should deliberate, and, without giving the source of his 
information, proceeds to specify the subjects thus proposed. 
The matters mentioned by him as appropriate for discussion 
by belligerents only were in substance the same as those enumer- 
ated in the Gacetdj but with regard to the subjects suitable for 
discussion by both belligerents and neutrals there are important 
differences. The most important of these relates to the pro- 
nouncement of President Monroe, which O'Leary describes as 
a declaration " relative to frustrating in the future any at- 
tempt of Spain to colonize the American continent," ^^ thus 
depriving it of its true significance. 

O'Leary's narrative evidently lacks at this point the exact- 
ness which characterizes his work as a whole ; for, besides mis- 
describing the Monroe declaration, he includes among the top- 
ics for the joint consideration of belligerents and neutrals sev- 
eral matters which clearly pertained to belligerents and to bellig- 
erents only ; such as the adoption of a plan of hostilities against 
Spain, and the determination of the contingent of land and sea 
forces which each state should provide. It can scarcely be 

ceived at Bogota until February 4, the copy sent to Mexico must have gone 
direct from Peru, for the time intervening between February 4 and February 
23 would not have been sufficient to permit communication between Bogota 
and Mexico. In view of all the circumstances it seems to be a fair deduc- 
tion that the government of Colombia communicated to the other govern- 
ments a statement of the objects of the congress similar to that contained 
in the letter to Dean Funes. The unpublished documents which undoubt- 
edly exist in the archives of Colombia and Mexico would clear up this 
point. Cf. La Diplomacia Mexicana, III, 175; British and Foreign State 
Papers, XII, 175. Gual, in a letter to his government dated Guaduas, 
October 4, 1825, refers specifically to a communication of February 9, 
1825, to the minister of Colombia in Mexico, which communication evi- 
dently contained a statement of the objects of the congress. Copies of it 
appear to have been sent to other governments. O'Leary, Memorias, 
XXIV, 283, 285. 

33 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 54?-548, 



324 PAlSr-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

doubted that these are inadvertences; but they show the im- 
portance of having recourse to a source of information free 
from any suspicion of inaccuracy. Such a source fortunately 
is available in the text of the instructions which the govern- 
ments of Colombia and Peru gave to their respective dele- 
gates. 

The general instructions of the government of Peru were 
the first to be prepared. They were signed on May 15, 1825, 
by Tomas de Heres, who then occupied the post of Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in the Council of Government entrusted by 
Bolivar with the exercise of the supreme authority which he 
had possessed in that country for more than a year.^* As 
Heres was a Colombian by birth and as Bolivar's popularity in 
Peru was then at its height, there is every reason to believe that 
the instructions embodied, in the main at least, the ideas of the 
Liberator. They contained no set statement of the objects of the 
congress ; and the part relating to the organization of >the pro- 
posed confederacy need not be examined. But of the parts re- 
lating to the pronouncement of President Monroe, to the libera- 
tion of Cuba and Porto Rico, and to the question of determining 
the future status of Haiti, the substance may be given. 

With regard to the first, the delegates were instructed to 
endeavor to have included in the manifesto which it was pro- 
posed to publish to the world, " a forceful and effective declara- 
tion such as that made by the President of the United States 
of America, in his message to the Congress of last year, rela- 
tive to preventing any future colonization on this continent by 
European powers and in opposition to the principle of inter- 
vention in our domestic affairs." It is worthy of note that 
there is no suggestion here of a joint declaration to which the 
United States should be a party, nor any suggestion of coopera- 
tion with that power to defeat the aims of the Holy Alliance. 
Very different was the attitude of the government of Colombia,, 
as will presently be seen. 

34 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 65, 



THE PAN"AMA CONGKESS 325 

As to Cuba and Porto Eico, the delegates were instructed to 
make efforts to have the congress decide upon their fate; for 
as long as those islands remained in the possession of Spain, 
the Spanish Government would be able to promote discord, en- 
courage domestic troubles, and even threaten the independence 
and the peace of different parts of America. ^ the congress 
should resolve to liberate the islands the delegates were in- 
structed to advocate that the allies should enter into a treaty 
setting forth in detail the contribution which each state should 
make to the enterprise, and determining whether the islands 
should be annexed to some one of the confederated states or be 
left free to set up for themselves the government which they 
might consider most appropriate. And finally the delegates 
were instructed to urge that a declaration be made regarding the 
political and commercial relations to be established with those 
parts of the hemisphere which, like Haiti and Santo Domingo, 
had emancipated themselves from the metropolis, but had not 
yet been recognized by any power, either American or Euro- 
pean.^ ^ 

On August 31, 1825, the delegates of Colombia were given 
a general credential and full power with corresponding instruc- 
tions, signed by Jose R. Eevenga, who had succeeded Gual as 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. On September 23 they were fur- 
nished with a special credential and full power relative to ques- 
tions upon which both belligerents and neutrals might delib- 
erate. In the general instructions the Colombian plenipoten- 
tiaries were informed that their activities should be limited to 
the following objects : 1. The renewal of the pact of perpetual 
union, league, and confederation between all and each of the 
American states. 2. The fixing of the contingents of land and 
of sea forces for the confederation. 3. The promulgation of 
a declaration or manifesto relating to the motives and objects 
of the assembly. 4. The arranging of commercial affairs. 5. 
The definition of the rights and duties of consuls. 6. The abo- 

35 0'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 250-262; XXVIII, 468. 



326 PAN'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS : 

lition of the slave trade. With reference to the first and sec-i 
ond objects the delegates were told that their full powers were' 
broad enough to permit the admission into the American league 
of any power whatever that might wish to make common cause 
with it ; and that, if the allies of Spain should arrogate to them- 
selves a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the Amer- 
ican states, the result would be a war in which all the powers 
of the Western Hemisphere, as well as a number of European 
powers, would be involved. The delegates were accordingly 
instructed to do whatever they could to increase the number of ij 
Spain's enemies by bringing into the confederation as many j| 
states as possible. [ 

In special instructions of September 23, 1825, the delegates jj 
of Colombia were informed, among other things, of the steps \\ 
taken by their government to secure the cooperation of the i 
United States and of Great Britain. It appeared that Hurtado, [ 
the Colombian minister to England, had been authorized to i 
acquaint Canning with the objects of the assembly,^^ and that j 
Salazar, at Washington, had been instructed on October 7, 1824, 
to invite the United States to take part in it.^'^ The instruc- 
tions of October 7, a copy of which was furnished to the dele- 
gates, contained interesting references to the Monroe pronounce- 
ment. The following extract is pertinent : 

" The United States is as interested as we are in maintaining 
certain conservative principles upon which the destiny of this 
continent in general depends. This is clearly shown by the last 
message of President Monroe, which establishes two maxims 
from which deductions of another kind may be made. These 
maxims are: First, that no further European colonization 
shall be permitted on the American continent; and secondly, 
that the fundamental principles of the Holy Alliance are con- 

36 Cf . a minute of the conference of Colombian minister with Canning 
on November 7, 1825; O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 352. 

37 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 270-280. 



THE PANAMA CONGEESS 32Y 

sidered to be prejudicial to the peace and security of the said 
United States. These two important declarations have brought 
the interests of Colombia and its allies into closer touch with the 
United States. And as the declarations are of vital importance 
to both nations, the necessity for arriving at a definite under- 
standing with regard to them becomes clearer every day. In 
order therefore to promote this essential object and in order that 
America may be seen for the first time in some sort united, 
the executive ardently desires that the United States should 
send its plenipotentiaries to Panama, so that together with 
those of Colombia and its allies they may agree upon some 
effective means for preventing foreign colonization in our con- 
tinent and for resisting the application of the principles of 
legitimacy to the American states in general. 

" If the publication of these proposed objects," continued the 
instructions to Salazar, " should seem to you to be prejudicial 
you may withhold them, and give as the ostensible object of the 
meeting of the plenipotentiaries the necessity arising out of the 
confusion produced by the late wars in Europe for the Ameri- 
can states to reach an agreement upon certain principles of in- 
ternational law applicable to times of war. As this ostensible 
object would not indicate in any way an intention on the part 
of the United States to depart from the neutrality which it pro- 
claimed at the beginning of the present war, it is to be pre- 
sumed that the invitation which you are authorized to extend 
to that government, whenever you deem it opportune to do so, 
will not be considered to be lacking in propriety. If the United 
States should agree to send its plenipotentiaries to the first 
congress of American states, as it is to be assumed it will do, 
the business of the congress will be of two kinds; first, confi- 
dential, to agree upon a plan for giving effect to the two maxims 
of which I have spoken above, and secondly, 'public, to agree 
upon the controversial points of maritime law in war, in order 
to make more stable and lasting the relations of peace, friend- 



328 PA:N"-AMERICANISM; ITS BEGmNmOS 

ship, conunerce, and navigation whicli are being established '« 
between all the states of the continent." ^® 

In the special instructions of September 23 Revenga declared 
that steps had been taken to secure the adhesion of the United 
States and Great Britain because of the frankness and friend- 
ship of which those powers had given proof. Moreover it was 
desired to defeat by this means the enemies of the new states [i 
who might take advantage of the occasion to represent the con- 1 
federation as dangerous to the peace and tranquillity of the \ 
civilized world. Adverting to the plan of conducting both se- f 
cret and public discussions, the author of the instructions de- , 
clared that the latter would serve to cloak the real purpose of \ 
the congress. " This is," he said, " to determine what part \ 
Great Britain and the United States will take with us in case 
the allies of Spain intervene in the affairs of the new American 
powers. The expressions of President Monroe and those of the 
British ministers have been so explicit on this subject that there 
appears to be no doubt of their disposition to enter into an even- 
tual alliance with us. If the casus foederis which these treaties 
would recognize as a basis should never arise, nothing would 
have been lost, by having taken a step counseled by prudence 
and foresight." ^^ 

ISTeither the instructions of August 31 nor those of September 
23 contained any reference to Cuba, Porto Pico, or Haiti. Re- 
garding the island of Haiti, however, special instructions were 
given by Revenga on September 24. In these the Colombian 
delegates were directed to consult the assembly as to the future 
status of Haiti and of any other parts of the hemisphere which 
might be found in a similar situation. " Upon bringing the 
matter before the congress," said Revenga, " you should make 
it known that Colombia feels a great repugnance to maintaining 
with Haiti those relations of courtesy generally observed among 
civilized nations, but that it desires at the same time to avoid, 

38 O'Leary, Memorias, 513-515. 

39 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 278. 



THE PANAMA COE^GKESS 329 

by a policy of temporization, every occasion for unpleasantness. 
There is no objection, however, to continuing to admit into 
Colombian ports merchant vessels flying the Haitian flag, sub- 
ject always to the customary laws relating to foreigners. Thus 
you are authorized to evade any proposal which has for its 
object the recognition of the independence of Haiti ; that is, 
any proposal looking to the exchange of ministers with that 
government or to the celebration of treaties with it in the form 
which is customary between Colombia and the other powers of 
Europe and America." '^^ 

After Gual had set out for Panama and before he had seen 
Briceno Mendez, who was to meet him at Cartagena, he wrote 
to his government requesting instructions respecting Cuba and 
Porto Rico ; '^^ for he was certain, he declared, that the Mexican 
ministers would be interested in discussing the fate of those 
islands. On October 14 Kevenga wrote the desired instructions. 
They had to do partly with the determination of the quota of 
troops, ships, or money to be contributed by each state to the 
liberation of the islands, and partly with the disposition which 
should be made of the islands after they had been liberated. 
On the latter point Revenga said : " As to the future condition 
of these islands and of any other Spanish colonies or posses- 
sions which it may be decided to emancipate, the vice president 
cannot give you other instructions than those which are com- 
prehended in the law of March 24, 1824,*^ a copy of which I 
have the honor to send herewith. Some of the American states 
would perhaps like to annex one or another of the islands, but 
if suspicions should arise as to the motives for engaging in the 
undertaking, its principal merit would be lost. Striving, there- 
to O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 285. 

41 Ibid., XXIV, 283. 

42 The law referred to is not included in O'Leary's collection of docu- 
ments relating to the Congress of Panama. Indeed it is not clear to what 
law Revenga here refers; for there were no laws passed in Colombia in 
March, 1824, the congress not having convened that year until April 5. 
In the Blanco- Azpurfia collection a list of the laws passed at that session 
is given (IX, 336-366), the first bearing the date of April 11. 



330 PAE"-AMEK[CANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

fore, to induce the other confederates to be content with the^ 
gratitude and the friendship which would result from so benefi 
icent an act, you will endeavor to secure their adhesion to thej. 
law referred to ; and as it would be imperative to establish pro-^ 
visional governments to begin with, the inhabitants of the islands, 
would have the opportunity to determine their own politicaJ^ 
condition. Plowever, you will inform this office as soon as pos-!^ 
sible in the event you discover designs on the part of any o:^| 
the states relative to these islands." *^ l 

Although the delegates of the new republic of Bolivia re-j[ 
ceived their appointment too late to enable them to take partij 
in the congress of Panama, yet the instructions which were prei 
pared for their guidance are of great interest. It will be re-j| 
called that a provisional government under General Sucre hadf 
been established in Upper Peru in the year 1825, and thati 
about the middle of the following year a constitution framed 
by the Liberator was taken into consideration and was shortly 
afterward adopted by the congress of the republic. For 
the moment Bolivar's influence in that quarter was supreme.! 
Sucre, who had been provisional president and who later be-j 
came the first constitutional president, was greatly beloved, andj 
his loyalty to Bolivar made it possible for the Liberator to se- 
cure more consistent support for his political plans in the Bo-| 
livian republic than he had been able to obtain in Colombia or 
in Peru. Moreover his influence there apparently had not be- 
gun to wane, as it had begun to do in the rest of the territory 
which claimed him as Liberator. He was in constant com- 
munication with Sucre, and the instructions of the Bolivian 
Government to its delegates to Panama undoubtedly represented 
a conscious effort to embody, at least in part, the ideas which 
Bolivar entertained at the time on the subject of an American 
confederation. 

In a letter to Bolivar, dated July 12, 1826, Sucre, in referring 

43 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 287. 



THE PANAMA CONGRESS 331 



^ to the appointment of the delegates,^^ one of whom was then 
■j in Lima, says : " I am sending the credentials, etc., for you to 
deliver to Mendizabal with whatever instructions you may de- 
! sire to add. You will also note our instructions to these gen- 
j tlemen, and you will find a sheet in blank upon which you may 
I write, if you wish, other instructions, kindly sending me a copy, 
i as I have to report to congress upon the whole matter." *^ This 
letter of Sucre's, together with the documents which accom- 
! panied it, could not have reached Lima until at least a month 
later. By that time it is quite certain that Bolivar had prac- 
tically lost interest in the congress of Panama. It is not likely, 
therefore, that he wrote any new instructions, nor is it likely 
that he changed in any way those which Sucre had sent him 
for delivery to the delegate, Mendizabal. They were succinctly 
expressed, and they diifer in some important respects from the 
instructions to the Colombian and Peruvian delegates. 

The following statement of the aims of the congress, though 
containing no new idea, is unique in form and worthy of being 
quoted in full : " You will advocate the making of the assem- 
bly a permanent body with the following objects: 1. To see to 
the exact execution of the treaties and to provide for the se- 
curity of the federation; 2. To mediate in a friendly way be- 
tween any of the allied states and foreign powers in the event of 
a difference arising between them. 3. To serve as a concilia- 
tor and even as an arbitrator, if possible, between the allies 
themselves who may have suffered, unfortunately, a disturbance 
of their friendly relations. 4. To expel from the confedera- 
tion the state who fails to live up to its obligations. 5. To 
direct the united forces of the confederation against that state 
who, because of ideas of ambition and of aggrandizement, 

44 The Bolivian delegates were not appointed until July, 1826. They 
were Jos6 Maria Mendizabal, minister of Bolivia to Peru, and Mariano 
Serrano, Bolivian minister at Buenos Aires. Cf. O'Leary, Memorias, I, 
359; XXIV, 375. 

45 O'Leary, Memorias, I, 359. 



33^ PA:t;r-AMERICAOTSM: ITS BEGINOTNGS 1 

should attempt to violate the independence of another state off 
the league." *® 

In connection with the last statement, especially, it will bej 
of interest to note what instructions were given relative to the 
forces necessary to make effective the will of the federation. 
The delegates were directed to advocate the formation of a fed- 
eral army and navy — an army of 25,000 men and a navy of 
thirty ships. The army should consist of contingents furnished 
by each state according to population, and the navy should be 
manned by similar contingents. Each state should provide 
for the maintenance of its forces. The allies should contribute 
according to population to the purchase of war vessels, but as 
it would only cause delay to undertake to build warships, the 
vessels then owned by each state should be justly appraised and 
turned over to the confederation. The commanders of the army 
and of the navy, respectively, should be designated by the as- 
sembly. In the event of the union of the land and sea forces, 
the senior officer should be commander in chief. The object 
of such a union of forces would be: The defense of any of 
the allies from invasion; the liberation of the islands of Cuba 
and Porto Eico ; or, finally, the carrying of the war to the 
coasts of Spain, if that power should continue to refuse to make 
peace. 

JSTo reference, other than that just indicated, was made to 
Cuba and Porto Rico. Nothing was said respecting a manifesto 
similar to that of President Monroe and nothing was said about 
the United States further than to instruct the delegates to 
sound the disposition of that government relative to the recogni- 
tion of the independence of Bolivia. As to relations with Bra- 
zil, the other neutral American state, in the event that that 
power should send representatives to the congress, the delegates 
were instructed to act in harmony with the rest of the confed- 
erates. And as to Great Britain, they were instructed to sound 

46 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 336. 



THE PANAMA CONGRESS 333 

the Britisli miuister at Panama for the purpose of discovering, 
if possible, the real policy of his government with respect to 
the new states of America, the nature of the relations which 
that power would be disposed to establish with the American 
states, and the extent to which it would carry its intimacy with 
them; for once the disposition of Great Britain were known 
an alliance with her might at an opportune moment be sought. 
It was suggested to the delegates, further, that close association 
with the ministers of Colombia would afford the means of be- 
coming acquainted with British aims. Concise references to 
the renewal of the treaty of union, league, and confederation, 
to the question of the conditions of peace with Spain, to matters 
of commerce, to the abolition of the slave trade, and to certain 
debated principles of international law, none of which questions 
need be discussed here, constitute the remainder of these brief 
instructions.'*'^ 

The preliminary treaties, considered in the preceding chap- 
ter, indicate in a general way the character of the confederation 
which it was proposed to organize. It remains now to review 
briefly the efforts made in the assembly at Panama to render 
effective and permanent the union whose foundations were laid 
in those treaties. 

The informal conferences between the representatives of Peru 
and Colombia were begun on December 17, 1825. At the first 
meeting, Yidaurre, one of the ministers of Peru, presented a 
plan which he called the " Bases for a general confederation 
of America." His plan differed in some essential points from 
the general scheme provided for in the preliminary treaties and 
for this reason is given below in full. 

1. " The interests of the Confederation shall be cared for by 
a general assembly to be called the Amphictyonic Congress. 

2. " The confederated states shall be represented by plenipo- 
tentiaries. 

47 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 337-338. 



334 PAK-AMEEICAITISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

3. " Each member of the confederation shall contribute not ij 
only to the defense of America in general, but also to that of ji 
each state in particular. 

4. " This defense shall be for the purpose of preventing for- r| 
eign attacks. 

5. " The territorial integrity of the states comprehended in 
the confederation shall be reciprocally guaranteed. 

6. " No state shall be allowed to enter into a treaty of alli- 
ance with any non- American power without having previously 
obtained the consent of the assembly. 

7. " Upon no pretext whatever shall the states of the confed- 
eration make war upon one another. All of their differences 
shall be decided in the general congress. 

8. " The assembly shall indicate the points to be fortified, 
the forces to be maintained in each state, and the funds which 
each state shall contribute to carry on war or to put down an- 
archy. 

9. " The assembly shall pass the general laws which may be 
necessary to maintain the existence of the confederation. 

10. " To this end the assembly shall be perpetual and shall 
be composed of two plenipotentiaries from each state. 

11. " The citizens of the confederated republics, upon pass- 
ing from the state of which they are citizens to another state of 
the confederation, shall enjoy the same rights and privileges 
as those which the native-bom citizens of the latter enjoy. 

12. " Any American residing in the confederation may be 
appointed to any office or dignity in any of the states without 
limitation whatever. The citizens of any one of the confeder- 
ated states shall not be held to be aliens in any other state. 

13. " Import and export dues when applied to native goods 
or products shall be the same in all the republics. 

14. " No article of commerce shall be prohibited in the recip- 
rocal trade between the republics. 

15. " To meet emergencies the congress may dispose of an 



THE PANAMA CONGRESS 335 

1 

ll armed force whose commander in chief the congress shall ap- 

i point. 

(16. " The states which compose the confederation shall not 
, have the right to withdraw until after a period of fifty years 
shall have elapsed. 

17. " They shall not have the right to reject articles that may 
have been stipulated and ratified by the assembly. 

18. " During the said fifty years they shall not change their 
form of government. 

19. " The acts of the congress shall become valid either by 
common consent or by a majority vote. 

20. " The decisions of the congress shall be valid without 
the ratification of the individual states. 

21. " The plenipotentiaries shall not be held answerable for 
their opinions or for their votes, being inviolable in their per- 
sons, employments, and property during the time of their mem- 
bership in the assembly and after their connection with it shall 
have ceased." ^^ 

Vidaurre's plan met with a cold reception. It did not have 
the approval even of his colleague, Pando. The Colombian 
delegates, in giving an account of the conference to Revenga, 
spoke of the conflict between some of Vidaurre's bases and the 
instructions which the delegates of both countries had been 
given by their respective governments. And Revenga, in re- 
plying, reminded the delegates that certain stipulations of Vi- 
daurre's plan, notably numbers 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 18, and 20, 
were contrary to the fundamental laws of Colombia. The pro- 
visions objected to, it will be noticed, were those which were 
meant by the author of the plan, no doubt, to give consistency 
to the confederation. That the congress should make general 
laws, that it should be permanently constituted, that there 
should be one common citizenship, that the citizens of one state 
should be eligible to office in the other states, that there should 

48 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 293-294, 



336 PAJST-AMEEICAlSriSM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

be no barriers to commercial interchange, that the form ofj, 
government in each state should be guaranteed by the congress, 
and that the acts of the congress should be valid without the 
ratification of the individual members of the confederation, , 
were all provisions which implied a movement in the direction 
of a common sovereignty. Such proposals, Revenga declared, 
were inadmissible. Colombia desired, he said, to perpetuate 
the American confederation, but preferred to employ indirect 
means to effect that end. The positive benefits of such an 
association would contribute more to give it permanency than 
would such restrictive measures as those advocated by Vidaurre. 
Moreover Revenga feared that these proposals would serve to 
increase the suspicion with which some of the states had al- 
ready begun to view the confederation and that they would also 
be the means of arousing jealousies and ill feeling in general 
among the republics, which condition it was naturally desired 
to avoid.^^ 

It will be recalled that by Article 10 of the treaty of union, 
league, and confederation concluded between Colombia and 
Peru on July 6, 1822, it was provided that if unfortunately 
the internal tranquillity of any part of either state should be 
interrupted by " turbulent and seditious persons," the contract- 
ing parties would make common cause against all such disturb- 
ers, aiding each other with all the means in their power to estab- 
lish order and the authority of the laws. And it will be re- 
membered that, while the treaty was under consideration by the 
senate of Colombia, the question raised as to the application 
of this stipulation to the dispute between O'Higgins and Freire 
in Chile led Colombia to reject the article. Buenos Aires, as 
has elsewhere been shown, was also extremely jealous of any 
outside interference in its domestic affairs. ]^o state except 
Pjeru had in fact reached the point of ratifying a treaty con- 
taining the intervention principle; and it was now one of the 
delegates of Peru who proposed a plan of confederation which 

49 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 292, 302. 



THE PAN"AMA CONGRESS 337 

would have given the general assembly the right to intervene 
for the purpose of maintaining the lav^ul governments ^^ of the 
states of the confederacy as well as for the purpose of guaran- 
teeing their territorial intee'ritv. The manner in which Vi- 1 
daurre's plan was received gave evidence of a growing spirit of 
nationalism. The difficulties of establishing a real confedera- 
tion began to be more clearly seen. The delegates of Peru 
themselves soon received new instructions which indicated that 
the attitude of that republic had undergone a profound change. 
The new instructions were brought to Panama early in April 
by Manuel Perez de Tudela, who had been sent to relieve 
Pando,^^ The Colombian delegates noted at once the changed 
attitude of the representatives of Peru, who now declared that 
the assembly could accomplish within a few days all that was 
required of it. Having obtained an informal statement of the 
instructions which Tudela had brought, the Colombian minis- 
ters described them in a communication to Revenga, in sub- 
stance as follows : 

ISTot desiring to contribute to the establishment of a federal 
navy, Peru would provide troops and money in proportion to 
its population, but it would not permit its troops to advance be- 
so The following articles of the instructions of May 15, 1825, to the 
delegates of Peru show what the attitude of that government was at the 
time the instructions were prepared. 

Article 19. " As America is in need of a long period of rest and peace 
for recovering from the harm she has suffered in the war with Spain, 
and as a tendency toward local independence and sovereignty is clearly 
noticeable through the whole of the continent, you shall endeavor to settle 
these questions which may arise out of this tendency, and obtain some de- 
cision about what portion of the new states can be considered representa- 
tives of the sovereignty and national will, and in what manner can this 
will be expressed to have legal effects. 

Article 20. " After this point is decided, you shall endeavor to obtain 
a declaration to the effect that the American states, far from encouraging 
and aiding seditious and ambitious disturbers of the public peace and 
order, will on the contrary cooperate with each other, by all the means in 
their possession, in supporting and maintaining all legally constituted 
governments." International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 172- 
173; O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 262. 

51 Gual and Briceno Mendez to Revenga, April 6, 1825. O'Leary, 
Memorias, XXIV, 313. 



338 PA^-AMERTCANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

yond its own frontiers in defense of the other members of the 
confederation. It would make, however, a money contribution 
to the defense of the other states. As a prerequisite to entering 
into commercial treaties the new instructions demanded that 
the Peruvian Congress should first agree upon the fundamental 
principles which were to serve as the basis for these treaties. 
Peru apparently hesitated, said the Colombian delegates, to es- 
tablish an alliance or to adopt sane rules for the conduct of 
international relations because its government had conceived 
the absurd idea that the assembly would attempt to make its 
decisions " obligatory upon all the powers of Christendom." 
Another matter which the government of Peru was now unwill- 
ing to have discussed at Panama was the boundary question with 
Colombia. And finally the government of that republic would 
decline to treat with the United States and Brazil unless they 
entered into the proposed league.^ ^ 

Commenting upon the changed attitude of the government of 
Peru, the Colombian delegates declared that they foresaw in- 
superable obstacles in the way of a successful outcome of the 
congress. Considerations of a local character, selfishness, jeal- 
ousies, and mistrust of the most puerile sort, inherent in the 
colonial state under which the inhabitants of the new republics 
had hitherto lived, made united action extremely difficult to at- 
tain. Nevertheless they had remonstrated with their Peruvian 
colleagues, who, convinced of the justice of the protest, had en- 
gaged to ask for more liberal instructions.^^ 

52 Ibid., 314. 

Gual declared in a private letter to Bolivar dated April 11, 1826, that it 
was the desire of Colombia to treat with the United States and Brazil as 
neutrals, in order to open the way to the establishment of more intimate 
relations, if circumstances should demand. O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 
438. 

53 Grual and Briceno Mdndez to Revenga, April 10, 1S26. O'Leary, 
Memorias, XXIV, 314. 

BrieeSo Mgndez, writing to Bolivar under date of April 12, 1826, voices 
his disappointment at the changed attitude of the Peruvian delegates and 
attributes the change to the delegates themselves rather than to their gov- 
ernment. " Who would have believed," he said, " that Peru would be the 



THE PAN^AMA CONGEESS 339 

In a letter to Santander, dated February 21, 1826, Bolivar 
explained the situation in Peru as follows: 

" As to the proposals of this government relative to the fed- 
eration I shall saj to you that I have refrained, through motives 
of delicacy, from intervening in its resolutions upon this sub- 
ject. I foresee that they will not care to become involved in a 
very close federation, for several reasons. Those which occur 
to me I regard as reflecting honor upon myself, but there may 
be always a second intention. They are afraid, moreover, of 
expenses, for they are very poor and greatly in debt : here they 
owe much and they owe everybody. They do not wish to go 
to Habana because they have to go to Chiloe, which belongs to 
them, and because they can pay Chile with that island. They 
have more than enough naval forces and will not, therefore, 
care to buy more vessels. They are afraid to become too 
closely bound to the English and they do not fear an uprising 
of the colored folk, who are very submissive. I give you this 
information in order that you may know what are the principal 
ideas opposed to those of Colombia." ^^ 

first to depart from the fundamental principles of the confederation? 
When I arrived here I was afraid that our time would be thrown away 
because the rest of the states would not accede to the project proposed by 
the Peruvians; for to do so would have given an excessive and even a 
dangerous extension to the central authority. Each state would have lost 
its political importance by being absorbed in the confederation. But this 
liberality 'is a thing of the past. They now intend that the league shall be^ 
no more than defensive. ... I have good reasons for believing that its 
[Peru's] ministers here are the ones who have suggested this negative pol- 
icy, and as SeSor Pando has been recalled by his government, it is to be 
supposed he will promote his ideas there. He is not a friend of the league 
and less of Colombia and Colombians. Senor Vidaurre is a partisan of the 
former; but perhaps I am not too bold in affirming that this is promoted 
more by hatred of Colombia than by a desire for the welfare of America." 
O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 188-189. See also Briceno Mendez's letter to 
Bolivar of April 26, lUd., 199. 

54 O'Leary, Memorias, XXXI, 167. 

Later Bolivar apparently lost all hope of seeing Peru form a part of 
the confederation; for in August he proposed through his secretary, P^rez, 
to the Colombian ministers at Panama a plan by which Colombia, Mex- 
ico, and Central America alone should constitute a federal army and 
navy to continue the war against Spain. O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 376. 



340 PAN'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

Revenga received the news of the threatened defection of [ 
Peru with deep concern. He feared that the assembly would 'j 
merit the contempt of the American states, if, after having at- 
tracted to itself the attention of the world, it should now lay 
aside the important objects for which it had been convened. 
For his own part he would do what he could to induce the gov- 
ernment of Peru to return to the more liberal policy which 
it had previously maintained. He believed that the proximate 
arrival of the Mexican plenipotentiaries would react favorably 
upon the attitude of Peru ; for the republic of Mexico appeared 
to have a more exact idea of the benefits to be derived from the 
union, entertained stronger hopes of its success and had a 
broader view of its bearing upon the happiness of mankind.^^ 

In reality the arrival of the Mexican delegates, early in June, 
appeared to revive the hopes of Gual and Briceiio Mendez, who 
now wrote more encouragingly of the outlook. The Mexican 
Government, they learned, desired to see the confederation made 
effective; and even though nothing more should be done than 
to present a respectable and imposing front to Spain, they be- 
lieved that a vast deal would thus have been accomplished, 
that peace would have been attained, and that the existence of 
the confederation would be assured by the practical demonstra- 
tion of its convenience and utility. But Mexico wished to see 
the sessions of the congress promptly begun, and, like Peru, 
believed that its work might be quickly finished.^^ 

Accordingly, after a few days more of preliminary discus- 
sion, the first formal meeting of the assembly took place. Be- 
tween June 22, the date of its opening, and July 15, the date 
of its adjournment, four separate conventions were concluded. 
They were : First, a treaty of perpetual union, league, and con^ 
federation, based upon the preliminary treaties discussed in 
the preceding pages ; second, a convention providing for the 
future meetings of the congress, fixing the qualifications of its 

55 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 322-323. 

56 Jj)id„ XXIV, 325-326. 



THE PAIJ^AMA CONGRESS 341 

members, and making other regulations respecting its constitu- 
tion and procedure; third, a convention fixing the contingent 
of armed forces and the subsidies which each republic should 
contribute to the formation of a permanent army and navy, and 
establishing certain regulations relative thereto ; fourth, a con- 
fidential agreement additional to the last-mentioned conven- 
tion, relating to the organization and movements of the army 
and navy.^" 

The treaty of union, league, and confederation contained 
thirty-one articles, and an additional article. Among its most 
important provisions were those relating to the common defense, 
the peaceful settlement of disputes between the members of the 
confederation, the status of the citizens of one state residing in 
another, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the sev- 
eral states, the admission of other powers into the confedera- 
tion, the abolition of the slave trade, and the revision of the 
treaty upon the conclusion of peace. Article 25 provided that 
the commercial relations between the contracting parties should 
be regulated in the next assembly. The additional article stip- 
ulated that as soon as the treaty of union, league, and confeder- 
ation had been ratified, the contracting parties should proceed 
to fix by common agTcement all the points, rules, and princi- 
ples that were to govern their conduct in peace and war; and 
it was provided that in the accomplishment of this task all 
friendly and neutral powers should be invited to take an active 
part. None of the provisions of the treaty gave the congress 
the right to intervene in the domestic affairs of the allied states, 
and by Article 28 it was expressly declared that the treaty did 
not in any wise interrupt, nor should ever interrupt, the exer- 
cise of the sovereignty of any of the contracting parties in the 
conduct of its foreign relations. Article 29 provided that if 
any of the republics should change substantially its form of 
government such republic should by that act be excluded from 

57 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 174; O'Leary, 
Memorias, XXIV, 372. 



A 



342 PA]^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

the confederation, subject to reinstatement only upon the unani^ 
mous consent of the parties concerned. That the character of 
the congress was intended to be no other than diplomatic isj 
made clear by Article 13, which sets forth its objects. In view 
of the importance of this article it is here quoted in full : 

" Article 13. The principal objects of the assembly of min- 
isters plenipotentiary of the confederate powers are : 

" First. To negotiate and conclude between the powers it 
represents all such treaties, conventions, and arrangements as 
may place their reciprocal relations on a mutually agreeable 
and satisfactory footing. 

" Second. To contribute to the maintenance of a friendly 
and unalterable peace between the confederate powers, serving 
them as a council in times of great conflicts, as a point of con- 
tact in common dangers, as a faithful interpreter of the public 
treaties and conventions concluded by them in the said assem- 
bly, when any doubt arises as to their construction, and as a 
conciliator in their controversies and differences. 

" Third. To endeavor to secure conciliation, or mediation, 
in all questions which may arise between the allied powers, or 
between any of them and one or more powers foreign to the 
confederation, whenever threatened of a rupture, or engaged in 
war because of grievances, serious injuries, or other complaints. 

" Fourth. To adjust and conclude during the common wars 
of the contracting parties with one or many powers foreign to 
the confederation all those treaties of alliance, concert, subsidies, 
and contributions that shall hasten its termination." 

The articles relating to the question of territorial integrity are 
also of special interest. The first of these appears to have been 
designed to give effect to the declaration of President Monroe 
regarding noncolonization ; nothing whatever is said as to the 
nonintervention principle. The articles read as follows: 

" Article 21. The contracting parties solemnly obligate and 
bind themselves to uphold and defend the integrity of their 
respective territories, earnestly opposing any attempt of colonial 



THE PANAMA CONGRESS 343 

settlement in them without authority of, and dependence upon, 
the governments under whose jurisdiction they are, and to em- 
ploy to this end, in common, their forces and resources, if neces- 
sary. 

" Article 22. The contracting parties mutually guarantee 
the integTity of their territories as soon as, by virtue of special 
conventions concluded between each other, their respective 
boundaries shall have been determined; and the preservation 
of these frontiers shall then be under the protection of the 
confederation." ^^ 

The special conventions relating to the army and navy show 
the effects of the nationalistic reaction. Although elaborate 
regulations were made respecting the number of troops to be 
maintained by each republic, the conditions under which one 
state should send its forces to the aid of another, and the equip- 
ment and support of such forces in the field, yet no provision 
was made for a central direction or command of the combined 
forces. The dream of a confederate army had not been re- 
alized. The troops of one state, as provided in the treaty, when 
sent to the aid of another, came nominally under the control 
of the latter state ; but since they remained under the command 
of their own ofiicers, the control of the state to which thev be- 
longed was by no means relinquished. It was possible, however, 
that, even if it should in any case be deemed advisable to take 
the offensive against a common enemy beyond the territory of 
the allies, the contracting parties would then agree as to the 
object of the expedition, the means to be employed in carrying 
it out, the commander to direct the operations, and the tem- 

58 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 184-190; O'Leary, 
Memorias, XXIV, 352-360. In an instruction dated April 8, 1826, Re- 
venga referred to the dispute between Buenos Aires and Brazil over the 
possession of the Banda Oriental, as a concrete illustration of the danger 
that might arise out of a stipulation guaranteeing the territorial integrity 
of the members of the confederation. He thought that a promise mutually 
to respect the territory held by each state at the moment of concluding the 
treaty would be as far as it would be safe to go. O'Leary, Memorias^ 
XXIV, 312. 



344 PAl^r-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

porary or permanent organization to be given to the countryjn 
which might be occupied as a result of such expedition.^® No 
reference to Cuba or Porto Rico other than this veiled one ap- 
pears in the protocols of the sessions. 

With regard to the navy the delegates of Peru, in accordancel 
with their later instructions, declined to become a party to any 
convention on the subject. But Colombia, Central America,} 
and Mexico agreed to cooperate in the maintenance of a navy I 
the direction and command of which was to be placed under aj 
commission of three members appointed by the three republics, j 
respectively. The commission, it was agreed, should have the' 
authority of a high military officer, if the contracting govern- 1 
ments so desired ; and in order that its members might have the | 
independence and liberty necessary to the fullest discharge of! 
their duties, it was further agreed that they should enjoy the 
privileges and immunities of diplomatic officers. But the sig- 
nificance of the provisions for a united navy as marking a 
tendency toward effective confederation, was in great part de- 
stroyed by an article making the agreement optional after the 
conclusion of peace with Spain.^^ 

Article 11 of the treaty of union, league and confederation 
provided that the congress should meet every two years in time 
of peace and every year in time of war.^^ Article 1 of the 
special convention on the subject of future meetings stipulated 
that the assembly should remove to the village of Tacubaya, 
one league distant from the City of Mexico, and that it 
should continue to hold its sessions there or at some other point 
in Mexican territory, so long as reason and circumstances should 
not demand the selection of a different locality having equal 
advantages of healthfulness, security, and convenience for 

5^ International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 192-199; O'Leary, 
MemoHas, XXIV, 362-369. 

&o International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 199-200; O'Leary, 
Memorias, XXIV, 370-371. 

ei International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 186; O'Leary, Me- 
morias, XXIV, 355. 



THE PANAMA CONGKESS 345 

communicating with the nations of Europe and America.*^ ^ 
The unhealthfuhiess of the Isthmus was undoubtedly an im- 
portant factor, if not the determining one, in the decision to 
abandon Panama as the seat of the congress. Soon after the 
arrival of the Colombian delegates at Panama, Briceno Mendez 
wrote Bolivar that the place was the worst enemy the project 
had. The people were not opposed to the congress, he said, 
but the climate was so merciless, the city was so ugly and un- 
comfortable, poverty was so general, the roads were so diiScult 
to travel over, and the necessities of life so scarce and so dear 
that it was impossible to think of Panama as a suitable meeting 
place.^^ 

Fearing that Bolivar would be displeased at the decision of 
the congTess to remove to Tacubaya, Briceno Mendez wrote on 
July 22 and explained that the change had been deemed neces- 
sary: First, because by that means it was assured that Mexico 
would continue in the league; secondly, because the unhealth- 
fulness of Panama made it impossible for the delegates to live 
there. Yellow fever and the black vomit, said Briceno Mendez, 
were frightening every human being from the city. The 
British commissioner had lost in one month his secretary and 
another member of his suite. The Colombian delegation had 
lost two servants, and almost everybody connected with the 
congress had been ill.^* Gual called attention, in addition to 
the reasons assigned by his colleague, to the consideration which 
Mexico merited by virtue of the importance of its contingents — 
more than half of the total,^^ to the greater respectability which 

62 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 191; O'Leary, Me- 
moriae, XXIV, 361. 

63 O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 186. 
Gifbid., 210. 

65 The contracting parties obligated themselves to raise and maintain on 
a war footing an army of 60,000 men in the following prpportions : Colom- 
bia, 15,250; Central America, 6,750; Peru, 5,250; and Mexico, 32,750. For 
the organization and maintenance of a competent naval force the sum of 
7,720,000 pesos was appropriated, apportioned as follows: Colombia, 2,- 
205,714 pesos; Central America, 955,811 pesos; and Mexico, 4,558,475 pesos, 
Int. Am. Conf. (1889-90), IV, 193; O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 363, 365, 



34:6 PAIiT-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNII^GS j 

the congress would acquire at its new seat, and to the morei 
direct contact which it would have with foreign governments.^® 

Other considerations undoubtedly entered into the resolution i 
of the congress to remove to Mexico, among which were personal 
jealousies and the ever-present spirit of localism. Gual and 
Briceno Mendez refer frequently in their letters to the un- 
friendly attitude of the Peruvian delegates toward Colombia 
and toward Bolivar and the Colombians in general.^'^ Gual 
later became convinced that the failure of the congress to re- 
new its sessions at Tacubaya was due in great part to the 
indifference of the government of Mexico.®^ It was even 
charged that Mexico defeated the project out of jealousy of 
Bolivar.^ ^ Whether or not this was true, it is certain that Boli- 
var viewed the removal with misgivings. " The transfer of 
the assembly to Mexico," he wrote Briceno Mendez, " is going to 
put it under the immediate influence of that power, already too 
preponderant, and also under the influence of the United States 
of the l^orth. These and other reasons oblige me to ask that 
the treaties be not ratified until I arrive at Bogota and have 
the opportunity of examining them with you and others." '^'^ 

It was agreed at the tenth and last conference, held on July 
15, that the ministers, Briceno Mendez, Molina, and Vidaurre, 
should return to their respective countries for the purpose of 
reporting upon the work accomplished at Panama and for the 
purpose of securing, if possible, the ratification of the four 
conventions which had been concluded. The other delegates, 
Gual, Larrazabal, and Perez de Tudela, together with the Mex- 
ican representatives, were to proceed to Tacubaya, where it was 
proposed to renew the sessions of the congress. This plan was 

66 Gual to Bolivar, July 17, 1S26. O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 448. 
For the report of the Mexican delegates on the subject of the transfer 
of the congress to Tacubaya see: American State Papers: For. Rel., VI, 362. 
.67 O'Leary, Memorias, VII, 189, 199, 439, 442. 
08 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 397, 407. 

69 Niles, History of South America and Mexico, I, 194. 

70 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 560. 



THE PAI^AMA CONGRESS 347 

carried out, as far as the several destinations of the delegates 
were concerned, with the exception that Perez de Tudela, after 
having waited at Panama until the following January (1827), 
received instructions from his government to return to Peru, 
as it was considered that his services would be more useful at 
home than in the general assembly of American nations.^ ^ 

Of the republics represented at Panama, Colombia was the 
only one to ratify the conventions. The ratification did not 
take place, however, until about the middle of the year 1827, 
and then it was effected in spite of the indifference and per- 
haps even the opposition of the Liberator. That Peru should 
have failed to ratify the treaties is not difficult to understand, 
in view of the attitude which that republic assumed before the 
formal sessions of the congress began. Moreover the return of 
Vidaurre to Lima for the purpose of securing the ratification of 
the conventions occurred at a moment when the reaction against 
Bolivar's political plans had strongly set in.*^^ Bolivar himself 
was opposed to the ratification of the treaties by Peru as he 
had been to their ratification by Colombia, and wrote to Pando, 
who was still loyal to him, to that effect. In replying Pando 
declared that he rejoiced to learn Bolivar's opinion; that he 
had himself always believed that the philanthropic project of 
confederating the whole of America was impracticable and that 
nothing would come of the general assembly, and that he re- 
garded the Panama conventions with indifference. More than 
that, he regarded them as doubly prejudicial to Peru; that is, 
they would be a burden to the country standing alone and an 
obstacle to its federation with Colombia and Bolivia, as pro- 

71 Torres Caicedo, Union Latino-Americana, 36 ; O'Leary, Memorias, X, 
417. International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 183. 

72 Bolivar left Lima early in September, 1826, to return to Colombia, 
At Guayaquil he met Vidaurre, who had stopped there on his way to Lima 
from Panama. On September 14, Bolivar wrote Jos6 de Larrea as follows: 
" Yesterday I talked with Vidaurre and he expressed to me a desire to 
proceed to Lima with the treaties; dissembling my motives I tried to lead 
him to change his mind, advising him to remain here a while longer." 
O'Leary, Memorias, XXXI, 266, 



348 PAI^-AMEEICAITISM: ITS BEGINOTJSTGS 

posed, Tinder a general government presided over by the Lib- 
erator. 

A sufficient explanation of the failure of the government of 
the Central American republic to ratify the conventions is to be 
found in the state of anarchy into which that section of the 
continent had fallen. '^^ The rejection of the treaties by Mexico, 
as well as the final abandonment of the plan for the reassem- 
bling of the congress at Tacubaya, is set forth in a series of 
illuminating dispatches which the Colombian plenipotentiary, 
Gual, sent to his government during his stay of more than two 
years in Mexico.*^* 

Proceeding upon his mission, soon after the adjournment of 
the Panama Congress, Gual reached Acapulco in August, and 
remained there until toward the close of the year, when he con- 
tinued his journey to the City of Mexico. On January 29, 
1827, he wrote from the Mexican capital that the Panama 
treaties were being considered by the house of deputies, and 
that he believed they would be approved. '^^ The only foreign 
representatives present, he said, were Larrazabal, the Central 
American delegate, and Sergeant, the minister of the United 
States, who had arrived a few days before. As the Mexican 
congress later adjourned without having acted upon the trea- 
ties, Gual became somewhat discouraged. ISTo other representa- 
tives had arrived. On the other hand, Sergeant had returned 
to the United States, while Van Veer, the agent of the I^ether- 
lands, who had come to Mexico from Panama, had quit the 
country. Moreover a discouraging state of disorder reigned 
throughout the new republics. Reviewing the situation, Gual 
raised the question whether it was possible to establish a con- 

73 For an account of the situation in Central America at this time, see 
Bancroft, History of Central America, III, 79-104. For a fuller account 
see Marure, Bosquejo Histdrico de las Revoluciones de Centro- America, I, 
169-191; II, 6-143. 

74 Extracts from these dispatches are found in O'Leary's Memoriae, XXIV, 
377-^08. 

75 Article 50, section 13, of the Mexican constitution of 1824 provided 
that treaties should be approved by the general congress. 



THE PANAMA CONGKESS 349 

federation of such discordant and disorganized elements. Was 
the confederation, he inquired, to be the efficient means of cor- 
recting the internal evils of the several states, or was it to be 
itself the product of order and purpose in each of the units ? 
To his concern over this state of affairs and over the failure of 
Mexico to ratify the treaties, was now added the anxiety caused 
by the continued inaction of his own government. In July, 
however, he was cheered by a decree of President Victoria call- 
ing an extra session of the congress to consider, among other 
things, the pending treaties. And in l^ovember he at last 
learned through a private source that the long-awaited ratifica- 
tion by Colombia had been effected.^'' 

But Gual V7as destined to suffer further disappointment. 
The special session of the Mexican congress took no action upon 
the treaties and the government showed no disposition to ad- 
vance the cause of union. By the end of January, 1828, the 
Colombian representative became convinced that to remain 
longer in Mexico would lead to no useful result. Upon inform- 
ing President Victoria, however, of his intention to retire from 
the country, Gual was urged by that functionary with such man- 
ifestations of sincerity to postpone his departure until a further 
effort had been made to secure favorable action on the part 
of the national congress, that he resolved to remain at his post 
a while longer. Some days later he wrote in a more hopeful 
vein. It then seemed likely that the American assembly would 
soon be able to resume its sittings. In March the treaties were 
approved by the house of deputies and having passed to the 
senate were referred to a committee of that body. But this led 
Gual to suspect that further delay would follow ; for it was un- 
certain when the senate committee would report. He again 
became gTeatly discouraged when he learned that some of the 
members of the Mexican congress were saying that Mexico had 
no need of a confederation, and that the republic ought not to 
cast in its fortune with a lot of unimportant republics where 

T6 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 378, 380, 383-386, 389, 



350 PAN'-AMEEICAE^ISM: ITS BEGINmJSTGS 

anarcliy reigned supreme. One of the gentlemen, indeed, had 
even had the impudence, as Gual expressed it, to speak, after 
the manner of the ungrateful Peruvians, disparagingly of Co- 
lombia, supposing it to be dominated by a tyrant, as the illustri- i 
ous Bolivar was characterized/'^ 

In May Gual wrote that the congress had again adjourned 
without ratifying the treaties. But, inasmuch as the president 
had spoken hopefully of the future, the Colombian plenipo- 
tentiary deemed it prudent, in spite of his growing distrust, to 
await the holding of another special session, which was soon 
to be called. It met on July 1, 1828, but the senate shortly 
afterward resolved, without explaining upon what ground, that 
the treaties should be again referred to the executive. This 
in effect meant their defeat. Gual now began to make prepa- 
rations to return to Colombia.'^^ On October 9, he had a formal 
conference with Larrazabal, and the two Mexican ministers, 
Michelena and Dominguez, in which he reviewed the efforts he 
had made to discharge his mission and explained the motives 
that at last impelled him to leave the country. In brief, he 
made it clear that he had become convinced that the plan of re- 
assembling the congress at Tacubaya was a failure, thanks 
mainly, as he believed, to Mexico. With these views the Cen- 
tral American delegate was in substantial accord.^^ 

In fairness to Mexico it must be said that the charge that its 
government was responsible for the failure of the project of 
confederation was not altogether just. The Mexican pleni- 
potentiaries maintained that, even if the conventions had been 
ratified by Mexico, it would not have been possible to proceed 
to the exchange of ratifications; for in Central America there 
was no legislative body in existence to approve the treaties, and 
in Peru there was not sufficient interest to induce the government 
to send ministers to Tacubaya. What advantage would there 

77 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 397-399. 
■JslUd., 401, 405. 

79 Ibid., 405. For the protocol of the conference of October 9, see 
Zubjeta, Congresos de Panamd y Tacubaya, 169-181, 



THE PAll^AMA CONGKESS 351 

have been, they inquired, in having the approval of Mexico 
and Colombia alone? And of what value, they might have 
added, was the ratification of Colombia, then already on the 
eve of dissolution ? It was true that the sessions of the congress 
could not be renewed in Mexican territory without the effective 
cooperation of the Mexican government; but it was also true 
that the congress could not fulfill its mission without the con- 
currence of the other members of the proposed confederacy. 
That concurrence, under the circumstances, it was impossible 
to secure. The spirit of particularism had become supreme. 

A protocol of the conference of October 9 was drawn up and 
signed by Gual, Larrazabal, Michelena, and Dominguez. Apart 
from the recital of the unavailing efforts which had been made 
to clear the way for the reassembling of the congress at Tacu- 
baya, the protocol contains a brief reference to what appears 
to have been the only measure of importance which the delegates 
in their informal conferences had had under consideration dur- 
ing their residence in Mexico ; namely, the mediation of Co- 
lombia and Mexico — in default of a general congress with au- 
thority to intervene — between the parties to the civil war 
then raging in Central America.^*' Gual believed that such a 
friendly interposition would have resulted in restoring order in 
that distracted quarter. ISTothing, however, was done, and this 
failure Gual also charged to the Mexican Government. 

In this conference of October 9, Poinsett, the American min- 
ister to Mexico, though he had been authorized to attend the 
meetings of the general congress whenever they should be re- 
sumed, took no part. Indeed Poinsett appears not to have 
participated in, nor to have desired to participate in, any of 
the informal negotiations which the delegates of Colombia, Cen- 
tral America, and Mexico had been conducting in the Mexican 
capital. Having gone to Mexico at a time when British in- 
fluence was in the ascendancy, he had intervened in the internal 

80 See a memorandum by Gual of a conference held on December 28, 1827, 
to discuss the subject. Zubieta, Congresos de Panama y Tacubaya, 153-158. 



352 PAN^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

affairs of the republic with a view to forming what he repeatedly 
spoke of as an American party. In this he met with success 
and soon the York rite masons whom he helped to organize were 
in control of the government. After a time resentment against 
Poinsett on account of his intermeddling in domestic affairs be- 
came very bitter. In the latter part of the year 1827 the Plan 
of Montano, the principal demand of which was that the minis- 
ter of the United States should be furnished with his passports, 
was proclaimed, and a revolution was started to force its adop- 
tion. The movement was soon put down by government forces 
and Poinsett remained at his post. But as it was believed that 
he continued to exercise undue influence in domestic affairs, at- 
tacks upon him in the public press became frequent. Finally, 
in July 1829, President Guerrero, who had succeeded Victoria, 
requested his recall. In October the request was complied 
with.«i 

In the mind of Gual, and perhaps also in the minds of the 
other ministers accredited to the congress of Tacubaya, Mex- 
ico's lack of interest in the plan of confederation was associated 
with the undue influence which Poinsett was thought to exercise 
over the government. In the published extracts of the Colom- 
bian representative's dispatches there are casual references to 
Poinsett, and these leave one to wonder whether the relations be- 
tween the two ministers were on the most cordial footing. In 
May, 1827, Gual wrote that it seemed strange that the pending 
treaty between Mexico and the United States had not been ap- 
proved by the Mexican government, in view of the influence 
which Poinsett had acquired in the republic by means of the 
York rite lodges. In January, 1828, he wrote that Poinsett had 
been spreading the report that Peru had disapproved the Pan- 
si Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations ieticeen the U. S. and Mexico, 
80-82, 190-204; 349-377. See also Poinsett's Career in Mexico by Justin 
Harvey Smith in Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, April, 
1914, 77-92. The contemporary Mexican historians were generally hostile 
to Poinsett; but for a friendly appreciation see Zavala, Ensayo Histdrico 
de las Revoluciones de Mexico, I, 339, 



THE PAN^AMA COISTGEESS 353 

ama treaties, the implication being that Poinsett's object was to 
put obstacles in the way of the resumption of the conferences of 
the general assembly at Tacubaya. And in May following Gual 
declared that to whatever it might be due, whether to party 
spirit, whether to a conviction that Mexico could stand alone, 
or whether to the intrigues of the American minister, Poinsett, 
the fact remained that the business of the assembly had made 
no progress.^^ 

Under the circumstances Poinsett's colleagues would have 
been unlikely to solicit his participation in the preliminary 
conferences. And if they had done so it is not likely that he 
could have acceded to their desire, for the general instructions 
given by Clay under date of March 16, 1827, supplementary to 
the general instructions of May 8, 1826, appear to have con- 
templated little activity on the part of the delegates of the 
United States in promoting the designs of the congress as they 
were then understood. " The intelligence," said Clay, " which 
has reached us from many points as to the ambitious projects 
and views of Bolivar, has abated the strong hopes which were 
once entertained of the favorable results of the congress of the 
American IsTations, If that intelligence is well founded (as 
there is much reason to apprehend), it is probable that he does 
not look upon the Congress in the same interesting light that he 
formerly did." Although the secretary of state went on to 
say to the delegates that the highly important objects contem- 
plated by their instructions ought not to be abandoned while any 
hope remained, and that the value of those objects did not de- 
pend entirely upon the forms of government which might con- 
cur in their establishment,^^ yet it is an evident conclusion that 
in the words quoted above, Poinsett found warrant for his pas- 
sivity concerning the general assembly. 

With the signature of the protocol of October 9, the efforts 
to revive the assembly of American plenipotentiaries came to an 

82 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 385, 394, 403. 
^^International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 152. 



354 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

end. Gual soon afterward presented his letter of recall, and 
when in January, 1829, he set out for Colombia it was to re- 
turn to a land torn by internal strife and bleeding from a war 
with a sister republic. When Gual reached Bodegas de Baba- 
hoyo, a little town near Guayaquil, he wrote Bolivar in a spirit 
of despair. " I left Mexico," he said, " sick of revolutions 
caused by those exaggerated doctrines which our people neither 
understand nor can understand. On the way down [from 
Acapulco] we ran short of water and had to put in at Realejo, 
a port of Central America, where we found everything in the 
greatest confusion ; for, having executed their governor, Cerda, 
they had not so much as a vestige of government. I left there 
with the hope of finding further to the south a more consoling 
order of things and I ran upon the Peruvians in Guayaquil, 
converted into propagandists of anarchy and of the subversion of 
all social principles. What a terrible state of affairs ! Colom- 
bia is apparently in a better situation than the rest of Spanish 
America, for it still possesses a single bond of union, which I 
hope you will not think for a moment of allowing us to lose. 
They tell me that you have aged greatly and that your health 
is bad. Take care of yourself and preserve with your life 
the hopes of the three millions of your compatriots." ^^ 

The Liberator, the single bond of union, had indeed become 
prematurely old and his increasing ill health obliged him within 
a year to release his hold on the conflicting elements which 
now only nominally constituted the republic of Colombia. This 
was the signal for the dissolution of the republic. And thus 
the state which Bolivar desired to weld into a powerful nation 
and which he hoped to make the controlling factor in a great 
American confederation abdicated its claim to a position of 
leadership in the Western Hemisphere. 

84 Gual to Bolivar, May 29, 1829. O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 449. 



CHAPTER IX 



BRITISH INFLUENCE 



Apart from the adoption of the four conventions referred to 
in the preceding chapter, no official action of importance was 
taken by the Congress of Panama. Matters of weight were dis- 
cussed informally, however, as is revealed by the correspondence 
of some of the delegates and by the dispatches of the British 
commissioner. Relative to Cuba, for example, Briceno Mendez, 
writing from Buenaventura on July 22, 1826, makes the fol- 
lowing remarks : " The Mexicans have also manifested a desire 
to incorporate Cuba into their already immense republic. They 
have proceeded with caution, it is true, and they have succeeded 
in evading our efforts to make them speak out clearly on the 
matter; but as good understanders require few words, we are 
no longer at a loss to know what their attitude is. We have 
in this question the first germ of division in America, unless 
we know how to reach a compromise, putting aside our national 
egoism." ^ 

In a postscript to the letter from which the above extract is 
taken, Briceno Mendez expressed the opinion that the fate of 
Cuba and of Porto Rico was one of the great difficulties which 
stood in the way of the recognition of the independence of the 
new states by Ferdinand VII. The desire of that monarch was 
to have his possession of Cuba and Porto Rico guaranteed by the 
mediating powers (England, Prance, and the United States) 
and by the new states. This pretension of the Spanish king, 
said Briceiio Mendez, was being supported by the United States, 
who had formally declared that it would not permit the islands 
to pass to any of the new republics nor to be held by any Euro- 
pean power other than Spain. England apparently adhered to 
this policy because she desired to be on friendly terms with the 

lO'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 210. 

355 



356 PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

United States and because she feared to have the islands fall 
into the hands of some power that might absorb the British 
possessions in the West Indies.^ To an understanding of this 
subject a brief review of the negotiations which the United 
States had been conducting relative to Cuba and Porto Rico is 
essential.^ 

The United States was in effect unwilling that Cuba and 
Porto Rico should be transferred to any European power or be 
annexed by any of the new American states. Not only so, but 
the.. United States, being con vinced t hat the islands were inca- 
pable of self-government, was opposed to any project to liberate 
them with a view to their independence. The situation was one 
of great concern to the government at Washington ; for, as long 
as the war lasted, there was danger of a change in the status 
quo of Cuba and of Porto Rico, with possibly serious conse- 

2 Ihid., 214. The part of the letter here referred to is as follows: " The 
question of recognition is progressing, so much so that even France has 
taken an active part in our favor. Do not doubt it. There are only two 
difficulties that keep Ferdinand from deciding: first, the fate of Cuba and 
Porto Rico, which he asks to have guaranteed by us and by the powers that 
mediate in the recognition, and secondly, Spain's burden of debt, and es- 
pecially the part of which she contracted with France during the campaign 
of restoration and during the occupation. In the first, Spain is sustained 
by the government of the United States, which has formally declared that 
it will not consent to the possession of those islands by any of the new 
republics nor by any European power other than Spain. It appears that 
England also adheres to this in conformity with her policy of courting 
and humoring the United States, and because she does not view with pleas- 
ure the creation of an insular power in the Antilles, which might absorb 
her colonies or fall into the power of Haiti. In the second, interest is 
shown in a general way by France, who sees no other way of being reim- 
bursed by a ruined Spain; the worst of it is that England is supporting 
France in this because England has debts to cover and above all because 
it suits her convenience to keep France as a friend against the Holy Alli- 
ance. You see how the question of our independence has become involved 
with the great interests of the leading maritime powers. We are forced 
therefore to make a prompt decision, for each day the outcome grows more 
complicated and more difficult." 

3 For the general diplomatic history of this period relative to Cuba and 
Porto Rico see: Moore, Digest of Int. Law, VI; Callahan, Cuba and Inter- 
national Relations; Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the 
United States and Mexico; Chadwick, The Relations of the United States 
and Spain; American State Papers, For, Rel., V. 



BKITISH INFLUENCE 357 

quences to the peace and tranquillity of the United States. Ac- 
cordingly, early in Adams' administration, Clay began nego- 
tiations looking to the termination of the war on the basis of 
Spain's recognizing the independence of the new American re- 
publics, while retaining Cuba and Porto Kico. Middleton, the 
American minister at St. Petersburg, was instructed in May, 
1825, to disclose this policy to the Eussian emperor in the hope 
that that monarch would lend the high authority of his name to 
the attainment of peace and to the prevention of further waste 
of human life.^ 

At about the same time instructions were given to Alexander 
Everett, the United States minister at Madrid, to impress upon 
Spain the necessity of peace. The American ministers in 
France and England were instructed to invite the cabinets of 
Paris and London to second this advice. It was hoped that 
by the united exertion of all the powers, and especially of Rus- 
sia, Spain might be brought to see her true interest in ending 
the war.^ The negotiations, however, produced no favorable 
result, and Middleton was later instructed to say to the Russian 
Government that, if Spain should obstinately resolve on con- 
tinuing the war, the United States, although it did not desire 
to see either Colombia or Mexico acquire the islands, could not 
forcibly interfere to prevent them from so doing. The libera- 
tion of Spain's remaining possessions being a lawful operation 
of war. Clay declared that his government could not interpose 
unless the struggle should chance to be conducted in such a man- 
ner and with such results as to endanger the quiet and safety of 
the United States. Nor did he, he said, apprehend that it 
would become necessary for the United States to depart from 
its position of a neutral observer of the progress of events.^ 

* Clay to Middleton, May 10, 1825. American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 
846-849. 

5 American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 887 ; for the correspondence re- 
ferred to see Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the U. 8. and 
Mexico, 115. 

6 American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 850. 



358 PAN-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Before these instructions were prepared, Clay had taken steps 
to forestall the complications that might have arisen from an 
invasion of Cuba and of Porto Rico by the new states. Al- 
though he recognized the right of Spain's enemies to attack her 
at any vital point, Clay requested the governments of Colombia 
and Mexico to suspend the expedition which it was understood 
they were fitting out against the islands until the results of 
the negotiations already initiated by the United States with a 
view to bring about peace, should have been ascertained.'^ Co- 
lombia's reception of this request was friendly though not very 
cordial. In a note addressed to the American minister at Bo- 
gota the Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that 
the importance of the matter demanded that it be duly weighed. 
On one side of the balance, he observed, were the noble efforts 
of the United States to effect and to maintain a general peace 
and to afford to the American continent an opportunity to heal 
its wounds; on the other side were the treaties which bound 
Colombia to its allies, the greater probability of bringing the 
war to a close by driving the enemy from the Western Hemi- 
sphere, and the guarantee which would be obtained for the fu- 
ture tranquillity of the continent by withholding from Spain 
the hand of friendship until she had recognized her utter 
defeat. 

He therefore expressed the opinion that, as it was not clear 
that Spain intended to abandon hostilities against the Ameri- 
can states, the suspension of vigorous and effective war against 
her would be a cause for regret, and that the postponement of 
operations against Cuba and Porto Rico in order to give the 
United States a new proof of friendship and of confidence in 
the continuance of its good offices, would result only in making 
more evident the contumacy and heedlessness of Spain. Never- 
theless Colombia wished, he said, to carry its deference to the 

7 American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 840, 851. 

A good, brief account of the question of Cuba and Porto B.ico from the 
Colombian standpoint is given by Restrepo, Historia de la Bevolucidn de la 
BepubUca de Colombia (1858), III, 488-494. 



BEITISH INFLUENCE 359 

United States as far as its own security, its treaty obligations, 
and its vital interests would permit; in consequence of which, 
operations of magnitude against Cuba would not be carried for- 
wai'd until the allies had had an opportunity to deliberate upon 
the matter in the congress to be assembled at Panama.^ 

Mexico on the other hand gave to Clay's request a cold recep- 
tion. President Victoria, after having received from Poin- 
sett a full explanation of the attitude of the United States re- 
garding Cuba, declared that his government " had no intention 
to conquer or keep possession of the island, [but] that the object 
of the expedition which they contemplated was to assist the 
revolutionists to drive out the Spaniards and in case they suc- 
ceeded to leave that people to govern themselves." A few days 
before this conference took place the Mexican senate had passed 
a resolution granting permission to the executive to undertake 
an expedition against Cuba jointly with Colombia. When the 
question came before the chamber of deputies that body voted 
to postpone further consideration of the subject until the execu- 
tive should have submitted to them the plans which were to 
be agreed upon at Panama.^ These things occurred shortly 
before Clay's request for a suspension of the expedition against 
Cuba and Porto Rico came into the hands of the Mexican cabinet. 

8 Revenga to Andersin, March 17, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 
506-508. 

A few days before this Santander had written to Bolivar, making the 
following comment on the subject: "Revenga will inform you confiden- 
tially of the interposition of the United States for the purpose of asking us 
to suspend the expedition against Cuba, because it might interfere with 
the negotiations which Russia is carrying on at Madrid in favor of our 
recognition. Habana is a point of great commercial importance to the 
United States, and as commerce is the god of the Americans, they are 
afraid that the independence of that island would be harmful to their 
trade. I shall have the answer given in equivocal terms in such a way 
as neither to reject the interposition nor declare that we will suspend 
our preparations, which would give great satisfaction to our enemies and 
encourage them to come and attack our coasts." O'Leary, Memorias, III. 
For Revenga's communication to Bolivar, see O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 
484. 

9 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and 
Mexico, 143-144. 



^ 



860 PA¥-AMERICAKISM: ITS BEGINNIKGS I 

The request was presented by Poinsett in March, 1826, andj 
he soon discovered that the reasons urged by Clay for suspend-' 
ing the expedition tended rather to incline the government of 
Mexico to persist in it. He reported that Mexico, relying upon 
the protection of Great Britain and of the United States, no I 
longer feared Spain nor the Holy Alliance, and regarded with 
indifference the question of Spain's recognition of her inde- 
pendence; that her greatest apprehension was that the powers! 
might compel a peace on the basis of Spain's retaining Cuba and 
Porto Eico, " which would deprive Mexico of the advantage and i 
glory of emancipating those islands," and that she also feared i 
that Colombia alone might liberate and thereafter control them, i 
Poinsett further reported that a messenger had recently brought 
news of the fitting out at Cartagena of a large squadron against 
Cuba ; that it was current rumor that Bolivar would arrive in 
April to take command ; that the Mexican Government was de- 
sirous to participate in the enterprise in order to acquire the 
right to a voice in the future disposition of the conquered ter- 
ritory ; and that President Victoria, being without authority to 
send troops out of the country, was planning to dispatch the 
Mexican fleet, with as many men as by a forced interpretation 
might be considered marines, to cooperate with the Colombian 
expedition. Poinsett believed that this would be done in spite 
of Clay's request. ^^ 

That Victoria's plans were not carried into execution by no 
means detracts from their significance. As has been shown in 
a previous chapter, Mexico, almost from the beginning of its 
independence, had regarded Great Britain as the only effective 
barrier to the intervention of the Holy Alliance in the war be- 
tween Spain and her former colonies in America. ^^ The es- 
tablishment of relations of friendship and commerce with Great 
Britain, it was believed, would be the " foundation of the pros- 

10 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and 
Mexico, 145-147. 

11 See supra, p. 228 et seq. 



BEITISH INFLUENCE 361 

perity and greatness of Mexico, which needed only to obtain the 
protection of so important a power to be able to advance 
rapidly to a high position among nations." ^^ England in turn 
being desirous of cultivating friendly relations with Mexico, 
early established informal diplomatic intercourse with that 
country. Dr. Mackie, the first British agent to be sent to Mex- 
ico, was appointed in December, 1822, and arrived in Mexico 
about the middle of the following year, after the downfall of 
the empire. The Mexican Government appointed General Vic- 
toria to treat with Mackie, and four conferences were held in 
July and August, in which the foundations were laid for fu- 
ture diplomatic relations. ^^ Upon the conclusion of the confer- 
ences Mackie returned to England. A second mission, consist- 
ing of Hervey, O'Gorman, and Ward, was appointed, and re- 
ceiving instructions from Canning on October 10, 1823, set 
out in time to reach Mexico before the close of the year.^^ 
Migoni, the first diplomatic agent of Mexico in Great Britain, 
was appointed, but without diplomatic character, soon after the 
fall of Iturbide. A commission as diplomatic agent which was 
later issued to him was borne to England by Mackie upon his 
return. Michelena, the first regular minister, was appointed 
in March, 1824. He reached England aboard a British warship 
about the middle of the year.^^ De facto relations continued 
until England recognized the independence of Mexico early in 
1825. The British Government then appointed Ward, one of 
the three commissioners above mentioned, as charge d'affaires 
to the Mexican republic. ^^ 

12 La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 98. For Colombia's plan relative to 
Cuba, see Santander to Bolivar, January 21, 1826; O'Leary, Memorias, III, 
237. 

13 For the protocols of these conferences, see La Diplomacia Mexicana, 
II, 109-113, 128. 

14 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and 
Mexico, 62. • 

''^5 Ibid., 56; La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 135, 150; III, 1, 13. 19. 

16 Ward was received by President Victoria on May 31, before Poinsett, 
the American minister, was received, S^e Bocanegra, Historia de Mexico, 
I, 379. 



362 PAISr-AMERICAlSriSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

During these years the United States had done little to es-^ 
tablish definitive relations with Mexico. Zozaya, who was sentlt 
by the empire to Washington as minister in 1822, was re-ji 
ceived by President Monroe; but, being neglected by his owni 
government and therefore unable to accomplish anything, he 
finally left the legation in charge of the secretary, Torrens, and 
quit the country. Not until the arrival of Obregon as minis- 
ter in the fall of 1824 did the Mexican legation at Washington 
have any important dealings with the government of the United 
States.^'^ On the other hand, the mission of Poinsett in 1822 
had tended rather to postpone than to hasten the appointment of 
a minister to Mexico by the United States ; and when Poinsett, 
who was finally designated as minister in March, 1825, reached 
the Mexican capital, he found that British influence in the 
affairs of Mexico had become thoroughly entrenched. Any 
advantage the United States might have derived from having 
been the first to recognize the independence of the new states, 
or from having taken a stand against the intervention of the 
Holy Alliance in behalf of Spain, was in great part lost.^^ 

The question of Cuba was early discussed between Great 
Britain and Mexico. In the last of the four conferences here- 
tofore mentioned, Mackie protested that the British Government 
desired the absolute freedom of Habana, with no other design 
than to prevent its being occupied by any foreign power, leav- 
ing to the island the choice of constituting an independent state 
or of uniting with Mexico.^® But, in spite of this declaration, 
the British Government later offered to mediate between Spain 
and her former colonies on the basis of the recognition of the 
independence of the new states and the retention of Cuba by 

17 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations "between the Umted States and 
Mexico, 6, 12, 15, 17, 19, 25. 

18 For a full account of British influence in Mexico prior to Poinsett's 
arrival, see Manning, Early Diplomatic Relation^ between the United 
States and Mexico, 55-88. 

19 La Diplomacia Mexicana, II, 127, 



BEITISH INFLUENCE 363 

Spain under the guarantee of Great Britain. ^^ About the mid- 
dle of 1825, however, Canning informed Michelena, who had 
been seeking a conference with him, that, as much time had 
passed and Spain had not accepted the offer of mediation, both 
parties were at liberty to act as they pleased. Canning further 
intimated, so Michelena avers, that England, while opposing the 
acquisition of Cuba either by France or by the United States, 
would not be displeased if it were united to Mexico. ^^ 

Michelena had been led to seek a conference with Canning on 
the subject of Cuba by news from Obregon at Washington to 
the effect that the United States was planning to seize the island 
on the pretext of suppressing piracy. In Mexico the same news 
caused consternation, and although it soon became evident that 
the United States had no intention of seizing Cuba on such a 
pretext,^^ the report had the effect of intensifying the suspicion 
with which the policy of the government at Washington had 
begun to be regarded. In these circumstances, it is not a violent 
assumption that Mexico's belief that Great Britain would not 
object to her annexing Cuba, to say nothing of Canning's avowed 
policy of defeating " certain claims and pretensions " of the 
Monroe pronouncement,^^ materially influenced her in her re- 
fusal to suspend hostilities against Cuba and Porto Rico. 

Returning now to the Congress of Panama, it is interesting 
to note the course of the British representative on the Isthmus in 
promoting Canning's policy as to Cuba and Porto Rico. From 
the published correspondence of the delegates it can scarcely be 
determined what really took place at Panama respecting those 

20 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and 
Mexico, 102. 

21 Memorandum de la conferencia del dia 11 de Junio de 1825, entre el 
Honorable Sr. George Cawning, el General Michelena y el Sr. Rocafuerte. 
La Diplomada Mexicana, III, 196-197. 

22 Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and 
Mexico, 103-104. 

23 Temperley, The Later American Policy of George Canning, American 
Historical Review, XI, 779-782. 



364 PAlSr-AMEEICAlSriSM: ITS BEGINNHSTGS I 

islands. Tlie reference to the subject in the letter of Briceiio 
Mendez, heretofore cited, leaves to surmise the nature of the 
discussions that may have taken place. In a later communica- 
tion, however, which he made to his government on arriving at 
Bogota in August following the adjournment of the congress, 
Briceiio Mendez drops a remark which is not without sig- 
nificance. The British agent, Dawkins, had been urging upon 
the delegates the necessity of a compromise with Spain, main-j| 
taining that the question of recognition by the mother country! 
became more complicated day by day. " In order to support i 
this assertion," said Briceno Mendez, "he adduced the declara-? 
tion which the United States had made relative to Cuba and, 
Porto Eico, adding that the intervention which that republic 
had given to Russia in the matter had already caused great 
difficulties, and would cause greater ones." ^* Was Dawkins 
trying to defeat certain " pretensions " of the United States by 
arousing suspicions relative to its policy in Cuba and Porto 
Eico and by disparaging its efforts to bring about peace between 
Spain and the new American states ? The answer to this ques- 
tion is to be found in Canning's instructions to Dawkins and 
in the latter's report of what occurred at Panama. 

In the autumn of 1825 negotiations took place between Great 
Britain and the United States with reference to the designs of 
France in sending a squadron to the West Indies and the pro- 
posed expedition of Bolivar against Cuba. Vaughan, the Brit- 
ish minister at Washington, conversing with Clay on the latter 
subject, actually " suggested an interference by the United 
States of America to dissuade the Mexicans and Colombians 
from making any attack upon Cuba." Canning promptly dis- 
avowed Vaughan and gave him fresh instructions in which the 
following declaration is found : " If it be merely the interests 
of the United States that are concerned, that ground of inter- 
ference can only belong to them, nor is there any obligation upon 

24 0'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 574. 



BKITISH INFLUENCE 365 

j US, to share the odium of such an interposition." ^^ In his in- 
I structions to Dawkins, Canning, though avowing an earnest de- 
sire on the part of his government to have Cuba remain a colony 
of Spain, sought to create the impression among the delegates 

25 Temperley, The Later American Policy of George Canning, American 
. Historical Revieic, XI, 791, citing Public Record OflBce, F. 0., America. 

The instructions to Vaughan, dated February 8, 1826, were printed in 
full in the Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society for Novem- 
ber, 1912, 233-235. 

Temperley, in his otherwise excellent study of the later American policy 
of George Canning, is extremely severe and unsympathetic in his treatment 
of the- Panama Congress. He says, " The congress was announced with the 
most extravagant boasts and rodomontades, fully worthy of the swaggering 
Don Guzmans and Don Alvarados of Spanish romance. Bolivar and his 
friends frequently spoke of it as one of the most important events of the 
world's history." To confirm this judgment he quotes as follows from a 
speech of the Peruvian delegate, Vidaurre : " An entire world is about to 
witness our labors. . . . From the first sovereign to the last inhabitant of 
the southern hemisphere nobody is indifferent to our task. This will prob- 
ably be the last attempt to ascertain whether mankind can be happy. 
Companions ! the field of glory — cleared by Bolivar, San Martin, O'Hig- 
gins, Guadalupe, and many others superior to Hercules and Theseus, is 
before us. Our names are about to be written either in immortal praise 
or in eternal opprobrium. Let us raise ourselves above a thousand 
millions of inhabitants, and may a noble pride inspire us, likening us to 
God himself on that day when He gave the first laws to the universe." 
American Hist. Rev., XI, 785, 786. 

Although the other representatives disclaimed responsibility for this 
speech, yet Temperley is of the opinion that it represented — more or less 
— the general feeling of the time. It is true that high hopes were enter- 
tained by men of distinction in both Americas with regard to the Panama 
Congress. But the extravagant expression of Vidaurre did not represent 
the feelings of the time, as contemporary records abundantly demonstrate. 
The address was printed in a Gazeta Extraordinaria of Panama on June 
23, the day after the congress assembled. On that same day the Colom- 
bian delegates entered a formal protest against the publication (O'Leary, 
Memorias, XXIV, 340). After the Mexican delegates had returned to 
Mexico, Poinsett wrote Clay that he had adverted, in the course of a con- 
versation with them, to the very extraordinary sentiments contained in 
Vidaurre's speech on the opening of the congress. They assured Poinsett 
that Vidaurre had never delivered that discourse, but published it without 
the knowledge of his colleagues; that on the following day they, the 
Mexican delegates, remonstrated, verbally, both against the publication and 
against the sentiments it contained. {American State Papers, For. Ret., 
VI, 361.) The address is to be found in American State Papers, For. Rel., 
VI, 359-361; in O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 329-336; and in Blanco-Az- 
purua, Documentos, X, 433^36. 



366 PAISr-AMEEICAISriSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

at Panama that the United States was the only obstacle in the 
way of an expedition against the remaining Spanish strong- I 
holds in the Western Hemisphere. The instructions were dated 
March 18, 1826, and the part referring to Cuba reads as fol- 
lows: 

"You will see how earnestly it is desired by the U[nited] 
S[tates], by France and by this country that Cuba should re- 
main a colony of Spain. The B[ritish] Gov[ernmen]t indeed, 
are so far from denying the right of the new States of America | 
to make a hostile attack upon Cuba, whether considered simply j 
as a possession of a power with whom they are at war, or ; 
as an arsenal from which expeditions are fitted out against i 
them, that we have uniformly refused to join with the U[nited] j 
S[tates] in remonstrating that we should feel displeasure at the 
execution of it. We should indeed regret it, but we arrogate 
to ourselves no right to control the operations of one belligerent 
against another. The Government of the U[nited] S[tates] 
however professes itself of a different opinion. It conceives 
that the interests of the U[nited] S[tates] would be so di- 
rectly affected by either the occupation of Havannah by an 
invading force, or by the consequences which an attack upon 
Cuba, even if unsuccessful, might produce in the interior of 
the island, that the cabinet of Washington hardly disguises its 
intention to interfere directly, and by force, to prevent or re- 
press such an operation. Neither England nor France could 
see with indifference the U[nited] S[tates] in occupation of 
Cuba. Observe, therefore, the complicated consequences to 
which an expedition to Cuba by Mexico and Colombia might 
lead, and let the States assembled at Panama consider whether 
it is worth while to continue a war the only remaining operation 
of which (that is likely to be sensibly felt by their adversary) 
is thus morally interdicted to them by the consequences to 
which it would lead." ^* 

26 Temperley, The Later American Policy of George Canning, American 
Historical Review, XI, 792, citing Public Kecord Office, F. 0., Colombia. 



BRITISH INFLUEl^CE 367 

! These instructions require no comment. The spirit in which 
Dawkins would be likely to carry them out may be inferred 
from Canning's definition of the general attitude of England 
toward the whole American situation. Referring to the nascent 
states he requested information " about their feelings toward 
each other, and the degree of influence in their concerns which 
they may appear to allow to the United States of ISTorth Amer- 
ica. You will understand," continued Canning, " that to a 
league among the states, lately colonies of Spain, limited to ob- 
jects growing out of their common relations to Spain, II[is] 
M[ajesty']s Gov[ernmen]t would not object. But any project 
for putting the U[nited] S[tates] of North America at the head 
of an American Confederacy, as against Europe, would be 
highly displeasing to your Gov[ernmen]t. It would be felt as 
an ill return for the service which has been rendered to those 
states, and the dangers which have been averted from them, by 
the countenance and friendship, and publick declarations of 
Great Britain; and it would, too, probably at no very distant 
period, endanger the peace both of America and of Europe." ^'^ 
Dawkins did not take part in the deliberations of the congress, 
but apparently held frequent informal conferences with the 
delegates.^^ He reported to Canning that on making one of 

For a translation into Spanish of the instructions to Dawkins, see Vil- 
lanueva, El Imperio de los Andes, 149-159. 

27 Temperley, The Later American Policy of Oeorge Canning, Amer. Hist. 
Rev., XI, 787, citing Canning to Dawkins, Public Kecord Ofl&ce, F. O., 
Colombia. 

28 In his instructions to Vaughan, written shortly before the instruc- 
tions to Dawkins, Canning had said : " The avowed pretension of the 
United States to put themselves at the head of a confederacy of all the 
Americas, and to sway that confederacy against Europe (Great Britain 
included), is not a pretension identified with our interests, or one that we 
can countenance as tolerable." See also Dunning, The British Empire and 
the United States, 56. In a dispatch dated September 23, 1826, Poinsett 
makes the following statement : " The agent sent to Panama by his 
Majesty, the King of Netherlands, is arrived here, but his Britannic Maj- 
esty's commissioner, Mr. Dawkins, is returned to England. These gentle- 
men were not present at the deliberations of the congress." (American 
State Papers, For. Rel., VI, 362.) Poinsett meant, of course, that the rep- 
resentatives of Great Britain and the Netherlands did not attend the meet- 



368 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINmNGS 

his almost daily visits to Gual on June 26, he had found the 
Colombian delegate somewhat cold and incredulous as to the 
good wishes of England. He discovered later that Gual's atti- 
tude had been caused by his having read some published dis- 
patches of Everett, the minister of the United States to Spain. 
These dispatches were distinctly unfavorable in their criticism 
of the English procedure at Madrid, and among other things 
asserted that Lambe, the British minister to Spain, had not 
been active in persuading Ferdinand to grant recognition.^^ 

ings of the congress and not that they were not present in the city of 
Panama while the assembly was in session ; for he must have had accurate 
information on this point. It is probably due to the above statement that 
Manning makes the mistake of saying, in speaking of the congress, that 
" neither the English nor the American representatives were present." 
{Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, 157.) 

29 The dispatches here referred to were undoubtedly those contained in a 
document entitled, " The executive proceedings of the Senate of the United 
States on the subject of the mission to the congress at Panama together 
with messages and documents relating thereto," published March 22, 1826. 
The following extract (p. 84) from one of the dispatches, dated October 20, 
1825, would account for Gual's attitude and for Dawkins' concern. 

" Mr. Lambe's sentiments in regard to the South American question are, 
of course, precisely the same with ours. I was desirous to ascertain 
whether the British Government had lately made any attempts to urge 
Spain to a recognition of the new states, and questioned Mr. Lambe upon 
this point. He said he had had one or two conversations with Mr. Zea 
soon after his arrival (he has been here about five months), and stated the 
substance of what had passed between them. The minister, it seems, gave 
to him the same answer which he has since given to me, and cited, to illus- 
trate his argument, the same examples of Louis XVIII and Bonaparte. No 
offer of formal mediation has been made by England since her recognition. 
Indeed her interest as a commercial and manufacturing country, is now on 
the other side. The longer the war continues, the longer she enjoys monop- 
oly of the Spanish American market for her fabrics, and the more diflBcult 
will Spain find it to recover her natural advantages upon the return of 
peace. England will, therefore, probably be very easy in regard to this 
matter, and will leave Spain to pursue, unmolested, the course she may 
think expedient. I suggested this point both to Mr. Zea and to the Eussian 
minister, and was inclined to think from what they said of it, that it had 
more weight with them than any other consideration in favor of recognition. 
They both admitted the justice of my remarks, and the great inconvenience 
that resulted in this way from the present state of things, and could only 
avoid the proper conclusion, by reverting to their common places, of the 
probability of a return of the colonies to their allegiance, which they really 
seem to imagine will come about sooner or later, without any effort on the 
part of either Spain or her allies, and by the aid of some unlocked for in- 



BRITISH INFLUE:N^CE 369 

Dawkins was greatly concerned and, having read the corre- 
spondence, wrote to Gual and contradicted the statements of 
Everett. He also furnished Gual with copies of English dis- 
patches which were intended to prove that Great Britain had 
been active and sincere in her attempts to secure recognition. 
According to Dawkins, British ascendancy at the congress was 
soon completely recovered, and Gual freely expressed his opinion 
" of the imprudence of the United States, of the errors com- 
mitted by Mr. Everett, and of the mischief which may be 
done by the indiscreet publication of his correspondence." 
Furthermore, Gual promised to bring before the congress a proj- 
ect for terminating the war through the mediation of Great 
Britain. ^° Evidently the British agent believed that he had 
satisfactorily accomplished at least a part of his mission — the 
making of the United States an object of suspicion to the 
Spanish Americans. In summing up the general results of the 
congress in a later dispatch he called attention to the fact that 

tervention of Divine Providence. I learned nothing material from Mr. L. 
excepting the fact that the British Government is now quiet in regard to 
this matter, and makes no attempts to influence the decision of Spain. He 
professed to have but little information as to the state of the Spanish set- 
tlements in America, and having passed the greater part of his life, in- 
cluding the last eight or ten years, on the Continent, has been, in fact, 
rather out of the way of obtaining it." Cf. also American State Papers, 
For. Rel., V. 869. 

About a year prior to the date of Everett's dispatch the French minister 
at Washington had written his government as follows : " North America 
believes that the mere force of its example will be sufficient protection 
against the dangers of democracy; as for England, she does not yet wish to 
see in all these commotions anything beyond her commercial interests, for 
which reason she is secretly putting obstacles in the way of any agreement 
between Spain and her colonies." Villanueva, El Imperio de los Andes, 
citing Mareuil to Villele, Ministere des Affaires Estrangeres, Etates Unds, 
1823-1824, No. 80. 

It seems unlikely in view of Canning's instructions to Dawkins that the 
policy of Great Britain was to prevent the termination of the war between 
Spain and her former colonies. It appears to be indisputable, however, 
that Canning was doing everything possible to prevent any other power, 
and especially the United States, from gaining the good will of the new 
states by mediating in their behalf. 

30 Temperley, The Later American Policy of George Canning, Am. Hist. 
Rev., XI, 789. 



370 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

the United States had failed to get any commercial treaties in 
its favor, owing to the opposition of Mexico and Peru. " The 
general influence of the United States/' he said, " is not, in my 
opinion, to be feared. It certainly exists in Colombia, but it 
has been very much weakened even there by their protests 
against an attack on Cuba, and by the indiscretions they have 
committed at Madrid." ^^ 

Though a man of discernment and not lacking in diplomatic 
experience and skill,^^ Dawkins appears to have placed too high 
a valuation upon what he was able to accomplish at Panama. 
The attitude of the new states toward Great Britain and the 
United States was the product of a number of factors which 
had been quietly producing their effects over a period of years. 
No amount of manipulation at the congress could have added 
greatly to British prestige in Mexico and South America, nor 
could have detracted appreciably from the friendly feeling with 
which the United States was generally regarded throughout 
the continent. Even though Dawkins had been able to affect 
in the most profound manner the opinions of the delegates, he 
could not have been sure of any consequent change in the atti- 
tude of the republics which they represented ; for the congress 
itself was destined to have little immediate influence, and as the 
individual members did not occupy commanding positions in 
their respective countries they were powerless to produce im- 
portant changes. To the question of Cuba, particularly, 
Dawkins attached too great importance as affecting the rela- 
tions between the United States and the southern republics. 
On this question there was no clear division of Spanish America 

31 Temperley, The Later American Policy of George Canning, Am. Hist. 
Rev., XI, 793; Dawkins to Canning, October 15, 1826. 

32 He was formerly British minister at Athens. Temperley calls him 
"the astute Mr. Dawkins." {Am. Hist. Rev., XI, 788) and the Spanish 
American delegates at the congress generally spoke of him with praise. 
He was born in 1792 and died in 1865. (Cf. Burke's, The Landed Gentry 
of Great Britain and Ireland, IV, sup.) 



BKITISH INFLUENCE 3Y1 

against Angio-America. Peru and Central America liad much 
less interest in the subject than had Colombia and Mexico. 
And the latter republics were more suspicious of one another 
than either was of the United States. Briceno Mendez laments 
not that the United States had designs on the islands but that 
he and his colleague, Gual, had not been able to induce the Mex- 
ican delegates to speak out clearly on the subject. And Mexico 
had been pushing its plans for an expedition against Cuba more 
through jealousy of Colombia than through fear that the United 
States would seize the islands. These were conditions which 
Dawkins' efforts could have done little to change. 

But Dawkins' mission to Panama was intended to be not 
merely negative, not merely destructive of the influence of the 
United States. The great aim was the positive one of achieving 
a lasting ascendancy for Great Britain in Hispanic American 
affairs. Such an end could be attained only by positive con- 
tributions to the welfare of the new states, the pressing need of 
which, for the moment, was peace and tranquillity. Accord- 
ingly Dawkins was instructed to tender the good offices of his 
government for reopening negotiations with Spain. As to the 
proposal of peace — a proposal which had often been discussed 
and which had usually been indignantly rejected — Canning 
gave no instructions.^^ Some record of this subject has been 
left by the delegates of Colombia and Peru in the O'Leary 
papers. The following references throw light upon this par- 
ticular point and upon the whole mission of the British agent, 
as it was viewed by the delegates assembled at Panama. 

The British commissioner arrived at Panama on June 2, and 
his credentials, according to which it appears that he had been 
appointed to reside at whatever place the congress should meet 
and to maintain with it a " friendly and frank communication," 
were considered at the second formal meeting held on June 23. 

33 Temperley, The Later American Policy of Oeorge Canning, America^ 
Eist. Rev., XI, 788. 



3Y2 PA:t;r-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

In consideration of tlie " generous and liberal policy of the gov- 
ernment of his Britannic Majesty toward the American states/' 
the assembly resolved that a letter be written to Canning and 
another to Dawkins in acknowledgment of the receipt of the 
credentials^^ No further reference to the British commissioner 
appears in the protocols of the sessions until July 15, when it 
was recorded that the president was requested to inform him of 
the removal of the congress to Tacubaya.^^ More extended al- 
lusions are to be found in the unofficial correspondence of some 
of the delegates. 

On June 4, Briceno Mendez wrote that Dawkins had said 
to the Colombian delegates, among other things, that his mission 
was merely one of deference and consideration on the part of 
Great Britain toward Colombia ; that there were great hopes of 
Spain's giving in finally and recognizing the new states ; that 
France had a lively interest in the matter and had agreed to take 
steps which could not fail to compel Ferdinand VII to acknowl- 
edge the independence of his former colonies in America. ^^ On 
June 6, Vidaurre wrote that the British minister had paid a 
visit on that day to the Peruvian delegation, on which occasion 
the question of the recognition of the independence of Peru by 
Great Britain was discussed. Dawkins expressed an opinion 
unfavorable to such a measure, because, he said, Peru had not 
yet established a constitutional government (gohiemo consti- 
tuido y procendente del congreso nacional). "He tells me," 
wrote Vidaurre, " that we ought to be careful to proceed in such 
a way as to avoid coming into conflict with the system of 
Europe, as well as to avoid arousing the prejudices of America. 
It is important that this should be duly considered. This gen- 
tleman assures us at the outset that his government wishes 
nothing and asks nothing. It is willing to help us, however, 

34 Protocol of the second conference of the congress. O'Leary, Memorias, 
XXIV, 340. 

35 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 348. 

^^ O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 205. Briceno Mendez to Bolivar. 



BEITISH INFLUENCE SYS 

when opportunity may permit." ^"^ Under the same date but 
in a separate communication, Tudela gave an account of the 
conference with Dawkins, agreeing in substance with the report 
of his colleague. ^^ 

In a joint letter dated June 10, Gual and Briceiio Mendez 
wrote that the amiable and frank character of the British agent 
had inspired confidence ; that he, Dawkins, detested the idea of 
intrigue or of spying; and that his greatest desire was to be 
a friend to all.^^ A month later the Colombian delegation 
wrote that the assembly had not had time to investigate what 
object the British commissioner might be seeking in Panama 
other than that stated in his credentials, but that his expressions 
to some of the delegates demonstrated that Great Britain was 
moved by a desire to contribute to the termination of the war.^** 
After the adjournment of the congress, Briceno Mendez wrote: 
" The English commissioner in Panama never ceased preaching 
to us about the necessity of granting an indemnity to Spain as 
a sine qua non of recognition. After the assembly had ad- 
journed he suggested that Mr. Canning would be very much dis- 
pleased to know that we had made no proposal of peace to Spain, 
and that this would be viewed in Europe as proof that we were 
for settling everything by force and thus following the footsteps 
of the French republic. A statement of so positive a nature, 
after all we had heard on the subject of an indemnity, could do 
no less than cause us to view the proposition as coming from the 
British ministry, in spite of the fact that the commissioner al- 
ways protested that these opinions were his own, and should by 
no means be taken as those of his government. Gual and I had 
several conferences with him on this subject, and finally after 
we had strongly urged him to say what in his opinion would 

37 Vidaurre to the minister of foreign affairs of Peru. O'Leary, Memorias, 
XXIV, 324. 

38 Perez de Tudela to Bolivar, O'Leary. Memorias, X, 415. 

39 Gual and Briceno M§ndez to the secretary of foreign relations of Co- 
lombia, O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 325. 

^0 Hid., 335, 



374 PAJST-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

be acceptable, he told us that the amount was between sixty and 
eighty millions, and that this could be paid without making it 
appear as an indemnity, for everything has a remedy. ^^ 

" He concluded by assuring us that on this basis recognition 
was more than certain, and that his government would take 
charge of the mediation, if it were believed to be necessary. We 
had him understand that what we might say was on our own 
responsibility, for we were not authorized to enter into negotia- 
tions on this subject; that we did not know of any intentions 
of our government except in a contrary sense, as appeared in 
our treaties with the rest of the republics ; and that even though 
we had the requisite knowledge and authority we would refrain 
from making any proposal for paying an indemnity, because 
by merely making such an offer we would lose the fight, and 
would encourage Spain to increase her pretensions beyond meas- 
ure, which would not be the case if the proposal came from her 
and we were the ones to consider it. He tried to reassure us 
on this point, giving us to understand that neither France nor 
England would permit too great pretensions on the part of the 
metropolis, since both were greatly interested in seeing that the 
new republics were not sacrificed, and that Spain should not 
escape too suddenly from the difficult situation in which she 
then found herseK." ^^ 

41 The attitude of the United States on this point was in contrast to 
that of Great Britain. Speaking in his instructions to Anderson and Ser- 
geant of the desirability of peace, Clay declared that there was " nothing in 
the present or in the future, of which we can catch a glimpse, that should 
induce the American republics, in order to obtain it, to sacrifice a particle 
of their independence. They ought, therefore, to reject all propositions 
founded upon the principle of a concession of perpetual commercial priv- 
ileges to any foreign power. The grant of such privileges is incompatible 
with their actual and absolute independence. It would partake of the 
spirit and bring back, in fact, if not in form, the state of ancient colonial 
connection. Nor would their honor and national pride allow them to en- 
tertain or deliberate on propositions founded upon the notion of purchasing, 
with a pecuniary consideration, the Spanish acknowledgment of their inde- 
pendence." International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 124. 

42 BriceSo Mendez to Bolivar, aboard the Macedonia, in front of Buena- 
ventura, July 22, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 215. 



BKITISH INFLUENCE 375 

Upon bis return to Bogota, Briceiio Mendez made a more ex- 
tended report on tlie proceedings at Panama, in which he again 
referred to Dawkins' mission. Expressing great satisfaction at 
being able to say that the conduct of the British agent had been 
" noble, frank, and loyal," he added : " We have had no cause 
for complaint against Mr. Dawkins and no reason to distrust 
him ; on the contrary all the delegations manifested toward him 
very flattering marks of respect and consideration. We Co- 
lombians, particularly, were the object of his special attentions 
and I am not ashamed to confess that my famous friend and 
colleague, Seiior Gual, received greater consideration than any 
of the rest, showing clearly the high opinion in which his talents, 
his learning, and his character are held." Alluding to the fact 
that Dawkins' relations to the congress were not official, Brin- 
ceno Mendez continued : " He limited himself to counseling that 
we show respect for the institutions of other countries, whatever 
they might be; that we not only avoid everything that might 
serve to increase the fears and misgivings which Europe already 
had relative to revolutionary principles, but that we make an 
effort to demonstrate that republicanism in America is not what 
France professed under a republican regime ; that we do not con- 
firm the suspicion that we are aiming to form a separate politi- 
cal system in opposition to Europe, but that we confine ourselves 
to looking after our own interests and to providing for our 
national security; that above all it was important that we 
give proof of a love of peace and of a disposition to embrace it, 
even though it were at the cost of some pecuniary sacrifice. On 
this last point he insisted with such tenacity that I have had no 
doubt but that it was the principal object of his mission, in 
spite of the fact that he constantly protested that what he said 
was his own and not the opinion of his government." ^^ 

Continuing, Briceno Mendez says that Dawkins gave every 
assurance that mediation by England would have a successful 

43 Briceno Mendez to the Secretary of Foreign Relations of Colombia, 
Bogota, August 15, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 573-574. 



SY6 PAK-AMEBICAKISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

outcome, provided the money consideration were taken as a 
point of departure in the negotiations; for otherwise France, 
' without whose aid England could make no progress, would not 
cooperate in the enterprise. It is at this point that Briceno 
Mendez made reference to Dawkins' veiled warning against 
the designs of the United States in Cuba and Porto Rico and 
against the joint mediation of the United States and Russia, 
for the purpose of terminating the conflict. Furthermore 
Dawkins declared, in a moment of ardor, that none of the re- 
publics would be able to obtain a loan in Europe for continuing 
the war, especially a war of invasion, but that on the contrary 
there would be no trouble in procuring money as the price of 
peace. Expecting that the congress would not adjourn without 
taking some notable step toward peace, Dawkins was unable to 
hide his surprise and disappointment on learning the contrary. 
Briceno Mendez concludes his references to the mission of the 
British agent in the following significant passage : " As to the 
results of the deliberations of the assembly he manifested great 
alarm, on the occasion of a visit which Gual and I made him, at 
the action of the confederates in renouncing, as he believed, the 
right to negotiate with foreign nations except through the as- 
sembly. We showed him his mistake and in order to remove 
any suspicions which public rumors might have inspired in 
him, we permitted him to read the treaty of union and that 
of contingents. After having read these he approved all their 
provisions, excepting the one relating to the removal of the 
congress to Mexico ; because, he said, apart from its geographi- 
cal position and its political importance, the services of Co- 
lombia to the cause of America gave it the right to have the 
assembly on its soil." ** 

In view of the prominent part which the name of Gual has 
played in the foregoing discussion, the following remarks which 

i^Ihid., 574. The delegates of the United States were authorized to 
agree upon a transfer of the conferences from Panama to any other place 
on the American continent. International American Conference ( 18'89- 
90), IV, 117. 



BKITISH INFLUENCE 377 

he made in a private letter to Bolivar, relative to the mission of 
the British agent, will be of interest. Declaring that in his 
opinion the object which was then demanding the chief atten- 
tion of the British cabinet was peace between Spain and the 
new states, and adverting to the persistence of Spain in her 
attempts to reconquer the lost colonies, Gual said : " We are thus 
between two extremes which offer not the least point of con- 
tact. Mr. Dawkins believes that peace may be bought with 
money, and this he has repeated so many times as an opinion 
of his own (not of the ministry) that I am almost persuaded 
that France is the one who desires to negotiate peace under these 
conditions in order to reimburse herself for what Spain owes 
her. In a word, from all I have heard on this subject, I deduce 
that France wishes to get something out of the recognition and 
leave something to Ferdinand VII, who, they say, thinks of 
nothing but getting money to buy gewgaws and such trifles in 
London and Paris. ... I confess that my private opinion is 
not altogether contrary to making some sacrifice for peace,^^ 
provided we do it voluntarily and are not forced into it by a 
decree in the French style, as was the case with Haiti, Peace 
would be an immense blessing to America, for without it, ex- 
posed as we are to domestic disturbances and to foreign wars of 
the most complicated nature, our fate would always be uncer- 
tain. . . . The proposition in any case ought to come from the 
other side, so that we might consider it ; for it may be made in 
such diverse forms that it would be impossible to decide upon 
its acceptability beforehand." ^^ No such proposal was ever 

45 Sentiment, however, particularly in Colombia and Peru, was decid- 
edly against the payment of an indemnity. On May 21, 1826, Revenga 
wrote to Bolivar as follows : " I have to add a request which I make from 
the bottom of my heart. I believe it to be very desirable that you should 
urge the congress of the Isthmus to ratify or renew the compact which pro- 
hibits Colombia and her allies from conceding in return for peace, in- 
demnity or recompense of any kind in detriment to our honor and to our 
independence. The plenipotentiaries of Colombia have instructions in con- 
formity with this ideal. But you will do it because you know I am no 
visionary." O'Leary, M.emorias, VI, 515. 

46 Gual to Bolivar, June 23, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, VIII, 447, 



378 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

made, of course, by the obstinate Eerdinand, and it is unlikely 
that it would have been accepted, even if it had been made, at 
so late a day. It may be added that Gual's correspondence, 
like that of Briceiio Mendez and of the Peruvian delegates, gives 
no evidence that his attitude toward the United States had in 
the least been affected by his conferences with Dawkins. 

Of doubtful success in one of its main objects, that of coun- 
teracting the influence of the United States in the concerns 
of the new governments, the mission of the British agent in 
another of its principal aims, the bringing about of an accom- 
modation between the allied belligerents and the mother coun- 
try, was a complete failure. But this failure must by no means 
be regarded as a sign of the inefficacy of Canning's American 
policy; for on the whole that policy, skillfully prosecuted as it 
had been over a period of several years, had succeeded in es- 
tablishing in at least some parts of Spanish and Portuguese 
America the ascendancy which Great Britain sought. On the 
whole, also, it may well be said that Dawkins' mission, in view 
of the failure of the congress itself and in view of what British 
diplomacy had already accomplished, did not fall far short of 
what might reasonably have been expected of it. He had 
stood in the relation of an adviser to the congTess, had offered 
the services of his government to bring about peace, had cul- 
tivated friendly relations with the delegates present, and in a 
general way had, no doubt, contributed to the cordiality of in- 
tercourse between Great Britain and the states taking part in 
the assembly. Under the circumstances little more was pos- 
sible. 

Ca,nmhg's policy of maintaining British supremacy in the 
Western Hemisphere had a^singularly ardent and tenacious sup- 
porter in Simon Bolivar. JJot that Bolivar was interested in 
British supremacy as such, but that he believed it to be essential j 
to the independence and future prosperity of the new states. ; 
If the Liberator's hopes could have been realized the Congress i 
of Panama would have been the scene of the negotiation of a ! 



BRITISH INFLUENCE 3Y9 

compact in virtue of which the nascent American states would 
have been placed under the protection of Great Britain. In 
such a contingency the declarations of President Monroe by 
implication would have ceased to be effective in their original 
intention and scope. Apparently Canning did not at any 
time approve of the plan. The idea was Bolivar's and for a 
period of nearly fifteen years he worked untiringly to carry it 
into execution. It was in 1815, while he was in exile in 
Jamaica, that Bolivar began a propaganda aimed at securing 
the assistance and protection of Great Britain, and in order that 
the plan which he later wished to have the Congress of Panama 
adopt may be viewed in its proper setting, it will be well to 
glance for a moment at some of his earlier expressions on the 
subject. 

Writing to Maxwell Hyslop on May 19, 1815, more than three 
months before he penned the famous prophetic letter so often 
referred to, Bolivar said : " The time has arrived, Sir, and per- 
haps there will not be another opportunity, for England to take 
part in determining the fate of the peoples of this immense con- 
tinent, who will succumb or be exterminated unless some power- 
ful nation comes to their rescue. . . ." Referring then to the 
great possibilities which were open to England for the exten- 
sion of her trade, and calling attention to the undeveloped re- 
sources, especially of ISTew Granada, where he declared the 
mountains were filled with gold and silver, he exclaimed: 
" What a bright prospect for British industry is offered by this 
spot of the New World ! I shall not speak of the other regions 
which but await the day of freedom when they will receive into 
their midst great numbers of continental Europeans who will 
constitute in a few years another Europe. Increasing by this 
means her weight in the political balance England rapidly dim- 
inishes that of her enemies, who will come here and indirectly 
and inevitably contribute to England's commercial preponder- 
ance and to an increase in her military strength sufficiently to 
maintain the colossus which embraces every part of the earth. 



380 PAI^T-AMEEICAI^ISM: ITS BEGIISTNINGS 

. . . These great advantages may be obtained at a very small 
cost : twenty or thirty thousand rifles, a million pounds sterling, 
fifteen or twenty war vessels, munitions, a few agents, and the 
number of volunteers who may choose to follow the flags of 
America. Here you have all that is needed to give liberty to 
this hemisphere and to establish the balance of the world." ^'^ 

Continuing, Bolivar declared that Costa Firme could be saved 
with six or eight thousand rifles and ammunition in proportion, 
together with five hundred thousand pesos to pay the expenses 
of the first months of campaign. Finally, he made the follow- 
ing remarkable statement : " With this assistance the rest of 
America will be relieved from danger ; and at the same time the 
provinces of Panama and E"icaragua may be delivered to Great 
Britain in order that she may make of these countries the cen- 
ter of the world's trade by constructing canals, which, breaking 
through the barriers separating the two seas, will bring nearer 
the remote parts of the earth and render permanent England's 
dominion over commerce." ^^ Bolivar explained his reasons 
for seeking the aid of Great Britain a few days later in a letter 
to Richard Wellesley. He said : " If I had had a single ray of 
hope left that America would be able to triumph unaided, no 
one could have desired more than I to serve his country without 
the humiliation of soliciting foreign protection. This is why 
I have left Costa Firme. I came in search of aid; I will 
go to seek it in that superb capital — if it were necessary I 
would go to the north pole — and if everybody is insensible to 
the voice of humanity, I will have done my duty, though in- 
effectually, and I will return to die fighting in my native 
land." 49 

Whether or not as a result of Bolivar's appeals, the struggling 
patriots of Costa Firme during the next three or four years re- 
ceived substantial aid from Great Britain. Meanwhile, and 

^T Cartas de Bolivar (Sociedad de Ediciones), 116-117. 
48Ihid., 118. 
i^IUd., 123. 



BRITISH mFLUEE^CE 381 

during the years that followed, Bolivar's faith in England ap- 
parently never wavered and his desire to enter into some sort 
of intimate political association with the British Empire grew 
stronger as the difficulties of organizing the former Spanish 
colonies into stable governments became more evident. It was 
not, however, until Great Colombia had been established and 
not until the Liberator had taken the first definite steps to bring 
about a confederation of the new states that he began what 
appears to have been a positive propaganda aimed at inclining 
the minds of the leaders in Colombia and Peru to the acceptance 
of the scheme which he was destined later to propose. During 
the eventful period immediately preceding the battle of Aya- 
cucho the references in his correspondence to Great Britain are 
frequent and most friendly. With his plans for the liberation 
of Peru still in formation, with his restless, imaginative mind 
running forward to the time when the whole of America would 
be free, and to the time when the necessity for the organization 
of a stable political system would be at hand, he wrote Sucre 
that after deep meditation he had become more strongly con- 
firmed in his first designs and that every day he was becoming 
more convinced of the correctness of his political opinions. 
" Everything confirms most positively," he said, " my conjec- 
tures relative to an early peace. England is the most interested 
in this transaction because she desires to form a league with all 
the free peoples of America and Europe, against the Holy Al- 
liance, for the purpose of putting herself at their head and rul- 
ing the world." ^^ 

Later it became evident, at least in a general way, what part 
Bolivar would have had the new states play in this great scheme 
of world dominion. In July, 1825, he wrote to Revenga and 
to Santander setting forth his ideas on the subject,^^ and al- 
though these letters are not included among the published docu- 
ments relating to the Liberator, it is nevertheless possible to 

50 Bolivar to Sucre, May 24, 1823. O'Leary, Memorias, XXX, 274. 

51 O'Leary, Memorias, III, 207, 209 ; VI, 499. 



382 PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

determine from other sources what were the essential features of 
the plan which he must have had in mind. He did not, it 
seems, set forth his scheme in detail; for Eevenga in replying 
declared that, although he had read the Liberator's letters on the 
subject, together with other papers furnished him by the vice 
president, yet he was left in doubt as to the nature of the ar- 
rangement which it was desired to make. The plan, which 
at first seemed " perfectly clear, relatively easy to carry out, 
and from every point of view desirable," now appeared to pre- 
sent certain difficulties. Was it, he inquired, a question of 
alliance between two nations, or a question of intimate federa- 
tion, in which there was a protector with more or less privilege 
or authority of one kind or another ? In attempting to answer 
this question Revenga made some observations which it is of 
interest to quote. 

" The indefinite nature of the fears," said Revenga, " which 
are expressed for our existence and which in present circum- 
stances cannot be attributed to the policies of continental 
Europe, for those policies are gradually becoming milder with 
respect to us; and the supposition that supremacy must be 
yielded to some one, induce the conclusion that it be the sec- 
ond [i.e. a protectorate] ; and if it be the second, however much 
the authority and the privileges of the protector be reduced, it 
appears clear that the strength of none of the confederates can 
grow without increasing in geometrical proportion that of the 
protector, who will excel the rest in this way as well as in knowl- 
edge, industry, and sources of wealth. It appears equally clear 
that there would be no hope of being able to separate from the 
federation later, for that same growth of power would give the 
protector greater prestige among foreign nations, more means 
for working secretly among the confederates, a stronger hold 
on their respect, and a greater number of pretexts for demand- 
ing their consideration and gratitude. ... I speak of the ob- 
jections to this kind of protectorate, or immediate supremacy, 
such as England exercises over the Ionian Islands, because the 



BRITISH INFLUENCE 383 

other species of protectorate consisting of a confederation of 
sovereigns, like that of Austria over the empire is not advan- 
tageous except in so far as it presents to the outside world a 
greater, more formidable, more harmonious mass. It cannot 
have any influence in bettering the internal condition of any 
of its members except by means of friendly counsel, exclusively ; 
for v^hat has excited in the Austrian Empire the greatest num- 
ber of complaints has been the attempt to influence, through the 
Diet, the institutions of the separate states. 

" After considering both systems I have come to the conclu- 
sion that you v^ere referring rather to an alliance as close and 
as cordial as it is possible to conceive, an alliance which will 
contribute to the conservation of the federation, present it to 
the world, shielded by all the power of the new ally, and at the 
same time point out to the members of the confederation the 
road to prosperity. Such is the alliance which from time im- 
memorial has existed between England and Portugal. And al- 
though it might be argued that the alliance practically exists al- 
ready as far as foreign powers are concerned, in virtue of decla- 
rations which have been made; that the breach of neutrality 
which it would occasion and the results which would follow in 
Europe are opposed to it ; and that the friendly counsels which 
would be obtained under such an arrangement would be avail- 
able without it, yet I judge that it may be brought about if, 
the minds of the people being prepared, the opportunity is taken 
advantage of." 

In conclusion Revenga requested Bolivar to explain with 
" precision and exactness " what were his wishes relative to the 
proposed arrangement with Great Britain. ^^ Without waiting 
for a reply, however, he set to work and prepared a plan which, 
with the approval of the cabinet, he communicated to the Liber- 
ator in the shape of additional stipulations or objects for the 
consideration of the Congress of Panama. They were in sub- 
stance as follows: 

52 O'Leary, Memorias, VI, 499-501. 



384 PAISr-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

1. That the penalty for failure to conform to the decisions 
of the confederation, serving as arbitrator between two of its 
members, should be exclusion. 

2. That none of the confederates should be permitted to 
form an alliance with a foreign power or with one or more of 
their own number independently of the rest. 

3. That the confederation should necessarily be the mediator 
in disputes arising between one of the confederates and a for- 
eign power. 

4. That the assembly, or a person or persons to whom it 
might delegate the necessary authority, should negotiate and 
conclude in the name of the confederation one or more treaties 
of alliance, purely defensive, whose aim should be the conserva- 
tion of peace. 

5. That it should be the duty of the assembly to meet at 
fixed periods. ^^ 

In the letter in which this plan is set forth, Revenga states 
that he had requested the representative of Colombia near the 
government of Peru to explain to the Liberator the reasons for 
the adoption of the additional stipulations and to inform him 
of the measures that had already been taken for securing the 
proposed alliance between " our confederation and the very noble 
and very powerful King of Great Britain and Ireland." When 
that should be accomplished, " the whole of America," he said, 
" being united by motives of common interest will rest without 
fear in its adhesion to justice and will flourish tranquil and con- 
tent in the shade of peace." In a private letter dated the next 
day he declared: " I have conceived the project without an ap- 
parent protector, though there is one in reality; and to allay 
the fears which an alliance with such a strong power inspires, 
provision is made for easy separation from the confederation. 
Nevertheless I have aimed at embracing the whole hemisphere, 
for the least of the benefits that would result from the project 

53 Revenga to Bolivar, November 5, 1825. O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 
351. 



BRITISH INFLUENCE 385 

would be that there should never be occasion for those fears. 
I tried at the same time to strengthen the bonds of the con- 
federation, not only with a view to the conservation of peace but 
with a view to protecting the independence of small states. I 
conmiunicate the scheme as being exclusively Colombian, be- 
cause you are a Colombian and do not need the glory of being its 
author, and because it will be more acceptable in the other states 
if you support it as the initiative of some one else rather than 
your own. It seems to me that we are going to renew with 
greater glory the ancient Hanseatic League." ^* 

There is reason to believe that the government of Colombia, 
in spite of its formal protestations to Bolivar, did not enter with 
enthusiasm into this scheme of political union with Great 
Britain. In communicating the additional stipulations to the 
Colombian delegation at Panama, Revenga declared that the 
extension which it was desired to give to the objects of the fed- 
eration, however advantageous such a move might appear to be, 
ought not to be too readily acceded to.^^ It cannot be definitely 
affirmed that this was taken as a hint not to push the matter, but 
for some reason the Colombian delegates did not manifest great 
interest in the project. Though informed of it in November, 
1825, they do not mention it in their correspondence, beyond 
an acknowledgment of the receipt of the papers, until the latter 
part of April, when their interest was momentarily aroused by 
hearing from Hurtado that Great Britain had appointed a rep- 
resentative to the congress. This led Gual and Briceiio Mendez 
to believe that the British Government had accepted the pro- 
posed plan and that as representatives of Colombia they would 
be required to enter into negotiations with the British agent 
upon his arrival at Panama. As a measure therefore of pre- 
vision they asked for instructions relative to certain points upon 
which they were not clear. ^® The desired instructions never 

54 Revenga to Bolivar, November 6, 1825. O'Leary, Memorias, XXIII, 
351. 

55 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 289. 
5^ Ibid., 296, 316. 



386 PAlSr-AMEEICAOTSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

were sent. The delegates of Peru were wholly without instruc- 
tions on the subject, and while those of Central America were 
authorized to solicit an alliance with Great Britain, they were 
not empowered to carry the negotiations to a definite conclu- 
sion,^'^ It was assumed that the Mexican delegates, who had 
not yet arrived, would not be favorably instructed, because of 
the disagreeable impression produced in Mexico by the failure 
of Great Britain to ratify a treaty which had been concluded 
between the two countries shortly before. ^^ There was, how- 
ever, no occasion for the Mexican delegates to intervene in the 
matter, for Dawkins who arrived two or three days ahead of 
them, had no instructions on the subject, and he apparently put 
to rest all talk of such an alliance as had been proposed. Thus 
the additional stipulations never became matter of formal dis- 
cussion in the Congress of Panama, and it is unlikely that they 
would have been seriously considered, in view of the attitude of 
the other republics, even if the government of Colombia had 
been sincerely striving to obtain their adoption. 

It appears on the other hand that a mere defensive alliance 
such as was provided for in the additional stipulations was not 
what Bolivar had in mind. It is true that in replying to 
Revenga's communications on the subject, he seemed to agree 
with the interpretation which had been given to his suggestions 
and to share with the government of Colombia its fear of too 
close a union with England. " It now appears to me," he 
wrote, " that the alliance with Great Britain will considerably 
add to our influence and to our respectability; for enjoying her 
protection we would grow to man's estate, and acquiring en- 

57 Ibid., 321. 

58 Ibid., VI, 515. The treaty referred to was signed at Mexico City on 
April 6, 1825. Great Britain refused to ratify it because of certain articles 
which it contained favorable to Mexico and contrary to principles which 
England did not wish to abandon. A new treaty was concluded between 
the two countries at London on December 26, 1826, and was duly ratiiied by 
the respective governments the following year. Manning, Early Diplomatic 
Relations betvxen the United States and Mexico, 70; Derecho Intema- 
cional Mexicano, Tratados y Convendones, I, 445. 



BEITISH INFLUENCE 38Y 

lightenment and strength take our place among the nations pos- 
sessed of the civilization and power which characterize a great 
people. But these advantages do not dissipate the fear that 
that powerful nation might become in the future sovereign of 
the counsels and decisions of the assembly ; that her voice might 
become one of command and that her will and her interests 
might become the soul of the confederation, which would not 
dare to displease nor to come into conflict with an enemy so 
irresistible. This, in my opinion, is the greatest danger in 
allowing a nation so powerful to become involved with others 
so weak." Continuing, Bolivar declared that the additional 
objects appeared to be as proper and as useful as the main part 
of the project, and he agreed with Eevenga that if the plan 
were adopted by the whole American continent and by Great 
Britain it would present an immense mass of power which would 
necessarily produce stability in the new states.^^ What Bolivar 
really thought is more adequately set forth in the memorandum 
which he wrote in February, 1826, either shortly before, or 
just after, the date of the letter above quoted. This memoran- 
dum, until recently unpublished, is found in the " Archives of 
the Liberator " at Caracas.^*' Here he appears to be not in the 

59 Bolivar to Revenga, February 17, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, XXXI, 
164. 

60 Simon Bolivar — Un Pensamiento Sobre el Congreso de Panama. Oh- 
svguio de Vicente Leciina, a los delegados al Segundo Congreso Cientifwo 
Pan- Americano, Washington, D. C, 1916. 

First published with an English translation (of which the part quoted is 
a copy) and presented to the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress at 
Washington in January, 1916. On account of its importance the Spanish 
text is given below in full : 

UN PENSAMIENTO SOBRE EL CONGBESO DE PANAMA 
(Inedito — El original se halla en el archivo del Liberator, Caracas.) 
El Congreso de Panama reunird todos los representantes de la- America y 
un ajente diplomdtico del Gobierno de S. M. B. Este Congreso parace des- 
tinado a formar la liga mas vasta, mas estraorlinaria y mas fuerte que ha 
aparecido hasta el dia sobre la tierra. La Santa AUanza sera inferior en 
poder a esta confederacion, siempre que la Gran Bretana quiera tomar parte 
en ella, como Miembro Constituyente. El jenero hum,ano daria mil ben- 
diciones a esta liga de salud y la America como la Gran Bretana cojerian 
cosechas de beneficios. 



388 PAi;r-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

least moved by the fear of Britisli domination. The memoran- 
dum is as follows : 

" The congress of Panama will bring together all the repre- 
sentatives of America and a diplomatic agent of H. B. M. This 
congress seems to be destined to create a further reaching, more 

Las relaciones de las sociedades poUticas recibitia/n un codigo de derecho 
publico por regla de conduota universal. 

1. El nuevo mundo se constituiria en naciones independientes, ligadas 
todas por una ley comun que fijase sus relaciones esternas y les ofreciese 
el poder conservador en un Congreso jeneral y permanente. 

2. La existeneia de estos nuevos Estados obtendrla nuevas garantlas. 

3. La Espana haria la paz por respeto a la Inglaterra y la Santa 
Alianza prestaria su reconocimiento a estas naciones nacientes. 

4. El orden interno se conservaria intacto entre los diferentes Estados 
y dentro de cada uno de ellos. 

5. Ninguno seria debil con respecto a otro: ninguno seria mds fuerte. 

6. Un equilibrio perfecto se estableceria en este verdadero nuevo orden 
de cosas. 

7. La fuerza de todos concur rirla al auxilio del que sufriese por parte 
del enemigo esterno o de las facciones andrquicas. 

8. La diferencia de orijen y de colores perderla su influencia y poder. 

9. La America no temeria m&s a ese tremendo monstruo que ha devorado 
a la isla de Santo Domingo ; ni tampoco temeria la preponderancia numerica 
de los primitives habitadores. 

10. La reforma social, en fin, se habrfa alcanzado bajo los santos aus- 
picios de la libertad y de la paz — pero la Inglaterra deberia tomar necesa- 
riamenta en sus manos el fiel de esta balanza. 

La Gran Bretafia alcanzard, sin duda, ventajas considerables por este 
arreglo. 

1. Su influencia en Europa se aumentaria progresivamente y sus deci- 
siones vendrfan a ser las del destine. 

2. La America le serviria como de un epulento dominio de comercie. 

3. Seria pa. ella la America el centre de sus relaciones entre el Asia 
y la Europa. 

4. Los ingleses se considerarfan iguales a los ciudadanos de America. 

5. Las relaciones mutuas entre los dos palses lograrlan con el tiempo 
ser Unas mismas. 

6. El carScter britanico, y sus costumbres los tomarian los americanos, 
pr. los objetos normales de su existeneia futura. 

7. En la marcha de los siglos, podria encontrarse quizS una sola naoi6n 
cubriendo al Universe — la federal. 

Tales ideas ecupan el animo de algunos Americanos constituldos en el 
range mSs elevado; ellos esperan con impaciencia, la iniciativa de este 
preyecte en el Congreso de Panama, que puede ser la ocasi6n de consolidar 
la uni6n de lea nuevos Estados con el jmpefio Brit&nico. 

BOIJVAR. 

(Lima: febrero de 1826.) 



BKITISH INFLUENCE 389 

extraordinary, stronger league than has ever been formed in 
the world. The Holy Alliance will be less powerful than this 
confederation should England be willing to be a party as a con- 
stituent member. Mankind will bless a thousand times such a 
leagTie for the public weal, and America as well as Great Britain 
will reap its benefits. 

" The relations of political communities would obtain a code 
of public law for their universal rule of conduct. 

"1. The New World would be formed by independent na- 
tions bound together by a common set of laws which would fix 
their foreign relations and would give them a conservative power 
in a general and permanent congress. 

" 2. The existence of these new states would obtain new guar- 
antees. 

" 3. Spain would make peace through respect for England 
and the Holy Alliance would recognize these new rising na- 
tions. 

" 4. Internal order would be preserved untouched, both among 
and within each of the different states. 

" 5. No one would be weaker than the other, no one the 
stronger. 

" 6. A perfect balance would be established in this true new 
order of things. 

" 7. The strength of all would come to the aid of one suffer- 
ing from a foreign enemy, or anarchical factions. 

" 8. Difference of origin and color would lose their influ- 
ence and power. 

" 9. America would have nothing more to fear from that 
av^ful monster which has devoured the island of Santo Domingo, 
nor would there be any fear of the preponderance in numbers 
of the primitive inhabitants. 

" 10. Social reform, in short, would have been attained 
under the blessed auspices of liberty and peace — but Eng- 
land should necessarily take in her hands the beam of the 
scales. 



390 PAl^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

" Great Britain would undoubtedly attain considerable ad- 
vantages through this arrangement. 

" 1. Her influence in Europe would progressively increase 
and her decisions will be like those of destiny. 

"2. America would serve her as a wealthy commercial do- 
main. 

" 3. America would be to her the center of her relations be- 
tween Asia and Europe. 

" 4. English subjects would be considered equal to the citi- 
zens of America. 

" 5. The mutual relations between the two countries in time 
would become the same. 

" 6. British characteristics and customs would be taken by 
Americans as standards of their future life. 

" T. In the advance of the centuries, there would be, per- 
haps, one single nation covering the world — the federal na- 
tion. 

" These ideas are in the mind of some Americans of the most 
prominent class; they are awaiting impatiently the initiation 
of this project in the Panama Congress, which may be the occa- 
sion of consolidating the union of the new states with the Brit- 
ish Empire." 

On February 10, 1826, Bolivar arrived in Lima after a so- 
journ of nearly a year in the south of Peru and in the new 
republic of Bolivar. Immediately on reaching Lima, he sent 
for the British consul general, Ricketts, and had a long con- 
ference with him.^^ A few days later Eicketts sent an account 
of the conference to his government and included with his re- 
port a memorandum in Spanish substantially the same as the 
one quoted above, though differing from it in some parts in 
phraseology.®^ 

Bolivar was then deeply absorbed in the question of the in- 
ternal organization of the new states, and the object of the con- 

61 Villanueva, El Imperio de los Andes, 97-108. 
ezlUd., 144-146. 



BRITISH mFLUENCE 391 

ference was in part to make his ideas on the subject known to 
the British Government. Thus the proposal for an alliance or 
a species of protectorate was closely related to the question of 
monarchy, which has been duly considered in a previous chap- 
ter and need not be dwelt upon here. But there is an important 
question which remains to be answered. 

What was the attitude of Great Britain toward the project? 
It has already been intimated that Canning probably did not 
go so far at any time as to approve of the plans for placing 
the new states under British protection. He had declared, 
however, in his instructions to Dawkins that Great Britain 
would not object to " a league of the states, lately colonies of 
Spain, growing out of their common relations to Spain," but 
that " any project for putting the United States of I^orth 
America at the head of an American Confederation, as against 
Europe," would be highly displeasing to the British Govern- 
ment. In so far, therefore, as the project dispensed with the 
leadership of the United States and was intended to assure to 
England the degree of influence which she hoped to exercise in 
the affairs of the new states. Canning must have regarded it at 
least with sympathy. But it is unlikely that he would have 
imperiled the friendly relations existing between Great Britain 
and other sections of America recently emancipated, particularly 
Buenos Aires, Brazil, and Mexico, by making his government 
a party to an arrangement which was viewed with suspicion in 
each of those sections. Indeed he could have adopted no more 
effective means for dividing the new states into hostile groups 
than by supporting the Liberator's grand project. Canning's 
policy aimed at maintaining harmonious relations with all 
these nascent powers and between them all. His diplomacy 
had been especially directed toward bringing about a friendly 
settlement of the differences between Buenos Aires and Brazil 
and toward preventing Bolivar from interfering in the quarrel 
between those countries. ^^ And he was even more desirous of 

63 Cf . the Minute of a conference which Hurtado, the minister of Colom- 



392 PAN'-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

avoiding a course whicL. would have surely resulted in an in- 
terruption of tlie friendly relations then existing between Great 
Britain and the United States. In accordance with this pol- 
icy he rejected the overtures which were finally made by the 
Colombian minister in London.*'^ 

bia at London, had with Canning on November 7, 1825 (O'Leary, Memorias, 
352^354) ; Hurtado to Revenga, November 16, 1825 (O'Leary, Memorias, 
358-360) ; Eevenga to Bolivar's secretary general (O'Leary, Memorias, 
478-479). 

64 In a letter to Bolivar, dated December 23, 1826, Santander said: 
" Hurtado has at last spoken to Mr. Canning concerning the alliance 
and the protectorate. The minister [Canning] fears that the rest of the 
nations will view the league unfavorably, and particularly the United 
States of the North. He declared that England aspired only to maintain 
the relations which she had established with the American states, unless 
some unforeseen event should oblige her to adopt some other course." 
O'Leary, Memorias, III, 341. 



CHAPTER X 

, ATTITUDE OF THE. UNITED STATES 

Attention must now be directed to the fuller consideration 
of the attitude of the United States toward the Panama Con- 
gress, as well as of the attitude of the great protagonist of that 
congress toward the United States. 

It will be recalled that the circular of invitation which Bol- 
ivar sent out under date of December 7, 1824, was directed 
specifically to the " republics formerly colonies of Spain." 
Nevertheless, two months previously the government of Colom- 
bia had instructed Salazar, its minister at Washington, " to 
sound gradually and in a manner confidential and private, the 
opinion and desires of the government of the United States rela- 
tive to the proposed American confederation," with a view to 
extend an invitation to that government if it should show a 
disposition to accept. -"^ In replying to Bolivar's circular, San- 
tander, the acting president of Colombia, wrote early in Feb- 
ruary, 1825, that he had deemed it expedient to invite the 
United States to send representatives to the assembly, and that 
he was firmly convinced that the allies of Colombia would not 
fail to see with pleasure friends so enlightened and sincere tak- 
ing part in deliberations for their common interest. Santander 
sent with his communication to Bolivar a copy of the instruc- 
tions to Salazar.^ In April, Bolivar wrote expressing the fear 
that the invitation to the United States would not be favorably 
regarded by Great Britain,^ to which objection Santander re- 

1 Gual to Salazar, October 7, 1824. O'Leary, Memorias, XXII, 615. 

2 Santander to Bolivar, February 6, 1825. O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 
255. 

3 The letter referred to has not been published. The inference is drawn 
from Santander's reply. 

393 



394 PAl^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGmNINGS | 

plied that if the United States entered the confederation it I 
would be only after having arrived at an understanding with | 
Great Britain, as he was sure had been done when President j 
Monroe announced his opposition to the American projects of 
the Holy Alliance.* 

The government of Colombia was not alone in inviting the 
United States to participate in the Congress of Panama. Re- 
plying to Bolivar's circular of December 7, 1824, President 
Victoria declared that, as he was persuaded that the cause of 
independence and liberty was the cause not only of the repub- 
lics formerly colonies of Spain but also of the United States, 
he had instructed the Mexican minister at Washington to broach 
the subject of the congress to the President and to inquire 
whether he would desire to send representatives to take part 
in its deliberations.^ During the spring of 1825, Clay held 
separate conferences on the same day with the ministers of 
Mexico and Colombia, at their request, in the course of which j 
each of them stated that his government was desirous that the j 
United States should send representatives to the proposed con- j 
gress. Clay informed the ministers that if certain preliminary | 
points relative to the subjects to be considered, the substance [ 
and form of the powers of the delegates, and the mode of I 
1 organizing the congress could be arranged in a satisfactory 
manner, the President would be disposed to accept in behalf of' 
the United States the invitation which had been provisionally •■ 
tendered. Thus the matter rested until early in ]^ovember, i 
when Obregon and Salazar, the ministers of Mexico and Co-j 
lombia, presented formal invitations, which were soon followed ■ 
by a similar communication from the minister of the republic i 
of Central America, who had not been a party to the previous 
conferences. In an identical note to Obregon and Salazar, | 
Clay, while lamenting the fact that the preliminary conditions j 



4 O'Leary, Memorias, III, 189. 

5 Victoria to Bolivar, February 23, 1825. O'Leary, MemoHas, XXIV, 
256-257, 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 395 

had not been satisfactorily arranged, declared that the President 
had resolved, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate, 
to send commissioners to the congress, and that, while these 
commissioners would not be authorized to enter upon any de- 
liberations nor to concur in any acts inconsistent with the neu- 
trality of the United States, they would be fully empowered 
and instructed on all questions likely to arise in which the na- 
tions of America had a common interest. On the same day 
Clay, in a shorter note, accepted the invitation which the min- 
ister from Central America had extended in behalf of his gov- 
ernment.® 

In his first annual message of December 6, 1825, President 
Adams referred briefly to the proposed assembly at Panama 
and made known the fact that he had accepted the invitation 
which had been extended to the United States to be repre- 
sented in it.'^ On December 26, he sent to the Senate his spe- 
cial message nominating Anderson and Sergeant as delegates. 
Accompanying this message there was a report from the secre- 
tary of state, together with copies of the correspondence with 
the ministers of Mexico, Colombia, and Central America. On 
January 9, 1826, he sent to the Senate, in compliance with a 
resolution of that body, yet another report of the secretary of 
State, furnishing translations of the conventions which Colom- 
bia had entered into with Peru, Mexico, Central America, and 
Chile ; ^ and with these there were transmitted such parts of 
the correspondence of the United States with Eussia, Erance, 
Colombia, and Mexico as were supposed to bear upon the sub- 
ject of the resolution. These messages and the accompanying 
papers were referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
from which, on January 16, Senator Macon made a report con- 
cluding with the recommendation that the following resolution 

6 American State Papers, For. Rel., V. 835-839. 

7 Eichardson, Messages and Papers, II, 302. 

8 The convention was never ratified by Chile. 



396 PAI^-AMEIIICA:^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

be adopted : '"'' Resolved^ that it is not expedient, at this time, 
for the United States to send ministers to the Congress of Amer- 
ican Nations assembled at Panama." ® 

On February 1, to which day the consideration of the reso- 
lution was postponed, the President transmitted to the Senate, 
at its request, extracts from the correspondence between the 
United States and Spain, relative to the interposition of the 
Emperor of Eussia to induce Spain to recognize the independ- 
ence of the South American states. ^° No action of importance 
was taken by the Senate until February 15, when, on motion 
of Van Buren, it was resolved, first, that, upon the question 
whether the United States should be represented in the Con- 
gress of Panama, the Senate ought to act with open doors, 
unless it should appear that the publication of the documents 
would be prejudicial to existing negotiations ; and secondly, 
that the President be requested to inform the Senate whether 
such objection existed. The President, in reply, declared that i 
the communications relating to the Congress of Panama had 
been made in confidence, and that, as he believed in maintain- 
ing the established usage of free confidential intercourse be- 
tween the executive and the Senate, he deemed it his duty to 
leave to the Senate itself the decision of the question. ^^ On 
February 23 a resolution was passed declaring that, although 
the Senate had the right to publish confidential communica- 
tions, yet circumstances did not then require the exercise of 
that right. With this question disposed of, the Senate pro- 
ceeded to consider the resolution reported by the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, and after a long debate it was defeated on 
March 14 by a vote of 19 to 24. The confirmation of the 
President's nominations followed without further difficulty, the 

9 Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States on the Subject 
of the Mission to Panama, 3-14, 15-56, 57-76. 

10 Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States on the Sub- 
ject of the Congress of Panama, 77-86. 

^T-Ibid., 87. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 397 

vote being 27 to 17 and 26 to IS for Anderson and Sergeant 
respectively.^" 

Agitation over the Panama Congress began in the lower house 
even earlier than in the Senate. On December 16, 1825, Ham- 
ilton of South Carolina introduced a resolution calling upon 
the President for information concerning the invitation ex- 
tended to the United States to take part in the congress. Three 
days later, however, having heard that the President intended 
in due time to send to the House all papers bearing upon the 
matter, he postponed the consideration of his resolution, re- 
serving, nevertheless, the right to call it up later if he should 
conceive this to be necessary.^^ On January 25, 1826, Miner 
of Pennsylvania introduced resolutions expressing sympathy 
with the new states and declaring that provision ought to be 
made by law for defraying any expenses which might result 
from the appointment of ministers to the assembly on the 
Isthmus. But at the request of their author the resolutions 
were ordered to lie on the table. ^* On January 31 Hamilton's 
resolution was called up, and after a debate occupying a large 
part of the time of the House for four days it was adopted. -^^ 
On March 15 Adams sent to the House the desired documents ; 
and, as the nominations of Anderson and Sergeant had been 
confirmed the day before, he asked the House to make an ap- 
propriation to defray the expenses of the mission. ^^ 

On March 25 Crowinshield from the Committee on For- 
eign Affairs, to which the President's message and the accom- 
panying documents were referred, made a favorable report. ^"^ 
But when, on April 4, the House in committee of the whole 

12 Ibid., 98, 101-104. For the debates, see Register of Debates in Con- 
gress (1826), II, 152-342. 

is Register of Debates in Congress, 1826, II, 817-819. 

^^Ibid., 1116-1118. 

^5 Ibid., 1208-1301. 

^^ Ibid, (appendix), 9. Other documents were sent to the house on 
March 30, on April 5, and on April 15. Ibid., 83, 89, 91. 

^■! Ibid, (appendix), 100-105. 



398 PAN^-AMEEICA]!TISM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

took up the report, McLane of Delaware offered an amendment 
whicli was designed to place upon the executive certain limi- 
tations respecting the powers and instructions to be given to 
the envoys. ^^ The debate which followed was long and spirited 
and involved every phase of the relations between the United 
States and the other American countries. There were, how- 
ever, as Webster pointed out, only two questions for the House 
to decide: First, whether it would assume the responsibility 
for failure to make the appropriation; and secondly, whether 
it should interpose with its opinions, directions, or instructions 
as to the manner in which that particular executive measure 
should be conducted.-^® AVhen the amendment came to a test 
on April 21, it was lost by a vote of 54 to 143. Three days 
later the appropriation was passed by a somewhat smaller ma- 
jority. ^^ 

It is no part of the purpose of the present study to review the 
debates which took place in the United States Senate and in 
the House of Eepresentatives on the subject of the Panama mis- 
sion ; for those debates had little if any influence, either directly 
or indirectly, upon the Congress of Panama. The internal con- 
ditions of the new states, and their relations not only with one 
another but also with other countries, particularly the United 
States and Great Britain, were factors which had already deter- 
mined the character of the assembly and its probable outcome. 
As has been intimated elsewhere in these pages, the discussions 
in the Congress of the United States are of interest chiefly on 
account of their bearing upon the condition of domestic politics. 
The opposition to the mission to Panama, in so far as it was 
genuine, was based upon Washington's precept against entan- 
gling alliances; but it was in fact largely factitious, and indi- 

is Register of Debates in Congress, 1826. II, 2011. For the debates, see 
ibid., 2011-2098; 2135-2514. 

19 Ibid., 2254. 

20 Ibid; 2490, 2514, 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 399 

cated hostility to the administration much more than disap- 
proval of the idea of cooperation with the new states. 

The question of slavery was brought into the discussion for 
the purpose of inflaming party passion, but it had practically no 
effect upon the policy either of the United States or of the 
other American states regarding Haiti, Cuba, and Porto Rico.^^ 
'No American state had recognized the independence of Haiti, 
or had manifested a disposition to receive the black republic 
on terms of equality. And as to Cuba, the policies of the 
United States, Colombia, and Mexico had been determined in 
the main independently of the question of slavery, long before 
the discussions began in the United States Congress. It is 
difficult to believe that the United States would have been less 
opposed to the transfer of Cuba to another power, or that Co- 
lombia and Mexico would have been less anxious to acquire 
it, had there been no slaves on the island. It is true that, if 
the congressional debates had not caused delay, the delegates 
of the United States might have set out in time to reach the 
Isthmus before the assembly adjourned. But, even so, it may 
be doubted whether the issue would have been more successful. 
It is possible, on the contrary, that the presence of representa- 
tives of the United States might not have contributed to the 
harmonious carrying out of the aims of the congress. 

ISTevertheless, in the papers sent by President Adams to the 

21 The vote in the Senate followed strictly party lines and not sectional 
lines, as would have been the case if slavery had been a determining factor. 
Of the nineteen senators who maintained Iby their votes that it was inex- 
pedient to send ministers to Panama seven were from non-slave holding 
states and of the twenty-four who voted in favor of the mission, eight rep- 
resented slave states. The seven Northern senators who cast their votes 
against the mission were: Chandler and Holmes of Maine; Woodbury of 
New Hampshire ; Van Buren of New York ; Dickerson of New Jersey ; Find- 
lay of Pennsylvania, and Kane of Illinois. The slave-state senators in 
favor of the mission were: Benton of Missouri; Bouligny and Johnston of 
Louisiana; Chambers and Smith of Maryland; Clayton and Van Dyke of 
Delaware; Johnson of Kentucky, Cf. Executive Proceedings of the Senate 
of the U. 8. on the Subject of the Mission of the Congress of Panama 
(1826), 101; Roosevelt, Thomas Hart Benton, 65. 



400 PAN'-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

two branches of the national legislature and occasionally in the 
speeches of senators and representatives, there are passages of 
great significance regarding the place the United States should 
occupy in the American system. Thus, in a letter of Adams, 
who was then Secretary of State, to Rodney, the first United 
States minister to Buenos Aires, dated May 17, 1823, the 
following interesting reference to the subject is found: 

" In the meantime a more extensive confederation has been 
projected under the auspices of the new government of the re- 
public of Colombia. In the last dispatch received from Mr. 
Forbes, dated the 2'7th January last, he mentions the arrival 
and reception at Buenos Aires of Mr. Joaquin Mosquera y Ar- 
boleda, senator of the republic of Colombia, and their min- 
ister plenipotentiary and extraordinary upon a mission, the 
general object of which, he informed Mr. Forbes, was to en- 
gage the other independent governments of .Spanish ^^ America 
to unite with Colombia in a congress, to be held at such point 
as may be agreed on, to settle a general system of American 
Policy^ in relation to Europe, leaving to each section of the 
country the perfect liberty of independent self-government. 
For this purpose he had already signed a treaty with Peru of 
which he promised Mr. Forbes the perusal ; but there were some 
doubts with regard to the character of his associations, and the 
personal influence to which he was accessible at Buenos Aires, 
and Mr. Forbes had not much expectation of his success in 
prevailing on that government to enter into his project of exten- 
sive federation. 

" By letters of a previous date, November, 1822, received 
from Mr. Prevost, it appears that the project is yet more exten- 
sive than Mr. Mosquera had made known to Mr. Forbes. It 
embraces North, as well as South America, and a formal pro- 
posal to join and take the lead in it is to be made known to the 
government of the United States. 

" Intimations of the same design have been given to Mr. 

22 Jt?ilic8 as in the printed instructions. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 401 

Todd, at Bogota. It will be time for this government to de- 
liberate concerning it when it shall be presented in a more defi- 
nite and specific form. At present it indicates more distinctly 
a purpose on the part of the Colombian republic to assume a 
leading character in this hemisphere, than any practicable ob- 
jects of utility which can be discovered by us. With relation 
to Europe there is perceived to be onl}^ one object in which the 
interests and wishes of the United States can be the same as 
those of the Southern American nations, and that is, that they 
should all be governed by republican institutions, politically 
and commercially independent of Europe. To any confedera- 
tion of Spanish American provinces, for that end, the United 
States would yield their approbation and cordial good wishes. 
If more should be asked of them, the proposition will be re- 
ceived and considered in a friendly spirit, and with a due sense 
of its importance." ^^ 

Ten days later, in his instructions to Anderson, who was 
being dispatched as minister to Colombia, Adams again refers 
to the question of confederation, as follows : " Of this mighty 
movement in human affairs, mightier far than that of the down- 
fall of the Roman Empire, the United States may continue to 
be, as they have been hitherto, the tranquil but deeply attentive 
spectators. They may, also, in the various vicissitudes, by 
which it must be followed, be called to assume a more active 
and leading part in its progress. Floating, undigested pur- 
poses of this great American Confederation have been for some 
time fermenting in the imaginations of many speculative states- 
men, nor is the idea to be disdainfully rejected, because its 
magnitude may appall the understanding of politicians accus- 
tomed to the more minute, but more complicated machinery of 
a contracted political standard. 

" So far as the proposed Colombian Confederacy has for its 
object a combined system of total and unqualified independence 

^^ Register of Delates in Congress (1826), Vol. I, Part II, 90 (App.); 
American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 918. 



402 PA:N'-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

of Europe, to the exclusion of all partial compositions, of any 
one of the emancipated colonies, with Spain, it will have the 
entire approbation and good wishes of the United States, but 
will require no special agency of theirs to carry it into effect. 

" So far as its purposes may be to concert a general system of 
popular representation for the government of the several inde- 
pendent states which are floating from the wreck of the Spanish 
power in America, the United States will still cheer it with their 
approbation and speed with their good wishes its success. 

" And so far as its objects may be to accomplish a meeting, 
at which the United States should preside, to assimilate the poli- 
tics of the South with those of the North, a more particular and 
definite view of the end proposed by this design, and of the 
means by which it is effected, will be necessary to enable us to 
determine upon our concurrence with it." ^* 

In the foregoing instructions Adams touches upon what is 
perhaps the most vital point in the whole question of the con- 
federation of independent American states; namely, which of 
the several governments should be the preponderant factor in 
the formation and maintenance of the proposed league? Bol- 
ivar had raised the question nearly a decade before and his 
efforts from that time onward had been directed toward build- 
ing up a state, in which he himself, perhaps, should be the 
dominant figure, sufficiently strong to assume the position of 
leadership. Adams would have been unwilling, it may be de- 
duced from the instructions to Eodney and Anderson, to com- 
mit the United States to participation in a league in which the 
influence of some other power should preponderate. Not only 
so, but he would give no assurance as to the course his govern- 
ment would adopt if invited to head the movement. In his own 
language, it was necessary to have first a more definite view of 
the end proposed and of the means by which it was to be ef- 
fected. 

2i Register of Delates in Congress (1826), Vol. I, Part II, 80 (App.) ; 
American State Papers, For. Rel., V, 895. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 403 

As has already been shown, during the two years from 1823 
to 1825 but little was heard of the project for confederating 
the American states. Toward the close of 1824, however, the 
Congress of Panama began to be discussed anew and, shortly 
after Adams became President, was the subject of diplomatic 
interchanges at Washington and of discussion in the public 
press of the country. Henry Clay, who had been, in the Con- 
gTess of the United States, the ardent advocate of the cause 
of the southern republics, was now Secretary of State ; but 
Adams, while acting as his predecessor in that office, had, dur- 
ing the period of agitation in favor of the new states, stood in 
the way of the realization of Clay's policy of a more benevolent 
attitude toward them. The two men had not changed their 
opinions. Clay, ever enthusiastic with respect to the possibili- 
ties of an intimate political association of the free states of the 
continent, saw in the Congress of Panama an opportunity to 
realize his dream of an American system. Adams, cold, judi- 
cial in his attitude toward the southern neighbors, critical of 
their accomplishments, and skeptical of their capacity for self- 
government, inclined to adhere to the traditional policy of no 
entangling alliances. ^^ And, strange to say, when the adminis- 

25 In March, 1821, Adams wrote in his diary as follows: " That the final 
issue of their present struggle would be their entire independence of Spain 
I had never doubted. That it was our true policy and duty to take no part 
in the contest I was equally clear. The principle of neutrality to all for- 
eign wars was, in my opinion, fundamental to the continuance of our liber- 
ties and of our union. So far as they were contending for independence, 
I wished well to their cause; but I had seen and yet see no prospect that 
they would establish free or liberal institutions of government. They are 
not likely to promote the spirit of either freedom or order by their example. 
They have not the first elements of good or free government. Abitrary 
power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their education, upon 
their habits, and upon all their institutions. Civil dissension was infused 
into all their seminal principles. War and mutual destruction was in every 
member of their organization, moral, political, and physical. I had little 
expectation of any beneficial result to this country from any future con- 
nection with them, political or commercial. We should derive no improve- 
ment to our institutions by any communion with theirs. Nor was there 
any appearance of a disposition in them to take any political lessons from 
us." Memoirs, Y, 324, 



404 PAl^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

tration was less than two months old, the President and his 
Secretary of State set forth, or caused to be set forth, their 
respective views in articles published in the daily press. These 
articles were cited a year later in the debate on the Panama 
mission in the House of Kepresentatives.^^ 

The article attributed to Clay first appeared in the Democratic 
Press of Philadelphia and was copied by the National Intelli- 
gencer of Washington in its issue of April 26, 1825. The 
writer of the article, adverting to the fact that it had been 
announced by the government of Colombia that a congress of 
the states of South America would be held at Panama during 
the course of the year, inquired whether or not the United 
States would be represented there. "If we do not appear 
there," the writer declared, " we shall most probably, and very 
deservedly, find those feelings that ought to unite all America 
transferred to other governments which know better how to 
appreciate the singular importance of reunion, and which will, 
by their forethought, derive, to our exclusion, the advantages 
arising from affectionate feelings, and from relations which 
we will have justly forfeited. At this congress, will, no doubt, 
be suggested the natural idea of a coalition, perhaps confedera- 
tion, of all the South American states. 

26 Ingham of Pennsylvania, speaking in the House of Representatives on 
April 18, 1826, quoted extracts from the articles in question. " I will 
not," he said, " conceal my belief as to the authorship of the two papers : 
so far, at least, as to declare that I am convinced that in the Philadelphia 
paper was written under the eye of the Secretary of State, and that in the 
National Intelligencer under the eye, if not by the pen, of the President 
himself. I pretend not to have any other evidence of this fact than what 
will be found in the articles; the circumstances of their appearance and 
the known opinion of these two gentlemen on the subject discussed in the 
papers; I will not, therefore, be suspected of having betrayed any con- 
fidence in relation to any supposed knowledge of their authorship. I 
will only add that the last contains more good sense, upon a subject some- 
what intricate, than I have ever seen comprised in so small a space. It is 
in my judgment one of the ablest papers that I ever put my eye upon. If 
I am correct in my supposition as to the authorship, these two papers will 
give us the free and untrammeled opinions of the two statesmen at the 
head of the executive department of the government at that time." Regis- 
ter of Debates in Congress (1826) Vol. I, Part 11, 2363. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 405 

" Let them propose to all the Ame7'ican nations a confedera- 
tion. The details of so magnificent a work would require long 
and laborious consideration; but the leading principle should 
be the establishment of a constitution something like our own, 
by which an Areopagus or congress should watch over the mu- 
tual relations of the confederated states, without interfering 
with their several or internal regulations or governments — 
which should govern to a limited extent the relations with for- 
eign powers, of the whole, and of the several confederated 
states — and which should wield the force of the confederated 
states in defense of any member that may be attacked. 

"Is it objected that foreig-n nations will view the confedera- 
tion with jealousy? I answer, first, it will be strong enough 
to conciliate the good, and to regard the rage of unjust men with 
indifference. Treaties of mere alliance have not hitherto been 
found sufficient ; they have almost always terminated in disgust, 
and have been broken. Secondly, I answer that in modem 
times the example has been repeatedly set us; the Holy Alli- 
ance is itself an example; the Germanic Confederation as it 
was, and as it stands is a case in point, the Confederation of 
the Rhine another ; the former union of the three Crowns of 
England, Scotland, and Ireland another ; as are also the former, 
and perhaps in a certain degree the present condition of the 
dominions of the Emperor of Austria; the heptarchy of Eng- 
land; and nearly all the nations of Europe in the dark ages; 
to say nothing of the Greek confederation in ancient times. 
The errors of these exemplars are before us, to warn us against 
their repetition, and to instruct us how to organize our con- 
federation. The fate of most of them, that of fusion into one 
mass, can never result from our confederation ; the regions are 
too enormous, and the distance too vast; they were within the 
compass of boundaries less than almost any of the states we 
propose to unite, and by language and many other causes, nat- 
urally formed to make one nation — but it would be the height 
of absurdity to attempt to form one government, or one na- 



406 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

tion, out of the two Americas, or even out of one of them ; and 
impossible, because absurd.^'^ 

" This scheme of a general confederation of the Americas, 
is submitted to the public as means of securing peace and power 
abroad, peace and happiness at home. Every argument of 
humanity, policy and reason, calls upon us to rivet the bonds of 
fraternal affection between the inhabitants of the same con- 
tinent, and to guard with a sacred vigilance against the rupture 
of a single link. 

" A confederation alone is competent to this duty, and with- 
out it we must submit to the ordinary fate of other nations, 
jealousy, discord and war, whenever any nation thinks itself 
strong enough to wage one with impunity." ^^ 

The article attributed to Adams appeared in the same issue 
of the National Intelligencer, as a reply to the proposals con- 
tained in the article from which the foregoing extracts are 
taken. Declaring that the United States had no concern with 
the policy of the governments of the other independent nations 
of America, in their relations to one another, further than 
to wish to see them in amity, the writer said : "As concerns 
this nation, we know not what might be the answer of the 
executive to an invitation to join the proposed confederation, 
but we know what we should wish it to be — what we hope 
nine tenths of the American people would desire it to be. If 
the public sentiment be in accord with ours on this point, we 
shall never send a representative to any congress of nations 
whose decisions are to be law for this nation. Our own con- 
federacy insures us the power and the mode of asserting our 
rights, and vindicating our wrongs. By an alliance with any 
other nation or nations, it is obvious we shall not strengthen 
but expose ourselves. We shall lose, by such an alliance, the 
independence which is our boast. For what is independence 

27 Compare the ideas here expressed with those set forth by Bolivar in 
his prophetic letter of a decade earlier. 

28 Wational Intelligencer, April 26, 1825. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 407 

but a name, if the question of peace or war, and other questions 
equally as important, are to be determined for us, not by the 
Congress of the United States, but by a stupendous confederacy, 
in which the United States have but a single vote ? 

" It will be seen that we consider the proposed congress, or 
confederation, as being intended to possess the powers, as well 
as the name which has been given to it, of the ancient council 
of Amphictyons, having the power to coerce obedience to its 
decrees. The proposition from the Democratic Press looks to 
a body having such powers, if the Bogota proposition does not, 
and our objections apply still more strongly to our own govern- 
ment moving in this matter, than they would to its meeting the 
overtures on the subject from the government of Colombia, or 
from any other government. 

" It is surely not necessary here to urge arguments against 
any departure from that cardinal principle in our foreign in- 
tercourse which distrusts and rejects alliances with foreign 
nations, for any purpose. We do not mean, of course, volun- 
tary cooperation with other nations for definite objects but 
that sort, which, by an alliance, becomes compulsory. Every 
one will see, at a glance, the vital objections there are to this 
government's coupling its destinies with those of any other 
people on earth. The Amphictyons of Greece were a body 
perhaps necessary in that age, among other objects, to keep 
alive its religious institutions, and to protect its oracle. We 
have, thank Heaven, escaped the bondage of such follies and 
are regenerated from such superstitions. We have no sacred 
wars to wage, nor occasion for a Holy Alliance, to protect 
either our religion or our political rights. It is no reason, be- 
cause such a measure has found favor among the nations of 
Europe, that it should be resorted to by the nations of Amer- 
ica." 

Continuing, the writer declared that if nothing more were 
meant than a conference of ministers to consult upon the in- 
terests of the whole, there would be no other objection to it 



408 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNIN^GS 

than that it could be productive of nothing beneficial. But 
if such a conference were proposed, perhaps mere courtesy 
might induce an assent to it on the part of the United States, 
were it only to assert, in that conference, the doctrine that in 
becoming independent of the metropolitan governments, the 
governments of America ought not, and as far as the people of 
the United States were concerned, would not, be dependent on 
one another. Against the magnificent scheme set forth in the 
Philadelphia paper the writer made, therefore, a decided pro- 
test, concluding as follows : " We want not his Areopagus any 
more than we do the Amphictyons. For our Areopagus we are 
satisfied with our bench of judges, and for our council of Am- 
phictyons we choose our own congress. We desire, in fine, to 
be members of no confederation more comprehensive than that 
of the United States of America." ^^ 

The articles in question, whether or not they were correctly 
attributed to Clay and Adams, respectively, nevertheless ex- 
pressed certain ideas of which those statesmen had previously 
been exponents. There is no reason to suppose that either of 
them had at this time essentially changed his attitude toward 
the new states. A slight accommodation of ideas, perhaps, 
made it possible for them to proceed at first without apparent 
friction. And as it soon became clear that the United States 
was not expected to form a part of the confederacy whose foun- 
dations were to be laid at Panama, a source of possible disagree- 
ment between the President and his Secretary of State was 
thereby removed; for Clay by force of circumstances was now 
driven to assume an attitude substantially the same as that 
which had from the beginning characterized the policy of 
Adams. On the other hand Adams, without altering in a 
fundamental way his own policy, was able to champion the 
cause of the assembly with something of Clay's enthusiasm.^'' 

29 'National Intelligencer, April 26, 1825. 

30 Adams thought that it would be indulging too sanguine a forecast of 
events to promise that the Panama Congress would accomplish all, or even 
any, of the transcendent benefits to the human race which warmed the con- 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 409 

Indeed the President now warmly urged upon the legislative 
branch of the government the adoption of the measures neces- 
sary to enable the executive to dispatch representatives to the 
Isthmus. Speaking in his special message of March 15, 1826, 
to the House of Eepresentatives, of the motives which led him 
to accept the invitation to take part in the deliberations of the 
congTess, he declared that his " first and great inducement was 
to meet in the spirit of kindness and friendship an overture 
made in that spirit by three sister republics of this hemisphere." 
He did not consider it a conclusive reason for declining the in- 
vitation that the proposal for assembling such a congress had 
not first been made by the United States. The project had 
" sprung from the urgent, immediate, and momentous common 
interests of the great communities struggling for independence 
and, as it were, quickening into life. From them the proposi- 
tion to us appeared respectful and friendly; from us to them 
it could scarcely have been made without exposing ourselves 
to suspicions of purposes of ambition, if not of domination, 
more suited to rouse resistance and excite distrust than to con- 
ciliate favor and friendship." The first and paramount prin- 
ciple, he concluded, upon which it was deemed wise and just 
to lay the corner stone of future relations between the United 
States and the new states was disinterestedness ; the next was 
cordial good will to them ; and the third was a claim of fair and 
equal reciprocity.^^ 

It was in harmony with the general principles laid down by 
Adams that Clay's instructions of May 8, 1826, to Anderson 
and Sergeant were prepared. " It is distinctly understood by 
the President," said Clay, " that it [the Congress of Panama] 

ceptions of its first proposers. But he said, " it looks to the melioration 
of the condition of man. It is congenial with that spirit which prompted 
the declaration of our independence, which inspired the preamble of our 
first treaty with France, which dictated our first treaty with Prussia and 
the instructions under which it was negotiated, which filled the hearts and 
fired the souls of the immortal founders of our revolution." Richardson, 
Messages and Papers, II, 340. 

31 Richardson, Messages and Papers, II, 330-331. 



410 PAIiJ'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

is to be regarded in all respects as diplomatic in contradistinc- 
tion to a body clothed with powers of ordinary legislation ; that 
is to say, no one of the states represented is to be considered 
bound by any treaty, convention, pact, or act to which it does 
not subscribe and expressly assent by its acting representative, 
and that, in the instance of treaties, conventions, and pacts they 
are to be returned for final ratification to each contracting state 
according to the provisions of its particular constitution. . . . 
All notion is rejected of an amphictyonic council invested with 
power finally to decide controversies between the American 
states or to regulate in any respect their conduct. . . . The 
complicated and various interests which appertain to the na- 
tions of this vast continent cannot be safely confided to the 
superintendence of one legislative authority." Continuing, 
Clay declared that with this necessary restriction upon the ac- 
tion of the congress great advantages might nevertheless be de- 
rived from an assembly of American ministers. Such an as- 
sembly would afford great facilities for free and friendly 
conferences, for mutual and necessary explanations, and for 
discussing and establishing some general principles applicable 
to peace and war, to commerce and navigation, with the sanction 
of all America. Treaties might be concluded in the course of 
a few months at such a congress, laying the foundation of last- 
ing amity and good neighborhood, which it would require many 
years to consummate, if, indeed, they would be at all practicable 
by separate and successive negotiations conducted between sev- 
eral powers at different times and places. ^^ 

Proceeding to give the delegates instructions upon the spe- 
cific subjects which would probably engage the consideration 
of the congress. Clay warned them, first of all, to refrain from 
taking part in discussions of matters relating to the future prose- 
cution of the war with Spain. But while it was perfectly un- 
derstood, said Clay, that the United States could not jeopardize 
its neutrality, it might be urged to contract an alliance, offensive 

^^International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 115-116. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 411 

and defensive, on the contingency of an attempt by the powers 
of Europe, commonly called the Holy Alliance, either to aid 
Spain to reduce the new American republics to their former 
colonial state or to compel them to adopt political systems more 
conformable to the policy and view of that alliance. " If, in- 
deed," said Clay, " the powers of continental Europe could have 
allowed themselves to engage in the war for either of the pur- 
poses just indicated, the United States, in opposing them with 
their whole force, would have been hardly entitled to the merit 
of acting on the impulse of a generous sympathy with infant, 
oppressed, and struggling nations. The United States, in the 
contingencies which have been stated, would have been com- 
pelled to fight their own proper battles, not less so because the 
stoi-m of war happened to rage on another part of this con- 
tinent at a distance from their borders ; for it cannot be doubted 
that the presumptuous spirit which would have impelled Eu- 
rope upon the other American republics in aid of Spain, or on 
account of the forms of their political institutions, would not 
have appeared if her arms in such an unrighteous contest should 
have been successful until they were extended here, and every 
vestige of human freedom had been obliterated within these 
states." ^^ 

There was a time, added Clay, when such designs were seri- 
ously apprehended. But the declaration of the late President 
to the Congress of the United States had had a powerful effect 
in disconcerting them ; and, after Great Britain had manifested 
a determination to pursue the same policy, thus showing that 
those two great maritime powers would not see with indifference 
any forcible interposition in behalf of Spain, it became evident 
to the European alliance that no such interposition could be 
undertaken with any prospect of success.^* 

Clay also adverted to the negotiations formerly initiated by 
the United States with the Emperor of Russia looking to the 

^3 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 118-119. 
silUd., 119. 



412 PA¥-AMERICA^ISM: ITS BEGIIiNIlTGS 

establishinent of peace between Spain and her former colonies 
through his mediation. An alliance between the United States 
and the new republics would therefore be worse than useless, 
since it might tend to excite feelings in the Emperor of Russia 
and his allies which should not be needlessly touched or pro- 
voked. Another reason which concurred to dissuade the United 
States from entering into an alliance was, declared Clay, the 
fact that illustrious statesmen, from the establishment of the 
Constitution, had inculcated the avoidance of foreign alliances 
as a leading maxim of the nation's foreign policy. Without 
asserting that an exigency might not occur in which an alli- 
ance of the most intimate kind between the United States and 
the other American republics would be highly proper and ex- 
pedient, it might, he said, be safely affirmed that only an occa- 
sion of great urgency would warrant a departure from that 
established maxim, and none such was believed then to exist. 
There was, besides, less necessity for such an alliance, because 
no compact, by whatever solemnities it might be attended, or 
whatever name or character it might assume, could be more 
obligatory upon the nation than the irresistible motive of self- 
preservation, which would be instantly called into operation in 
the supposed contingency of a European attack upon the liber- 
ties of America. If, however, it should appear that the posi- 
tive rejection of the proposed alliance would be likely to be 
regarded by the representatives of the other states in an un- 
friendly light, the delegates of the United States were author- 
ized to receive written proposals on the subject ad rpferendum.^^ 

With reference to the noncolonization principle proclaimed 
in President Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, the dele- 
gates were authorized to propose a joint declaration of the sev- 
eral American states, each, however, acting for and binding 
only itself, that within the limits of their respective territories 
no new European colony would thereafter be allowed to be 
established. It was not intended to commit the parties who 

^5 Ibid., 120-123. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 413 

might concur in that dechiration to the support of the particular 
boundaries which might be claimed bj any one of them; nor 
was it proposed to commit them to a joint resistance against any 
future attempt to plant a new European colony. It was be- 
lieved that the moral effect alone of a joint declaration, emanat- 
ing from the authority of all the American nations, would ef- 
fectually serve to prevent the effort to establish any such new 
colony; but if it should not, and the attempt should actually 
be made, it would then be time enough for the American pow- 
ers to consider the propriety of negotiating between themselves, 
and, if necessary, of adopting in concert the measure which 
might be necessary to check and prevent it. It would not be 
necessary to give to the proposed declaration the form of a 
treaty. It might be signed by the several ministers of the con- 
gress, and promulgated to the world as evidence of the sense of 
all the American powers.^® » 

On the subject of Cuba and Porto Eico, the instructions ad- f 
hered closely to the previous policy of the United States regard- 
ing those islands, and especially so as to Cuba. As that policy 
has already been set forth in these pages it need not be restated. 
On the question of the recognition of Haiti, the instructions 
were likewise free from innovation. Considering the nature of 
the governing power, the manner of its establishment, and the 
little respect shown to other races than the African, the question 
of acknowledging its independence was, said Clay, far from be- 
ing unattended with difficulty. In this connection, he mentions 
an arrangement, then lately made, under which the parent coun- 
try, France, had acknowledged a nominal independence in her 
former colony, in consideration of the latter's agreeing forever 
to receive French products at a rate of duty one half below that 
which was exacted from all other nations. This was, declared 
Clay, a restriction upon its freedom of action to which no sover- 

^^ International American Conference (1889-90), TV, 137. Between 
Clay's discussion of the noninterference principle and of the noncolonization 
principle there intervene several pages devoted to other matters, 



414 PAN^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGmNINGS 

eign power, really independent, would ever subscribe. But be 
intimated tbat, wbile tbe United States did not think it proper 
to recognize Haiti as a new state, the question of its recognition 
was not one of sufficient magnitude to require a concert of all 
the American powers.^'^ 

'Next to tbe pressing object of putting an end to the war be- 
tween the new republics and Spain, Clay placed that of devising 
means for the preservation of peace among the American na- 
tions, and with the rest of the world. " ISTo time could be more 
auspicious," he declared, " than the present for a successful in- 
quiry by the American nations into the causes which have so 
often disturbed the repose of the world, and for an earnest en- 
deavor, by wise precaution, in the establishment of just and 
enlightened principles for the government of their conduct, in 
peace and in war, to guard, as far as possible, against all mis- 
understandings. They have no old prejudices to combat, no 
long-established practices to change, no entangled connections 
or theories to break through. Committed to no particular sys- 
tems of commerce, nor to any selfish belligerent code of law, 
they are free to consult the experience of mankind, and to estab- 
lish without bias principles for themselves, adapted to their con- 
dition, and likely to promote their peace, security, and happi- 
ness. Remote from Europe, it is not probable that they will 
often be involved in the wars with which that quarter of the 
globe may be destined hereafter to be afflicted. In these wars, 
the policy of all America will be the same, that of peace and 
neutrality, which the United States have heretofore constantly 
labored to preserve." ^^ 

Clay furthermore declared that if the principles which that 
probable state of neutrality indicated as best for the interests 
of the Western Hemisphere were just in themselves and calcu- 
lated to prevent wars or to mitigate their rigor, they would 

s'T International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 138, 145, 
38 /W., 124. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 415 

present themselves to the general acceptance with a union of 
irresistible recommendations. Observing that uncontrolled 
power, on whatever element it was exerted, was prone to abuse, 
and that, when a single nation found itself possessed of a power 
which no one nation, nor all the other nations combined, could 
check or countervail, such nation grew presumptuous, impatient 
of contradiction or opposition, and found the solution of na- 
tional problems by the sword easier and more grateful to its 
pride than the slow and less brilliant process of patient investi- 
gation, he declared that, if the superiority was on the ocean, 
the excesses in the abuse of such power became intolerable. 
And since the progress of enlightened civilization had been 
much more advanced on land than on the ocean, there could 
scarcely be any circumstance which would tend more to exalt 
the character of America than that of uniting its endeavors to 
bring civilization on the ocean to the same forward point that 
it had attained on land. 

On these grounds the representatives of the United States 
were instructed to bring forward a principle for which the 
United States had ever contended — the abolition of war against 
private property and noncombatants on the ocean. If, by the 
common consent of nations, private property on the ocean were 
no longer liable to capture as lawful prize of war, the prin- 
ciple that free ships make free goods would, said Clay, lose its 
importance by being merged in the more liberal and extensive 
rule. But inasmuch as some nations might be prepared to 
admit the limited, who would withhold their assent from the 
more comprehensive principle, the delegates were authorized to 
propose the adoption of the rule that free ships make free goods, 
and its converse, that inimical ships make inimical goods. And 
in order that nations might be rendered still more secure in 
time of war against abuses at sea, the delegates were directed 
to propose a plain and intelligible definition of blockade, the 
want of which had been the source of many difficulties, espe- 



416 PA:ti[-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

cially between the United States and the nascent American 
powers. ^^ 

Among the most important matters to which the attention of 
Anderson and Sergeant was drawn was that of the establish- 
ment of some general principles of intercourse applicable to all 
the powers of America for the mutual regulation of their com- 
merce and navigation. The United States had on all proper 
occasions, said Clay, disclaimed any desire to procure for itself 
from the new powers peculiar commercial advantages. This 
disinterested doctrine would be adhered to, and in the joint ne- 
gotiations at Panama no privileges would be sought by the 
United States which were not equally extended to all the Amer- 
ican states. Indeed the United States was prepared to extend 
to the powers of Europe those same liberal principles of com- 
mercial intercourse and navigation. Two general principles 
were in particular to be observed. The first was that no nation 
should grant any favor in commerce or navigation to any for- 
eign power whatever, either upon this or any other continent, 
which should not extend to every other American nation; and 
the second, that whatever might be imported into or exported 
from any American nation in its own vessels might in like man- 
ner be imported or exported in the vessels of other nations, the 
vessel, whether national or foreign, and the cargo paying in both 
instances exactly the same duties and charges and no more. 

Since nations were equal, common members of a universal 
family, why, asked Clay, should there be any inequality between 
them in their commercial intercourse ? Why should one grant 
favors to another which it withheld from a third ? If this prin- 
ciple were correct in its universal application, it must, he said, 
be allowed to be particularly adapted to the condition and cir- 
cumstances of the American powers. The United States had 
had no difficulty in negotiating on this point with the republics 
of Colombia and Central America, and the principle had been 

^9 iiif^rnational American Conference (ISSQ-QO), IV, 125, 127. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 41Y 

accordingly inserted in the treaties which had been made with 
both those powers.^^ Other American nations were believed to 
have a disposition to adopt it. The United Mexican states 
alone had opposed it, and in their negotiations with the United 
States had brought forward the inadmissible exception of the 
Spanish American states, to which the government of Mexico 
insisted upon being permitted to grant commercial favors which 
it might refuse to the United States, On this point Clay spoke 
with some impatience. The minister of the United States at 
Mexico had, he said, been instructed to break off the negotia- 
tions if, contrary to expectation, the Mexican Government should 
persist in the exception.^ ^ What rendered it more extraordi- 
nary was that, while they pretended that there was something 
like an understanding between the new republics, no such ex- 
ception was insisted upon by either Colombia or Central Amer- 
ica. The delegates were accordingly instructed to resist any 
attempt to bring forward such an exception and to subscribe 
to no treaty which should admit it.^^ 

40 The treaty between the United States and Colombia, which was the 
first treaty to be concluded by any of the new states with a foreign power, 
was signed at Bogota on October 3, 1824. Article II of that treaty was as 
follows : " The United States of America and the republic of Colombia, de- 
siring to live in peace and harmony with all the other nations of the earth, 
by means of a policy frank and equally friendly with all, engage mutually 
not to grant any particular favor to other nations, in respect of commerce 
and navigation, which shall not immediately become common to the other 
party, who shall enjoy the same freely if the concession was freely made, 
or on allowing the same compensation if the concession was conditional." 
The treaty with Central America which was concluded at Washington on 
December 5, 1825, contained an article identical with the one just quoted. 
Cf. Davis, Treaties and Conventions, 108, 117, 169-177. 

41 The negotiations began in August, 1825. Mexico insisted on the ex- 
ception and negotiations were after a time broken oflf. They were renewed, 
however, in April, 1826, and a treaty containing the most favored nation 
clause was concluded on July 10 of that year. This treaty was never rati- 
fied. A treaty of limits was concluded on April 5, 1828, but not until ex- 
actly three years later was a treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation 
containing the most favored nation clause finally concluded between the 
two republics. Cf. American State Papers, Foreign Relations, VI, 578- 
613; Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and 
Mexico, 205-251. 

^2 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 129-131. 



418 PAIST-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

The representatives of the United States were urged to press 
the general principle of reciprocal freedom of navigation, with 
an earnestness and zeal proportionate to its high value. But 
while they were to emphasize its reciprocity, which was thought 
to be perfect, they were warned against any proposal to impose 
precisely the same rates of duty on vessels and cargoes in all 
the ports of the American nations. Such a procedure would, 
it was declared, subject each state to inconvenient restrictions 
upon its power of taxation instead of leaving it free to consult 
its own peculiar position, its habits, its constitution of govern- 
ment, and its most fitting sources of revenue. If it should, on 
the other hand, be objected that the other American nations 
were not ready for reciprocal liberty of navigation, because their 
marine was still in its infancy, they should be urged to seek 
the elements of its increase, not in a narrow and contracted 
legislation neutralized by the counteracting legislation of other 
nations, but in the abundance and excellence of their materials 
for shipbuilding, in the skill of their artisans and the cheapness 
of their manufactures ; in the number of their seamen, and their 
hardy and enterprising character formed by exposure in every 
branch of a seafaring life and by adventure on every ocean, 
and invigorated by a liberal, cheerful, and fearless competition 
with foreign powers. If, in spite of these considerations, oppo- 
sition to the principle should be found to be unyielding, the 
delegates were instructed to propose a modification of it, com- 
prehending at least the products and manufactures of all the 
American nations, including the West Indies. While the rea- 
soning used in support of the general principle was believed to 
sustain it in this restricted form, the further consideration was 
suggested that the great similarity in the produce of the Amer- 
ican states made it difficult to trace articles, imported in differ- 
ent vessels or blended in the same vessel, to the countries of 
their origin for the purpose of subjecting them to different rates 
of duty. And finally if the principle as thus modified was 
still opposed, the delegates were to endeavor to secure its ac- 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 419 

ceptance by any two American nations who might agree to apply 
it to their own navigation, when employed in transporting their 
respective produce and manufactures."*^ 

In urging upon the Panama Congress the adoption of the 
foregoing principles of maritime war and of commerce and 
navigation, Clay was following authoritative precedents. In 
1785, more than forty years before the Panama instructions 
were written, Franklin had declared it to be the policy of the 
United States to endeavor to abolish the practice of privateer- 
ing by offering to incorporate in all its treaties an article en- 
gaging that in case of future war no privateer should be com- 
missioned on either side and that unarmed merchant ships 
on both sides should pursue their voyages unmolested. In the 
same year this principle was embodied in a treaty between the 
United States and Prussia. During the years which followed 
the United States continued to advocate the principle, and in 
1823 opened negotiations with several of the maritime powers 
of Europe looking to the adoption of a convention to make it 
effective.^* The United States had also long advocated a defi- 
nition of blockade, and had from the beginning of its existence 
as a nation striven to establish by treaty the liberal principles 
of commerce and navigation which Clay was now urging upon 
the congress of American nations. ^^ ITevertheless, in advo- 
cating concerted action on these subjects by the American na- 
tions at Panama, Clay could not have been unmindful that such 
action would constitute a great advance toward the ideal of 
continental solidarity, nor that it would tend to diminish Brit- 
ish influence in the concerns of the new states. 

In 1829, after the Panama instructions were made public, 
the opinion seems to have prevailed in England that the latter 
consideration furnished a controlling motive in their prepara- 
tion, and that the United States aimed to secure for itself an 

*s International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 131-135. 

44 Moore, Digest of International Law, VII, 461, 463-465. 

45 lUd., 788-789. 



420 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

undisputed place of leadership in the New World, with a view 
to enjoy certain commercial privileges to the exclusion of the 
powers of Europe. The London Times declared : " There is 
an obvious anxiety throughout these long documents to assume, 
as a sort of political datum, that all ' American ' states are to 
constitute a system and a community of their own, recognizing 
interests, and establishing maxims for their common regulation 
as affects each other, and for their separate, exclusive, nay, re- 
pulsive use, as regards the other nations of the world. The 
first obvious consequence of such a scheme, if adopted by Mex- 
ico and the states of South America, would be to place the 
United States at the head of the new federation, in virtue of 
superior strength, maturity, safety, commercial and political 
resources." ^^ 

An anonymous writer who published in 1829 a pamphlet 
containing Clay's instructions,^'^ accompanied with observations 
of his own, expressed in a manner no less positive the opinion 
that the instructions plainly avowed the design of placing the 
United States " at the head of the American family." If, said 
this writer, the United States should do this in a magnanimous 
spirit, without any exclusive views. Great Britain would not be 
likely to take offense. But what did the United States do ? 
" To infant states without maritime force, without the possi- 
bility of becoming maritime powers for many generations, if at 
all," the United States, he declared, urged the adoption, in 
their intercourse with Europe, of the " highest pretensions, 
which, in the maturity of her naval strength, the United States 
herself ever ventured to urge — and even then, without the 
remotest hope of success," and, instead of advising those states 

ieThe Times (London), May 18, 1829. 

47 Spanish America. Observations on the instructions given hy the Pres- 
ident of the United States of Am,erica to the representatives of that re-". 
public, at the congress held at Panama in 1826. 

The pamphlet is inscribed to the Earl of Aberdeen, " in the hope that 
no sentiment will be found in these pages at variance with those high 
principles of national justice of which his Lordship is the uncompromising 
advocate," 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 421 

to cultivate the most friendly relations with the powers of Eu- 
rope, to be wise and not meddle with questions which did not 
affect their interests, said to them, " Take the highest ground 
in your negotiations with Europe, that an old-established, power- 
ful state would propose. Insist that free ships shall make free 
goods. Demand also a definition of blockade." ^^ 

" What," continues this writer, " must have been the effect of 
counsel such as this, if it had been followed, but to have pro- 
duced embarrassment and coldness between the new states and 
the European powers, and between them and Great Britain in 
particular ? . . . Having recommended to the new states that 
they should call upon us, to renounce in their favor, a belliger- 
ent right which we have never yet conceded to any other power, 
the elder branch of the American family further suggests to 
them the experiment of prevailing upon us to make a slight 
inroad into our navigation act. One of the principles of this 
code is, that we admit from other nations their own produce, 
in their own shipping, or in our own; but in no other, unless 
such produce be again exported from this country. Thus, a 
ship of the United States brings us cotton or tobacco from New 
York ; but she cannot do so from Colombia ; it must come from 
the latter country either in a Colombian or a British ship. 
Now, the government of the United States says to these young 
republics, ' America is one continent — insist in your treaties 
with Europe that it is one nation — and that it shall be so con- 
sidered for all commercial purposes — that we, your elder 
brethren, may come to your ports, and be the carriers of your 
produce.' " ^® 

In the instructions to the delegates to Panama, Clay did not 
fail to discuss the subject of an interoceanic canal. This vast 
object, if it should ever be accomplished, would, he declared, 
be interesting in a greater or less degree to all parts of the 
world. But to this continent would accrue the largest amount 

48 Op. cit., 8-9. 

49 Op. cit., 9, 12. 



422 PA¥-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

of benefit from its execution ; and to Colombia, Mexico, Central 
America, Peru, and the United States more than to any of the 
other American nations. What was to redound to the advan- 
tage of all America should, in his opinion, be effected by com- 
mon means and united exertions, and should not be left to the 
separate and unassisted efforts of any one power. With the 
limited information then at hand as to the practicability and 
probable expense of the object. Clay thought that it would not 
be wise to do more than make some preliminary arrangements. 
The best routes would, he thought, be most likely to be found 
in the territory of Mexico or in that of Central America. He 
stated that the latter republic had made, the year before, a lib- 
eral offer to the United States respecting the construction of 
a canal through its territory; but the answer had gone no fur- 
ther than to make suitable acknowledgment of the friendly 
overture and to assure the central republic that measures would 
be adopted to place the United States in possession of the in- 
formation necessary to enlighten its judgment. Finally, the 
delegates were instructed to receive and to transmit to their 
governments any proposals or plans that might be suggested for 
the joint construction of the canal, with the assurance that they 
would be attentively examined, with the earnest desire to recon- 
cile the interests and views of all the American nations.^® 

A word may be said in explanation of the " liberal offer " 
of the republic of Central America. On February 8, 1825, 
Caiias, the minister of that republic at Washington, addressed 
a communication to the Secretary of State soliciting the co- 
operation of the United States in the construction of an inter- 
oceanic canal upon the ground that the noble example of the 
elder republic was a model and a protection to all the Amer- 
icas and entitled it to a preference over any other nation in the 
merits and advantages of the proposed undertaking. Williams, 
the American charge d'affaires at Guatemala, was instructed to 

50 International American Conference (1889-90), IV, 143 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 423 

assure the Central American government of the great interest 
taken by the United States in an enterprise " so highly calcu- 
lated to diffuse a favorable influence on the affairs of man- 
kind," and to investigate carefully the facilities afforded by 
the route and transmit the intelligence acquired to the govern- 
ment at Washington. But Williams never made any report of 
his action under these instructions. 

During the year 1825 a number of propositions for the con- 
struction of the canal were received by the Central American 
government from Europe. None of these was accepted ; but, on 
June 14, 1826, a contract was entered into with a company in 
the United States, called " The Central American and United 
States Atlantic and Pacific Canal Company." Under this con- 
tract the company was to open a canal through Nicaragua, 
which should be navigable for large ships. The sum of two 
hundred thousand dollars was to be deposited in the city of 
Granada, within six months, for the payment of preliminary 
expenses. The company was to erect fortifications for the pro- 
tection of the canal, and was to begin its construction within a 
year. Not having sufficient capital for the purpose, the con- 
tractors addressed a memorial to the United States Congress, 
praying the assistance of the government in their work, which 
they represented to be of national importance. The memorial 
was referred to a committee, but was never reported upon. A 
subsequent attempt to secure capital in England having failed, 
the enterprise was abandoned. ^^ 

A few remaining points in Clay's instructions may be briefly 
mentioned. On the subject of religious toleration the dele- 
gates of the United States were authorized to propose a joint 

51 Bancroft, History of Central America, III, 741-742, citing Daniel 
Cleveland's Across the Nicaragua Transit, MS. Cf. also a short article en- 
titled Ship Canal through Central America in Niles' Register for May 7, 
1825, and another in the same paper entitled Atlantic and Pacific Canal in 
the issue for September 30, 1826; also National Intelligencer for April 26, 
1825. 



424 PA:N^-AMERrCANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

declaration to tlie effect that within the limits of the several 
states there should be freedom of worship. Should the con- 
gress attempt an amicable adjustment of questions of boundary 
and other matters of controversy among the American powers, 
the delegates were instructed to manifest a willingness to give 
their counsel and advice or to serve as arbitrators, whenever 
their assistance should be required. A dispute was under- 
stood to exist between Mexico and Central America as to the 
province of Chiapas.^^ It was, said the instructions, the de- 
sire of the President that the commissioners of the United 
States should give this matter their particular investigation, 
and if justice should be found on the side of Central America, 
they were to lend to its cause all the countenance and support 
which they could give without actually committing the United 
States. " This act of friendship on our part," declared Clay, 
" is due as well on account of the high degree of respect and 
confidence which the republic has on several occasions dis- 
played toward the United States, as from its comparative weak- 
ness." 

The attention of the delegates was next directed to the sub- 
ject of forms of government and the cause of free institutions 

S2 It will be recalled that the provinces of Central America, with the ex- 
ception of Salvador, became incorporated voluntarily in the empire of 
Mexico in 1823, and that upon the downfall of Iturbide they withdrew and 
set up an independent republic. Mexico did not resist the separation, and 
on August 20, 1824, issued a decree recognizing the independence of the new 
republic, but declaring that the border province of Chiapas was not in- 
cluded in the territory recognized as independent. Central America in 
negotiating the recognition of its independence by Mexico requested that 
Chiapas be left to choose its allegiance as between the two republics. 
Chiapas chose Mexico and the Central American republic protested on the 
ground that the province had been coerced, the troops which General Fii- 
Isola had maintained in Guatemala and Salvador having been transferred 
to Chiapas. In the constitution adopted by Central America in 1824 it was 
provided the province of Chiapas would be received into the federa- 
tion as a state whenever it should freely seek such a union. This was 
the condition of affairs when Clay's instructions were written. Cf. La Di- 
plomacia Mexicana, II, 215, 223; AlamSn, Historia de Mexico, V, 759; Me- 
morias para la Historia de la Revolucidn de Cen>tro Amirica (Montllfar), 
XVI. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 425 

in the Western Hemisphere. The United States, it was de- 
clared, was not and never had been animated by any spirit of 
propagandism. Allowing no foreign interference either in 
the formation or the conduct of its own government, it was 
equally scrupulous in refraining from all interference in the 
original structure or subsequent interior movement of the gov- 
ernments of other independent nations. Its interest in the 
adoption and execution of their political systems was rather 
a matter of feeling than a principle of action ; and the general 
habit of cautiously avoiding a subject so delicate would be 
adhered to in the present instance. But there was, it was inti- 
mated, reason to believe that one European power, if not more, 
had been active both in Colombia and in Mexico, if not else- 
where, in efforts to substitute the monarchical for the republi- 
can form, and to plant on the newly erected thrones European 
princes. It was due the sister republics, said Clay, to state 
that this design had met with a merited and prompt repulse; 
but the scheme might be revived. It has been plausibly sug- 
gested that the adoption of monarchical institutions would con- 
ciliate the European powers, and hasten their recognition of 
the new states. Such recognition could not, however, be much 
longer postponed. It was not worth buying; nor could any- 
thing be more dishonorable than to purchase by mean compli- 
ances the formal acknowledgment of what had actually been 
won by so much valor and so many sacrifices. While, there- 
fore, it was not anticipated that there would be any difficulty in 
dissuading the new states from entertaining or deliberating on 
such propositions, the delegates were instructed to take advan- 
tage of every fit opportunity to strengthen the political faith of 
the new republics and to inculcate the solemn duty of every 
nation to reject all foreign dictation in its domestic concerns. 
At the same time they were to manifest a readiness to satisfy 
inquirers as to the theory and practical operation of the fed- 
eral and state constitutions of the United States and to illus- 
trate and explain the manifold blessings which the people of the 



426 PAI^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

United States had enjoyed and were continuing to enjoy under 
them.^^ 

Finally, Clay referred to the war which had recently broken 
out between Brazil and the United Provinces of the Eio de la 
Plata as being a cause of most sincere regret. In that war, he 
said, the United States would be strictly neutral. But the dele- 
gates were to avail themselves of every suitable opportunity to 
represent to the parties how desirable it was to put an end to 
the conflict and with what satisfaction the United States would 
see the blessings of peace restored.^* 

The foregoing summary of Clay's instructions serves to make 
clear the policy of the Adams administration with reference to 
the other American countries. The United States would take 
no part in an assembly whose object was to legislate for the 
whole continent; would form no alliance with the new powers 
for the purpose of maintaining their independence, nor for the 
purpose of preventing European interference in their affairs; 
would enter into no arrangement by which its freedom of action 
in any contingency might be restricted; and finally, would not 
lend its aid to the formation of a powerful neighboring confed- 
eration, which might become a menace to republican institu- 
tions, or which might succeed in assuming the position of leader- 
ship which the United States desired to retain for itself. 
Adams had declared in 1823 that to any confederation of 
Spanish American provinces which had for its aim the estab- 
lishment of republican institutions, politically and commer- 
cially independent of Europe, the United States would yield 
its approbation and cordial good wishes. But the confederation 
which it was proposed to constitute at Panama appeared not to 
be limited to the objects enumerated by Adams. There was 
some doubt about Bolivar's designs. One of the cardinal points 
of his policy was the establishment of intimate relations, not 
only commercial but also political, with Great Britain. 

5^ International Ainerican Conference (1889-90), IV, 148-149. 
54 lUd., 150. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 427 

Whether this fact was definitely known to the government at 
Washington is not clear. The United States, however, would 
hardly have departed in any event from its settled policy of 
avoiding entangling alliances, although knowledge of Bolivar's 
plans would necessarily have tended to intensify distrust of 
the scheme of a southern confederacy. 

ISTevertheless, the spirit of American unity pervades Clay's 
instructions. Dangers to be met, interests to be promoted, 
problems to be solved, were common to all and demanded com- 
mon counsel and united action. Remoteness from the scenes of 
European conflicts permitted the establishment of an American 
policy of peace and neutrality. No old prejudices, no long- 
established practices, no entangled connections, prevented the 
states of the New World from adopting for themselves princi- 
ples of international intercourse suited to their peculiar condi- 
tion and calculated to promote their peace and happiness. In 
short, the idea of continental solidarity, in so far as it could 
be attained by means short of the alliance or the political union 
of the separate states, was strongly advocated. 

While it is of interest to know what was the attitude of the 
United States toward the Panama Congress, it is of no less im- 
portance to know what was the attitude of the other countries 
toward the participation of the United States. Much has al- 
ready been disclosed from which deductions may be drawn. 
We have seen that in Colombia a party led by the acting presi- 
dent, Santander, early developed in opposition to what was 
thought to be the imperial designs of the Liberator. This party, 
strongly republican in its sympathies, was inclined to look to 
the United States rather than to any European power for po- 
litical guidance. Moreover the predominant sentiment in Mex- 
ico and Central America had come to be strongly republican 
in its tendencies, in spite of the powerful British influence in 
Mexico. Much light remains to be thrown on the circum- 
stances surrounding the invitation which was extended to the 
United States by Colombia, Mexico, and Central America be- 



428 PAN-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

fore anything can be positively affirmed with reference to the 
significance of that invitation. The fact that the three repub- 
lics acted in concert might have been due to a common distrust 
of Bolivar's political designs, and to a common belief that 
the presence of delegates from the United States would be, in 
a measure, a guaranty of their respective national aspirations 
under a republican form of government. The adoption of a 
clause in the general treaty of union, league, and confederation 
concluded at Panama, by which any member changing substan- 
tially the form of its government should by that act be excluded 
from the league, lends color to this surmise. 

No revelation has ever been made of the instructions by the 
Spanish American governments to their respective delegates 
regarding the position to be held by the United States in the 
proposed confederation. The general instructions to the dele- 
gates of Peru — no special instructions have been published — 
do not refer to the northern republic except in an incidental 
way. The general instructions to the delegates of Colombia 
do not allude to the United States; but, by direction of Vice 
President Santander, Revenga, the Colombian Minister of For- 
eign Affairs, late in May or early in June, 1826, appears to 
have dealt with the subject in special instructions, of which, un- 
fortunately, only a fragment seems to be extant. In this frag- 
ment, which is printed in the Memorias of General O'Leary, 
Pevenga, after acknowledging the receipt of a number of com- 
munications from the Colombian delegates at Panama, and ad- 
verting briefly to the new aspect which the conduct of the 
Peruvian delegates had placed upon the affairs of the assem- 
bly, takes up the subject of the United States. " The opposi- 
tion in the United States," he said, " to sending plenipoten- 
tiaries to the Panama Congress has been sustained principally 
by the representatives of the states of the south. The object 
may have been to discredit the assembly and thus to prevent an 
agreement among the countries as to the emancipation of the 
Spanish Antilles, to the end that the tranquillity of the south- 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 429 

ern part of the United States might not as a consequence be 
disturbed. It was probably proposed that their govern- 
ment ..." ^^ Here the extract abruptly ends. A footnote 
states simply that the conclusion of the letter is not found in 
the archives- 
Whatever may have been the instructions to the delegates of 
Colombia, Mexico, and Central America, it is not likely that 
they contained anything indicating a desire to exclude the 
United States from contributing with its counsel, at least, to 
the formation of the proposed league. But altogether different 
was the attitude of the great protagonist of the movement of 
confederation. Bolivar was anxious to have a representative 
of Great Britain present at Panama, and he was apparently not 
averse to the presence there of commissioners from other Eu- 
ropean countries ; yet he did not welcome the participation of 
the United States in the congress. Of this there can scarcely 
be any doubt; for, although he did not openly express his dis- 
approval, yet his writings may be searched in vain for any 
approbation of the action of Colombia, Mexico, and Central 
America in extending an invitation to the United States. What 
is the explanation of this attitude of the Liberator? The an- 
swers given by certain Latin American writers may be briefly 
examined. 

Gil Eortoul, in his Historicu C onstitucional de Venezuela/^ 
published in 1907, concludes his treatment of the Panama Con- 
gress with a paragraph reading as follows: " Thus was frus- 
trated the double purpose of Bolivar: that of saving from the 
domination of Spain — and of the United States — the islands 
of Cuba and Porto Rico, and that of establishing a permanent 
balance between the great republic of English origin and the 
republics of Spanish origin. This probably would have made 
impossible the hegemony of the United States and would have 
prevented that power from exercising a protectorate over the 

55 O'Leary, Memorias, XXIV, 323. 

56 1, 386. 



430 PAI^-AMERICAlSriSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

other countries of this hemisphere. In any case the accom- 
plishment of Bolivar's purpose would have been the means of 
developing among the Latin American people the position of 
influence in the v^orld which they lack to-day." 

Vargas, in his Historia del Peru Independienie^'^ declares 
that Bolivar instantly comprehended the danger to which the 
ambiguous protection of the Monroe Doctrine subjected Hispanic 
America, and that, recognizing the necessity of emancipating 
the Hispanic states from the power of the Anglo-American re- 
public, he desired to oppose to that power an insuperable barrier 
in the Gulf of Mexico. With the foregoing opinions Villanueva 
seems to agree when he says that the Bolivar doctrine was, 
Spanish America for the Spanish Americans.^^ 

Jacinto Lopez, in a recent number of La Beforma Social, 
declares that the idea of the Liberator in assembling the Con- 
gress of Panama was to prevent foreign domination, and that, 
believing the United States to be a menace to the other Ameri- 
can states, he desired to preserve the latter from the domination 
of the former as well as from the domination of the powers of 
Europe. The invitation extended to the United States to take 
part in the congress was, in Lopez's opinion, a mistake. There 
was no place in that body for any but the confederates — that 
is, Mexico, Central America, and the nations of the southern 
continent. It was a congress essentially, exclusively, Hispano- 
American. This, Lopez thinks, being the cardinal point in the 
history of the Panama Congress, cannot be too much insisted 
upon. The departure from the plan of the Liberator, which 
was implied in the invitation to the United States, was the 
source of a train of evil consequences. The United States was 
thus led to form a concept of the congress entirely different from 
Bolivar's and to entertain aims relative to it altogether con- 
trary to those which the Liberator entertained. If the idea of 
Bolivar had been realized — that is, if the grand American 

57 III, 69. 

58 El Imperio de los Andes, 140. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 431 

confederation had been consummated, with all its great re- 
sults — it would have been time then to think of a congress 
of all the nations of America for the solution of their common 
problems. 

Between the American states, continues Lopez, from Mexico 
to Buenos Aires, there was no conflict of interests. There 
might have been petty, vulgar rivalries between the men who 
held the reigns of government, such as prevented the United 
Provinces of Rio de la Plata from participating in the Con- 
gi'ess of Panama, but no such spirit existed between the peoples 
themselves. On the other hand, between the United States and 
the American countries still at war with Spain, there was an 
irreconcilable conflict of interests and aims, of which the ques- 
tion of Cuba and the manifesto which the congress was to formu- 
late in accordance with the Liberator's instructions ^^ were im- 
portant signs. The United States was not confederable. Bol- 
ivar never allowed himself to be deceived on this point. He 
knew that, even if the United States could have joined the con- 
federation, it would have been too powerful and its influence 
would have been too preponderant to make desirable an alliance 
between it and the other states.^'' 

According to these writers, the aim which was uppermost in 
Bolivar's mind was that of interposing a barrier to the future 
expansion of the United States and of disputing its pretensions 
to a position of leadership in the western world. That Bolivar 
really entertained such an idea has not been clearly demon- 
strated. On the other hand, it does seem clear that the fear of 
the growing power of the United States was never the controlling 
motive in the determination of his national and international 

59 The delegates of Peru were instructed {Int. Am. Conf., 1889-90, IV, 
170) to secure the great compact of union, league, and perpetual confedera- 
tion against Spain, and against foreign rule of whatever character. 
Lopez, in the article referred to, is of the opinion that the manifesto which 
the delegates were instructed to issue, similar to that made by the Presi- 
dent of the United States, was accordingly aimed to prevent the domination 
of the United States as well as that of the powers of Europe. 

60 La Reforma Social, VI, 376. 



432 PAN^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

policies. More than once lie expressed doubts as to the abil- 
ity of a nation to progress, or indeed long to exist under such 
a political system as the United States had adopted. This he 
may have done with a view to discourage what he conceived to 
be the too prevalent tendency of his countrymen to look to 
the United States for their political doctrines; and he may 
have had at bottom a higher opinion of the governmental sys- 
tem of the United States than he was willing to admit. But 
to affirm that his chief purpose in calling together the Congress 
of Panama was to prevent the United States from taking a posi- 
tion of leadership in the Western Hemisphere is to do him an 
injustice, is to detract from his greatness, is to deny him that 
breadth of vision and that nobility of ideal which have marked 
him as one of the great men of all time. 

The chief purpose of the Liberator was not negative but posi- 
tive. He had much less interest in challenging the leadership 
of the United States than in assuming a commanding place for 
the confederation in which his own Colombia should be the 
dominant power — a consummation which, in his opinion, de- 
pended infinitely more upon the behavior of Great Britain than 
upon any action which might be taken by, or in relation to, the 
United States. Bolivar, no doubt, believed that the presence 
of delegates from that republic might interfere with the free- 
dom of negotiations with Great Britain; and that it might 
deepen the tendency toward particularism, which was the prin- 
cipal obstacle to the accomplishment of his immediate political 
designs. Hence, if he had been able to control the situation, the 
United States would have been permitted to remain in the back- 
ground until his American confederation had been definitely 
established under some satisfactory arrangement with Great 
Britain. But there was no intention on his part permanently 
to. exclude either the United States or any other section of the 
continent from a share in the grand project of which the Ameri- 
can confederation was to be only a part. The whole of America 
was to stand with Great Britain against the Holy Alliance. 



ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES 433 

Liberalism was to be pitted against absolutism ; freedom against 
despotism. Bolivar's great aim was not an American balance 
of power but a world balance of power, and ultimately a fed- 
eral nation of the world, whose capital, perhaps, should be lo- 
cated upon the Isthmus of Panama. The author of so mag- 
nificent a conception cannot be fairly charged with minor aims 
incommensurate with the realization of his ffrand ideal. 



CHAPTER XI 

ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 

The international situation in the southern part of the con- 
tinent, particularly in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, must now 
be considered more at length. Argentina — that is, the loose 
confederation then known under the name of the United Prov- 
inces of Eio de la Plata — was represented in its foreign affairs 
by the province of Buenos Aires. Under the able g-uidance of 
Mariano Moreno, the provincial junta early adopted, as we 
have seen in a previous chapter, a distinctive policy in relation 
to the other belligerent communities of America. Jealous of 
the national autonomy, the junta declined in 1810 an invita- 
tion of the government of Chile to send representatives to a 
general congress, and proposed, instead, defensive alliances as 
the most effective means of cooperation between the govern- 
ments of the revolted colonies. To this policy the Buenos 
Aires authorities continued to adhere, and when the Colombian 
envoy, Mosquera, arrived early in 1823 on his mission of ne- 
gotiating the preliminary treaties which were intended to pave 
the way to definite union at Panama, he was obliged to put 
aside the extensive Colombian project and conclude with Buenos 
Aires merely a brief treaty of friendship and defensive alli- 
ance. 

A few months later this treaty was sent by the executive to 
the junta of representatives, the legislative body of the province, 
for action authorizing its ratification. It appears from the dis- 
cussion which arose in the junta that Rivadavia, who was then 
serving as Minister of Government and of Foreign Affairs, and 
who represented Buenos Aires in the negotiations with Mos- 
quera, upon declining to accept the Colombian draft as a basis 

434 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 435 

of discussion, presented a counter project containing two arti- 
cles which Mosquera in turn rejected. By the first of these 
articles the two contracting parties engaged not to accept from 
Spain, or from any other power, the recognition of independ- 
ence unless it was extended simultaneously to both, and by the 
second they entered into a mutual guarantee of the integrity 
of their respective territories against all powers except those 
which, like themselves, were formerly possessions of Spain. ^ 
Around these two rejected articles the discussion chiefly re- 
volved, for in them were expressed the two great immediate 
ends of Argentine policy — leadership in the southern continent 
and the consolidation of the old viceroyalty of La Plata into a 
single state.. 

Leadership and the integration of the national territory as 
features of Argentine policy were intimately connected. If 
integration were consummated, leadership would be assured; 
and if leadership were first attained, national consolidation 
would more surely follow. The greatest obstacle in the way 
of the attainment of these aims seemed at the moment, at least, 
to be the extraordinary progress of Colombia and the plan of 
union which it advocated. In 1822, when the Colombian 
agents first set out to negotiate the treaties preliminary to carry- 
ing this plan into effect, the Buenos Aires government, in al- 
liance with Chile, had in hand an undertaking by which it ex- 
pected to checkmate the growing influence of Colombia and to 
promote at the same time its own ends. This undertaking was 
the liberation of Peru. In accord with its foreign policy the 
Argentine Government had long maintained an entente cordiale 
with Chile, and in 1819, it will be recalled, concluded a treaty 
with that government under the terms of which the two countries 
sent an expedition into Peru, under the Argentine general, San 
Martin. But San Martin, after expelling the Royalists from 
Lima and creating the republic of Peru, found himself unable 

1 Diario de Sesiones de la Junta de Representates d^ la Provincia d^ 
Buenos Aires, Ano de 1823, 44, 51. 



436 PAE'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

to dislodge the enemy from the interior of the country. Having 
appealed in vain to Bolivar for assistance, and having become 
aware that his authority over the discordant elements in Peru 
was being gradually undermined, the Argentine leader, in 
September, 1822, abandoned the great enterprise, leaving the 
expeditionary forces to continue the struggle as best they could 
in cooperation with the Peruvians. Such was the situation 
when Mosquera. reached Buenos Aires in the course of his mis- 
sion. As Bolivar had not yet taken up San Martin's unfinished 
task, Argentine statesmen were still hopeful of maintaining 
their influence in Peru and through that means of achieving 
their national aims. 

Specifically the government of Buenos Aires aimed, by means 
of the expedition under San Martin, to liberate Upper Peru and 
thus to assure its incorporation in the Argentine nation. There 
had prevailed throughout Spanish America a tacit under- 
standing that the boundaries of the new states should conform 
to those which marked the limits of the major divisions in 1810, 
when in the most of them the movement of revolt began. This 
was in accordance with a principle described in international 
law by the term uti possidetis. Its meaning is made clear by 
the complementary phrase, ita possidetis, the whole then sig- 
nifying, " As you possess, so you may possess." ^ Under this 
principle, the enipire, and afterward the republic, of Mexico 
conformed to the later boundaries of the viceroyalty of Mexico, 
and the Central American republic, after a brief voluntary 
union with Mexico, to those of the captaincy-general of Guate- 
mala. The vice-royalty of New Granada was comprised within 
the bounds of a single state, the republic of Colombia. Volun- 
tarily associated with it under the same flag were the captaincy- 
general of Venezuela and the presidency of Quito. Chile had 
established itself within the bounds of the former captaincy- 
general of that name; and the viceroyalty of Peru, with the 

2 Moore, Co^ta Rica-Panama Arbitration. Memorandum on Uti Possi- 



AEGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 437 

help of its neighbors, was now struggling, with every prospect 
of success, to convert its domains into a single independent na- 
tion. The viceroyalty of La Plata alone stood in danger of 
permanent dismemberment of its territory.^ The province 
lying on the eastern shore of the estuary of La Plata, and 
variously known as the Banda Oriental, the province of Uru- 
guay, or the province of Montevideo, had been seized by Portu- 
gaiese forces in 1817, and four years later had been definitely 
incorporated into the united kingdoms of Portugal and Brazil. 
Paraguay, a province of the old union, had rebelled against the 
central government at Buenos Aires, and, having declared its 
independence, had successfully maintained it. Upper Peru, 
comprising the four provinces of the former presidency of 
Charcas, also an undisputed part of the viceroyalty of La Plata, 
was still in the hands of the Royalists. If it were freed through 
the agency of Argentine troops there was every hope of its 
joining the confederation. Success in that quarter would give 
the government at Buenos Aires the influence and prestige re- 
quired to restore by peaceable means the other dismembered 
parts of its territory. Failure, on the other hand, meant not 
only the loss of Upper Peru, but its attraction to the ever grow- 
ing Bolivarian system. 

The rejection by Mosquera of the proposed articles on recog- 
nition and territorial integrity, together with San Martin's 
abandonment of the undertaking in Peru, placed the Buenos 
Aires government in an embarrassing and difiicult situation. 
In a vain endeavor to extricate the nation from this situation 
and to recover in part at least its lost prestige, the junta of rep- 
resentatives, on July 19, 1823, passed an Act authorizing the 
executive to employ whatever means he might " find most 
efficacious to hasten the termination of the war and to secure 
the recognition of independence." But the Act forbade the es- 

3 Cf. La desmembracidn del territorio Argentino en el siglo XIX. Con- 
fer encia dada en la Real Sociedad Geogrdfica en su sesidn publica del 3 de 
diciembre de 1914' 



438 PAI^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNmGS 

tablishment of treaty relations with the mother country except 
on two conditions — the termination of the war throughout 
America, and the recognition of the independence of the new 
states. If, however, one or more governments should treat 
with Spain independently of Buenos Aires or should 
establish conditions for recognition diiferent from those of 
the Argentine Government, the Act authorized the executive to 
negotiate in behalf of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata 
alone.* For a year or more past informal negotiations had 
been going on between the Buenos Aires Government and the 
Peninsular authorities looking to some form of accommodation. 
Toward the middle of 1823 two Spanish agents arrived at 
Montevideo, and, entering into correspondence with the Argen- 
tine Government, were permitted to pass over to Buenos Aires 
where, under the Act of June 19, negotiations were begun, re- 
sulting shortly in the conclusion of a preliminary treaty of 
peace,^ which provided for the suspension of hostilities for a 
period of eighteen months, and bound the government of Buenos 
Aires to negotiate between Spain and the American states a 
definitive treaty of peace. After authorizing the ratification 
of the preliminary treaty, the junta of representatives em- 
powered the government, in case the definitive treaty were con- 
cluded, to negotiate with the new states an agreement to vote 
twenty million pesos, ostensibly as a grant to enable the mother 
country to maintain her independence, but really as an indem- 
nity for the loss of her colonies.^ At the Panama Congress, 
three years later, the British agent, Dawkins, it will be recalled, 
proposed the payment of a similar sum as a part of the peace 
settlement which he urged the delegates to enter into with the 
Spanish Government. The Argentine proposal, though not 
originating with the British Government, doubtless had its ap- 
proval. 

This plan for terminating the conflict in America without 

^ Diario de la Junta, 1823, 51. 

5 liegistro Oficial de la Republica Argentina, II, 38, 41, 42. 

6 Golecci6n de Tratados celebrados por la RepUhlica Argentina, I, 71. 



AEGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 439 

further bloodshed proved to be illusory. The ministers sent 
out from Buenos Aires to negotiate with Chile, Peru, and 
Colombia failed to obtain the desired results; for Bolivar's 
agents had already created an atmosphere of hostility to the 
Argentine plan. In September, 1823, the Liberator himself ar- 
rived at Lima and took personal charge of the operations in 
Peru. Opposed to any species of compromise with the enemy, 
he believed that the independence of the new states could only be 
achieved and made secure by an unrelenting prosecution of the 
war. This he undertook, with what success is already known. 
His political achievements kept pace with his military successes. 
In February, 1824, Rivadavia tried once more by diplomacy to 
stem the rising tide of Colombian influence in Peru."^ It was 
of no avail ; the victories of Junin and Ayacucho made Bolivar's 
name resound throughout the civilized world, and established 
his influence in the lands which he had liberated, beyond the 
possibility of any rival to shake. Early in 1825, his veterans 
under General Sucre marched into Upper Peru and dispersed 
the remaining bands of Royalists in that quarter. Meanwhile 
the Patriot, General Lanza, had taken possession of the city of 
La Paz and declared the country independent.^ Sympathizing 
with the national aspirations of the people, Sucre convoked an 
assembly which, after reaffirming the declaration of indepen- 
dence, undertook the provisional organization of the new state. 
In honor of the Liberator, the name chosen for it was the 
republic of Bolivar, which was later changed to Bolivia. 

The government of Buenos Aires, accepting the fait accompli^ 
made no protest against the independence of Upper Peru. On 
the contrary, it sent thither a mission, composed of Carlos 
Alvear and Jose Miguel Diaz Velez, to congratulate the Liber- 
ator, who was expected soon to visit the new state, on " the 
high and distinguished services " which he had rendered the 
" cause of the world," and to arrange with him all questions 

7 Guastavino, Ban Martin y Simdn Bolivar, 420. 

8 Barros Arana, Compendio, 495. 



440 PAiT-AMEEICAiq^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

that miglit arise as a result of the liberation of these provinces. 
The envoys were instructed also to invite the Bolivian assembly 
to send representatives to the constituent congress sitting at 
Buenos Aires, with the assurance that although the provinces 
of Upper Peru had always belonged to the Argentine state, yet 
it was desired that they should exercise full liberty to make 
such choice as might best accord with their own interests and 
happiness.^ This invitation was, doubtless, merely a matter of 
form; for the aim, momentarily at least, appears to have been 
to conciliate the Liberator and to obtain his assistance in the 
impending struggle with the empire of Brazil over the Banda 
Oriental. The loss of Upper Peru was to be balanced by the 
recovery of the important province guarding the entrance to the 
Eio de la Plata. " The Emperor of Brazil," said the Argentine 
representatives in an address to the Liberator at Potosi, " has 
dared, in violation of every right, to provoke the free peoples 
of America by attempting to rob the Argentine nation of its 
eastern province and to insult the immortal Colombia and the 
government of Peru by aggressions in Upper Peru, which is 
under the protection of these two illustrious republics. It is 
high time," they said, " that American honor be stirred and 
that the Liberator of Colombia and Peru undertake to compel 
the Brazilian Government to desist from a course no less dis- 
loyal to the rest of America than contrary to its own interests." 
Bolivar in replying expressed surprise that an American prince, 
who had raised his throne upon the indestructible foundations 
of popular sovereignty and of law, a prince who was destined, 
it would appear, to be the friend of the neighboring republics, 
should nevertheless be guilty of holding without right a province 
dominating the very existence of a neighboring state. Not only 
so, but the invasion by his troops of one of the provinces of 
Upper Peru, with the consequent illegal seizure of its property 
and citizens, had greatly added to his offenses against the law 
of nations. And yet those officers had remained unpunished. 

9 Registro Oficial de la Republica Argentina, II, 77. 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 441 

" But," said the Liberator, " let us be thankful that events 
have made the ties which bind us together so strong that we 
shall be able to vindicate our rights as successfully as we have 
acquired them." ^^ 

It is evident that Bolivar wished to intervene in the dispute 
between Argentina and Brazil. Some months before, in a 
letter to Santander, he had expressed the hope that the 
Colombian Congress would authorize him to " tread upon Ar- 
gentine soil," if his presence there should be demanded by cir- 
cumstances.^^ The repeated references to the matter in subse- 
quent letters leave no doubt. With the arrival of the Ar- 
gentine mission the opportunity for which he had longed seemed 
to be at hand. It only remained to reach an agreement upon 
the conditions under which he should lend his support. As in 
the case of Peru, legal objections would doubtless have been 
easily overcome, if every other difficulty were removed. Ac- 
cordingly in a series of interviews which he held with the Ar- 
gentine representatives efforts were made to surmount the ob- 
stacles which presented themselves and reach a coriamon ground 
of understanding. Alvear and Diaz Velez proposed an offensive 
and defensive alliance of the four republics of Colombia, Peru, 
Bolivia, and the United Provinces against the Empire of Brazil. 
In support of their proposal they mentioned, in addition to the 
aggressions of the Brazilian Government, the pernicious in- 
fluence of monarchical institutions upon the neighboring re- 
publics, and the tendency of the Brazilian court to introduce 
into America ideas of absolutism and of intervention based upon 
the European principle of legitimacy. The Liberator, avowing 
the justice of the cause, assured the Argentine envoys of his 
willingness to lend his assistance, if the laws of Peru and of 
Colombia would permit. But as to entering into such an al- 
liance as they proposed, he could not fail to remind them of 
the indifference with which Colombia's invitation to enter 

10 Odriozola, Documentos Histdricos del Peru, VI, 318-320, 

11 February 18, 1825. O'Leary, Memorias, XXX, 40. 



442 PAl^-AMERICAITISM: ITS BEGINNII^GS 

into an offensive and defensive alliance had been received by- 
Buenos Aires. To tbat invitation Buenos Aires had responded 
with an insignificant treaty which, in the existing crisis, was 
of no value whatever. The United Provinces had now to suf- 
fer, declared the Liberator, for Bivadavia's lack of prevision. 
I^othing would conduce more efficaciously to the security and 
prosperity of America, he said, than the union of all the re- 
publics to defend their rights. From the beginning of the revo- 
lution he had been advocating an alliance and he still believed 
it to be the only means of giving the new states consistency and 
respectability. That was the aim of the Panama Congress, and 
all he could promise the Argentine representatives was to recom- 
mend their case to that body for favorable action. ^^ 

What Bolivar's attitude would have been if the freedom of 
action which he demanded and finally obtained in Peru had 
been offered in Argentina can hardly be a matter of surmise. 
But the situations were altogether different. Peru, when Boli- 
var intervened there, had been but partly liberated. Anarchy 
menaced the life of the new state. Keconquest was imminent. 
The Argentine provinces, on the contrary, with the exception of 
Upper Peru, had been among the first to shake off foreign domi- 
nation. They had successfully maintained their independence. 
'No enemy threatened to resub jugate them. No interference 
in the internal affairs of the republic was desired, therefore, 
or would be tolerated. Cooperation of equal states on equal 
terms alone was sought, as a means to restore to one of the 
provinces of the old union, the union under the viceroyalty, the 
liberty to determine its own destiny. There were other obsta- 
cles also which stood in the way of the Liberator's further con- 
quests. Public sentiment at Buenos Aires was decidedly hos- 
tile to him.^^ On the other hand, opinion in Colombia was 
little inclined to favor such an undertaking. Santander wrote 

12 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 425-435. 

13 Mitre, Historia de San Martin, IV, 118; O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 
439. 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 443 

to caution that under Colombian laws the Liberator had no 
authority to go beyond the territory of Peru. " Our intermed- 
dling in the war with Brazil," he said, " is certainly a very 
grave and delicate matter, and it would be still more so if you 
should take part in it formally. . . . You should under no con- 
ditions think of directing the contest in person." This he 
advised, first, because the Liberator's presence was indispen- 
sable in Colombia; and secondly, because Great Britain would 
not take w^ell a war against a government which owed so much 
to British influence, and whose very existence rested upon Brit- 
ish consent.-^* 

In referring to the attitude of Great Britain, Santander hit 
upon what was, doubtless, the most influential factor in the 
whole situation. He did not overrate the importance of British 
influence in Brazil ; and Buenos Aires sought with eagerness its 
exercise in favor of the United Provinces. Bolivar, ever con- 
stant in his admiration of British institutions and in his desire 
to conciliate British favor, would undertake no enterprise of 
such magnitude without the approval of the British Government. 
Writing to Santander, he said, " We shall save the New World 
if we act in accord with Great Britain in political and military 
matters. This simple clause should say to you more than two 
volumes." ^^ Doubt as to the British attitude would have 
made Bolivar hesitate even though satisfactory arrangements 
had been made with Buenos Aires. He suspected, but did not 
know, that Great Britain frowned upon any tendency of the 
South American republics to unite for the purpose of over- 
throwing monarchy in Brazil. The matter was, in effect, under 
consideration by the British Cabinet. In February, 1826, Lord 
Ponsonby was appointed minister plenipotentiary to Buenos 
Aires, and in instructions to him Canning defined his view of 
the normal relations and attitude of England toward the new 
states as that of " anxiety to restore and preserve peace " among 

1* November 25. 1S2.5. O'Leary, Memorias, III, 215. 
15 March 11, 1825. O'Leary, Memorias, XXX, 49. 



444 PAl^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGI^mNGS 

tliem with a view to prevent the " interference of foreigners in 
their political concerns." In a subsequent instruction, the 
British minister declared : " Important as the question of Mon- 
tevideo may be to the Brazilian Government, it is scarcely less 
important that the discussion of that question should not be 
conducted on such principles, or supported on their side by such 
arguments, as to array against the monarchy of Brazil the com- 
mon feeling and common interests of all the republican states 
of Spanish America." He went on then to warn the Brazilian 
Government against trying " too high " the patience of Bolivar, 
who was being incited to undertake a war against Brazil, " for 
the express purpose of overturning a monarchy which stands 
alone on the vast continent of America, and which is considered 
by those enamored of democratical forms of government, as es- 
sentially inconsistent with the existence of the American re- 
publics." ^® 

Uncertainty as to the attitude of Great Britain led Bolivar 
to suggest an alternative project, which greatly appealed to his 
spirit of romance. This was a scheme to create a diversion in 
favor of the United Provinces by invading Paraguay, with the 
ostensible object of liberating the scientist, Bonpland, who was 
being held a prisoner there, and of compelling the tyrant 
Francia to restore to the people of the country the political 
freedom of which he had deprived them.^'^ The phase of the 
scheme which most strongly challenged the Liberator was, doubt- 
less, the liberation of Bonpland. In 1821, Bonpland, the com- 
panion of Humboldt on his famous voyages to America, having 
entered the territory of Paraguay by way of the United Prov- 
inces of Rio de la Plata, was arrested and held by the Dictator 
as a spy. The scientist had been invited by Bolivar to reside 
in Colombia and, it appears, had come to America with that 
intention. His excursion into Paraguay and his detention 

16 Temperley, The Later American Policy of George Canning, in Am. 
Hist. Rev., XI, 783. 

17 O'Leary, Memorias, XXVIII, 426; Mitre, Historia de San Martin, TV, 
120. 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 445 

there, however, had interfered with his plans and caused no 
little annoyance to his great patron. Great Britain and Brazil 
interceded in behalf of the unfortunate traveler, and France 
sent a special commissioner to pray for his release, but despite 
all remonstrances Dr. Erancia remained finn.^^ Nothing 
daunted, Bolivar added his protest. " From my early youth," 
he wrote in the midst of his campaigns in Peru, " I have had 
the honor of cultivating the friendship of M. Bonpland and of 
Baron von Humboldt, whose learning has been of greater 
benefit to America than all the deeds of its conquistador es." 
Pained to learn that his " adored friend," Bonpland, was de- 
tained in Paraguay, and convinced that the charges against 
him were false, Bolivar urged Francia to set the scientist at 
liberty. " I induced him to come to America," declared Boli- 
var, adding : " This learned man can enlighten my country with 
his knowledge." Upon these grounds the Liberator rested his 
claim. Suggesting that Bonpland could give assurances that 
his departure would in no way be prejudicial to the interests 
of Paraguay, Bolivar added : " I await him with the anxiety of 
a friend and the respect of a pupil. I would march all the 
way to Paraguay for no other purpose than to liberate this 
best of men and the most celebrated of travelers." ^^ 

To this letter Bolivar probably never received a reply. He 
ventured, however, three or four months before the negotiations 
in Upper Peru began, to send another ; but this time he wrote in 
a different vein and made no mention of Bonpland. Great 
events had occurred in the meantime. The Liberator had 
reached the height of his glory. The emancipation of the vast 
territory from the Orinoco to the bounds of Chile and the 
Argentine provinces had been completed, and throughout its 

18 Eengger y Longchamp, Ensayo Historico sobre la revolucion del Pa- 
raguay, 101; O'Leary, Memorias, XI, 145. 

19 Bolivar to Francia, October 22, 1823, O'Leary, Memorias, XXIX, 317. 
Humboldt, writing from Paris under date of November 28, 1825, thanked 
Bolivar for the efforts which he had made to liberate " poor Bonpland, 
who continues a prisoner in the mysterious empire of Dr. Francia." 
O'Leary, Memorias, XII, 236, 



446 PAN^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNII^GS 

whole extent Bolivar's influence was supreme. He had now 
high hopes of being called to further achievement in the southern 
part of the continent. The Spaniards still held out in the island 
of Chiloe and he had made a proposal to the government of 
Chile to reduce that stronghold with his veteran forces. Con- 
ferences with representatives of the United Provinces of Rio de 
la Plata, out of which might grow the liberation of the Banda 
Oriental and the overthrow of the Brazilian monarchy, were 
soon to begin. Why should not the rich section lying isolated 
under the despotic rule of Dr. Prancia also be brought under his 
influence ? With a view to accomplish this end Bolivar wrote 
the Dictator inviting him to abandon the policy of neutrality 
and isolation under which he had governed the country for the 
past twelve years. The letter was sent by Captain Ruiz with 
a detachment of twenty-flve men. Setting out from La Paz, 
the detachment, after a month's travel, reached the Paraguayan 
frontier. There it was halted and Captain Ruiz alone, under 
guard, was permitted to proceed to Asungion. Two hours after 
his arrival there Captain Ruiz, still under guard, was started 
back toward the frontier bearing Francia's reply. It read: 
" Patrician : The Portuguese, Argentine, English, Chileans, 
Brazilians, and Peruvians have expressed to this government 
desires similar to those of Colombia, without other result than 
to confirm the foundation principle of the happy regime which 
has liberated this province from rapine and other evils, and 
which it will continue to follow until that tranquillity is restored 
to the 'New World which it enjoyed before the apostles of revo- 
lution appeared, concealing with a branch of olive the per- 
fidious dagger, to water with blood the liberty which the am- 
bitious proclaim ; but Paraguay understands the situation and, 
if it can help it, will not abandon its system, at least so long 
as I am at the head of the government, even though it be neces- 
sary to draw the sword of justice to compel respect for such 
sacred ends, and if Colombia would assist me I would be pleased 



AKGENTINA, BKAZIL, AND CHILE 447 

to devote my efforts to her good sons, whose life may God pro- 
tect for many years." ^° 

It was after receiving this curt reply that Bolivar proposed 
an invasion of Dr. Erancia's domains. But the Argentine repre- 
sentatives interposed objections. Even though the government 
should wish to accede to it, congress, they said, would hardly 
lend its approval, for that body had adopted the principle of 
not compelling by force any territory to join the national asso- 
ciation.^^ The Colombian agent at Buenos Aires, Dean Eunes, 
wrote Bolivar that the government was extremely averse to the 
scheme. In the first place, he said, it was thought to be an 
odious procedure to force Paraguay to join the union ; sec- 
ondly, at the first show of force there was danger of its rushing 
into the arms of Brazil ; and thirdly, there was good reason to 
hope that it could be won over by peaceable means. ^^ Thus this 
proposal came to nothing. Other plans were discussed, among 
them an overture by the Argentine representatives to Bolivar to 
obtain his support for an intimate alliance between Bolivia and 
the United Provinces, and a suggestion by Bolivar that he medi- 
ate in the dispute over the Banda Oriental. But the negotia- 
tions finally came to an end without having accomplished any- 
thing. 

Early in January, 1826, Bolivar started on the laborious 
journey back to Lima, and Alvear turned southward to Buenos 
Aires, Diaz Velez remaining at Chuquisaca. A few days after 
Bolivar reached Lima he wrote Eevenga, the Minister of Eor- 
eign Affairs at Bogota, that he had no hope of seeing Chile and 
the Argentine provinces enter the confederation which it was 
proposed to establish at Panama. " These two countries," he 
said, " are in a lamentable situation, and almost without gov- 
ernment." ^^ To remedy the situation he had interposed his 

20 Rengger y Longchamp, Essayo Historico, 227. 

21 Mitre, Historia Se San Martin, TV, 122. 

22 O'Leary, Memorias, XI, 143. 

23 February 17, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, XXX, 165. 



448 PAUT-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGIKN^GS 

good offices, but, lie added, without result. A few days later 
lie wrote Santander, referring to tlie importunities of certain 
members of the Peruvian congress who wished him to remain in 
Peru. " There are also others," he declared, " who would like 
for me to be absolute chief of the south. They expect Chile 
and Buenos Aires to need my protection this year, for war 
and anarchy is devouring these countries. The emperor and 
Chiloe will make an end of them." ^* And though the Liber- 
ator declared that to play such a part did not enter into his cal- 
culations, a faint hope, doubtless, still lingered in his mind 
that some turn of fortune might yet make him the arbiter of the 
destiny of the whole continent. Such, however, was not to be 
his fortune. He was already entering upon the period of his 
decline. 

The failure of the negotiations in Upper Peru was the death- 
blow to Bolivar's dream of American union. Por a time there 
had been some hope of winning the adherence of the provinces 
of the Rio de la Plata. At about the time Alvear and Diaz 
Velez were sent to treat with the Liberator, the constituent con- 
gress, then in session at Buenos Aires, voted funds for the ex- 
penses of a mission to Panama. Though the unsatisfactory out- 
come of the negotiation with Bolivar definitely precluded the 
active participation of the United Provinces, yet the government 
of Buenos Aires, late in April, 1826, appointed Manuel Jose 
Garcia, who as Minister of Foreign Relations had been the 
dominant figure in the government for nearly two years past, 
to represent the provinces at Panama. A few days later he 
resigned, and Diaz Velez, still in Upper Peru, was appointed 
in his stead.^^ Some weeks later Diaz Velez wrote Bolivar 
that the Argentine Government would surely be represented at 
Panama, that he, Diaz Velez, had been appointed minister, and 
that his acceptance had been forwarded to Buenos Aires. ^® 

24 February 21, 1826. Ibid., 167. 

25 Registro Oficial de la Republica Argentina, II, 123, 125. 

26 June 16, 1826. O'Leary, Memorias, XI, 325. 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 449 

But it was too late. The congress at Panama had already con- 
vened, and would have adjourned before the Argentine repre- 
sentative could reach the Isthmus, even though he had proceeded 
at once and with all haste. It does not appear, however, that 
he ever started on the journey, and there is little reason to 
believe that the authorities at Buenos Aires intended that he 
should go. Moreover, had he attended the congress, his par- 
ticipation in its deliberations, under instructions from his gov- 
ernment, would have been, doubtless, extremely limited. 

The half-hearted policy of conciliation toward Bolivar which 
the government at Buenos Aires had temporarily pursued had 
been, in fact, definitely abandoned. In October, 1825, Riva- 
davia returned from England, where for some months past he 
had been serving as Argentine minister at the court of St. 
James's. As soon as he arrived he began to advocate open war 
upon Brazil; and it was due, in part at least, to his decided 
stand that the congress publicly declared what had long been 
timidly considered in secret — the " reincorporation " of the 
Banda Oriental in the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata. ^''^ 
This amounted to a declaration of war, and to support it Riva- 
davia was elected to the chief magistracy of the union. Thus 
there was placed at the head of the state " the man," according 
to Dean Funes, " most opposed to the views " of the Liberator. ^^ 
" For some time," vrrote Bolivar's faithful agent at Buenos 
Aires, " I have noted not without great surprise the profound 
silence which has been observed on the subject of sending dele- 
gates to the Congress of Panama. As they should have already 
been on their way, this silence led me to believe that the min- 
istry had changed its policy, departing from that upon which 
it agreed with me when I presented the invitation of Colombia. 
In order to make sure of this, I approached, a few days ago, 
Dr. Manuel Moreno, who I knew had already been appointed 

27 Funes to Bolivar, October 26, 1825. For the Act of the congress see 
Registro Oficial, II, 89. 

28 Funes to Bolivar, January 10, 1826. CPLeary, Memorias, XI. 



450 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

to tlie post. He is worthy of the place and his appointment is 
desirable because of his decided adhesion to your Excellency. 
With me he agreed there had really been a change of policy, 
and, searching for its origin, we could find no other than the 
influence of the former minister, Rivadavia." ^^ 

At Panama the action of the United Provinces was a matter 
of concern, especially to Colombia's delegates. Early in 1826, 
a report reached the Isthmus, by way of Peru, that the gov- 
ernment of Buenos Aires had reconsidered its resolve not to 
take part in the congress. To meet the situation, Gual and 
Briceno Mendez wrote to Bogota for special instructions. The 
sudden change of policy, they thought, was intended to involve 
Colombia in the war with Brazil. It was indispensable, there- 
fore, to examine two cardinal points: First, whether Brazil 
planned to attack the independence of the United Provinces; 
and secondly, whether Colombia was under obligations to lend 
the Argentine Government assistance in the maintenance of its 
rights. In other words, was this the casus foederis contemplated 
under the treaty of May 8, 1823, between Colombia and Buenos 
Aires ? Under the terms of this treaty, the Colombia delegates 
pointed out, the alliance was defensive and was to become 
effective in the maintenance of independence only. Moreover, 
the conditions of the alliance in any particular case were to be 
arranged according to the circumstances and resources of each 
of the contracting parties. If, then, the question should come 
up in the congress, would Colombia reject any proposal tending 
to involve it in the war, or would it regard active participation 
on the side of Buenos Aires as " conducive to the general in- 
terests of our hemisphere, and to the establishment of some 
sort of balance between the American states " ? ^'^ 

Revenga, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his reply 
promptly dispelled all doubt as to the attitude of Colombia. 

29 Fimes to Bolivar, January 26, 1826. Ibid. The appointment of Mo- 
reno was not published in the Registro Oficial. 

30 Zubieta, Congresos de Panama y Taciibaya, 25-6. 



AKGE:N'TINA, brazil, and chile 461 

The situation which had arisen between Brazil and the Prov- 
inces of La Plata was not, he declared, the castis foederis contem- 
plated under the treaty ; for Brazil, far from attacking the in- 
dependence of the United Provinces, was merely disputing the 
possession of a territory which it had occupied and held with- 
out protest on the part of Buenos Aires. Moreover, the in- 
habitants of the disputed province had voted to unite with Brazil 
and had been given a voice in the legislation of the empire. 
These same people now being free of the evils from which the 
Brazilian forces had liberated them, were seeking to return 
to the Argentine confederation. To accede to their wishes, to 
permit a province or section to belong to-day to one association 
and to-morrow to another, without other motive than a " versa- 
tile inclination " would be to sanction irregularity and dis- 
order. And though Bevenga admitted that the uprising of the 
Uruguayans favored Buenos Aires, yet he saw in the conflict 
between the two claimants for the possession of the disputed 
territory nothing but " a war of state against state " in which 
the government of Colombia should in no way be involved. ^^ 

As has been pointed out above, no Argentine representatives 
ever reached Panama, and the congress therefore had no occasion 
to take action upon the dispute between the United Provinces 
and Brazil. Had the government at Buenos Aires been willing 
to abandon its traditional policy of relative aloofness, and had 
it been able to overcome its aversion to Colombian leadership, 
its advances might have resulted in consolidating the whole of 
Spanish America against the Brazilian monarchy. But the Ar- 
gentine authorities, despite the overtures which they made, 
never had any serious intention of entering franldy and unre- 
servedly into the Colombian scheme of continental union. 
This was made clear in a series of articles published at Buenos 
Aires, apparently setting forth in a semiofficial manner the at- 
titude of the government toward the plan of confederation.^^ 

31 Zubieta, Congresos de Pa/namd y Tacuiaya, 28. 

32 Op. cit. Unfortunately Zubieta does not give the name of the paper 



452 PAl^-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNIE"GS 

The following extracts embody the essential points: 
" We have demonstrated that the idea of establishing a su- 
preme or sublime authority to regulate the most important 
affairs between the states of the 'New World is, from every point 
of view, dangerous, and it would not be strange if such an es- 
tablishment should become the source of destructive wars be- 
tween peoples much in need of the tranquillity of peace. Con- 
sequently, if this is the great and chief object of the reunion of 
an American Congress at Panama, we believe that the republic 
of the United Provinces should decline frankly and firmly to 
send representatives, and indeed, if hitherto it may have been 
thought that Colombia, the first to conceive the idea of a su- 
preme authority, had given it up, such is known now not to be 
the case, for the treaty which she has just concluded with the 
provinces of Central America involves the idea with the same 
interest and ardor with which it was proposed to us in 1822. 
It might be said, therefore, that for us the matter is ended, 
ITevertheless, we wish to go a little deeper into it. . . . 

" We cannot fail to realize that there may be points of general 
interest which it would be convenient to settle in a common 
treaty, in the conclusion of which plenipotentiaries of all the 
states should participate, in a gathering equivalent to what 
is to-day called an American Congress. But even this, which 
under other circumstances might appear to be advantageous, 
at present would be dangerous. The reason which we have 
given for resisting the creation of a supreme authority with 
respect to the whole of the ISTew World, apply with scarcely less 
force to the negotiation of a common treaty under such condi- 
tions as will prevail in the projected Congress of Panama. The 
influence, real or potential, of Colombia in the deliberations 
would be sufiicient to inspire jealousy and cause to be viewed 
with suspicion any treaty, however rational or beneficial it 

nor the dates of publication. The reference, however, to the treaty be- 
tween Colombia and Central America which was ratified by Colombia in 
1825 places the publication some time after that date, 



AEGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 453 

miglit be, or however scrupulously it might establish the equal- 
ity of rights and duties of the states of the league. This leads 
us to regard it as imprudent for the American states to com- 
promise themselves so soon in such a pact. But such is the 
mania for an American Congress that, if the other states agree 
to participate, we cannot stand apart without making our posi- 
tion very conspicuous. Even though we should not send delegates, 
therefore, we should at least agree to what is stipulated if our 
particular interests permit. In such case, since it is out of the 
question to consider the establishment of a common sovereignty, 
we shall discuss some of the other objects which the congress 
may consider. 

" The government of Colombia, in its note cited above, sug- 
gests two objects, in our opinion, the principal and perhaps the 
only ones which merit the trouble to send delegates such long 
distances to discuss. We single these out because of their par- 
ticular importance, the rest being so obvious that for all the 
states of America to assemble in congress to discuss them would 
lead to no useful result. The two objects of which we speak, 
the importance of which cannot be denied, are the wise princi- 
ples proclaimed by the enlightened government of the United 
States; namely, that which proclaims that in future no part 
of America shall be subject to colonization by foreign powers, 
and that which deprecates and resists every pretension on the 
part of Europeans to intervene in American affairs. But, let 
us repeat, these two principles are so clearly accepted by Amer- 
ica that the convening of a congress to establish them and agree 
upon them would create the idea at once that the real objects in 
view are other than these. As to the first of these principles, 
there is no need to comment. As to the second, resistance to 
the intervention of European powers in our affairs, now that 
this point is touched upon, it is worth while to give it all the 
extension to which it is susceptible. In effect, in the actual 
state of things, the American republics have little or no fear 
of intervention on the part of the European powers, nor would 



454 PAK-AMEEICAISriSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

these powers aspire to intervene in our affairs unless we should 
commit the imprudence of soliciting it in our differences. Im- 
prudence, yes; this point is worth considering. We have 
hitherto abstained from entering into detailed discussion. But 
while accepting the principle of no European intervention in 
our affairs, we regard it as no less important to resist it when 
it is attempted under whatever name or pretext by one or more 
American states. This kind of intervention is more probable 
than the European, and, in our opinion, would be, at least in 
our present state, more harmful. Everything is to be feared 
from new, inexperienced peoples and nations united in the noble 
pride of recent triumphs. The new states of America, if they 
are to win the good opinion of the onlooking world, must dis- 
play no small amount of unselfishness and the greatest of mod- 
eration. The American state which should presume to give 
laws to other peoples and to intervene in their domestic affairs 
might perhaps humiliate its neighbor for the moment; but 
henceforward it should expect the hatred and execration of all 
the states of the New World." ^^ 

Continuing, the writer discusses the question of Cuba and 
Porto Rico, to illustrate further the objectionable tendency of 
the Panama Congress to intervene in American affairs. The 
promotion by every possible means of plans for the liberation 
of these unfortunate peoples was, he thought, altogether com- 
mendable, and, as the provinces of La Plata claimed the glory 
of having given liberty to two new states, they would gladly 
contribute to the emancipation of Cuba and Porto Pico. But 
it had been declared that the Congress of Panama would re- 
solve whether the islands would be permitted to determine their 
own fate or whether they would be annexed to some other state. 
" See," exclaimed the writer, " how already, even before the 
congress meets, its unfortunate results begin to be felt! See 
how already peoples are forced to suffer the pus of American 
intervention, precisely when an effort is being made to estab- 

33 Zubieta, Congresos de Panamd y Tacubaya, 32. 



AKGENTINA, BEAZIL, AND CHILE 455 

lish a principle of resistance to the intervention of European 
powers! " ^^ 

The conflict between Brazil and the United Provinces, which 
has been so constantly before our view in the preceding pages, 
demands further consideration. The strip of territory over 
which the contest arose lies to the eastward of the Eio de la 
Plata, and for that reason was commonly known as the Banda 
Oriental. In colonial times it was often in dispute between the 
crowns of Spain and Portugal. At the outbreak of the Spanish 
American wars of independence, however, its possession by 
Spain had long been recognized by Portugal and as it had con- 
stituted from 1776 onward an integral part of the viceroy alty 
of La Plata, as the province of Uruguay, its union with the 
independent state founded upon the old viceroyalty was taken 
as a matter of course by the revolutionary authorities at Buenos 
Aires. Civil war having broken out between the central gov- 
ernment of the United Provinces and the Uruguayans under the 
leadership of Artigas, the Portuguese king, then residing with 
his court at Eio de Janeiro, took advantage of the resulting dis- 
order to seize the territory. Buenos Aires being unable, on ac- 
count of its domestic troubles, to repel the invaders, withdrew 
from the contest. The Portuguese, after taking possession of 
the principal city, Montevideo, continued, with greatly superior 
forces, the war against Artigas, and finally, having driven him 
to seek refuge in the neighboring state of Paraguay, proceeded 
to take steps to ground their title on a basis of legality. Ap- 
parently foreign occupation was not wholly unwelcome to the 
inhabitants of the province, for they thus escaped the constant 
turmoil of civil war and the fierce, lawless sway of Artigas. 
Moreover, the Portuguese king had declared that he was moved 
to occupy the territory not by the spirit of conquest, but solely 
by the desire to preserve order in his own neighboring provinces. 
The inhabitants were not to be deprived of the right freely 
to determine their political future. Accordingly an opportunity 

^ilhid., 34. 



456 PAN^-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNHSTGS 

was given them to register their will. This was accomplished 
by means of a representative assembly, which was convened at 
Montevideo in 1821. It voted in favor of annexation to the 
united kingdom of Portugal and Brazil. The next year, Brazil 
having declared its independence, the province after some hesi- 
tation adhered to the new order, and later sent delegates to the 
congress which met at Rio de Janeiro to frame a constitution 
for the empire. ^^ 

Meanwhile the situation in the United Provinces of Rio de la 
Plata had greatly improved. Civil strife had abated and a na- 
tional government with clearly defined policies, under the in- 
spiration of Rivadavia, was inaugurated. The time was 
thought opportune to press with renewed vigor the negotiations 
which had been initiated with a view to restore the province 
to the Argentine confederation. Valentin Gomez, whose mis- 
sion to Europe in 1819 was referred to in a previous chapter, 
was now sent as special commissioner to conduct the negotiations 
with the Brazilian court. Under date of September 15, 1823, 
he handed the Brazilian Government a memorandum in which 
the claims of the United Provinces to the territory in dispute 
were reviewed at length. As Brazil grounded its claim chiefly 
upon the vote of the representative assembly which met at Mon- 
tevideo in 1821, it was upon this point that Gomez mainly di- 
rected his attack. The gist of his argument was that the as- 
sembly was illegal. It was convoked, he maintained, by in- 
competent authority and held in the presence of a foreign army 
interested in the revolution. Its deliberations and acts he con- 
sidered, therefore, " as illegal as were the famous transactions 
at Bayonne, in the year 1808." Urging Brazil not to " depart 
from that line of conduct so honorable to her and moreover so 
befitting her own interests," Gomez appealed to the spirit of 
America. " How," he inquired, " would the other states of the 
continent contemplate that spirit of conquest, developed thus 
early, and the abandonment of those principles which, with 

35 Saldlas, Historia de la Gonfederacidn Argentina, I, 200-204, 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 45Y 

strict propriety, may be said to constitute American policy ? " 
To this lie added that the American states " united together by 
the identity of their principles, by the cause which they uphold, 
and above all, by the ideas of justice with which their minds are 
so strongly impressed," would be " capable of successfully re- 
pelling any aggression " directed against their " rights or the 
liberties which they have proclaimed." In conclusion, Gomez 
declared that the United Provinces would, if necessary, ad- 
venture their very existence to obtain the reincorporation of 
the disputed territory and to obtain control of the river which 
" washes their shores, offers channels to their conxtnerce, and 
facilitates communication between a multitude of points in their 
territory." ^^ 

To this memorandum the Brazilian Government replied only 
after repeated insistence on the part of the Argentine commis- 
sioner. Finally, on February 6, 1824, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Luis Jose Carvalho Melo, in a letter addressed to 
Gomez, set forth the position of the imperial government. The 
Brazilian minister pointed out the difficulty of reaching a 
definite decision as to the restoration of the province by reason 
of the fact that both governments based their claims on the 
same principle ; namely, the choice of the province itself. There 
was no reason to believe, he maintained, that the inhabitants de- 
sired separation from the monarchy, and even admitting the 
right of remonstrance on the part of Buenos Aires, the ex- 
pedient of again ascertaining their wishes could not in justice be 
resorted to. Maintaining that the decision of the Montevideo 
assembly expressed the will of the people, he declared that his 
imperial majesty would not wish to take upon himself to de- 
cide peremptorily, for in countries with representative govern- 
ments it belongs exclusively to the legislature to alienate terri- 
tory in actual possession. Nevertheless, should the province 
be again consulted and should its wish be expressed (which v^as 

36 British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 752-756; Coleccidn de tratados 
celebrados por la Repiiblica Argentina, 1, 75-86. 



458 PA1^-AMEEICA:N'ISM: ITS BEGINNII^GS 

scarcely credible) in favor of incorporation with Buenos Aires 
or other power, the imperial government could not but regard 
such a result as a measure directed, not only against the true 
interests of the province itself, but against the rights acquired 
by Brazil at the cost of so many sacrifices ; because the conven- 
tion solemnly concluded between the province and the empire 
could not be annulled at the option of one of the contracting 
parties alone, the consent of the other being necessary, and with- 
out that consent the empire would be under the obligation of 
defending its rights. These rights, the Brazilian minister 
maintained, were as sacred as the cause out of which they grew, 
as without reference to the ancient treaties of limits concluded 
with the crown of Spain it was sufiicient to consider: (1) That 
the inhabitants of Montevideo, being exposed to the despotism 
of Artigas, and the province being almost annihilated by the 
horrors of civil war, could not find protection from any other 
power than Brazil. (2) That the Brazilian Government had 
since that time expended immense sums of money in the 
province, for which it has an evident right to be indemnified. 
(3) That after the province became tranquil and free, his 
Most Faithful Majesty enabled it to decide its future condition 
without restraint, the province having the same right to dispose 
of its destiny as the other provinces of the viceroyalty.^'^ 

Convinced that to continue the negotiations would be futile, 
Gomez returned to Buenos Aires. Meanwhile the government 
of Brazil took steps to strengthen the bonds uniting the disputed 
territory to the empire. The constitution, which had just been 
adopted at Rio de Janeiro, was presented to the Oabildos of the 
Cisplatine province, which ratified it with great pomp and 
ceremony. Deputies were then elected to the Cortes. These 
events produced great excitement in Buenos Aires, where many 
emigrados (exiled Uruguayans) were gathered. Popular 
clamor demanded war ; but, in view of the strong national spirit 

37 British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 761-763 ; Goleccidn de trata- 
dos celehrados por la Republic Argentina, 1, 90. 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 459 

of the Oriental Province Buenos Aires hesitated to enter upon 
the enterprise. If the province were liberated there was no as- 
surance that it would freely join the Argentine confederation. 
When news of the victory of Ayacucho reached Buenos Aires 
early in 1825, however, the agitation was renewed with in- 
creased vigor. As the government still declined to act, the emi- 
gradoSj with every promise of the material and moral support 
of the citizens of Buenos Aires, dispatched Juan Manuel Rosas, 
the future Argentine dictator, on a secret mission to fo- 
ment revolution among the inhabitants of the province. In 
April, 1825, General Antonio Lavalleja, who was the leader of 
the movement, followed with thirty-two companions. This in- 
trepid band of " thirty-three," quickly growing to a formidable 
military force, was able from the first to maintain itself in the 
field. Lavalleja, in order to bring the government of Buenos 
Aires decisively into the struggle, organized a provisional gov- 
ernment, which declared in August, 1825, that the general will 
of the Oriental Province was in favor of union with the rest 
of the Argentine provinces. Some two months later the Ar- 
gentine Congress declared the Banda Oriental as " in fact in- 
corporated in the republic of the United Provinces, to which 
it has belonged and to which it wishes to belong." Upon being 
informed of this act the Brazilian Government immediately de- 
clared war.^^ 

Eor more than two years the war continued. Its details do 
not interest us here. Its outcome and its international aspects, 
however, must receive our attention. 

It has been made clear in preceding pages that Brazil had 
cause to fear a combination of Spanish American powers against 
her. It was not a mere coincidence that about the time the 
question of the Banda Oriental became acute, Rebello, the Bra- 
zilian charge d'affaires at Washington, began sounding the 
United States on the subject of a defensive alliance. Upon the 
invitation of Secretary of State Adams, Rebello submitted, early 

38 Saldlas, Historia de la Confederacidn Argentina, I, 215-223. 



460 iP AIT-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

in 1825, a definite proposal, stipulating first, " that the United 
States should enter into an alliance with Brazil to maintain its 
independence, if Portugal should be assisted by any foreign 
power to reestablish her former sway " ; and secondly, " that an 
alliance might be formed to expel the arms of Portugal from 
any part of Brazilian territory of which they might happen to 
take possession." This proposed alliance, though based in 
part upon the Monroe declaration of December 2, 1823, and 
directed ostensibly against resubjugation by Portugal, whether 
with or without European assistance, was doubtless advocated 
by Brazil with a view also to its moral effect in preventing the 
other American states from making a combined attack upon the 
empire. Clay, who had succeeded Adams as Secretary of State, 
replied that while the President adhered to the principles of 
the Monroe declaration, " the prospect of a speedy peace between 
Portugal and Brazil, founded on the independence which the 
United States was the first to acknowledge, seemed to remove 
the ground which would be necessary to justify the acceptance 
of the first proposition." He added, however, that " if there 
should be a renewal of demonstrations on the part of the Euro- 
pean allies against the independence of American states, the 
President would give to that condition of things every consider- 
ation which its importance would undoubtedly demand." As 
to the second proposition. Clay declared that it was contrary to 
the policy which the United States had pursued, which was 
" that whilst the war is confined to the parent country and its 
former colony, the United States remain neutral, extending their 
friendship and doing equal justice to both parties." ^^ 

The conflict over the Banda Oriental led Buenos Aires also 
to seek the assistance of the United States. In the fear that 
the Holy Alliance might intervene in behalf of Brazil, the Ar- 
gentine government addressed an inquiry to the government 
at Washington as to the scope of the declarations contained in 
President Monroe's message. In his reply. Clay restated the 

39 Moore, Digest of International Law, VI, 437. 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 461 

principles of the Doctrine and, referring specifically to the war 
which had then broken out between the United Provinces and 
Brazil, declared that that struggle could not be conceived " as 
presenting a state of things bearing the remotest analogy to the 
case which President Monroe's message deprecates. . . . It is a 
war," he continued, " strictly American in its origin and its ob- 
ject. It is a war in which the allies of Europe have taken no 
part. Even if Portugal and the Brazils had remained united," 
he declared, " and the war had been carried on by their joint 
arms against the Argentine Republic, that would have been 
far from presenting the case which the message contemplated." ^^ 
Ear from taking sides in the contest the United States wisely 
maintained a strict neutrality, insisting upon a scrupulous ob- 
servance of the rules of international law in so far as the in- 
terests of the nation were concerned. In maintaining this posi- 
tion the United States charge d'affaires at Rio de Janeiro, 
Condy Raguet, unfortunately brought his government to the 
verge of a break with Brazil and destroyed every possibility of 
its serving as a mediator in the conflict. The source of difficulty 
was the unenforceable blockade which Brazil declared of all 
Argentine and Uruguayan ports. Against the legality of this 
blockade Raguet made heated and injudicious remonstrances, 
and finally, losing his temper, demanded his passports. They 
were granted and he returned to the United States. Raguet had, 
on the whole, reason and law on his side, but his " too hasty " 
proceedings made his government " much trouble " from which 
it could " derive neither credit nor profit." Though the Cabinet 
concurred in the opinion that his conduct had been " deficient 
in temper and discretion," the President declared that it had 
been " dictated by an honest zeal for the honor and interests 
of his country " and for that reason did not disapprove it.^^ 
"William Tudor, being appointed in Raguet's stead, represented 

40 Moore, Digest of International Law, VI, 434. 

41 Adams, Memoirs, VII, 270. See also Manning, An Early Diplomatic 
Controversy between the V. 8. and Brazil, in Hispanic Am,. Hist. Rev., I, 
143. 



462 PAIT-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

the nation creditably; but unfortunately causes of complaint 
continued to accumulate as long as- the war continued. 

Meanwhile, Great Britain took advantage of the opportunity 
to strengthen the position of influence which she so much 
coveted in American affairs. Canning, as we have seen above, 
was particularly interested in preventing the union of Spanish 
America against the Brazilian monarchy. Discussing more 
particularly in his instructions to Lord Ponsonby the question 
at issue between Brazil and the United Provinces, he suggested 
that Buenos Aires had the stronger claim to Montevideo, but 
that if it were transferred to the Argentine confederation, it 
would still be reasonable " to secure to Brazil an uninterrupted 
enjoyment of the navigation of the River Plate." And though 
" on the general principle of avoiding as much as possible en- 
gagements of this character " the British Government would pre- 
fer to stand aside, it would give this guaranty " if it were de- 
sired by both parties. . . . rather than that the treaty should 
not be concluded." Great Britain, he added, " while scrupu- 
lously neutral in conduct " during the war, could not fail to be 
in favor of the belligerent showing the readiest disposition to 
bring the dispute to a " friendly termination." In a secret in- 
struction, Ponsonby was told that in case of " any essential 
change " in the form of government his functions would be sus- 
pended. Pinally, he was " studiously to keep aloof from all 
political intrigues and all contentions of party in Buenos 
Aires." Upon this point Canning again insisted in November, 
1826, when he wrote: "As to taking part with either side in 
the contest, your Lordship cannot too peremptorily repress any 
expectation of that nature." *^ 

Arriving at Buenos Aires after the war had broken out, Pon- 
sonby was unable to mediate between the parties to the conflict. 
Of this he duly informed his government. " There is much," 

*2 Temperley, The Later American Policy of George Canning. In Am. 
Hist. Rev., Xi, 784. 



ARGENTIITA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 463 

Canning wrote, " of the Spanish character in the inhabitants of 
the colonial establishments of Spain ; and there is nothing in 
the Spanish character more striking than its impatience of for- 
eign advice, and its suspicion of gratuitous service." In his 
original instnictions, Canning declared, it was foreseen that 
the suggestion respecting Montevideo " was not unlikely to ex- 
cite a jealousy of some design favorable to British interests. 
Such a jealousy," he declared, " has been openly inculcated by 
the public press of the United States of North America, and no 
doubt secretly by their diplomatic agents." He advised Pon- 
sonby, therefore, " to let that matter drop entirely," unless 
Buenos Aires itself should raise it. The best chance to suggest 
their doing so, he added, would be by " some slight manifesta- 
tion of resentment at any such misconstruction of motives." 
Canning's last instruction to Ponsonby on this subject was in 
February, 182Y. He then wrote that Gordon, the new British 
minister at Rio de Janeiro, would " press the many consider- 
ations which render peace essential to the interests and safety 
of Brazil. . . . with all the means in his power short of that 
degree of importunity which, after the repeated refusal, would 
become derogatory to the dignity of Great Britain." *^ 

On May 24, 1827, there was concluded at Rio de Janeiro a 
preliminary treaty of peace. Under this treaty the United 
Provinces acknowledged the independence and integrity of the 
empire of Brazil and renounced all rights to the territory of the 
Cisplatine Province. The Emperor of Brazil equally acknowl- 
edged the independence and integrity of the United Provinces. 
Article VIII of the treaty was as follows : " For the purpose 
of securing in the best manner the benefits of peace and to 
avoid temporarily all distrust, until the relations which ought 
naturally to subsist between the two contracting states be es- 
tablished, their governments agree to solicit, jointly or separ- 
ately, their great and powerful friend, the King of Great 

*3lUd., 785. 



464 PAN-AMEEICA]^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Britain (Sovereign Mediator for the establishment of this 
peace) that he will please to guarantee to them, for the space 
of fifteen years, the free navigation of the Kiver Plate." ** 

This document the government at Buenos Aires refused to 
ratify, on the ground that the Argentine commissioner had ex- 
ceeded his instructions. The war continued, and not until 
August, 27, 1828, was a treaty concluded which finally brought 
it to an end. The two governments, desirous "of establishing 
upon solid and lasting principles that good intelligence, har- 
mony and friendship which ought to exist between neighboring 
nations, who are called by their interests to live united by the 
bonds of perpetual alliance," agreed, again through the media- 
tion of Great Britain, to settle forever their differences. Under 
the terms of the treaty both parties renounced all claim to the 
territory of the Cisplatine Province, with a view to its estab- 
lishment as an independent state, and bound themselves to de- 
fend its independence and integrity, until it should be duly con- 
stituted and for five years thereafter. It was also stipulated 
that should questions be raised in the definitive treaty of peace 
upon which, notwithstanding British mediation, they might not 
agree, hostilities between the republic and the empire should not 
recommence until after the five years of the guaranty should 
have elapsed, nor should they then be renewed without a previ- 
ous notice of six months being given, reciprocally, with the 
knowledge of the mediating power.^^ To this compromise, set- 
ting up the Banda Oriental as an independent state, Brazil was 
driven to agree by the military success of the Argentine and 
Uruguayan forces, and doubtless also by the mediating influence 
of Great Britain. Buenos Aires had never been strongly in- 
clined to bring the territory into the Argentine Confederation 
by force, and when, as the war progressed, the Uruguayans be- 
gan to manifest a strong spirit of nationality, it wisely re- 

4i British and Foreign State Papers, XIV, 1027-1031. 

45 British and Foreign State Papers, XV, 935-943. This treaty remained 
in force until 1856, when a definitive treaty of peace, friendship, com- 
merce, and navigation was concluded between the two countries. 



AKGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 465 

linquished its claims. Thus the republic of Uruguay came into 
being. 

In view of the circumstances which have here been related, 
it is not surprising that Brazil was not represented at the 
CongTess of Panama. Before the question of the Banda Orien- 
tal became acute, the government of Colombia invited the em- 
pire, however, to participate in the congress. The invitation 
was sent through the Brazilian minister at London, who replied 
on October 25, 1825. " The policy of the emperor," he said, 
"is so generous and benevolent that he will always be ready to 
contribute to the repose, the happiness and the glory of Amer- 
ica." And he added that as soon as the negotiations relative 
to the recognition of the empire should be honorably terminated, 
a minister plenipotentiary would be appointed to take part in 
the deliberations of general interest that would be compatible 
with the strict neutrality which the empire had observed be- 
tween the belligerent states of America and Spain. In Janu- 
ary, 1826, Theodore Jose Brancardi, chief clerk of the Home De- 
partment, was appointed " plenipotentiary " to the congress ; ^^ 
but as war had then begun with the United Provinces, the inten- 
tion doubtless was no other than to have an observer at the 
Isthmus in case the Buenos Aires representative should attend. 
As we have seen, the representative of neither government was 
ever dispatched to the place of meeting. 

In Chile the scheme of continental confederation was viewed 
at first vdth less suspicion than in Buenos Aires; but distrust 
grew as a result of certain acts and declarations of the Liberator 
which were believed to imply a spirit of supremacy contemptu- 
ous of the other states. ^'^ In replying to the invitation to send 
delegates to the congress, Chile dissembled these feelings and 
■approved the idea of confederation. But the Chilean congress 
which met in 1825, whose approval was necessary, dissolved 
without taking action, and there the matter rested. Early the 

46 British and Foreign State Papers, XIII, 497. 

47 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XV, 87-93. 



466 PAlT-AMEEICAmSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

next year the government received communications from tlie 
Colombian and Peruvian delegates at Panama, urging tliat rep- 
resentatives be sent to the Isthmus at once. The Chilean Minis- 
ter of Foreign Affairs, Blanco Encalada, replied that while his 
government recognized the importance and the utility of the 
congress, it was impossible to send delegates without the ap- 
proval of the national legislature, which was expected soon to 
convene. On July 4 this body met at Santiago, but the ques- 
tion of representation at Panama was not brought up until some 
six weeks later. In September the committee, to whom the 
matter had been referred, reported, maintaining that the pacts 
of " union, league, and confederation which might be concluded 
should not in any way interrupt the exercise of the national 
sovereignty of each of the contracting parties." This commit- 
tee pointed out also the danger that " some state or its head, 
taking advantage of its influence over the majority of the pleni- 
potentiaries, might arrogate to itself over the rest prerogatives 
and rights which might be irresistible when supported by the 
force of the whole confederation." It was desired, therefore, 
that the Chilean delegates should be instructed to safeguard the 
absolute sovereignty of the nation. The report was approved, 
and in November Jose Miguel Infante and Joaquin Campino 
were appointed as delegates to the congress and given instruc- 
tions in accordance with the desires of the national legislature. 
Not even then, however, were funds voted for the expenses of 
the mission. In the meantime the congress had assembled at 
Panama and adjourned to reconvene at Tacubaya. 

Though the government of Chile put obstacles in the way of 
the formation of an American league under the inspiration of 
Bolivar, it was favorably inclined to the idea of alliances in the 
form advocated by the government of the United Provinces of 
Rio de la Plata. While the question of the Panama Congress 
was being agitated at Santiago, in fact, a treaty of alliance was 
negotiated with Buenos Aires. This pact consisted of two 
parts, the first stipulating the terms of alliance, and the second 



ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 467 

relating to matters of commerce and navigation. By the terms 
of the alliance the contracting parties bound themselves " to 
guarantee the integrity of their territories, and to cooperate 
against whatever foreign power should attempt to alter, by 
force, their respective boundaries, as recognized before their 
emancipation or subsequently in virtue of special treaties." 
They also bound themselves not to conclude treaties with the 
Spanish Government until the independence of all the states 
foraierly Spanish should be recognized by the mother country. 
It was further agreed that in respect of the alliance the cooper- 
ation of the contracting parties should be regulated conform- 
ably to their respective circumstances and resources.^^ Upon 
the interpretation of this latter provision there arose a lengthy 
discussion in the Chilean congress, which resulted finally in the 
rejection of the treaty. Under the existing circumstances, when 
no part of the territorial domain of Chile was in dispute, and 
when on the other hand the United Provinces were engaged in 
a war with Brazil to recover the Banda Oriental and were main- 
taining rights over Upper Peru and Paraguay, it was thought 
that the terms of the treaty involved Chile in a grave promise 
without possible reciprocity.^^ Although public opinion had 
been openly expressed in favor of Buenos Aires as against 
Brazil, yet it was realized that it would be impossible for Chile 
to take part in the struggle. Hence the caution in declining 
to ratify a document generally expressive of the strong friend- 
ship and hearty cooperation which had always characterized the 
relations of the two countries. 

48 British and Foreign State Papers, XIV, 968-73. 

49 Barros Arana, Historia Jeneral de Chile, XV, 95. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

This study is based almost wholly upon printed sources. 
The newspapers and periodicals included in the list below have 
been consulted in the library of the Hispanic Society of Amer- 
ica, in the 'New York Public Library, and in the Library of 
Congress. Of papers published in Spanish America between 
1809 and 1830, none covers both decades, and none of the col- 
lections is complete for the period of publication, however brief 
that may have been. The dates set opposite each title should 
be understood, therefore, merely to signify the years for which 
these incomplete collections were available. This limitation, 
however, does not apply to the other newspapers and periodi- 
cals in the list. 

Among the books and pamphlets are included a few bound 
volumes originally published in periodical form. Here are also 
included, for ready reference, under the authors' names, a num- 
ber of useful articles appearing in periodical publications. 
Owing to the difficulty of tracing a clear line of demarcation 
between the secondary works and the sources, both classes of 
material have been included in a single alphabetical list. The 
bibliography does not pretend to be exhaustive. 

Newspapers and Periodicals 

La Abeja Argentina, 1823. 

Aguila Mexicana, 1824-1828. 

The American Historical Review, 1895 — 

The American Journal of International Law, 1907 — 

Anglo-Colombiano (changed to El Venezolano), 1822-1823. 

The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 

- Science, 1890— 
El Centinela (Buenos Aires), 1822-1823. 
La Concordia Cubana, 1823-1824. 
Correo del Hagdalena, 1825. 

468 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 469 

Cuba Contemporanea, 1913 — 

Diario de Documentos del Gobierno (Chile), 1825-1827. 

The Examiner (London), 1824. 

Gaceta de Colombia, 1822-1827. 

Gaceta del Gobierno (Peru), 1825-1826. 

Gaceta del Gobierno Supremo de Guatemala, 1824^1825. 

The Hispanic American Historical Review, 1918 — 

Iris de Venezuela, 1822-1823. 

El Nacional (Buenos Aires), 1824-1826. 

National Gazette and Literary Register (Philadelphia), 1821-1830. 

National Intelligencer (Washington), 1810-1830. 

Niles' Weekly Register (Baltimore), 1814-1830. 

North American Review, 1815 — 

The Pan American Union Bulletin, 1890 — 

El Patriota Chileno, 1826. 

El Patriota de Guayaquil, 1821-1825. 

Political Science Quarterly (New York), 1886 — 

Reforma Social (Habana, New York), 1914 — 

Revista Argentina de Ciencias Politicas, 1910' — 

Revue Generale de Droit International Public (Paris), 1894 — 

El Sol (Mexico), 1821-1825. 

The Times (London), 1810-1830. 

Weekly Register, later Niles' Weekly Register (Baltimore), 1811-1814. 

Books and Pamphlets 

Abranches, Dunshee de. Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine. Rio de 

Janeiro, 1915. 72 p. 
Adams, Ephraim Douglas. British interests and activities in Texas. 

Baltimore, 1910. 267 p. 
Adams, Henry. History of the United States of America, 1801-1817. 

New York, 1889-1891. 9 vols. 
Adams, John. The Works of John Adams. Boston, 1850-1856. 

10 vols. 
Adams, John Quiney. Memoirs; comprising portions of his diary 

from 1795 to 1848. Philadelphia, 1874-1877. 12 vols. 
Writings of John Quiney Adams; edited by W. C. Ford. New 

York, 1913. 7 vols. Other volumes to follow. Those published 

cover the period from 1779 to 1823. 
Alaman, Lucas. Memoria Presentada a las dos Camaras del Con- 

greso General de la F'ederacion, por el Secretario de Estado y 

del Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores e Interiores, al abrirse las 

sesiones del ano de 1825. 51 p. 

Historia de Mejico. Mexico, 1849-1852. 5 vols. 

Alberdi, Juan Bautista. El Imperio del Brasil ante la Democracia de 

America. Paris, 1869. 432 p. 



470 PAK-AMERICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Organizacion de la Confederacion Argentina. Nueva Edicion 

con un estudio preliminar sobre las ideas politicas de Alberdi por 
Adolf o Posada. Buenos Aires, 1913. 2 vols. 

Alvarez, Alejandro. American Problems in International Law. Re- 
printed from the Journal and Proceedings of the American So- 
ciety of International Law. New York, 1909. 102 p. 

La codification du droit international; ses tendances, ses bases. 

Paris, 1912. 294 p. 

La Diplomacia de Chile durante la Emancipacion y la Sociedad 

Internacional Americana. Madrid, 1915. 274 p. 

Le Droit International Americain ; son f ondement, sa nature ; 

d'apres I'histoire diplomatique des etats du Nouveau Monde et 
leur vie politique et economique. Paris, 1910. 386 p. 

La Solidaridad Americana. (In : Eevista Argentina de Ciencias 

Politicas. Tomo I, 159-168 p. 8 vo.) Buenos Aires, 1910. 

American Annual Register. New York, 1825-1833. 8 vols. 

American State Papers, Foreign Relations. Washington, 1832-1854. 
6 vols. 

American State Papers; Naval Affairs. Washington, 1834-1861. 
4 vols. 

Americus. Cartas Politicas, London, 1825. 2 vols. 

Amimategui, Miguel Luis. Santiago de Chile, 1893. 4 vols. 

La Cronica de 1810. Santiago de Chile, 1911-1912. 3 vols. 

La Dictadura de O'Higgins. Santiago de Chile, 1914. 463 p. 

Ensayos Biograficos. Santiago de Chile, 1893-1896. 4 vols. 

^Vida de Don Andres Bello. Santiago de Chile, 1882. 672 p. 

Amunategui, Miguel Luis and Gregorio Victor. La Reconquista Es- 
panola. Santiago de Chile, 1912. 512 p. 

Antokoletz, Daniel. La Doctrine de Monroe et lAmerique latine. 
Paris, 1905. 208 p. 

Histoire de la Diplomatic Argentine. Buenos Aires, 1914. 

528 p. 

Apuntes para la Biografia del Exmo. Sr. D. Lucas Alaman, Secre- 
tario de Estado y del Despacho de Relaciones Exteriores. Mex- 
ico, 1854. 56 p. 

Aranda, Ricardo. Cbleccion de los Tratados, Convenciones, Capitu- 
laciones, Armisticios y otros Actos Diplomaticos y Politicos cele- 
brados desde la independencia hasta el dia. Lima, 1890. 16 vols. 

Arcaya, PeHro M. Personajes y Hechos de la Historia de Venezuela. 
Caracas, 1911. 346 p. 

Arcos, Santiago. La Plata. Etude Historique. Paris, 1865. 588 p. 

Armitage, John. The History of Brazil. From the period of the 
arrival of the Braganza family in 1808 to the abdication of Dom 
Pedro the First in 1831. London, 1836. 2 vols. 

Arosemena, Justo. Constituciones Politicas de la America Meri- 
dional. Havre, 1870. 2 vols. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 4T1 

Estudios CoBstitucionales sobre los Gobiernos de la America 

Latina. Paris, 1878. 2 vols. 

Bagot, Josceline. George Canning and his Friends. London, 1909. 
2 vols. 

Bancroft, H. H. The Works of Hubert Howe Bancroft. Vol. 8, His- 
tory of Central America, 1801-1887 ; Vols. 12 and 13, History of 
Mexico, 1803-1861. San Francisco, 1885-1887. 

Baralt, Eafael Maria, y Diaz, Ramon. Resumen de la Historia de 
Venezuela desde el ano 1797 hasta el de 1830. Paris, 1841. 
2 vols. 

Barros Arana, Diego. Compendio de Historia de America. Buenos 
Aires, 1904. 557 p. 

Historia Jeneral de Chile. Santiago, 1884-1902. 16 vols. 

Benedetti, Carlos. Historia de Colombia. Lima, 1887. 961 p. 

Beneski, Charles de. A Narrative of the last moments of the life of 
Don Agustin de Iturbide, ex-emperor of Mexico. New York, 
1825. 41 p. 

Benton, Elbert Jay. International Law and Diplomacy of the Span- 
ish-American War. Baltimore, 1908. 300 p. 

Benton, Thomas Hart. Thirty Years' View. New York, 1861-62. 2 
vols. 

Bemis, George. American Neutrality; Its honorable past, its expe- 
dient future. Boston, 1866. 211 p. 

Bigelow, John. American policy; the Western Hemisphere in its 
relation to the Eastern. New York, 1914. 184 p. 

Biografia del Libertador Simon Bolivar, o la Independencia de la 
America del Sud. Resena Historico-Biografica por L. C. Paris 
and Mexico, 1877. 180 p. 

Blaine, James G. Foreign policy of the Garfield Administration. 
Peace Congress of the two Americas. Chicago, 1882. 8 p. (An 
article published in the Chicago Weekly Magazine, September 16, 
1882.) 

Blanco-Fombona, R. (editor). Simon Bolivar; Discursos y Proc- 
lamas. Paris. 302 p. 

Cartas de Bolivar, 1799 a 1822; prologo de Jose Enrique Rodo 

y notas de R. Blanco-Fombona. Paris. 459 p. 

Blanco, J. F. and Azpurua, R. (editors). Documentos para la His- 
toria de la vida publica del Libertador de Colombia, Peru y Bo- 
livia. Caracas, 1875-77. 11 vols. 

Blanco White, Joseph. Variedades ; Mensajero de Londres. London, 
1825. 2 vols. 

Bocanegra, Jose Maria. Memorias para la Historia de Mexico Inde- 
pendiente. Mexico, 1892. 2 vols. 

Bonnycastle, R. H. Spanish America; or a descriptive, historical, 
and geographical account of the dominions of Spain in the West- 
ern Hemisphere, continental and insular. London, 1818. 2 vols. 



4T2 PAK-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Brackenridge, Henry W. South America, a letter on the present state 
of that country, to James Monroe. Washington, 1817. 

British and Foreign State Papers. 1812-1829. Vols. 1-16 inclusive. 

Bulnes, Francisco. La Guerra de Independencia, Hidalgo-Iturbide. 
Mexico, 1910. 431 p. 

Bulnes, Gonzalo. Historia de la Expedicion Libertadora del Peru 
(1817-1822). Santiago de Chile, 1887-1888. 2 vols. 

Burgess, John W. The Middle Period. 1817-1858. New York, 1897. 
544 p. 

Bustamante, Carlos Maria de. Cuadro Historico de la Revolucion 
Mexicana. Mexico, 1843. 6 vols. 

Callahan, James Morton. Cuba and International Relations. A 
study in American diplomacy. Baltimore, 1899. 503 p. 

C'alvo, Carlos. Derecho Internacional. Paris, 1868. 2 vols. 

Le Droit International Theorique et Pratique Precede d'un ex- 
pose Historique des Progres de la Science du Droit des Gens. 
Troisieme edition completee. Paris, 1880. 4 vols. 8vo. 

Recueil Historique complet des Traites, Conventions, Capitula- 
tions, Armistices et autres actes diplomatiques de tons les Etats 
de I'Amerique Latine. Seconde Periode depuis la Revolution 
jusqu'a la reconnaissance de I'independance. Paris, 1864^1867. 
5 vols. 

Canning, George. Speeches of the Right Honorable George Canning, 
with a memoir of his life by R. Therry. London, 1836. 6 vols. 

Castro-Ruiz, Carlos. The Monroe Doctrine and the Government of 
Chile. (In: American Political Science Review, Vol, 11. 231- 
238 p.) 

Cespedes, J. M. La Doctrina de Monroe. Habana, 1893. 511 p. 

Chadwick, French Ensor. The Relations of the United States and 
Spain. The Spanish-American War. New York, 1911. 2 vols. 

Chandler, Charles Lyon. Inter- American Acquaintances. Sewanee, 
1915. 139 p. 

Chew, Benjamin. A sketch of the politics, relations, and statistics 
of the Western World, and of those characteristics of European 
policy which most immediately affect its interests : intended to 
demonstrate the necessity of a grand American confederation 
and alliance. Philadelphia, 1827. 200 p. 

Chile. Sesiones de los cuerpos Legislatives. 1811-1845. 

Clark, Allen C. Doctor and Mrs. William Thornton. A paper read 
before the Columbia Historical Society in 1914. (In: Records 
of the Society. Vol. 18. 144r-208 p.) 

Clay, Henry. Works; comprising his life, correspondence, and 
speeches. Edited by C. Colton, New York, 1897. 7 vols. 

Coffin, J. F. (Translation by J. F. Medina.) Diario de un joven 
Norte- Americano detenido en Chile durante el periodo revolu- 
cionario de 1817 a 1819. Santiago, 1898. 240 p. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 473 

Coggeshall, George. 

Voyages to various parts of the world made between the years 1800 

and 1831. New York, 1853. 273 p. 
Second Series of voyages to various parts of the world made be- 
tween the years 1802 and 1841. New York, 1852. 335 p. 

Coleccion de ensayos y documentos relatives a la Union y Confedera- 
cion de los pueblos Hispano-Americanos. Publicada a espensas 
de la " Sociedad de la Union Americana de Santiago de Chile," 
por una comision nombrada por la misma y compuesta de los 
Senores D. Jose Victorino Lastarria, Alvaro Covarrubias, Do- 
mingo Santa Maria, y D. Benjamin Vicuna Mackenna. San- 
tiago de Chile, 1862. 400 p. 

Coleccion de los Decretos Expedidos desde Noviembre de 1826 hasta 
Julio de 1827. Caracas, 1828. 351 p. 

Coleccion de Historiadores i de Documentos relatives a la Indepen- 
dencia de Chile. Santiago de Chile, 1903-1914. 26 vols. 

Coleccion de Tratados celebrados por la Republica Argentina con las 
Naciones Extrangeras. Publicacion Oficial. Buenos Aires, 1884. 
3 vols. 

Coleccion de Tratados de la Eepublica de Costa Rica. San Jose de 
Costa Rica, 1896. 245 p. 

Constancio, Francisco Solano. Historia do Brasil. Paris, 1839. 2 
vols. 

Cortes, Jose Domingo. Bolivia. Apuntes Geograficos, Estadisticos, 
de Costumbres Descriptivos e Historicos. Paris, 1875. 172 p. 

Diccionario Biogi'afico Americano. Paris, 1875. 552 p. 

Cox, Isaac Joslin. Monroe and the early Mexican Revolutionary 
Agents. (In: An. Rep. Am. Hist. Assn. Vol. I. 1911. 199- 
228 p.) 

The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson (Reprint 

from Miss. Valley Historical Review. Vol. I, September, 1914.) 

Davis, J. O. Bancroft. Notes upon the treaties of the United States 
with other powers. Washington, 1873. 245 p. 

Treaties and Conventions concluded between the United States 

of America and other powers. Washington, 1873. 1167 p. 

Dealey, James Q. The Spanish Source of the Mexican Constitution 
of 1824. (In : Quarterly of the Texas State Hist. Assn. V. 3. 
No. 3.) 

Despedida de Washington al pueblo de los Estados Unidos. Tra- 
ducida con una introduccion en el ano 1813 por el General Ma- 
nuel Belgrano. Prologo en fac-simile autografo del General 
Mitre. Buenos Aires, 1902. 47 p. 

Destruge, Camilo. Cuestion Historica. La Entrevista de Bolivar y 
San Martin en Guayaquil. Guayaquil, 1918. 59 p. 

Diario de Sesiones de la H. Junta de Representantes de la Provincia 
de Buenos Aires. Buenos Aires, 1822. 



474 PAN'-AMEEICA^ISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Diecionario Universal de Historia y de Geografia. Obra dada a luz 
en Espana por una Sociedad de Literates distinguidos y refun- 
dida y aumentada considerablemente para su publicacion en 
Mexico, con noticias Historicas, Geograficas, Estadisticas y 
Biograficas sobre las Americas en general y especialmente sobre 
la Republica Mexicana por los Srs. D. Lucas Alaman, J. M. An- 
drade, etc. Mexico, 1853-1856. 7 vols, and appendix of 3 vols, 
containing articles relating to Mexico. 

La Diplomacia Mexicana. Mexico, 1910-1913. 3 vols. 

Du Coudray Holstein, H. L. V. Memoirs of Simon Bolivar, Presi- 
dent Liberator of the Eepublic of Colombia; and of his principal 
generals; comprising a secret history of the revolution and the 
events which preceded it from 1807 to the present time. Lon- 
don, 1830. 2 vols. 

Dundonald, Thomas Cochrane, Tenth earl of. Narrative of services 
in the Liberation of Chile, Peru, and Brazil from Spanish and 
Portuguese domination. London, 1859. 2 vols. 

Dunning, William Archibald. The British Empire and the United 
States. New York, 1914. 381 p. 

Ensayo sobre la conducta del General Bolivar. Santiago de Chile, 
1826. 16 p. 

Everett, Alexander Hill. America : A general survey of the political 
situation of the several powers on the Western Continent, with 
conjectures on their future prospects. Philadelphia, 1827. 
364 p. 

Fish, Carl Eussell. American Diplomacy. New York, 1919. 551 p. 

Gamboa, Jose M. Leyes Constitucionales de Mexico. Mexico, 1901. 
598 p. 

Garcia Camba, Andres. Memorias del General Garcia Camba para 
la historia de las armas espanolas en el Peru, 1809-1821. Ma- 
drid, 1916. 581 p. 

Garcia, Genaro (editor). La Cooperacion de Mexico en la Independ- 
encia de Centro America, por el General Vicente Filisola. Mex- 
ico, 1911. 2 vols. 

^Documentos Historicos Mexicanos; obra conmemorativa del 

Primer Centenario de la Independencia de Mexico. Mexico, 1910. 
7 vols. 

Garcia Calderon, Francisco. El Panamericanismo ; su pasado y por- 
venir. (In: Cuba Contemporanea. Vol. 12, 1916.) 

Garcia Merou, Martin. Historia de la Diplomacia Americana. 
Buenos Aires, 1904. 2 vols. 

— ^ — Historia de la Republica Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1908. 2 
vols. 

Gelpi y Ferro, Gil. Estudios sobre la America. Conquista, Colo- 
nizacion, gobiernos coloniales y gobiernos independientes. Ha- 
bana, 1864, 1870. 2 vols. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 475 

j^iberga, Eliseo. El Pan-Americanismo y el Pan-Hispanismo, (In: 
La Eeforma Social, Habana, January, 1916.) 

Gil Fortoul, Jose. Historia Constitucional de Venezuela. Berlin, 
1907. 2 vols. 

Goebel, Julius. The Recognition Policy of the United States. New 
York, 1915. 229 p. 

Goenaga, J. M. — La Cruz, Ernesto de. — Mitre, B. — Villanueva, 
Carlos A. 

La Entrevista de Guayaquil. Prologo de don Rufino Blanco- 

Fombona. Madrid, [1918]. 283 p. 

Gomez Carrillo, Agustin. Compendio de Historia de la America 
Central. Madrid, 1892. 286 p. 

Guastavio, Juan Estevan. San Martin y Simon Bolivar. — Glorifobia 
y Cochranismo Postumos. Buenos Aires, 1913. 475 p. 

Guerra, Dr. Jose. Historia de la Revolucion de Nueva Espana, 
antiguamente Anahuac, o verdadero origen y causas de ella con 
la relacion de sus progresos hasta el presente ano de 1813. Lon- 
don, 1813. 2 vols. 
(The author of the above work was Servando Teresa de Mier 
Noriega y Guerra, commonly known as Father Mier.) 

Guerra, Jose Joaquin. La Convencion de Ocana. Bogota, 1908. 
530 p. 

Hackett, James. Narrative of the Expedition which sailed from 
England in 1817 to join the South American Patriots. London, 
1818. 144 p. 

Haigh, Samuel. Sketches of Buenos Aires and Chile. London, 
1829. 316 p. 

Hamilton, Alexander. The "Works of Alexander Hamilton, edited by 
Henry Cabot Lodge. New York, 1885-1886. 9 vols. 

Harrison, William Henry. Remarks of William Henry Harrison on 
certain charges made against him by the republic of Colombia, to 
which is added an unofficial letter to General Bolivar. Wash- 
ington, 1830. 69 p. 

Henderson, James. History of Brazil. London, 1821. 522 p. 

Hernandez y Davalos, J. E. Coleccion de Documentos para la His- 
toria de la Guerra de Independencia de Mexico, de 1808 a 1821. 
Mexico, 1877-1882. 6 vols. 

Hippisley, G. A narrative of the Expedition to the Rivers Orinoco 
and Apure, which sailed from England in November, 1817. 
London, 1819. 653 p. 

Hyde de Neuville, Baron. M6moires et Souvenirs. Paris, 1890-1892. 
3 vols. 

Iglesias, Francisco Maria (editor). Documentos relatives a la inde- 
pendencia. San Jose de Costa Rica, 1899-1901. 3 vols. 

Ingersoll, Charles Jared. Recollections, Historical, Political, Bio- 
graphical, and Social. Philadelphia, 1861. 458 p. 



476 PA:N'-AMERICAi;riSM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

International American Conference, 1889-1890. Minutes of the Con- 
ference. Washington, 1890. 905 p. 
International American Conference, 1889-1890. Eeports of Com- 
mittees and discussions thereon. Washington, 1890. A vols. 
International American Conference, 1902. Report of the United 

States delegates. Washington, 1902. 243 p. Organization of 

the Conference, projects, reports, etc. Washington, 1902. 403 p. 
International American Conference, 1906. Report of the United 

States delegates. Washington, 1907. 180 p. 
International American Conference, 1906. Minutes, Resolutions, 

Documents. Rio de Janeiro, 1907. 664 p. 
International American Conference, 1910. Report of the United 

States delegates. Washington, 1911. 296 p. 
Irisarri, Antonio Jose de. Historia eritica del asesinato cometido 

en la persona del Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho. Caracas, 1915. 

265 p. 
Iturbide, Agustin de. Don Agustm de Iturbide. (In: Records of 

the American Catholic Historical Society for December, 1915, 

and March, 1916.) 
Memoires Autographes de Don Augustin Iturbide, ex-empereur 

du Mexique, contenant le detail des principaux evenements de sa 

vie publique avec une preface et des pieces justificatives. Paris, 

1824. 209 p. 
Jefferson, Thomas. The writings of Thomas Jefferson. Monticello 

edition. Washington, 1905. 20 vols. 
Johnson, Willis rieteher. America's Foreign Relations. New York, 

1916. 2 vols. 
Jurien de la Graviere, Jean Pierre Edouard. Souvenirs d'un amiral. 

Memoires du Vice-amiral Jurien de la Graviere. Paris, 1872. 

2 vols. 
King, Charles R. The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King. 

New York, 1897. 6 vols. 
La Croix, Louis Peru de. Raciocinio del Libertador Simon Bolivar 

sobre Religion, Politica, Educacion y Filosofia, o Diario de 

Bucaramanga. Paris, 1869. 140 p. 
-Diario de Bucaramanga o Vida publica y privada del Libertador 

Simon Bolivar. Publicado por primera vez con una introdueeion 

y notas por Cornelio Hispano. Paris, [1912]. 267 p. 
La Cruz, Ernesto de. See Goenaga, J. M. 
Lafond de Lurcy, Gabriel. Yiaje a Chile. Traducido de la edicion 

Francesa de 1853, por Federieo Gana G. Santiago de Chile, 1911. 

217 p. 
Latane, John H. The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and 

Spanish America. Baltimore, 1900. 294 p. 
Lavalle, J. A. de. Galeria de Retratos de los Gobernantes del Perti 

independiente. (1821-1871.) Barcelona, 1909. 113 p. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 4Y7 

Galeria de retratos de los gobernadores y virreyes del Peru. 

(1532-1824.) Barcelona, 1909. 184 p. 

Leborgne de Boigne, M. Essai de Conciliation de I'Amerique, et de 
la necessite d'une union de cette partie du monde avec I'Europe, 
consideree dans ses rapports politiques et commerciaux, et dans 
ceux de leur prosperite et tranquillite respective. Paris, 1818. 
150 p. 

Leger, J. N. Haiti, her History and her Detractors. New York, 
1907. 372 p. 

La Politique Exterieure d'Haiti. Paris, 1886. 207 p. 

Leyes, decretos y ordenes que forman el derecho internacional Mex- 
ican©, o que se relacionan con el mismo. Edicion oficial. Mex- 
ico, 1879. 1208 p. 

El Libro Nacional de los Venezolanos. Actas del Congreso Consti- 
tuyente de Venezuela en 1811. Origenes de la Eepiiblica. Pub- 
licacion oficial acordada por el ciudadano General Juan Vicente 
Gomez, presidente constitucional de los Estados Unidos de Ven- 
ezuela. Caracas, 1911. 436 p. 

Londonderry, Robert Stewart, second marquis of. Memoirs and Cor- 
respondence of Viscount Castlereagh; Edited by his brother, 
Charles Vane, Marquis of Londonderry. London, 1848-1853. 12 

, vols. 
jLopez, Jacinto. La Doctrina de Monroe y el Congreso de Panama. 
(In: La Reforma Social, Habana, February, 1916. 353-384 p.) 

Lopez, Vicente Fidel. Historia de la Repiiblica Argentina. — Su 
origen, su revolucion y su desarrollo politico hasta 1852. Buenos 
Aires, 1883-1893. 10 vols. 

Lyman, Theodore, Jr. The Diplomacy of the United States, being 
an account of the foreign relations of the country from the first 
treaty with France, in 1778, to the present time. Second edition 
with additions. Boston, 1828. 2 vols. 

McMaster, John Bach. A history of the people of the United States, 
from the Revolution to the Civil War. New York, 1885-1913. 
8 vols. 

Madion, Thomas. Histoire d'Haiti. Port-au-Prince, 1847-1904. 4 
vols. 

Madison, James. The writings of James Madison. New York, 1900- 
1910. 9 vols. 

Manning, William R. An Early Diplomatic Controversy between 
the United States and Brazil. (In. Hispanic American His- 
torical Review. Vol. I, No. 2.) 

Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mex- 
ico. Baltimore, 1916. 406 p. 

Marshall, Thomas Maitland. A History of the Western Boundary 
of the Louisiana Purchase, 1819-1841. Berkeley, 1914. 266 p. 

Marure, Alejandro. Bosquejo Historico de las Revoluciones de Cen- 



478 PAN'-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINOTE^GS 

tro America desde 1811 hasta 1834. Guatemala, 1877-1888. 2 
vols. 

Matienzo, Jose Nicolas. La Politica Americana de Alberdi. (In: 
Revista Argentina de Ciencias Politicas. Buenos Aires, 1910. 
Vol. I. 28-42 p.) 

Maurtua, Anibal. La Idea Panamericana y la Question del Arbitraje. 
Estudio historico a proposito del Congreso de Mexico. Lima, 
1901. 224 p. 

Miller, John. Memoirs of General Miller, in the service of the Re- 
public of Peru. London, 1829. 2 vols. 

Miscelanea Hispano-Americana. London, 1829. 4 vols. 

Mitre, Bartolome. Historia de Belgrano. Buenos Aires, 1902. 4 
vols. 

Historia de San Martin y de la Emancipacion de Sud-America. 

Buenos Aires, 1890. 4 vols. 

Molina, Felipe. Bosquejo de la Republica de Costa Rica, seguido de 
apuntamientos para su historia. Convenios, mapas, vistas y re- 
tratos. New York, 1851. 126 p. 

Monroe, James. The writings of James Monroe. New York, 1898- 
1903. 7 vols. 

Monsalve, J. T>. El Ideal Politico del Libertador Simon Bolivar. 
Madrid, 1916. 2 vols. Published also at Bogota, 1916. 1 vol. 

Monteagudo, Bernardo. Ensayo sobre la necesidad de una federacion 
general entre los Estados Hispano-Americanos y plan de su 
organizacion. Obra postuma. Lima, 1825. Reimpreso en Gua- 
temala, 1825. 24 p. 

Montero Barrantes, Francisco. Elementos de Historia de Costa Rica. 
San Jose de Costa Rica, 1892. 349 p. 

Montufar, Lorenzo. Resena Historica de Centro-America. Guate- 
mala, 1878-1887. 7 vols. 

Montufar, Manuel. Memorias para la historia de la revolucion de 
Centro-America. Jalapa, 1832. This work has been erroneously 
ascribed to A. Marure, the edition of 1832 having been published 
anonymously. 

Moore, John Bassett. American Diplomacy; its Spirit and Achieve- 
ments. New York, 1905. 286 p. 

Costa Rica-Panama Arbitration. Memorandum on Uti Possi- 
detis. Roslyn, Virginia, 1913. 51 p. 

A digest of international law as embodied in diplomatic discus- 
sions, treaties, and other international agreements, Washing- 
ton, 1906. 8 vols. 

Four phases of American development; federalism, democracy, 

imperialism, expansion. Baltimore, 1912. 218 p. 

-The Growth of Pan-American Unity. (In. The Independent. 

Vol. 81. 58-66 p.) 



BIBLIOGEAPHY 479 

Henry Clay and Pan-Americanism. (In: Columbia University 

Quarterly for September, 1915.) 

History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which 

the United States has been a party. "Washington, 1898. 6 vols. 

The principles of American Diplomacy. New York, 1918. This 

volume incorporates substantially the entire text of American 
Diplomacy with additions. 476 p. 

Mora, J. J. de. Museo Universal. London, 1825-1826. 2 vols. 

Moreno, Mariano. Escritos Politicos y Economicos. Ordenados y 
con un prologo por Noberto Pinero. Buenos Aires, 1915. 3Y0 p. 

Museo Social Argentino. American Ideals. Speeches of the Presi- 
dent of the " Museo Social Argentino," Dr. Emilio Frers and 
of Col. Theodore Roosevelt at the banquet given in the Colon 
Theatre, Buenos Aires, November 12, 1913. Buenos Aires, 1914. 
32 p. 

Narrative of a Voyage to the Spanish Main in the ship Two Friends, 
the occupation of Amelia Island by McGregor, etc. Sketches of 
the Province of East Florida, and anecdotes illustrative of the 
habits and manners of the Seminole Indians. With an appendix 
containing a detail of the Seminole War and the execution of 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister. London, 1819. 328 p. 

Niles, John Milton. A View of South America and Mexico. New 
York, 1825. 2 vols. Reprinted in 1826. A new edition entitled 
South America and Mexico was published in 1839. 

Obin, M. J. y Aranda, Ricardo. Anales Parlamentarios del Peru. 
Congreso Constituyente, 1822-1825. Lima, 1895. 504 p. 

O'Connor, G. Burdett. Independencia Americana ; Recuerdos de 
Francisco Burdett O'Connor, Cbronel del ejercito de Colombia y 
General de Division de los del Peru y Bolivia. Madrid, 1915. 
416 p. 

Odriozola, Manuel de. Documentos Historicos del Peru en las 
Epocas del Coloniaje, despues de la Conquista, y de la Inde- 
pendencia hasta la Presente. Lima, 1863-1877. 10 vols. The 
first three volumes only relate to the colonial period, the remain- 
ing volumes covering the period of independence to 1831. 

Olarte Camacho, Vicente. Los Convenios con el Peru. Bogota, 1911. 
308 p. 

O'Leary, Daniel Florencio. Memorias del General O'Leary, publi- 
cadas por su hijo, Simon B. O'Leary. Caracas, 1879-1888. 32 
vols. This work embracing the period from 1810 to 1830, con- 
sists of letters, documents, and a life of Bolivar by General 
O'Leary. 

Oliveira Lima, Manoel de. Pan-Americanismo. Bolivar, Monroe, 
Roosevelt. Rio de Janeiro, 1908. 342 p. 



480 PAI^-AMEKICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Onis, Luis de. Memoir upon the Negotiations between Spain and 
the United States of America, which led to the treaty of 1819, 
with a statistical notice of that country. Translated from the 
Spanish, with notes, by Tobias Watkins. Baltimore, 1821. 
152 p. 

Ortiz, Tadeo. Mexico considerada como nacion independiente y libre 
sean algunas indicaciones sobre los deberes mas esenciales de 
los Mexicanos. Bordeaux, 1832. 600 p. 

Palacio Fajardo, Manuel. Outline of the Revolution in Spanish 
America. London, 1817. 362 p. 

Palomeque, Alberto. Origines de la Diplomacia Argentina. Buenos 
Aires, 1905. 2 vols. \J '- 

'Manama Congress, 1826. United States. 19th Congress, 1st Session. 
The executive proceedings of the Senate of the United States, on 
the subject of the Mission to the Congress of Panama, together 
with the messages and documents relating thereto. March 22, 
1826. Washington, 1826. 160 p. 

Pan-American Conferences and their significance. The. Proceed- 
ings of a special session of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Science, February 24, 1906. 

Pan-Americanism, The New. World Peace Foundation. Boston, 
February, 1916. Pamphlet Series, Vol. VI. No. 1, 53 p. 

Partes Oficiales y Documentos Belativos a la Guerra de la Inde- 
pendencia Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1902. 4 vols. 

Paxson, Frederic L. The Independence of the South American Re- 
publics. A study in recognition and foreign policy. Philadel- 
phia, 1903. 264 p. 

Paz Soldan, Mariano Felipe. Historia del Peru Independiente. 
Lima, 1868-1874. 3 vols. 

Pazos, Vicente. The Exposition, Remonstrance, and Protest of Don 
Vicente Pazos, Commissioner on behalf of the Republican Agents 
established at Amelia Island, in Florida, under the authority and 
in the behalf of the Independent States of South America, with 
an appendix. Presented to the Executive of the United States 
on the ninth of February, 1818, Translated from the Spanish. 
Philadelphia, 1818. 32 p. 

Petre, F. Loraine. Simon Bolivar, El Libertador. A life of the chief 
leader in the revolt against Spain in Venezuela, New Granada, 
and Peru. New York, 1910. 459 p. 

Phillips, Walter Alison. The Confederation of Europe; a study of 
the European Alliance, 1813-1823, as an experiment in the inter- 
national organization of peace; six lectures delivered in the uni- 
versity schools, Oxford, 1913. London, 1914. 315 p. 

Phillipson, Coleman. Wheaton's Elements of International Law. 
Fifth English Edition revised throughout, considerably enlarged 
and rewritten. London, 1916. 901 p. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 481 

Pinilla, Sabino. La Creacion de Bolivia. -Prologo y notas de Al- 
cides Argiiedas. Madrid, 1917. 371 p. 

Pifiero, Norberto. Union Pan- Americana. (In : Revista Argentina 
de Ciencias Politicas. V. 713-719 p. Buenos Aires, 1912.) 

Poinsett, Joel Roberts. Notes on Mexico, made in the autumn of 
1822, accompanied by an historical sketch of the revolution and 
translations of official reports on the present state of that coun- 
try. Philadelphia, 1824. 359 p. 

Politica Argentina, La. Bosquejos de critica y de historia contem- 
poranea, por H. B. C. Buenos Aires, 1904. 148 p. 

Porter, Captain David. Journal of a Cruise made to the Pacific 
Ocean in the U. S. Frigate Essex in the years 1812, 1813, and 
1814. New York, 1822. 2 vols. 

Posada Gutierrez, Joaquin. Memorias Historico-Politicas. Bogota, 
1865. 2 vols. 

Pradier-Fodere, Paul. Traite de droit international public, Euro- 
peen et Americain. Paris, 1885-1894. 7 vols. 

Pardo, Eduardo. A Ulusao Americana. Paris, 1895. 237 p. 

Pradt, Dominique Dufour de. The Colonies and the Present Amer- 
can Revolutions. London, 1817. 501 p. 

Congres de Panama. Paris, 1825. 95 p. 

La Europa y la America en 1821. Bordeaux, 1822. 2 vols. 

Vrai systeme de I'Europe relativement a TAmerique et la Grece. 

Paris, 1825. 304 p. 

Proctor, Robert. Narrative of a journey across the Cordillera of the 
Andes, and of a residence in Lima and other parts of Peru in 
the years 1823 and 1824. London, 1825. 374 p. 

Proyecto de Constitucion provisoria para el Estado de Chile. San- 
tiago de Chile, 1818. 48 p. 

Rafter, M. Memoirs of Gregor McGregor; comprising a sketch of 
the revolution in New Granada and Venezuela, with biograph- 
ical notices of Generals Miranda, Bolivar, Morillo, and Hore 
and a narrative of the expeditions to Amelia Island, Porto Bello, 
and Rio de la Hache, interspersed with revolutionary anecdotes. 
London, 1820. 

Recollections of a Service of Three Years during the War of Ex- 
termination in the Republics of Venezuela and Colombia by 
An Officer of the Colombian Navy. London, 1828. 2 vols. 

Recopilacion de Tratados y Convenciones celebrados entre la repub- 
lica de Chile y las potencias extrangeras. Santiago, 1894-1908. 
5 vols. 

-^Register of debates in Congress comprising the leading debates and 
incidents of the first session of the nineteenth Congress. Wash- 
ington, 1826. 2 vols. 

Registro Oficial de la Republica Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1879, 1880. 
2 vols. 



482 PiLtSr-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

Rengger, J. K, y Longchamp. Ensayo Historico sobre la Eevolucion 
del Paraguay. Edicion especial precidida de la biografia del 
tirano Francia y continuada con algunos documentos y observa- 
ciones historicos por M. A. Pelliza. Buenos Aires, 1883. 258 p. 

Eestrepo, Jose Manuel. Historia de la Eevolucion de la Republica 
de Colombia. Besanzon, 1858. 4 vols. 

E.io Branco (supposed autbor). Brazil, the United States, and the 
Monroe Doctrine. Eeprint in English of an article published in 
the Jornal do Comereio, January 20, 1908. 21 p. 

Eivas, Angel Cesar. Ensayos de Historia Politica y Diplomatica. 
Madrid, 1916. 353 p. 

Eives, George Lockhart. The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848. 
New York, 1913. 2 vols. 

Eocafuerte, Vicente. A la Nacion. Quito, 1908. 421 p. 

Eobertson, William Spence. The beginnings of Spanish-American 
diplomacy. (In : Essays in American History. New York, 1910. 
231-267 p.) 

■ Francisco de Miranda and the Eevolutionizing of Spanish Amer- 
ica. (In: Annual Eeport of the American Historical Associa- 
tion, 1907. Vol. I. 189-539 p.) 

The Monroe Doctrine Abroad in 1823-1824. (In : American Po- 
litical Science Eeview. Vol. 6. 1912.) 

Eise of the Spanish- American Eepublics as told in the lives of 

their liberators. New York, 1918. 380 p. 

South America and the Monroe Doctrine. (In. Political Science 

Quarterly. Vol. XXX.) 

Eobinson, Fayette. Mexico and her Military chieftains, from the 
Eevolution of Hidalgo to the present time. Philadelphia, 1847. 
343 p. 

Eobinson, William Davis. Memoirs of the Mexican Eevolution; in- 
cluding a narrative of the expedition of General Xavier Mina. 
With some observations on the practicability of opening a com- 
merce between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, through the 
Mexican Isthmus, in the province of Oaxaca, and at the Lake 
of Nicaragua, and on the future importance of such commerce 
to the civilized world and more especially to the United States. 
Philadelphia, 1820. 396 p. 

Eodriguez, Simon, Maestro del Libertador. Defensa de Bolivar. 
Caracas, 1916. 179 p. 

Eojas, el Marques de. Tiempo Perdido. Coleccion de escritos sobre 
politica, literatura y hacienda publica. Paris, 1905. 338 p. 

Eoscio, Juan G. El Triunfo de la Libertad sobre el Despotismo, en 
la confesion de un pecador arrepentido de sus errores politicos 
y dedicado a desagraviar en esta parte a la religion ofendida con 
el sistema de la tirania. Philadelphia, 1817. 406 p. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 483 

Kush, Eicliard. Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London. 
Philadelphia, 1833. 501 p. 

The Court of London from 1819 to 1825. London, 1873. 536 p. 

Salas, Ismael. La Doctrina Monroe es un principio del derecho de 
gentes, reconcido y aceptado en Europa y America. Mexico, 1896. 
21 p. 

Saldias, Adolfo. Historia de la Confederacion Argentina: Pozas 
y su Epoca. Puenos Aires, 1892. 5 vols. 

Samper, Jose M. Ensayo sob re las Revoluciones Politicas y la condi- 
cion social de las Kepublicas Colombianas (Hispano-Americanas) 
con un apendice sobre la orografia y la poblacion de la con- 
federacion granadina. Paris, 1861. 340 p. 

San Martin, Jose de. Su Correspondencia. 1917. 354 p. 

Satow, Sir Ernest Mason. A Guide to Diplomatic Practice. Lon- 
don, 1917. 2 vols. 

Seijas, Rafael Fernando. El Derecho Internacional Hispano-Amer- 
icano. Caracas, 1884-1885. 6 vols. 

Schouler, James. History of the United States under the Constitu- 
tion, 1783-1865. Washington, 1885-1899. 6 vols. 

Shepherd, William R. Polivar and the United States. (In: The 
Hispanic American Historical Review, August, 1918.) 

Latin America. New York, 1914. 256 p. 

Silva, J. Francisco V. La desmembracion del territorio Argentino 
en el siglo XIX. Madrid, 1915. 46 p. 

El Libertador Polivar y el Dean Funes en la Politica Argentina. 

Madrid, 1918. 421 p. 

Smith, Justin Harvey. Poinsett's career in Mexico. (In: Proceed- 
ings of the American Antiquarian Society, S. 24. 77-92 p.) 

Solar, Alberto del. La Doctrina de Monroe y la America Latina. 
Conferencia leida en el Ateneo el 20 de Junio de 1898. Puenos 
Aires, 1898. 60 p. 

Sosa, Francisco. Piografias de Mexicanos Distinguidos. Mexico, 
1884. 1115 p. 

vS'panish America. Observations on the instructions given by the 
President of the United States of America to the representatives 
of that Republic at the Congress held at Panama in 1826 : On 
the conduct of Mr. Poinsett, minister of the United States in 
Mexico; and generally on our relations with Spanish America; 
with a copy of the instructions. London, 1829. 68 p. 

Squier, E. G. Apuntamientos sobre Centro-America, particularmente 
sobre los estados de Honduras y San Salvador. Traducido del 
Ingles por un Hondureno. Paris, 1856. 384 p. 

Compendio de la Historia Politica de Centre America. Tradu- 
cido al Castellano por un Centro Americano. Paris, 1856. Ill p. 

Stapleton, Augustus Granville. The Political Life of the Right 
Honorable George Canning. London, 1831. 3 vols. 



484 PAl^-AMERICANISM; ITS BEGIit^NINGS 

Stapleton, Edward J. Some official correspondence of George Can- 
ning. London, 1887. 2 vols. 

Stevenson, W. B. Twenty Years in South America. Historical and 
descriptive narrative of twenty years' residence in South Amer- 
ica. London., 1829. 3 vols. 

Stille, Charles J. The Life and Services of Joel K. Poinsett. Re- 
printed from the Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biog- 
raphy. Philadelphia, 1888. 84 p. 

Strangeways, Thomas. A sketch of the Mosquito Shore including 
the territory of Poyais, descriptive of the country, with some in- 
formation as to its productions, the best mode of culture, etc. 
Edinburgh, 1822. 355 p. 

Suarez y Navarro. Historia de Mexico y del General Antonio Lopez 
Santa Anna. Mexico, 1850. 457 p. 

Temperley, H. W. V. The Later American Policy of George Can- 
ning. (In: Am. Hist. Rev. XL 779-797 p.) 

Life of Canning. London, 1905. 293 p. 

Terribles cargos contra el Ministro Poinsett. Mexico, 1827. 8 p. 

Thornton, William. Outlines of a Constitution for United North 
and South Columbia. "Washington, 1815. 14 p. 

Tomel, Jose Maria. Breve resena historica de los acontecimientos 
mag notables de la Nacion Mexicana, desde el ano 1821 hasta 
nuestros dias. Mexico, 1852. 424 p. 

Toro, Caspar. Notas sobre arbitraje intemacional en las republicas 
Latino-Americanas. Santiago de Chile, 1898. 192 p. 

Torrente, Mariano. Historia de la Revolucion Hispano-Americana. 
Madrid, 1830. 3 vols. 

Torres Caicedo, J. M. Ensayos Biograficos. Primera Serie. Paris, 
1863. 2 vols. 

^Union Latino-Americana. Pensamientos de Bolivar para formar 

una liga americiana ; su origen y sus desarroUos y estudio sobre la 
cuestion que tanto interesa a los estados debiles. Paris, 1865. 
381 p. 

Tratados y Convenciones concluidos y ratificados por la Republica 
Mexicana desde su independencia hasta el ano actual, acompana- 
dos de varios documentos que les son referentes. Mexico, 1878. 
706 p. 

Tratados y convenciones celebrados y no ratificados por la Republica 
Mexicana, con un apendice que contiene varios documentos im- 
portantes. Mexico, 1878. 408 p. 

Ugarte, Manuel. El Porvenir de la America latina; la raza y la 
integridad territorial; la organizacion. Valencia, 1911. 319 p. 

ITnited States. Executive Document 65. 15th Congress, 2d Session. 
Affairs with Spain. 215 p. 

Executive Document 175. 15th Congress, 1st Session. On occu- 
pation of Amelia Island. 50 p. 



BIBLIOGKAPHY 485 

ITpdyke, Frank A. The Diplomacy of the War of 1812. Baltimore. 
The John Hopkins Press, 1915. 494 p. 

Urien, Carlos M. El Derecho de Intervenir y la Doctrina de Monroe. 
Buenos Aires, 1898. 171 p. 

Urrutia, Francisco Jose. Paginas de Historia Diplomatica. Ivos 
Estados Unidos de America y las Reptiblicas hispanoamericanas 
de 1810 a 1830. Bogota, 1917. 423 p. 

El Ideal Internacional de Bolivar. Quito, 1911. 105 p. 

Uzcategui, Pinzon. Critica Historica sobre el Diario de Bucara- 
manga. Caracas, 1914. 225 p. 

Vadillo, Jose Manuel. Apuntes sobre los principales sucesos que han 
influido en el actual estado de la America del Sud. Segunda 
edicion corregida y aumentada. Paris, 1830. 295 p. 

Vallenilla Lanz, Laureano. El Libertador juzgado por los miopes. 
Caracas, 1914. 16 p. 

Vargas, M. Nemesio. Historia del Peru Independiente. Lima, 1903- 
1912. 5 vols. 

Varnhagen, Francisco Adolfo de. Baron de Porto Seguro. Historia 
geral do Brazil antes da sua separagao e independencia de Por- 
tugal. Rio de Janeiro, 1876. 2 vols. 

Vedia, Agustin de. Constitucion Argentina. Buenos Aires, 1907. 
587 p. 

Viallate, Achille. Les Etats-Unis et le Pan-Americanisme. (In: 
Revue des Deux Mondes. V. 51. 419-445 p.) 

Vicuna Subercaseaux, B. Los Congresos Pan-Americanos. Articulos 
publicados en " El Mercurio." Santiago de Chile, 1906. 113 p. 

Villanueva, Carlos A. Fernando VII y los nuevos Estados. Paris, 
1914. 291 p. 

-=La Monarquia en America; Bolivar y el general San Martin. 

Paris, 1912. 287 p. 

La Monarquia en America. El Imperio de los Andes. Paris, 

1914. 379 p. 

Resumen de la Historia General de America. Paris, 1912. 

474 p. 

La Santa Alianza. Paris, 1914. 303 p. 

Villanueva, Laureano. Vida del Gran Mariscal de Ayacueho. Cara- 
cas, 1895. 590 p. 

Villaran, Manuel Vicente. Ensayo sobre las ideas constitucionales 
de Bolivar. (In: El Comercio, Lima, 1 de enero de 1917.) 

Weatherhead, W. D. An account of the Late Expedition against 
the Isthmus of Darien under the command of Sir Gregor Mc- 
Gregor, together with the events subsequent to the recapture of 
Portobelo till the release of the prisoners from Panama. Lon- 
don, 1821. 134 p. 

Wheaton, Henry. Elements of International Law. Edited with 
notes by Richard Henry Dana, Jr. Boston, 1866. 749 p. 



486 PAN"-AMEEICANISM: ITS BEGINNINGS 

^History of the Law of Nations in Europe and America ; from the 

earliest time to the treaty of Washington, 1842. New York, 

1845. 797 p. 
Wooten, Dudley G. (editor). A comprehensive History of Texas. 

Dallas, 1898. 2 vols. 
Yoakum, Henderson K. History of Texas. (See Wooten, Dudley 

G.) 
Zamacois, Niceto de. Historia General de Mexico. Barcelona and 

Mexico, 1877-1882. 18 vols. 
Zavala, Lorenzo de. Ensayo Historico de las Revoluciones de Mex- 
ico desde 1808 hasta 1830. Paris and New York, 1831-1832. 2 

vols. 
^Viaje a los Estados Unidos del Norte de America. Paris, 1834. 

374 p. 
Zeballos, Estanislao S. Discurso en la Universidad de Buenos Aires 

el 10 de Noviembre de 1913. (In: Boletin del Museo Social 

Argentine. V. II. 483-500 p.) 



INDEX 



Aberdeen, Lord: reply of, to Co- 
lombia on establishment of mon- 
archy, 123. 

Abreu, jNIanuel: Spanish agent to 
Peru, 52. 

Adams, John: maintains neutral 
policy, 138; on the independence 
of Santo Domingo, 140; prevents 
war with France, 266. 

Adams, John Quincy: his apprecia- 
tion of Colombia, 39; advocate ol' 
system of neutrality, 157; excep- 
tional preparation for office of 
Secretary of State, 157; calls at- 
tention to European hostility to 
United States, 158; states prin- 
ciples of recognition, 164; on the 
sympathy of United States for 
Patriot cause, 172; displeasure 
of, at violations of neutrality, 
174; instructions of, to Ander- 
son, 297; views of, on Panama 
Congress, 315; nominates dele- 
gates to Panama Congress, 395 ; 
letter of, to Pvodney, 400; to An- 
derson, 401; attitude of, toward 
Hispanic America, 403; article 
attributed to, in National Intelli- 
gencer, 406 ; accommodation of 
views to those of Clay, 408; 
states principles of relations with 
Hispanic countries, 409. 

Aguila Mexicana: prints first news 
of Monroe declaration, 225. 

Aguirre, Manuel H. de: mission of. 
to United States, 180; arrest of, 
181 

Aix-la-Chapelle : Congress of, dis- 
cusses arrangement between 
Spain and her colonies, 216. 

Alaman, Lucas : biographical notice 
of, 227; report of, on interna- 
tional situation, 228. 

Alberdi, Juan Bautista: on Argen- 
tine foreigTi policy, 257. 



487 



Allen, Heman: minister to Chile, 
170; reception of, at Santiago, 
261. 

Alliance: of American States, pro- 
posed by Wilkinson, 271; of new 
states with Great Britain, dis- 
cussed, 386; attitude of Great 
Britain toward, 386; offensive 
and defensive, proposed against 
Brazil, 441; defensive, between 
Buenos Aires and Colombia, 
450. 

Alvarez, Alejandro: views of, on 
Pan- Americanism, 16; on equal- 
ity of states, 29. 

Alvarez de Toledo, Jose: mentioned, 
147; revolutionary activities of, 
in United States, 148; name of, 
connected with Amelia Island 
affair, 190. 

Alvear, Carlos: becomes director of 
United Provinces, 85; sent on 
mission to negotiate with Bolivar, 
440. 

Ambrister: mentioned, 191. 

Amelia Island: mentioned, 163; 
suppression of insurgent estab- 
lishment on, 183; revolutionary 
governments disclaim connection 
with, 184; suppression discussed 
in Correo del Orinoco, 194. 

American System: Moore's view, 
31; Correa's plan, 178; refer- 
ence of Tornel to, 229; place of 
United States in, discussed, 400; 
Clay's advocacy of, 403. 

" Americus " : see Maciel da Costa. 

Amphictyonic body: proposed, 292; 
to sit at Habana, 304. 

Anderson, Richard C: dispatch of, 
on reception of Monroe declara- 
tion, 244; minister to assembly 
at Panama, 314, 395, 397. 

Angostura, Congress of: addressed 
by Bolivar, 102; adopts consti- 



INDEX 



tution creating Republic of Co- 
lombia, 104. 

Arbitration: provision for, in 
treaty concluded at Panama, 242, 
341. 

Arbuthnot: mentioned, 191. 

Arce, Juan Manuel: mission of, to 
United States, 77; elected presi- 
dent of Central American repub- 
lic, 79. 

Arequipa: proposed as capital of 
one of divisions of Peru, 108. 

Argentina,: reception of Monroe dec- 
laration in, 254; opposed to 
schemes of political union, 284; 
contribution of, to general cause 
of independence, 285; interna- 
tional situation in, 434, 464. 
See also Buenos Aires and United 
Provinces of Rio de la Plata. 

Argentine Government : entente 
cordiale with Chile, 435. 

Argentine Republic: see Buenos 
Aires and United Provinces of Rio 
de la Plata. 

Army: convention relating to, con- 
cluded at Panama, 343. 

Artigas, Jos6: privateering enter- 
prises of, 178; leader of Uru- 
guayan forces, 455. 

Assembly of plenipotentiaries: pro- 
posed, 292; treaty provision for, 
294; designs of, contrasted with 
those of Holy Alliance, 303. See 
Panama Congress. 

Aury, Luis : " Commodore " of com- 
bined insurgent fleet, 151; not 
agent of Bolivar, 187. 

Ayacucho: victory of, 37. 



Bagot: declines to intermeddle in 
Amelia Island affair, 192. 

Balance of Power: absence of, in 
American system, 6, 21; as a step 
toward international government, 
32; of the world suggested, 288. 

Baltimore: becomes center of illicit 
privateering, 174. 

Banda Oriental : votes to join 
Buenos Aires, 459. See Uruguay. 



Barataria: base of operations for 
pirates, 151, 152. 

Barros Arana: on Poinsett's mis- 
sion, 143. 

Battle y Ordonez : views of, on Pan- 
Americanism, 14. 

Belgrano, Manuel: mission of, to 
Europe, 84; arrives in England, 
86; negotiations with Charles IV, 
87; returns to Buenos Aires, 89; 
proposes resuscitation of Inca 
Empire, 89; said to favor mon- 
archy, 93. 

Bello, Andres: mission of, to Eng- 
land, 286. 

Benton, Elbert J.: on international 
status of Cuba, 24. 

Biddle, Captain: takes issue with 
Lord Cochrane on salutes, 210. 

Bland, Theodorick: commissioner to 
South America, 160; relations 
with the Carreras, 176. 

Blaine, James G. : speech of, before 
Pan-American Conference at 
Washington, 4. 

Blockade: of coast of Peru, 210; 
United Provinces and Uruguay, 
461. 

Bocanegra, Jose Marfa: on British 
recognition, 230. 

Bolivar, Simon: interview of, with 
San Martin, 55; takes command 
in Peru, 59; political plans of, 
60; returns to Colombia, 61; 
" prophetic letter " of, 99 ; sug- 
gests government of England as 
model, 101 ; opinion of government 
of United States, 102; address 
to Congress of Angostura, 102; 
Bolivian constitution, 105; pro- 
poses federation of Colombia, 
Peru and Bolivia, 107 ; reply of, 
to Paez's " Napoleonic " proposal, 
109 ; expressions of, on monarchy 
in 1823, 110; in 1824, 111; con- 
versation of, with Captain Mai- 
ling, 111; conference with Cap- 
tain Rosamel, 114; remarks to 
Sutherland, 115; quits Peru, 115; 
attitude of, toward rebellion in 
Colombia, 118; opposition of San- 



INDEX 



489 



tander to, 119; resumes the chief 
magistracy as dictator, 120; at- 
tempt to assassinate, 120; sug- 
gests placing Colombia under pro- 
tection of Great Britain, 121; dis- 
approves steps taken by Council 
of Ministers to establish mon- 
archy, 124; supposed instructions 
of, to Demarquet, 125; resigns, 
127; dies near Santa Marta, 127; 
summary of political views, 127; 
supposed relations of, with 
Amelia Island affair, 185, 193; 
break of, with Santander, 240; on 
Monroe declaration, 248; plans 
of, relative'To Brazil, 251; first 
utterances on American Union, 
^^^86; conception of world balance 
of power, 288; letter to Pueyrre- 
d6n, 290; takes first definite 
steps to organize a league, 291; 
revives project for holding Ameri- 
can Assembly, 312; views on, 
316; influence of, in Bolivia, 330; 
on situation in Peru, 339; op- 
posed to ratification of Panama 
conventions, 347; rumored plans 
of, respecting Cuba, 360; sup- 
porter of Canning's policies in 
America, 378; seeks British pro- 
tection, 379; memorandum on 
alliance with Great Britain, 387; 
attitude toward United States, 
393, 429; view of Gil Fortoul, 
429; of Vargas, 430; of L6pez, 
430; of author, 431; supremacy 
of, in Peru, 439; desire of, to in- 
tervene in dispute between Buenos 
Aires and Brazil, 440; declines of- 
fensive alliance with Buenos Aires, 
442; project of, for invading Par- 
aguay, 444; return of, to Lima, 
447; loses hope of union, 448. ^^ 

Bolivarian republics: reception of 
Monroe declaration in, 239. 

Bolivia: independence of, 41; pro- 
posed federation with Peru and 
Colombia, 106; appoints delegates 
to Panama Congress, 330; in- 
structions, 331; negotiations of, 
with Buenos Aires, 439. 



Bolivian Constitution : discussed, 
105; proclaimed in Peru, 117; 
opposition to, in Colombia, 
119. 

Bonaparte, Joseph : placed on 
throne of Spain, 36; proposal to 
place at head of great His- 
pano-American Confederation, 

91. 

Bonpland: held by Francia as spy, 
444; Bolivar's scheme to liberate, 
445. 

Boyer, Jean Pierre; unites Haiti 
imder one government, 38. 

Brackenridge, Henry M.: Secretary 
to the mission to South America, 
160. 

Brancardi, Theodoro Jos6: Brazil- 
ian delegate to Panama, 465. 

Brazil: declares independence, 36; 
recognized by United States, 170; 
protests against privateering, 
178; strained relations with 
United States, 179; position of, 
in 1824, with regard to European 
powers, 250; with regard to 
neighbors, 251; seeks recognition 
of United States, 252; proposes 
definition of Monroe Doctrine, 
253; replies to Argentine de- 
mands, 457; war with United 
Provinces, 455-464; Panama Con- 
gress, 465. 

Briceno Mgndez, Pedro: Colombian 
delegate to Panama Congress, 
319; instructions to, 325, 326, 
329; return of, to Colombia, 346; 
views of, as Cuba and Porto 
Rico, 355, 364; on Dawkins' mis- 
sion, 372-376. 

Bucaramanga: mentioned, 120. 

Buenos Aires: revolt of, 40; repre- 
sents the other provinces in for- 
eign relations, 41; recognized by 
United States, 170; remonstrates 
with Chile, 205; reception of 
Monroe declaration at, 254; pro- 
poses territorial guarantee, 255; 
preliminary treaty of, with Spain, 
257; dispatches agents to Chile, 
Peru, and Colombia, 258; dis- 



490 



IKDEX 



putes leadership of Colombia, 
258; not inclined to accept non- 
intervention principle, 259; oppo- 
sition of, to American league, 
302; press of, against plan of 
confederation, 452; treaty of al- 
liance with Chile, 466; aims of, 
in Peru, 435; negotiations with 
Spain, 438; peace plan of, a fail- 
ure, 439 ; public sentiment of, hos- 
tile to Bolivar, 442. 

Callao: fortress of, surrendered, 37. 

Canada: included in idea of Amer- 
ican solidarity, 272. 

Canal, Interoceanic : discussed in 
Clay's instructions, 421. 

Cauas, Antonio Jose: received as 
diplomatic representative of Cen- 
tral America, 170. 

Canning, George: declaration of, on 
American affairs, 217; sounds 
Eush, 218; interview of, with 
Polignac, 219; fame of, in Amer- 
ica, 230; pompous language of, 
232 ; favorable to transfer of Cuba 
to Mexico, 363; instructions to 
Dawkins, 365; American policy 
of, supported by Bolivar, 378; de- 
sires harmony among American 
states, 391; policy in war over 
Banda Oriental, 462. 

Carrera, Jos6 Miguel: welcomes 
Poinsett, 144; mentioned, 207. 

Carrera, Luis: visits the Essex, 207. 

Casa Yrujo: dismissal of, 146. 

Casasus, Joaquin D.: on Pan- 
American Conferences, 11. 

Castlereagh, Lord: mentioned, 166; 
on attitude of Great Britain to- 
ward conflict between Spain and 
her colonies, 168; declarations of, 
as to Florida, 191. 

Censors: provision for, in Angos- 
tura project rejected, 104; 
adopted in Bolivian constitution, 
106. 

Central America: little contact of, 
with South America, 61; forma- 
tion of republic, 78; recognition 
of, by United States, 170; recep- 



tion of Monroe declaration in, 
235; treaty of, with Colombia, 
301; failure of, to ratify Panama 
conventions, 348; invites United 
States to Panama Congress, 394; 
seeks aid of United States in 
building canal, 423. 

Chacabuco: battle of, 42. 

Charles IV: negotiations of Argen- 
tine agents with, 87 ; renounces 
throne in favor of Ferdinand, 88. 

Chiapas: province of, joins Mexico, 
73; dispute over, 424. 

Chile: independence of, 41; O'Hig- 
gins made Supreme Director, 43; 
constitution of, 44-47; Freire as 
Supreme Director, 45 ; treaty with 
United Provinces, 49; little in- 
clined toward monarchical sys- 
tem, 96; welcomes Poinsett, 144; 
recognized by United States, 170; 
neutrality of, in war of 1812, 
205; pays Macedonian claims, 
211; declines to join Buenos 
Aires in treaty with Spain, 258; 
genuine response to Monroe dec- 
laration, 260; why scheme of, for 
union came to nothing, 283; 
treaty with Colombia, 296, 309 
(foot note), distrust of Bolivar's 
plans, 465; Panama Congress, 
466; treaty of alliance with 
Buenos Aires, 466. 

Chilpancingo: congress of, 62. 

Christophe: mentioned, 156. 

City of America: provided for, in 
Thornton's scheme, 277. 

Claiborne, Governor : mentioned, 
142; on exclusion of European in- 
fluence, 271. 

Clay, Henry: correspondence with 
Bolivar, 129; refers to the "am- 
bitious projects" of Bolivar, 131; 
opposed Neutrality bill of 1817, 
156; on recognition of new states, 
162; declines to enter into agree- 
ment with Brazil, 253; early 
views on American unity, 281; 
advocates American system, 282; 
views on Panama Congress, 316; 
supplementary instructions on 



INDEX 



491 



Panama Congress, 353; negotia- 
tions of, I'elative to Cuba and 
Porto Rico, 357; requests Colom- 
bia and Mexico to suspend expe- 
dition, 358; conferences with 
Colombian and Mexican minis- 
ters, 394; article attributed to, 
in Democratic Press, 404; in- 
structions to United States Dele- 
gates to Panama, 409-426; on na- 
ture of Congress, 410; on efforts 
of United States to effect peace, 
411; on alliance with new states, 
412; on non-colonization, 412; on 
Cuba and Porto Rico, 413; on ad- 
vantages of peace and neutrality, 
414; on freedom of the seas, 415; 
on regulation of commerce and 
navigation, 416; on definition of 
blockade, 419; Panama instruc- 
tions commented on by London 
Times, 420; by anonymous writer, 
420; on inter-oceanic canal, 421; 
on religious toleration, 423; 
Chiapas, 424; on form of Gov- 
ernment, 425; on war between 
Brazil and United Provinces, 426; 
spirit of American unity in in- 
structions, 428; replies to Re- 
bello's proposal, 460. 

Cochrane, Lord: commands naval 
forces against Royalists in Peru, 
48; defies the authority of San 
Martin, 55; correspondence of, 
with Captain Biddle, 210; block- 
ades coast of Peru, 210. 

Colombia: formation of republic, 
39, 104; proposed federation with 
Peru and Bolivia, 106; rebellion 
in, 116; war with Peru, 120; 
sounds England and France on 
monarchy, 122; union of, with 
Venezuela and Quito dissolved, 
127; recognition of, by United 
States, 170; declines to accede to 
treaty with Spain, 258 ; takes lead 
in organizing American League 
of Nations, 291; treaties of, with 
Peru, 292; with Chile and 
Buenos Aires, 296; promotes the 
plan of holding a Congress at 



Panama, 318; letter to Funes on 
Panama Congress, 321; instruc- 
tions to delegates, 325, 326, 328; 
attitude toward Vidaurre's plan, 
336; ratifies Panama conventions, 
347 ; attitude on postponement of 
operations against Cuba and 
Porto Rico, 358; against political 
union with Great Britain, 385; 
invitation of, to United States to 
send delegates to Panama Con- 
gress, 393; purpose of, to lead 
in western hemisphere, 401 ; un- 
willing to intervene in behalf of 
Buenos Aires, 451. 

Community of political ideals: as 
principle of Pan-Americanism, 33. 

Concert of Europe: leadership of, 
discussed, 20. 

Confederacion Americana: article 
on, 301. 

Confederation of American States: 
discussed in the United States, 
303. 

Congress of Aix-la-Ohapelle: deq- 
laration of, regarding privateer- 
ing in America, 174. 

Congress of Panama: see Panama 
Congress. 

Congress of Verona: proposal to re- 
store the absolute power of Ferdi- 
nand, 217. 

Conquest: principle of no, 6. 

Constitution: outlines of a, by Wil- 
liam Thornton, 273. 

Cooperation: as principle of Pan- 
Americanism, 35. 

Cornejo, Mariano H.: views on con- 
tinental solidarity, 13. 

Correa, the Abb§: proposes an 
"American system," 178. 

Correo del Orinoco: on the cession 
of Florida, 199-201. 

Costa Rica : see Guatemala and Cen- 
tral America. 

Crowinshield, Representative: re- 
port of, on Panama Congress 
397. 

Cuba: international status of, 23; 
reported concentration of Span- 
ish forces in, 108; interest of 



492 



INDEX 



Jefferson in, 141; instructions of 
Peru on, 325; of Colombia, 328, 
329; of Bolivia, 332; desire of 
Mexicans to incorporate, 355 ; pol- 
icy of the United States relative 
to, 355 et seq.; attitude of Colom- 
bia respecting, 358; of Mexico, 
360; negotiations between Great 
Britain and United States re- 
specting, 364 ; discussed at Buenos 
Aires, 454. 
Cundinamarca : the new state of, 
98; one of the divisions of Co- 
lombia, 107. 

Dawkins, Edward J.: appointed 
British agent to Panama Con- 
gress, 313; Canning's instructions 
to, 366; what he accomplished at 
Panama, 370; opinions of, Bri- 
cefio M6ndez and others as to his 
mission, 372-378; suggests an in- 
demnity to Spain, 375, 377, 378. 

Del Real: Agent of New Granada, 
mentioned, 172. 

Dessolle: negotiates with Spain on 
Monarchy in America, 94. 

Demarquet, General: apocryphal in- 
structions to, 125. 

Diaz V6lez, Jose Miguel: Bolivia, 
mission of, to, 440. 

District of America: provided for, 
in Thornton's scheme, 277. 

Domfnquez, Jos§: Mexican delegate 
to Panama Congress, 320. 

Downes, Lieutenant : commands 
Essex Junior, 205. 

Drago, Luis M. : views of, on Amer- 
ican solidarity, 14. 

Duke of Orleans: proposed as sov- 
ereign at Buenos Aires, 93. 

Egana, Juan: proposes a plan of 
\anion, 283. 

England: hostility of, toward mon- 
archical plots in Argentine prov- 
' inces, 96; government of, re- 
garded by Bolivar as model, 103; 
rejects Colombian overture for 



monarchy, 123. See Great Bri- 
tain. 

Equality: as principle of Pan- 
Americanism, 6, 35; doctrine of, 
as applied to certain American 
republics, 19-29; to commercial 
intercourse, 416. 

Essex, U.&.8.: voyage of, to Pacific, 
205; surrender of, 209. 

Essex Junior: see Essex, U.S.S. 

Europe: hostility of, toward United 
States, 158-159. 

European powers: supposed propen- 
sity of, to intervene in America, 
247. 

Evening Post: first to use term 
Pan-Americanism, 2. 

Everett, Alexander: impresses on 
Spain necessity of peace, 357; dis- 
patches of, 368. 

Federal system: proposed for Span- 
ish America, 303. 

Federation: of Colombia, Peru, and 
Bolivia projected, 107; as means 
to peace, 280. 

Ferdinand VII: dethroned, 36; re- 
stored, 52; proposed asylum for, 
in Mexico, 64; loyalty of Amer- 
ican subjects to, 83; acclaimed 
by people of Spain, 88; desire 
of, to retain Cuba and, Porto 
Rico, 355. 

Fillsola, General: commands in Cen- 
tral America, 75. 

Florida: president empowered to 
occupy, 184; British activities in, 
191; negotiations for acquisition 
of, 195; British attitude as to 
transfer of, 196-199; Venezuelan 
attitude, 199-201; Mexican, 201, 
204. 

Folch, Governor: toast of, 271. 

Forbes, John M. : succeeds Rodney 
at Buenos Aires, 260; mentioned, 
297. 

Foreign Enlistment Act: mentioned, 
214. 

France: influence of, in monarchical 



INDEX 



493 



plots, 94; fails to receive support, 
96; army of, invades Spain, 218. 

Francia, Dr.: dictator of Paraguay, 
40; imprisons Bonpland, 444; 
reply of, to Bolivar, 446. 

Francisco de Paula: proposal to 
Crown, at Buenos Aires, 92. 

Franklin, Benjamin: on immunity 
of private property at sea, 419. 

Franklin, U.S.S.: alleged aid of, to 
the viceroy of Peru, 213. 

Freire, Ram6n: Supreme Director 
of Chile, 45; convokes constituent 
assembly, 46. 

Frers, Emilio: quoted on American 
questions, 26. 

Funes, Dean: instructions to, on 
Panama Congress, 321; on pro- 
posed invasion of Paraguay, 447. 



Gaceta de Colombia: on Monroe 
Doctrine, 241; on the Panama 
Congress, 322. 

Gainza, Captain-general: adheres to 
revolution in Guatemala, 73; at- 
tempts to reduce Salvador to sub- 
mission, 75. 

Galveston: government of Texas 
organized at, 151 ; base of insur- 
gent fleet, 152. 

Galveston Island: see Galveston. 

Gamarra, Agustin: offers to sup- 
port Bolivar in the establishment 
of monarchy, 109; mentioned, 
126. 

Garcia, Manuel Jos6: mission of, 
to Rio de Janeiro, 85, 91; men- 
tioned, 256; minister of foreign 
affairs, 260. 

Garcia Calderon, Francisco: quoted, 
on Pan -Americanism, 17. 

Garcia del Rio, Juan: Minister of 
Foreign Relations of Peru, 51; 
mission to Europe, 53. 

Gelston v. Hoyt: case of, mentioned, 
156. 

Genet: arrival of, in United States, 
137. 



Gilchrist, William: vice consul at 
Buenos Aires, 143. 

Gil Fortoul, Jos6: on Panama Con- 
gress, 429. 

G6mez, Jos6 Valentin: mission of, 
to Europe, 93; objects to Prince 
of Lucca, 94; mission to Brazil, 
456; return of, to Buenos Aires, 
458. 

Government: form of, discussed, 
82-84; in Argentine provinces, 
89; discussed by Bolivar, 102. 

Graham, John: commissioner to 
South America, 160. 

Great Britain: treaty of, vt^ith 
Spain, 86; attitude in 1816, 158; 
supposed complicity in Amelia 
Island affair, 192; designs in 
America, 203; neutral policy, 
213; policy as to independence 
of Spanish America, 215; at- 
tempts mediation between Spain 
and her colonies, 215-217; the 
Monroe Doctrine, 217-222; recog- 
nizes the new states, 219; tend- 
ency of the new states to look 
to, 223; policy according to San- 
tander, 247; commission in Co- 
lombia, 248; policy in Brazil, 
251; invited to Panama Congress, 
312; alliance with the new states, 
333; policy as to Cuba and Porto 
Rico, 355; informal diplomatic 
intercourse with Mexico, 361; 
discusses Cuba with Mexico, 362; 
alleged indifference to peace in 
America, 367; aim in America, 
371; aid to insurgents, 380; pro- 
posed protectorate over new 
states, 382-384, 391; against in- 
tervention in Brazil, 443; medi- 
ates between Buenos Aires and 
Brazil, 462. 

Great Colombia: see Colombia. 

Grotius: on doctrine of equality, 
20. 

Gual, Pedro: connection of, with 
Amelia Island affair, 188-190; 
states bases of American confed- 



494 



INDEX 



eration, 291; Colombian delegate 
to Panama Congress, 319; in- 
structions to, 325, 326, 329; pro- 
ceeds to Mexico, 348; correspond- 
ence from Mexico, 348-353; con- 
ference of Oct. 9, 351; returns to 
Colombia, 354; confers with Daw- 
kins, 368; on proposed indemnity 
to Spain, 377. 

Guatemala : Captaincy-general of, 
during revolt, 72; declares inde- 
pendence, 73; becomes part of 
Mexican empire, 75. 

Guayaquil: conference of, 55; an- 
nexation to Colombia, 56; reas- 
sumes sovereignty, 116. 

Guerrero, Vicente: adheres to lead- 
ership of Iturbide, 64. 

Guise, Admiral: mentioned, 248. 

Gutierrez -Magee raid: account of, 
149, 

Gutierrez de Lara, Jos6 Bernardo: 
represents Hidalgo in United 
States, 149. 

I 

Haiti: independence of, 37; not 
recognized by United States, 237; 
not mentioned in Monroe's mes- 
sage, 238; Panama Congress, 
321; status as viewed by Peru, 
325; by Colombia, 329. 

Hall, Basil: interviews of, with San 
Martin, 54. 

Halsey, Thomas Lloyd: dismissal 
of, mentioned, 180. 

Hamilton, Alexander: on neutrality, 
137; favors Miranda's plans, 1-38, 
265; on independence of Santo 
Domingo, 140. 

Hamilton, Representative : resolu- 
tion on Panama Congress, 397. 

Harrison, William Henry: minister 
to Colombia, 130, 131. 

Hegemony: so-called, of United 
States, 29. 

Henley, Captain: breaks up Amelia 
Island establishment, 184. 

Henry IV: Great Design of, men- 
tioned, 280, 311. 



Herrera, Jos§ Manuel de: activities 
of, in United States, 147, 150; 
correspondence of Santa Maria 
with, 298. 

Heres, Tomis de: mentioned, 324. 

Hervey: British commissioner to 
Mexico, 361. 

Hidalgo, Miguel: leads revolt in 
Mexico, 62. 

Hillyar, Commodore : commands 
British squadron in Pacific, 208; 
mediates between Patriots and 
Royalists, 209. 

Hispanic America: attitude of, to- 
ward Monroe declaration, 223- 
262. 

Holy Alliance: rumors concerning, 
108; plans of, 218; American 
counterpoise to, proposed, 297. 

Honduras: see Guatemala and Cen- 
tral America. 

House of Representatives, U. S.: 
declaration on revolt of Spanish 
provinces, 145; discussions on 
neutrality, 161; on recognition, 
166; discusses Panama Congress, 
397. 

Hyde de Neuville: protests against 
projected invasion of Mexico, 91 ; 
proposes monarchies in Spanish 
America, 92; finds insurgent 
cause popular in United States, 
173; on Amelia Island aff"air, 192. 



Inca: as title in Thornton's scheme, 
279. 

Inca dynasty: proposed reestablish- 
ment of, 91; revolt to reestablish, 
263. 

Indemnity: proposed, to Spain, 375, 
377, 378, 438. 

Independence: as principle of Pan- 
Americanism, 33; indifference of 
Spanish Americans, 83; chief in- 
terest of new states, 308; under 
British protectorate, 385; total 
and unqualified, desired by 
United States, 402. 



INDEX 



496 



Ingham, Representative : quoted, 
404 (foot note). 

International American Conference: 
at Washington, 2; at Mexico, 6; 
at Rio de Janeiro, 7 ; at Buenos 
Aires, 15; significance of, 33. 

Intervention : Monteagudo on, 309 ; 
attitude of Colombia on, 336; of 
Peru, 337 ; discussed at Buenos 
Aires, 453. 

Irisarri, Antonio Jose: mission to 
England, 96. 

Irvine: United States agent to 
Venezuela, 189. 

Iturbide, Agustin de : leader of re- 
volt in Mexico, 64; proclaims 
Plan of Iguala, 65; made emper- 
or, 67; deposed, 68; executed, 69. 

Jefferson, Thomas: on principles of 
neutrality, 137; on Spanish re- 
volt against Bonaparte, 141; 
favors Correa's American system, 
179; conference of, with Maia, 
264; on alliance with Great Bri- 
tain, 266; sends Wilkinson on 
mission, 269. 

John VI: flight of, to Brazil, 36. 

Kentucky: resolutions in favor of 

insurgent cause, 173. 
King of Belgium: arbitrator in 

Macedonian case, 211. 
King, Rufus: advocates Miranda's 

plans, 265. 

Lafitte, Jean: mentioned, 151. 

La Fuente, General: letter of 
Bolivar to, 106; mentioned, 126. 

Lambe: British minister to Spain, 
367. 

Lansing, Robert: address of, on 
Pan-Americanism, 9. 

Lamed, Samuel: mentioned, 125. 

Larrazabal, Antonio: Central Amer- 
ican delegate to Panama Con- 
gress, 320. 

La Serna: viceroy of Peru, 52. 



Las Heras, General: on the Monroe 
declaration, 260. 

Lavalleja, Antonio: leader of the 
" thirty-three," 459. 

Law: as principle of Pan- American- 
ism, 34. 

Lawrence, T. J.: on primacy of 
United States, 31. 

Leadership: question of, involved 
in Confederation, 402. 

League of Nations: an American, 
bases of, proposed, 291. 

Le Moyne: received by Pueyrredon, 
93. 

Liberator, The: see Bolivar. 

Lima: taken by San Martfn, 51; 
recaptured by the Royalists, 58. 

Lino de Clemente: connection of, 
with Amelia Island affair, 188; 
conduct not approved by Vene- 
zuelan government, 189. 

Lircay, Treaty of: concluded 
through mediation of Commodore 
Hillyar, 209. 

Longfellow, H. W.: quoted, 1. 

L6pez, Jacinto: on Pan- American- 
ism and "Monroeism," 16; on 
Bolivar and the Panama Con- 
gress, 430. 

Lopez, M6ndez: mission of, to Eng- 
land, 286. 

Lowry, Robert K. : United States 
agent to Venezuela, 145. 

Lorimer, James: on equality of na- 
tions, 19. 

Lyman, Theodore: on neutral policy 
of United States, 134. 

Macedonian: case of the, 210-212. 

MacGregor, Sir Gregor: services to 
Venezuela, 185; undertakes expe- 
dition against Amelia Island, 186. 

Maciel da Costa, J. Severiano: 
Cartas Politicas of, 252 (foot 
note ) . 

Mackie, Dr.: first British agent to 
Mexico, 361. 

McLane, Representative: mentioned. 



496 



INDEX 



Macon, Senator: resolution of, on 
Panama Congress, 396. 

Madison, James: appoints agents to 
South America, 142; refers to 
struggle of revolted colonies, 145; 
thinks of continent as a whole, 
272. 

Magee, Augustus W.: commands ex- 
pedition in Texas, 149. 

Maia: conference of, with Jeffer- 
son, 264. 

Maipo: battle of, 42. 

Maitland, General : negotiates 
treaty with Toussaint, 139. 

Martinez de Rozas : the " Politico- 
Christian Catechism" of, 282. 

Mediation : attempted, between 
Spain and her colonies, 215- 
217. 

Memoria Politico-Instructiva : on 
cession of Florida, 202. 

Mexico: little contact with South 
America, 61; revolution under 
Hidalgo and Morelos, 62; consti- 
tution of 1814, 63; change in 
character of revolution, 63; plan 
of Iguala, 65; Treaty of Cordova, 
66; Iturbide proclaimed emperor, 
67; establishment of federal re- 
public, 70; political parties in, 
70; proposed invasion of, from 
United States, 91; interest of 
Jefferson in, 141 ; the Mina ex- 
pedition against, 152-154; recog- 
nition of, by United States, 170; 
supposed connection with Amelia 
Island affair, 185; discussions of 
British attitude, 226; reception 
of Monroe declaration, 225-235; 
attitude toward cession of Flor- 
ida, 261; early plans for inde- 
pendence, 263 ; Jefferson's view 
of, 264; treaty with Colombia, 
299; attitude toward Panama 
Congress, 340; removal of Con- 
gress to, 346; considers Panama 
conventions, 348; rejects them, 
350; influence of Poinsett, 352; 
proposed expedition against Cuba, 



359; treaty with United States, 
417. 

Michelena, Jose Mariano: Mexican 
delegate to Panama Congress, 
320; first Mexican minister to 
England, 361 ; negotiations rela- 
tive to Cuba, 363. 

Middleton, Henry: negotiates with 
Russia, 357. 

Mier, Father: views on the cession 
of Florida, 202; attitude toward 
Great Britain, 203. 

Mina, Xavier: expedition of, to 
Mexico, 152-154; his failure dis- 
cussed, 154; name of, connected 
with Amelia Island affair, 190. 

Miner, Representative : resolution 
of, relative to Panama Congress, 
397. 

Miranda, Francisco de: plans of 
favored by Hamilton, 138; revolu- 
tionary efforts, 265-268. 

Molina, Pedro: Central American 
delegate to Panama Congress, 
320. 

Monarchy: plots for the establish- 
ment of, 82-133; mission of Bel- 
grano and Rivadoria, 84-89; ne- 
gotiations between Argentine 
provinces and Brazil, 90; pro- 
posal of Hyde de Neuville, 92; 
preferred at Buenos Aires, 93; 
efforts to establish, discontinued 
at Buenos Aires, 96; Chile little 
inclined toward, 96; attitude of 
Peru, 98; in the northern part 
of South America, 99; Bolivar's 
views on, 100, et seq.; discussed 
in Clay's Panama instructions, 
425. 

Money, Senator: article of, cited, 
134. 

Monroe Doctrine: interpreted by 
Lansing, 9; by Olney and Cleve- 
land, 22; by Roosevelt, 25; by 
Alvarez, 29; as Minciple of Pan- 
Americanism, 33jji message of Dec. 
2, 1823, quoted, 220; how re- 
ceived, in Hispanic America, 223- 
262; in Mexico, 225; Central 
America, 235; Haiti, 237; Boli- 



INDEX 



49Y 



varian repiiblics, 239; Brazil, 
250; Argentina, 254; Chile, 260; 
summary, 261; Panama Congress, 
323, 324, 326, 328, 342; in Clay's 
Panama instructions, 412; dis- 
cussed at Buenos Aires, 453; re- 
stated by Clay, 460. - 

Monroe, James: on ^'eTOgnition of 
the new states, 164, 165, 167, 
169; on Amelia Island affair, 183; 
declaration of December 2, 1823, 
220; less celebrated in Mexico 
than Canning, 230; negotiates 
with Spanish American agents, 
271. 

Monteagudo, Bernardo: member of 
provisional government of Peru, 
51; banished from Peru, 57; 
biographical notice of, 307 ; essay 
on federation, 308-311. 

Moore, John Bassett: quoted on 
Pan-Americanism, 9. 

Moore, Thomas Patrick: succeeds 
Harrison as minister to Colombia, 
131; conduct restores relations 
between United States and Co- 
lombia, 132. 

Morelos, Jos# Maria: leader of re- 
volt in Mexico, 62. 

Moreno, Mariano: political legacy 
of, 284; policy referred to, 434. 

Mosquera, Joaqufn: instructions to, 
291; negotiates treaties with 
Peru, 292; with Chile, 296; with 
Buenos Aires, 297; mission to 
Buenos Aires, 434. 

Mosquito Shore: McGregor estab- 
lishes himself on, 187. 

Myers, Lieutenant Colonel: men- 
tioned, 153. 

Nabuco, Joaquim : views of, on 
Pan-Americanism, 12. 

Napoleon: intervention of, in Spain, 
36. 

Nation, The: on Olney's interpre- 
tation of the Monroe Doctrine, 22. 

Navy: convention relating to, con- 
cluded at Panama, 343. 

Nereyda: captured by Captain Por- 
ter, 208. 



Nesselrode, Count: mentioned, 166. 

Netherlands: sends agent to 
Panama Congress, 312. 

Neutrality: policy of United States, 
136; laws of, 137; proclamation 
of, 147; violations, 152; the Act 
of 1817, 156; policy reiterated, 
161; difficulties of enforcement, 
172; further legislation, 176; mo- 
tive of, questioned, 200; on the 
West Coast, 205; alleged viola- 
tion 'by United States, 213; policy 
of Great Britain, 214; policy be- 
comes clearly defined, 273; of 
United States between Buenos 
Aires and Brazil, 461. 

New Granada: constitution of, 98; 
Union, with Venezuela, 101; sup- 
posed connection with Amelia 
Island affair, 185. 

New Orleans: violations of neu- 
trality at, 152. 

New states: formation of, 36-81. 

Nicaragua: canal route through, 
423. See also Guatemala and 
Central America. 

Nicholls, Colonel: attempts to per- 
petuate British influence in Flor- 
ida, 191. 

Non-intervention: as principle of 
Pan-Americanism, 34. 

North American Review: articles 
in, cited, 134. 

Obregon: arrival of, at Washington, 
362. 

Ocana, Assembly of: fails to revise 
constitution of Colombia, 119. 

O'Donoju, Juan: viceroy of Mexico, 
66. 

Oglethorpe, James: communications 
of, with Mexico, 263. 

O'Gorman : British commissioner to 
Mexico, 361. 

O'Higgins, Ambrose : biographical 
notice, 43. 

O'Higgins, Bernardo : Supreme Di- 
rector of Chile, 43 ; forced to re- 
sign, 45; disclaims connection 
with the Amelia Island affair, 
185, 



498 



INPEX 



O'Leary, Daniel Florencio: on Bol- 
ivar's political views, 109; on 
Monroe declaration, 323. 

Olney, Richard: instructions on 
Anglo- Venezuelan boundary dis- 
pute, 22. 

Onis, Luis de: received by United 
States, 146; protests against ad- 
mittance of insurrectionary flags, 
147. 

Osmond, Marquis of: sends agent 
to Buenos Aires, 93. 

Pdez, Jose Antonio: Bolivar's reply 
to monarchical proposals of, 109; 
loyalty of, to Bolivar, 119. 

Pan: as prefix, 1. 

Panama Congress: discussed, in 
Spanish America, 301; in United 
States, 303; in Great Britain, 
305; in France, 306; revival of 
project, 312; personnel, 313, 319; 
errors concerning, 314 (foot 
note) ; views of Adams, Clay, and 
Bolivar, 315; sessions, 319; Co- 
lombia states objects of, 321; in- 
structions of Peru on, 324; of 
Colombia, 328; of Bolivia 331; 
informal conferences, 333; Vi- 
daurre's plan, 333; formal meet- 
ings begin, 340; conventions con- 
cluded by, 340-345; Colombia 
ratifies conventions, 347; Mexico 
rejects them, 350; Cuba and 
Porto Eico discussed, 355, 363; 
United States and the, 393 et 
seq.; discussed in Senate, 396; in 
the House, 397; slavery and the, 
399; attitude toward participa- 
tion of United States, 427 ; Buenos 
Aires appoints delegate, 449; 
Gual and Briceiio Mendez ask for 
special instructions as to Buenos 
Aires, 450; objects discussed at 
Buenos Aires, 452. 

Panaina, Isthmus of: proposed as 
meeting place of American na- 
tions, 289, 295; unhealthfulness 
of, 345. 

Pan-Americanism; meaning of, 1- 



35; first use of term, 2; defini 
tions of, 3; views of Blaine, 4-6 
of Wilson, 8; Lansing, 9; Moore. 
9; Casastis, 11; of Nabuco, 12 
Rio Branco, 13; Cornejo, 13 
Battle y Ordonez, 14; Drago, 14 
Plaza, 15; Prado, 16; Ugarte, 16 
L6pez, 16; Alvarez, 16; as con- 
ceived by Garcia Claderon, 17; 
as an international policy, 30; 
as a political system, 31; prin- 
ciples of, 33-35; Bolivar's rela- 
tions to, 317. 
Pando, Jose M. : appointed minister 
of foreign affairs of Peru, 108; 
proposes the establishment of em- 
pire, 109; delegate of Peru to 
Panama Congress, 319; recalled, 
337. 
Paraguay: independence of, 40; re- 
bellion against Buenos Aires, 437. 
Paroissen, Diego: mission of, to 

Europe, 53. 
Pazos, Vicenta: defends Amelia 

Island seizure, 190. 
Paz Solddn, Mariano Felipe: cri- 
ticises attitude of United States, 
213. 
Peace: federation necessary to at- 
tain, 309. 
Pedro I: emperor of Brazil, 37. 
Peredo, Antonio Francisco: Mexican 
agent in the United States, 150. 
Perez de Tudela, Manuel: delegate 
of Peru to Panama Congress, 319; 
new instructions to, 337; return 
of, to Peru, 347. 
Perry, Colonel: mentioned, 149. 
Perry, Commodore: mission of, to 

South America, 177. 
Peru: reply to first International 
American Conference, 1 1 ; Royal- 
ist strong hold, 50; independence 
of, declared, 51; adopts popular 
representative government, 57 ; 
Riva Agiiero appointed President, 
58; Bolivar commands in, 59; 
constitution of, 61 ; proposed 
federation of, with Colombia and 
Bolivia, 106; recognition by the 
United States, 170; pays Mace- 



IKDEX 



499 



doman claims, 212; protests 
against the partiality of Captain 
Stewart, 213; declines to accede 
to treaty with Spain, 258; trea- 
ties with Colombia, 292; appoints 
delegates to Panama, 318; in- 
structions to, 324 ; changed atti- 
tude, 337 ; attitude toward 
United States and Brazil, 338; 
Bolivar on the situation in, 339. 

Peru, Upper: loss of, to Buenos 
Aires, 437, 440. 

P6tion, resident: aids Bolivar, 99; 
aids Mina, 153. 

Pezuela: viceroy of Peru, 51. 

Phillipson, Coleman: on the equal- 
ity of nations, 20; on status of 
Cuba, 23. 

Pinkney, William: mentioned, 174. 

Piracy: on Louisiana coast, 151; 
act to punish, 176. 

Plan of Iguala: proclaimed by 
Iturbide, 65. 

Pla^a, Dr. V. de la: quoted, 15. 

Poinsett, Joel Roberts: appointed 
agent to Buenos Aires, 142; in- 
structions to, 142, 143; activities 
in Chile, 144; refuses second mis- 
sion to Buenos Aires, 160; on 
board the Essex, 207 ; appointed 
to replace Anderson, 314; does 
not participate in negotiations at 
Tacubaya, 351; intervenes in in- 
ternal affairs of Mexico, 352; 
mission of, to Mexico, 362. 

Political inequality: discussed, 20- 
29; compatible with legal equal- 
ity, 21; Roosevelt on, 26. 

Ponsonby, Lord : Canning's instruc- 
tions to, 462. 

Porter, Captain David: cruise to 
Pacific, 205-209; friendly recep- 
tion at Valparaiso, 206. 

Porto Bello: captured by McGregor, 
187. 

Porto Rico: instructions of Peru 
on, 325; of Colombia, 328, 329; 
of Bolivia, 332; discussed at 
Panama, 355; policy of the 
United States relative to, 355 et 
seq.; of Colombia, 358; of Mexico, 



360; discussed at Buenos Aires, 

454. 
Prado, Eduardo: skeptical as to 

Pan-Americanism, 16. 
Pradt, Abbe de: suggests mon- 
archies in America, 101 ; pamphlet 

of, on Panama Congress, 306. 
Preponderance: of United States, 

discussed, 29, 402. 
Prevost, John B.; mentioned, 297; 

on American Confederation, 400. 
Primacy: Lawrence's view, 31. 
Prince of Lucca: proposed for 

American throne, 92. 
Privateering: source of annoyance, 

174; illegal, at Amelia Island, 

184. 
Protector: see San Martin, Jose de. 
Pueyrredon, Juan Martin: supreme 

director of United Provinces, 90; 

plans to place French prince on 

throne at Buenos Aires, 91. 

Quito: province of, liberated by 
Bolivar, 55; revolt against Co- 
lombian constitution, 116; sepa- 
rates from Colombia, 127. 

Raguet, Condy: demands passports 
of Brazil, 461. 

Rayon, Ignacio Lopez: organizes 
revolutionary government, 62. 

Rebello, Jos6 Silvestre: received at 
Washington, 170; proposes offen- 
sive and defensive alliance, 253, 
459. 

Recognition: of belligerency of new 
states, 146; of independence 
urged, 160; mission to Buenos 
Aires, 160; becomes a pressing 
question, 161 ; advocated by Clay, 
163; principles as set forth by 
Adams, 164; discussed by the 
President, 164, 165; discussed by 
Clay, 166-167; Monroe's views, 
168; accorded, 169; effect of, in 
Hispanic America, 170; impor- 
tance compared with Monroe 
declaration, 226. 

Republic: federal and unitary dis- 
cussed, 101. 



500 



INBEX 



Republicanism : Bolivar partisan 
of, 56; decline of, in Europe, 
89; championed by Sarratea, 
95. 

Revenga, Jose R. : instructs Colom- 
bian delegates to Panama, 325, 
328, 329; on Vidaurre's plan, 
335; on Peru's defection, 340; on 
postponement of operations 
against Cuba and Porto Rico, 358 ; 
on British protection, 382; sends 
additional stipulations to Pa- 
nama, 383; on United States and 
Panama Congress, 428. 

Richelieu, Due de: favors establish- 
ment of monarchies in America, 
92. 

Ricketts, Consul General: confer- 
ence of, with Bolivar, 390. 

Rio Branco, Baron de: on Inter- 
national American Conferences, 
13. 

Rio de la Plata: see United Prov- 
inces of Rio de la Plata and 
Buenos Aires. 

Riva Agiiero, Jose de la: president 
of Peru, 58; forced into exile, 60. 

Rivadavia, Bernardino: mission of, 
to Europe, 84; arrives in Eng- 
land, 86; negotiations with 
Charles IV, 87; represents Buenos 
Aires in negotiations with Span- 
ish agents, 257; addresses other 
insurgent governments, 258; ne- 
gotiates treaty with Colombia, 
297; advocates war on Brazil, 
449; president of the United 
Provinces, 456. 

Rives, William Cabell : on Victoria's 
partiality for Great Britain, 234. 

Robinson, W. D. : historian of Mina 
expedition, 154, 191. 

Rocaf uerte, Vicente : mentioned, 
202. 

Rodney, Cesar A. : commissioner to 
South America, 160; minister to 
Buenos Aires, 170; on reception 
of Monroe declaration at Buenos 
Aires, 254. 

Rodriguez, Martin: mentioned, 256. 

Romero, Matlas: on assistance of 



United States to cause of inde- 
pendence, 134. 

Rondeau: compelled to resign, 85. ,,, 

Roosevelt, Theodore: instructions j 
to delegates to Pan-American Con- 
ference at Mexico, 6; on relations 
with Dominican Republic, 24; on 
political inequality, 26. 

Root, Elihu: on Pan-American Con- 
ferences, 7; speech at Rio de 
Janiero, 8. 

Rosas, Juan Manuel: dictator of 
Argentine provinces, 41; foments 
revolution in Uruguay, 459. 

Roscio, Juan German: finds people 
of United States favor the insur- 
gent cause, 173; on cession of 
Florida, 199. 

Rozas, Juan Martinez de: views of, 
83. 

Rush, Richard: conversations of, 
with Canning on American af- 
fairs, 218. 

Ruuth, Colonel Count de: takes part 
in the Mina expedition, 153. 

St. Domingue: see Haiti. 

Salazar, Jose Marfa: instructed to 
sound United States on confed- 
eration, 393. 

Salvador: resists incorporation in 
Mexican empire, 73; proposes an- 
nexation to United States, 76. 

Samouel, Naval Lieutenant: quoted, 
on British influence in Mexico, 
224. 

San Juan de Ultia: surrender of, 
37. 

San Martin, Jose de: biographical 
sketch of, 41; wins the battles 
of Chacabuco and Maipo, 42; 
prepares expedition against Peru, 
47; takes Lima, 51; ideas on form 
of government, 52; unpopularity 
of, 55; interview with Bolivar, 
55; abandons Peru, 57; effect of 
failure in Peru, 436. 

Santa Anna, Antonio L6pez de: 
revolts against Itnrbide, 68. 

Santa Cruz, Andres: in supreme 
command in Peru, 61. 



INDEX 



501 



Santa Maria, Miguel: appointed 
Colombian minister to Mexico, 
29S ; dismissed by imperial gov- 
ernment, 209; recalled, 299. 

Santander, Vice-President: opposes 
Bolivai", 119, 240; message on 
Monroe declaration, 243; attitude 
toward Great Britain, 245; on 
United States in 1825, 247 ; favors 
inviting United States to Panama 
Congress, 393; against inter- 
meddling in war between Buenos 
Aires and Brazil, 443. 

Santo Domingo: independent repub- 
lic formed, 38; French part of, 
and neutrality, 139; Panama 
Congress and, 322. 

Sarratea, Manuel : agent of Buenos 
Aires in London, 87; champions 
republicanism, 95. 

Security : Monteagudo's discussion 
of, 310. 

Senate, U. S. : declaration of, on re- 
volt of Spanish provinces, 145; 
discusses Panama Congress, 396. 

Sergeant, John : minister to assem- 
bly at Panama, 314, 395, 397. 

Slavery: discussed, in relation to 
Panama Congress, 399. 

Smith, Captain Eliphalet: alleged 
aid of, to Royalists, 211. 

Spain: the invasion of, in 1823, 
218, 233. 

Spanish authorities: hostile atti- 
tude, in America toward the 
United States, 206. 

Spanish constitution: cast aside by 
Ferdinand VII, 52. 

State Department: conferences of, 
with insurgent agents, 149. 

Stevens, Dr. Edward: diplomatic 
agent of United States to Santo 
Domingo, 139. 

Stewart, Captain: alleged aid of, 
to viceroy of Peru, 213. 

Strangford, Lord: British minister 
at Rio de Janeiro, 85, 86. 

Stuart, Sir Charles: mentioned, 251. 

Sucre, Antonio Jose de: liberates 
Upper Peru, 41; biographical 
sketch, 58. 



Supreme Court: in Thornton's 
scheme, 280. 

Tacubaya: American Assembly ad- 
journed to, 344. 

Temperley, H. W. V.: on the 
Panama Congress, 365. 

Temps, Le: on Anglo- Venezuelan 
boundary dispute, 22. 

Territorial integrity: as principle 
of Pan-Americanism, 33; in 
Gual's bases, 291; in treaty be- 
tween Colombia and Mexico, 299; 
in Panama treaty, 342; Revenga's 
views on, 343 (foot note) ; Ar- 
gentine policy, 435, 437. 

Texas: the invasion of, in 1812, 149. 

Thompson, Martin: dismissal of, 
mentioned, 180; 

Thornton, William : biographical 
sketch of, 273; scheme for United 
North and South Colombia, 275- 
281. 

Times, The (London) : on Olney's 
interpretation of Monroe Doc- 
trine, 22; on cession of Florida, 
196-199; on the Panama Con- 
gress, 305. 

Todd, Charles S. : mentioned, 297; 
on American confederation, 401. 

Tornel, Jose Maria: on policies of 
United States and Great Britain, 
229. 

Torre Tagle, Marquis de: chief 
executive of Peru, 56. 

Torrens: Mexican chargg d'affaires 
at Washington, 77, 362. 

Torres, Manuel: received as Colom- 
bian charge d'affaires, 170. 

Treaty: of Cordova, concluded, 66; 
rejected by Spain, 67; secret, be- 
tween Toussaint and Maitland, 
139-140; of Morfontaine, 140; of 
cession of Floridas, 195; of Lir- 
cay, 209; preliminary, between 
Buenos Aires and Spain, 257; 
general, between Colombia and 
Peru, 292; special, 294; between 
Colombia and Chile, 296; between 
Colombia and Buenos Aires, 296, 
434, 435; between Colombia and 



502 



INDEX 



Mexico, 299; Colombia and Cen- 
tral America, 301; concluded at 
Panama, 340; between the United 
States and Colombia (1824), 417; 
preliminary, of peace between 
Brazil and Buenos Aires, 463; 
definitive, 464; of alliance be- 
tween Chile and Buenos Aires, 466. 

TucumSn, Congress of: declares Ar- 
gentine independence, 89 ; ap- 
points agent to treat with Brazil, 
90. 

Tudor, William: appointed to re- 
place Raquet, 461. 

Toussaint L' Ouverture: negotia- 
tions of, with United States, 139; 
secret treaty with General Mait- 
land, 140. 

Ugarte, Manuel: against Pan-Amer- 
icanism, 16. 

Unanue, Hipolito: member of pro- 
visional government of Peru, 51. 

Union, projects of: the conspiracy 
of 1741, 263; Miranda's scheme, 
265; Jefferson's ideas, 269; 
Thornton's "United North and 
South Columbia," 273; views of 
Clay, 281; proposal of Martinez 
de Rozas, 282; plan of Egana, 
283; views of Moreno, 284; of 
Bolivar, 286; the Panama Con- 
gress, 292. 

United Provinces of Rio de la 
Plata: revolt of, 40; disorganiza- 
tion, 41; constitution, 41, 95; 
Congress meets at Buenos Aires, 
256; war with Brazil, 455-464. 

United States: leadership of, 20- 
22, 29; attitude toward monarchy 
in Hispanic America, 128-132; 
relation to Hispanic American 
struggle for independence, 134- 
171; neutral policy, 136; negotia- 
tions with Toussaint, 139; recog- 
nizes the new states, 170; sym- 
pathy for Patriots, 172; strained 
relations with Brazil, 179; pres- 
tige declines on Pacific, 209; al- 
leged aid to Royalists in Peru, 
213; Santander's opinion of, in 



1825, 247; rejects Brazil's pro- 
posal of alliance, 253; suggested 
alliance with Great Britain, 266; 
269; receives reports of proposed 
confederation, 297; Panama Con- 
gress, 326, 393 et seq.; policy as 
to Cuba and Porto Rico, 355 et 
seq.; early diplomatic relations 
with Mexico, 362; Canning's atti- 
tude toward, 391; place of, in 
American system, 400; treaties 
with Colombia and Mexico, 417; 
rejects Brazilian proposal for alli- 
ance, 460; neutrality of, in war 
over Banda Oriental, 461. 

Upper Peru: independence of, 41; 
proposed union with Lower Peru, 
108. 

Uti possidetis: basis of territorial 
integrity, 291; defined, 436. 

Uruguay: occupied by Portuguese, 
40, 437; Brazilian claims in, 95; 
plans to recover, 440; independ- 
ence, 464. 

Valencay, treaty of: mentioned, 87. 

Valle, Jose del: advocate of Ameri- 
can unity, 79. 

Van Buren, Martin: instructions to 
Thomas Patrick Moore, 131; reso- 
lution on Panama Congress, 396. 

Van Veer, Colonel: representative 
of the Netherlands at Panama, 
313; quits Mexico, 348. 

Vargas, Nemesio: on Bolivar's aims 
in the Gulf of Mexico, 430. 

Venezuela: boundary dispute with 
Great Britain, 21; adopts federal 
constitution, 98; reconquered by 
Royalists, 99; adopts new consti- 
tution, 102; unites with New 
Granada, 104; secedes, 127. 

Versailles, Covenant of: mentioned, 
311. 

Viceroyalty of La Plata: dismem- 
berment of, 437. 

Victoria, General: elected president 
of Mexico, 72; on relations of 
Mexico with powers of Europe, 
233; calls extra session to con- 
sider the Panama treaties, 349; 



INDEX 



503 



plans to take Cuba, 360; invites 
United States to Panama Con- 
gress, 394. 

Vidal: vice consul at New Orleans, 
270. 

Vidaurre, Manuel Lorenzo: delegate 
of Peru to Panama Congress, 319; 
proposes plan of union, 333 ; plan 
rejected, 335; return of, to Peru, 
346; speech of, at Panama, 365 
( foot note ) . 

Von Gentz: on the balance of 
power, 32. 

Ward: British Commissioner to 
Mexico, 361. 

Washington, George : neutrality 
proclamation of, 136; farewell ad- 
dress, 138. 

Washington's Precept: referred to, 
398. 

Webster, Daniel: on Panama mis- 
sion, 398. 



Wellesley, Marquess : mentioned, 
215. 

West Florida: occupation of, 183. 

Westlake, John: on the equality of 
nations, 20. 

Whitcomb: on the international 
status of Cuba, 24. 

Wilkinson, James: mission to the 
Southwest, 269; proposes alliance 
of American States, 271. 

Wilson, President: views on Pan- 
Americanism, 8. 

Worthington, W. G. D. : dismissal 
of, mentioned, 180. 



Zavala, Lorenzo: biographical no- 
tice of, 231; on policies of Great 
Britain and United States, 232. 

Zea: on Amelia Island affair, 190. 

Zozaya, Manuel: first Mexican min- 
ister at Washington, 170, 362. 

Zubieta: quoted, 452. 



THE END 



FEINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 



VITA 

Joseph Byrne Lockey was born February 2, 1877, near 
Campbellton, Jackson County, Florida. His elementary edu- 
cation was received in the public schools of his native State. 
In ISO 7 he was graduated from the Florida State Normal 
School at DeFuniak Springs. After teaching for three years 
he entered Peabody College, Nashville, Tennessee, from which 
he was graduated in 1902 with the degree of Bachelor of Sci- 
ence. From 1902 to 1904 he was principal of the public school 
at Deland, Florida, and from 1904 to 1908, of the public high 
school at Pensacola, Florida. During 1908-1909 he pursued 
studies in educational administration and in other subjects at 
Columbia University, and receiving the degree of Master of 
Arts entered the service of the Republic of Peru as Inspector 
of Public Instruction, Continuing in this service for five years, 
he wrote an extensive report on the educational situation in 
the Department of Lima, which was published under the title 
of ESTUDios soBEiE LA iNSTBUCCiON PEiMAEiA. Returning to 
the United States he was admitted to the Faculty of Political 
Science at Columbia University as a candidate for the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy. Before completing the work for his 
degree he entered the Second Officers Training Camp at Platts- 
burg, New York, at the close of which he was commissioned 
First Lieutenant of Infantry in the United States Army. He 
was assigned to the 49th Infantry and accompanied this Regi- 
ment to France in July, 1918. Returning to the United States 
in February, 1919, and being discharged from the service, he 
entered anew upon his work at Columbia University. In 1917 
and again in 1919 he gave courses in Pan American Relations 
in the summer session of Columbia University. In the fall of 
1919 he accepted the appointment of Professor of International 
Relations at George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, 
Tennessee. 



X52 «^«ii.jg 



<='0 



\ = 




•^, 






^ ^ Z ^/ o \- 














cP^ 






5; 


■^o 


0^ 




: ^ 




.^^ 


^^.. 




^ 
^ 






^c 


h- 


^ 














.^^ ''^^ 



^°^ 



. K > ^>\^' 



^^. 


















.iX*^^ 



.A 









\.. ■//'-.. 



X"'^^ 



v*-^ 

f.^ 



cv, y 






.v'?-' 



\^' ^-. ".* 



.'V 















-^. 






^A V^^ 






-'^^^ 










A^ 









-V 






:1 



